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Abstract 
 
Figures of scientists and engineers emerge during the nineteenth century as 
icons of masculinity distinct from either the figure of the magician or the figure 
of the military hero.  I analyze these figures in three major works that trace an 
arc from myth to realism across the first half of the century.  Percy Bysshe 
Shelley’s lyric drama Prometheus Unbound, Mary Godwin Shelley’s 
Frankenstein, and Jules Verne’s 20,000 Leagues under the Sea are the principal 
case studies.  Additionally, I examine several other Verne novels and such texts 
as Robert Louis Stevenson’s Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde,  
H. G. Wells’s The Invisible Man and The Island of Dr. Moreau, and the works of 
Samuel Smiles, including Self-Help, Character, and The Lives of the Engineers.  In 
these works, images of Prometheus, elemental fire and water, and the Phallus, 
as symbol of masculinity and male social power, express a struggle between 
the ideal of disembodied reason and the expression of embodied love for 
others.  The technician-hero, whether he takes the form of a medical doctor or 
an engineer, such as Verne’s Captain Nemo, is chained in his body as he 
struggles to assume the archetypal father’s Law and control over Nature.  The 
Promethean Complex is an extension of the Oedipal rivalry of father and son 
and the desire inscribed in sons to possess their father’s knowledge-power.  As 
nineteenth-century bourgeois culture privileged a masculinity based on Logos 
and disciplined control over bodies and Nature, the mentality of the technician 
emerges as a distinct configuration.  Constructed in opposition to Eros, the 
body, the feminine, and the unconscious, the technician ego-ideal generates a 
psychotic and paranoid subject, radically fragmented and unable to deal with 
its ultimate inability to achieve omnipotence. 
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Let it rain! 
Who cares? 
I’ve a train 
Upstairs, 
With a brake 
Which I make 
From a string  
Sort of thing, 
Which works 
In jerks, 
‘Cos it drops 
In the spring,  
Which stops 
With the string, 
And the wheels  
All stick 
So quick 
That it feels  
Like a thing  
That you make 
With a brake, 
Not a string… 
 
So that’s what I make, 
When the day’s all wet. 
It’s a good sort of brake 
But it hasn’t worked yet. 
 
 A. A. Milne, “The Engineer” 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Deus ex Machina 
 
 
The Man-Machine 
 In his 1967 study, Flesh of Steel: Literature and the Machine in American Culture, 
Thomas Reed West wrote: 
When Henry Ford initiated his automotive assembly line, he established 
not only a method of manufacture but a kind of intellectual and literary 
convention.  For the assembly line has come to represent the machine 
process itself, as a distinctive ordering of the personality:  it is Discipline 
perfectly embodied.  There are sophistication and purity in the control that 
it imposes.  (ix) 
 Such discipline is a “paradoxical blending of monotony and minutely 
integrated complexity” and suggests further that this ideal of discipline is pitted in 
muscular contest against “energy: power, massiveness, multiplicity of social and 
technical institutions, extravagance of productivity” (x).  West’s study, preceding the 
1969 watershed in the latest wave of feminist consciousness, is a recent example of the 
rhetoric of interwoven masculinism and mechanism.  West celebrates the machine as 
an icon of modern industrial America and of a dominant ideal of masculine energy 
and power.  In his discussion of Carlyle, Whitman, Adams, Dickens, and Ruskin, 
West generally concurs with the negative view these writers took of the 
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mechanization of “man” through the factory system and Utilitarian philosophy, but 
his tone slips continually into a (possibly unconscious) tone of worship: 
As an energy, industrialism projects itself upon a magnificent scale.  It 
assumes weight and ruggedness of contour; all its acts are exhibitions of a 
massive power, wielded against massive materials.  As a discipline, 
industrialism becomes tighter and more exacting in its method.  It subjects 
the workman to the ordered routines of the factory and demands of his 
imperfect spirit a relentless perfection in labor; it drills the intellect in 
science and grim mechanical Fact and in the precise understanding and 
mastery of expanding complexities.  (20) 
 “In these forms,” he concludes (before embarking on his study of Carl 
Sandburg, Sherwood Anderson, and other American writers) “the machine would 
continue to confront writers of a more recent day:  its disciplines, still subtler; its 
energies, more multiple and swift” (20).  The adjectives are affirmative, and even the 
word “discipline” carries a tone of pride and satisfaction.  The word has taken on 
quite a different sound since the publication of Foucault’s Discipline and Punish 
(Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison, Gallimard,1975; English translation, 1977).  In 
recent work published on the social-imaginary construction of masculinity, 
“discipline” is a grim and insidious force of ideological conditioning that penetrates 
to the deepest structures of the psyche—particularly the male psyche.  The 
unconscious masculinism inherent in expressions such as “massive power,” 
“tighter… more exacting method,” “the workman,” “spirit,” “relentless perfection,” 
“drills the intellect,” “grim mechanical Fact,” and “mastery” is far more obvious to 
readers today than it would have been in 1967. 
 Since World War II there has been, in popular culture and art, an increasing 
number of representations of men as machines.  The metaphor of body or brain as 
machine has become literalized when it is employed by the medical profession.  The 
image exists unexamined by its users even though it received scrutiny in such early 
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works of male gender studies as Fasteau’s The Male Machine and in feminist studies of 
the culture of medical representation such as Emily Martin’s The Woman in the Body.  
The examination of the mechanistic metaphor takes on a high degree of psychological 
sophistication in Klaus Theweleit’s voluminous study of masculinity, patriarchy, and 
fascism, Male Fantasies. 
 West’s identification of the polarity between discipline and energy is an 
important starting point for my own investigation and I want to carry it farther in two 
directions.  First, I want to carry it forward into current theories of masculinity as a 
myth.  Masculinity is not the same as biologically defined maleness.  The discourses 
of biology and medicine play a role in the cultural construction of masculinities, but 
the object of my study has to be considered to be a set of shifting and historically 
changing images and narratives that envelope and shape the male sex and the self-
conception of men.  Masculinity is, in other words, a cultural ideology constructed 
out of representations of men’s bodies to support the larger social structures we 
identify as patriarchy.  It is a context in which real, individual men grow up and learn 
to love and hate themselves and others.   
 From this analytic point of view, the metaphor of man as machine, man within 
the machine, or man as wielder of the machine are objects of criticism, not celebration.  
Such images are ideological illusions inculcated for the affirmation and advancement 
of particular power interests.  The images and narratives are, just as much as the 
machines themselves, instrumentalities of oppression.  In some cases--for example, 
recent popular cyberpunk fiction and art--the celebration takes on ambiguous tones of 
satire and the grotesque.  The recent Arnold Schwarzenegger vehicles, Terminator and 
Terminator II, explicitly merge the image of man as a machine with man as supreme 
product of mechanized discipline.  That is, the android, on the one hand, and the 
champion bodybuilder crafted by the machinery of the weight room:  the pec deck 
and Stairmaster, as well as the machinery of reps and sets, steroids and chemistry, 
 
4 
and those old mechanical icons, the “pump” and “iron.”  One can hardly imagine a 
figure that more clearly epitomizes West’s title, Flesh of Steel than Schwarzenegger as 
the Terminator.   
 The muscle-machine figure epitomizes the Narcissistic ideal of bodybuilding 
and fitness that reduces human value to muscular hardness and power, the 
manufacture of a disciplined, commodified, and impenetrable shell around an ego 
often brooding on its own loss of soul.  This is an ideal that dominates the late 
twentieth-century image industry of the United States—the media, advertising, 
politics—and dominant standards of male (and increasingly of female) beauty. 
 Modern film, television, and advertising could be analyzed to good effect 
using Theweleit’s model of the “soldier-male” psyche.  For this hegemonic ideal of 
masculinity is a manliness of hard surfaces, convex and imposing on the world, and 
on the gaze of the Other—whether other men or women.  In the passage I quoted 
from West, the icon of mechanized virility is extended beyond the individual man’s 
body into systems of social and economic control, the scientific management of Ford 
and another hegemonic model for social order:  the assembly line.  This kind of order 
is both a product of and the reproducing agent of a mechanized mentality.  The body-
machine metaphor is followed in the twentieth century--one might even say that it is 
given a new breath of life--by the mind-computer metaphor that has come to 
dominate the discourses of science and science fiction in the second half of the 
century.  The myth of the mechanical man is composed of these two parts:  the 
machine body and the machine mind.  The roots of both are in the Foucauldian idea 
of discipline, and yet discipline is rooted deeper still in the psychic underworld of 
masculinity.   
 Taken as a complex whole, I call this myth the myth of the Technician-hero 
because the figure of the Technician becomes a kind of archetypal image of mechanized 
and mechanizing masculinity.  Techne forms the core around which modern 
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masculinity has been constructed.  It is the root concept of scientific and engineering 
practices and, more generally, of professionalization as an apparatus of social order 
and the organization of power.  As such, the myth is too pervasive and multiform for 
any single study to treat it exhaustively.  The present work aims to suggest a method 
and a terminology for analysis and to trace the pattern in its nineteenth-century 
beginnings during what has been called the second Industrial Revolution.   
 The articulation of the myth, in its textual particulars in that period, reveals 
that images of fire, steel, machinery, and instrumental reasoning (for example, 
procedures, methods, rules, regulations, scientific classifications, laws) are applied to 
masculinity in a oppositional move that rejects water, flesh, organic life, emotions, 
feelings, and intuitions, by relegating them to the sphere of “the feminine.”  Fluidity 
and chaos are represented to be the “essence” of femininity, just as hardness and 
order (hard-headedness, hard work, scholarly “rigor”) are identified as the “essence” 
of masculinity.  Few men have the discipline to become Arnold Schwarzeneggers but 
many are made rigorous, hard-headed, and hard-driving bureaucrats, academicians, 
and salesmen. 
   The ideal of the machine man is intimately interwoven with both the 
Nietzschean and the comic book ideal of the superman (the “man of steel”) and these, 
in turn, are traceable to romantic variants of the myth of Prometheus.  Several books 
have been written on the figure of Prometheus in romantic poetry, but these have not 
examined the construction of gender in the figure of Prometheus, an omission which 
in some ways misses the whole point of the myth.  For the Promethean hero became 
such a popular expression of rebellious subjectivity precisely because he represented 
a strenuous and virile masculine subject and his equally virile opponent in Jupiter 
(who is combined with the Miltonic-Christian Sky-Father in Romantic mythology).   
 Moreover, in the works I will examine, this Promethean hero—the archetypal 
representative of energy vying with discipline—is increasingly cloaked in the garb of 
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industrialism.  Even in the beginning of this genealogy one can trace the lineaments of 
the machine-man’s desire, the merging of man with tool, muscle with locomotive, 
phallus with piston, spirit with the fire of electricity, steam boiler, or forge.  
Frankenstein and his monster are separate beings prone to fateful merging; Nemo 
and his monstrous submarine are at times as hard to distinguish as soul and body, 
mind and muscle.  The connections are subtle and psychological, below the level of 
the explicit representations of machines and factories.  They lie in the mythic and 
archetypal patterns that cluster around what C.G. Jung called Logos and its binary 
opposition to Eros.  The technician-heroes I will present here are all personifications 
of instrumental reason, logic, science, and technicism.  Each serves the collective 
psyche by validating the practices and discourses that produce and reproduce these 
ideas and a particular organization of power.  In other words, the mythic heroes 
embody a particular kind of subjectivity, a particular species of self-image, and this in 
turn articulates and reciprocates with the social order and technostructure of 
industrial capitalism. 
Between Scholarship and Boyhood Longing 
 The imaginary currents through which this ebb and flow of fantasy and reality 
occurs may be illustrated by the way I came to this material.  It was with Captain 
Nemo and Twenty Thousand Leagues Under the Sea  that this study began and the 
chapter on Verne consequently is the culmination of my analysis.  But the roots of my 
fascination with Nemo lie as much in my own boyhood reading and adult recreations 
as in scholarship.  Nemo was brought back to my mind when I saw the film version 
of Tom Clancy's The Hunt for Red October and subsequently read the novel.  I was 
struck by similarities between Captain Ramius and Captain Nemo and by the 
strangely numinous environment of the submarine.  There is a certain glamour 
surrounding the image of the sea captain in command of secret, new technologies, 
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undetectable, yet hunted by the powers of nationalism and the military which rule 
the surface world.  There is a deep appeal to boyhood longings in the image of the 
bearded commander acting violently and meeting the violence of other men with 
complete calm and assurance.   
 Watching Hunt for Red October and musing over the popularity of Clancy’s 
brand of technological adventure, I turned again to Jules Verne, who might be readily 
called the nineteenth century’s Tom Clancy.  Other heroes came to mind too:  Star 
Trek’s Captain Kirk, Star Wars’s Luke Skywalker (or Han Solo) and other less famous 
commanders of fantastic ships of underwater or extra-atmospheric space.  I and 
began to consider this Nemo figure as an archetypal image of modern masculinity.  
Did these captains exemplify a virility struggling with its expression through 
engineering and science; men struggling against each other for control of—or escape 
from—the structures of technical mastery that enclose them in a steel web of power. 
 When Verne wrote his novels, the idea of the submarine captain was a 
romantic fantasy, but today the same kind of romance has merged with the business 
of hundreds of real submarine captains who form the most important element in the 
mythos of nuclear war and national security.  When I was eighteen I wanted to be a 
naval architect and had every intention of becoming a submarine designer and 
captain.  Jules Verne’s rhetoric had shaped my inner imagination of what was 
possible to such an extent that I wanted to erected a career on the foundation of those 
fancies; a career, moreover, where fancy itself is transformed into steel and nuclear 
fission, and the apparatus of social power.  The connection between childhood 
fantasies and the engineering of manhood, between novels and machines is very real, 
and yet seems to be largely repressed. 
 Until I returned to Verne and to Walt Disney’s film version of 20,000 Leagues 
with the training of a student of cultural forms, I was unconscious that my choice of 
career was motivated by chapters eleven to thirteen of Jules Verne’s novel and the 
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subsequent reading of a host of other science fiction writers.  It is the sort of thing 
adult men would only admit with amused embarrassment.  The origin of their work 
in the imaginal sphere of childhood is neatly cordoned off from the masculine realm 
of power and fact.  The child that men carry about in their heads is the custodian of 
our motivating myths. 
 I began my musing with the particular figure of the submarine captain but 
have found him to represent the archetypal psychic structure which underlies male 
figuration as scientists, engineers, physicians, and even explorers.  This is not really 
the study of a single figure or motif, but rather the study of the complex of masculinity 
as it as been woven within an industrial and increasingly technological society.  To 
take up an apparently discrete and classifiable figure—such as, a collection of 
submarine captains or physicians—would be neat and tidy but would ignore the 
underlying pattern in these figures and the connection of that pattern to other, more 
messy categories, such as that of scientists or engineers in all their diversity.  The 
reality of the imaginal process of collective myth is messy, slippery, and liquid, and I 
have made an effort at every stage of writing this study to subvert my own tendency 
to master the material and solidify it into rational nodules of Fact structured in elegant 
systems of categorization and objective structure.  Where I do categorize and set up 
structures of opposition, it is in order to turn Logos back upon itself, so to speak, in a 
spirit of boyish play, not manly mastery. 
Organization and Scope of the Study 
 The first two chapters that follow are offered as theoretical introductions.  The 
first is an attempt to review and revise Freud, Lacan, and Jung and to lay out my own 
understanding of the psyche and its processes as they relate to myth, ideology, and 
identity.  I take a revisionary approach to all these “great men” and their theories but 
my particular predilection lies with Jung whose work I find the most useful to the 
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study of imagination.  Despite an habitual slippage into essentialism on the part of 
Jung and many of his followers, his method of analytical psychology (as he 
distinguished it from Freud’s psychoanalysis) is far less reductive and dogmatic, far 
more flexible and aware of the fundamental polyvalence of signs (or symbols, as Jung 
preferred to call them).  Chapter II carries the discussion of psychology and textuality 
into the field of gender studies and particularly the study of masculinity.  Here again, 
of course, the field is too large, diverse, and rich to be summarized satisfactorily in a 
few score pages, but I attempt to clarify some of the major issues and terms and to 
offer a method of relating the terminology of social constructionism to those of 
analytical psychology. 
 Chapter III bridges the discussion of theory and texts by addressing the basic 
terms Libido, Eros, Logos, and Thanatos as they appear in the work of Freud and 
Jung.  I offer my own map of Libido or “psychic energy” and its expressions by 
reading the psychological terms through the prophetic books of William Blake.  The 
gesture may seem outrageous or even perverse as a scholarly method but is 
motivated by my desire to subvert the privileging of “scientific” discourses over 
literature.  Moreover, as I mulled these ideas over, I was struck by the applicability of 
Jung’s terms to the mythology Blake created.  I have not been able, at this date, to 
determine the extent of Jung’s familiarity with Blake, but the similarity between the 
two men as artists and mythographers of the psyche are striking.1   
 One of the structural elements that one sees vividly in Blake is the Romantic 
idea of the psyche as split in an almost schizophrenic fashion.  This representation of 
mind as a dramatic stage of mythic gods and demons who are also doublings and 
shadows of each other, is applied to the classical myth of Prometheus in the 
Prometheus Unbound of Percy Bysshe Shelley, a work I examine at length in Chapter 
IV.  Mary Shelley's Frankenstein, the subject of Chapter V, is the classic formulation of 
the split psyche of the “mad scientist” alongside Robert Louis Stevenson’s Dr. Jekyll 
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and Mr. Hyde written a generation later.  Chapters VI and VII treat heroes in the works 
of Jules Verne exploring further the use of elemental imagery of Fire, Earth, Air, and 
Water as symbols of masculine aspirations and energy set against the “irrational” and 
“disordered” force of the feminine.   
 Chapter VII is devoted mostly to a close scrutiny of 20,000 Leagues under the Sea 
and its heroes.  In each case, I have tried to tease out the symbolic undercurrents of 
the "mad" technician.  Such figures represent men suffering from the same splitting 
tensions that Blake described in his prophetic poems.  It is the splitting of masculinity 
from the feminine complex (what Jung termed the Anima), a splitting one can more 
generally formulate at the separation of Ego from Eros and feeling.  Such alienation 
from feeling and relatedness is a response to culture’s demand for a persona woven of 
technical mastery, expertise, and conquests over Nature.   
The Technician-Critic 
 John Fekete, in his 1977 critique of critical practice from New Criticism to 
Structuralism, argues that literary study itself has been complicit with the ideology of 
technicism, fetishizing order and form rather than critiquing the socially constructed 
mechanistic selfhood which can find such abstractions erotic.  The celebration of 
poetical form or narrative structure as an aesthetic object or a source of cerebral 
pleasure does nothing to change the world or to question those whose lives find their 
primary satisfaction in the control of others.  “In our time, when the existing social 
forms stand between the possibility of realizing the dreams of humanity… and the 
actuality of the nightmare evolving daily within those forms,” Fekete argues, “…the 
fetish of achieved form bears an affirmative relation to the ideology of perpetual 
domination, and it must accept responsibility in the reproduction of a counter-
revolutionary society” (Fekete xxii).  In other words, a literary scholar who embraces 
the Promethean ego-ideal of the technician reproduces, with his or her affirmation of 
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form as value, a society solidified into constraining institutions that increasingly seek 
to eliminate human freedom amid the illusion of a “free market.”  Readers and critics 
alike are constructed as technicians and the consumers of technology. 
 This wedding of literary study with scientism and technicism is an ideological 
marriage masquerading as the logical imperative of method.  “Structuralism is not a 
neutral methodology… In the 1960s structuralism emerged as a philosophy of 
scientific cognition rapidly becoming a major antagonist of dialectical humanism, the 
Marxist philosophy of liberation”  (Fekete 195) with the result that,   
[a]ttention is shifted away from the ways in which human beings have 
altered and do alter and may yet alter their objectifications …structuralism 
finds nothing to investigate but order, the codes of order, reflections upon 
order, and the experience of order.  …In this sense, structuralism can be 
interpreted as an epistemological strategy of technocratic rule.  Placing 
himself methodologically at the vantage point of a transcendent observer, 
the structuralist scientist claims cognitively a privileged power that the 
technocrat exercises in social practice.  For this kind of theoretical 
consciousness, the world appears given to us not as the ground of historical 
praxis and the field of goals, needs, and efforts, but as an object of 
knowledge, a system of formal signs.  It renounces the projects around 
which society is built, and sees everything, from literature to social 
relations, from spiritual objectifications to the work process, as forms of 
signification. (196) 
 As I shall demonstrate in my discussion of Verne, this reduction of Nature 
(and so people) to epistemic signification is at the heart of technician-heroism.  I call 
attention at the outset to the implication of structuralist analysis within the ideology 
of Law and Order because this study is about structures.  Jungian psychology is itself 
a kind of structuralism even though it doesn’t exhibit quite the same propensity to 
mathematical formulation or cryptic, linguistic-algebraic hieroglyphs as hardcore 
structuralists.  Analytical psychologists have been criticized with some justification 
for their essentialist use of binary oppositions as well as the tendency exemplified by 
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such practitioners as Joseph Campbell to divert attention entirely from questions of 
social power and politics in favor of a kind of autoerotic fascination with mythic 
patterns.  These are legitimate criticisms and I raise them at the outset in order to 
caution the reader against the temptations of structuralist fetishism.   
 Everything may be potentially a form of signification, but one must not rest 
satisfied with having unwoven a rainbow, however magisterially.  I approach 
signification and the mysteries of religious symbols with the knowledge that they are 
forms of “symbolic action” as Kenneth Burke put it.  It is, after all, symbolic action 
that permits the creation of technology:  semiosis produces dominance and control.  
To fetishize and worship the machine, the “technological fix,” or the “scientific 
method” is to worship signification itself as “godlike” and so deny our collective 
ability to decide, to create our own values and lives rather than enslave ourselves to 
the mind-forged manacles of “free-market laws” or the “dictates of logic.”  The act of 
fetishizing is to mistake the factitious artifact for one’s beloved, to repress one’s desire 
for other people, one’s relatedness, one’s compassion and instead love safely inanimate 
things like spaceships and submarines, systems of scientific management, religious 
dogmas, theoretical schools. 
 By contrast to such early archetypal and structural theorists as Northrop Frye, 
in the hands of such practitioners as Roland Barthes or contemporary critics of the 
mass media, semiology becomes a political practice, a way of unmasking the lies and 
seductions of institutionalized authority.  Noam Chomsky, one of the greatest of 
linguistic structuralists after all, has published widely in recent years on the problems 
of propaganda and the “manufacture of consent” through the manufacture of myths.  
My study of the technician-hero is offered in this vein, as a step towards more 
detailed understanding of the way archetypal myths underlie the social practices of 
the technological elite.  Moreover, I wish to suggest that the key to greater 
understanding is the unweaving of masculinity as a constricting structure that 
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inhibits what Fekete calls “human self-activity,” the transformation of our 
internalized reality and the will to act upon that transformation.  
 Promethean Desires is thus broadly transdisciplinary, reflecting on literature and 
depth psychology,2 bridging the gap between Jungian and Freudian analytic models, 
and hoping to break down walls that have long persisted between those two analyses.  
The study is also interdisciplinary in its incorporation of feminist and men’s studies 
methodologies to the myths and culture of technicism.  It is philosophical and 
speculative but also grounded in historical texts.  I hope that this study will be not 
only a contribution to the literature on masculinity and to the criticism of the 
particular literary texts it treats, but also a re-visioning of depth psychology as a 
critical hermeneutic that can bridge the gap between the personal and the political, 
the imaginal life and our social, institutionalized lives as disciplined subjects. 
14 
 
 
Notes 
 
1 Jung produced illuminated manuscripts similar to Blake’s etchings, particularly the 
unpublished work known as the Red Book in which some of Jung’s most private visions 
were recorded.  Although a medically trained scientist, Jung was as fascinated as Blake 
with mysticism, religion, and the revisioning of Christianity into a new psychology-
mythology. 
2 Jos Van Meurs in a survey of Jungian literary criticism published in 1988 sketches a picture 
of the field which suggests that it has been growing  at an almost exponential rate, so that 
the seventies and eighties have seen a larger number and greater variety of such studies 
published than ever before.  Donald Dyer’s graph of the increase in Jungian book 
publication up to 1990 corroborates this feeling, showing a ninefold increase in book 
publications and printings since Jung’s death in 1961.  Since 1970 the number has 
doubled--from somewhere around forty books a year to over ninety--and this only 
considers books in English.  An excellent recent collection of work is Jungian Literary 
Criticism edited by Richard P. Sugg (1992).  Other recent contributions (less scholarly than 
popular in their treatment), some of them addressing gender, are Clifton Snider’s The Stuff 
that Dreams are Made On: A Jungian Interpretation of Literature  (1991), Tom Absher’s 
Men and the Goddess:  Feminine Archetypes in Western Literature (1990), Martin 
Bickman’s American Romantic Psychology (1988), and Betina Knapp’s several studies 
including Women in Twentieth-Century Literature:  A Jungian View (1987) 
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Chapter I 
Psyche—Self—Poesis 
_______________________ 
 
 
Poesy alone can tell her dreams. 
— Keats, The Fall of Hyperion 
 
 
(1)  In the Gap Between Freud and Jung 
 The study of images of masculinity requires a psychological-historical 
criticism, one which sees cultural representations as complexes of signs that constitute 
our psyches.  In male gender studies, Klaus Theweleit’s Male Fantasies is a 
monumental study of this sort, reading popular pictorial and written texts through a 
Freudian model of psyche.   Anthony Easthope’s What a Man’s Gotta Do: The Masculine 
Myth in Popular Culture is a more general and popular study, which spans media from 
sculpture to film  and draws on Freud and Lacan.  I want to follow a similar 
methodology of psychoanalytic reflection and reading, with the addition of some of 
Freud’s other pupils and their revisions of his model.  Besides Lacan, I find the work 
of  C. G. Jung and Heinz Kohut to be most instructive for an understanding of the 
kind of self-fashioning performed by human subjects.  While Kohutian object-
relations and “self psychology” has received some attention in humanistic studies, 
Jung has, until recent years, not received the detailed, critical reading his works 
demand.  So, to compensate for the fuzzy thinking of pop-Jungianism, I would like to 
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take this chapter to discuss some of his revisions of Freud and how they can be 
adapted to cultural studies.1 
 One should remember at the outset that Jungian analytical psychology is 
founded in Freudian psychoanalysis and despite the heated clash of egos that caused 
the two men to separate, each theory can benefit from consideration of the other.  
Freud’s rejection of Jung, it seems to me, was a rejection of the logical implications of 
his own system and indeed several writers have traced the similarities between 
Freud’s later cultural studies and the work on mythic images Jung pursued.  On the 
other hand, Jung’s rejection of Freud’s theories was more the result of stubbornness 
than good judgment.  Each of these men was bent on establishing a distinct school of 
depth psychology and so made no effort to reconcile their ideas or combine their 
terms.  Their respective followers did likewise and the acceptance of Freudian ideas 
in the humanities led to the anathematizing of Jungian theory within the academy.  
Left as it has been to carry on in clinical practice and its own training institutes, 
Jungian analytical psychology has been rendered inaccessible in ways Freud’s 
theories have not.  The relatively brief heyday of the Myth Criticism of the sixties and 
seventies brought Jung’s name into university and college English departments, but 
the absorption in myth never developed into an examination or critique of Jung’s 
psychological model.  Indeed, as I shall suggest, the term archetype prevalent 
following Northrop Frye’s Anatomy of Criticism, bears only very superficial similarity 
to Jung’s concept. 
 Freud clung tenaciously to his reduction of psychic phenomena to sexuality 
and to a view of human souls based in the mechanistic and materialistic medical 
model which, in his day, enjoyed a yet unquestioned hegemony.  Jung, primarily 
interested during his whole career in visionary and clairvoyant episodes, and in the 
psychology of religious experiences, left the sexual and embodied nature of humans 
to Freud and devoted himself to the pursuit of spirit and soul.  Both men were 
 
19 
engaged in their own way with the mind/body problem that has haunted Western 
philosophy since its beginning.  Jung went beyond this schism inherent in the medical 
model by addressing the difficult problem of symbolic representation which Jacques 
Lacan would take up much later in his own linguistically-based terms.  Jung realized 
more fully than Freud the implications of the latter’s own revelation that any 
description of the world, whether scientific, historical, or artistic is conditioned by 
imagination on a cultural scale.  It is precisely this respect for creative imagination 
that makes Jungian psychology more attractive to a student of art than Freud’s 
sexual-pathological reductionism.  The pursuit of bodily pleasure, at its unconscious 
level, is polymorphous, as Freud said, and therefore ought not to be reduced simply 
to sexual pleasure.   
 On the other hand, one should not go overboard in the other direction and 
suppose that spirit can (or ought to) be liberated from the flesh.  In the terms of 
modern neurology and sociobiology, the cognitive processes of the cerebrum are built 
out of and inescapably interwoven with the processes of the so-called “lizard brain,” 
the primitive brainstem, thalamus, and hypothalamus.  Medical neurology has yet to 
provide an anatomical map of Freud’s tripartite division of psyche into Id, ego, and 
Superego, but the analogy at least serves as an illustration of the kind of relationship 
one should be talking about.  Rational cognition is influenced by the non-rational 
processes Freud called instinct or drive, but it is not reducible to these.  Nor, however, 
are the “higher functions” restricted to reasoning.  The formation of images—dreams, 
reveries, visualizations—and the material visual sense with its memories, are the stuff 
that reason is made on. 
 Jung’s model of the psyche elaborates Freud’s tripartite topography.  Id, ego, 
and Superego become a whole cast of archetypal complexes interacting in ways that 
go far beyond Freud’s simple model.  The mind is more like a stage play than a 
hydraulic system.  Repression, a key Freudian concept, is revised by Jung in 
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important ways.  Freud considered repressed words and images to always be 
memories of personal experiences or thoughts.  Jung’s rejection of this elegant model 
arose from his discovery of contents in the unconscious of his analysands (and 
himself) which could not be accounted for in the subject’s past.  Dreams sometimes 
contained images that were strikingly similar to mythological motifs of a very obscure 
variety, images Jung himself recognized only because of his esoteric side interest in 
medieval alchemical manuscripts and Far Eastern religion.  As he pursued the idea of 
myths imbedded in the imaginal unconscious—an idea already implied by Freud’s 
reference to Oedipus—Jung became convinced that significant mythic patterns were 
reproduced among peoples around the globe and that these patterns played out the 
fundamental structures of the psyche. 
 The Jungian idea of a collective psyche (consciousness and unconscious) went 
beyond that implicit in Freud’s theories.  As J. C. Smith writes,  
According to Freud, the postulation of a “collective mind” is a necessary 
assumption for the existence of any social psychology.  Since there is no 
societal equivalent of the individual brain, the collective mind or psyche 
can best be viewed in terms of the stored information which constitutes 
cultures, subcultures and shared views of the world.  Myth, as a product of 
the collective psyche, parallels dreams and fantasies as products of the 
individual psyche (21) 
   Jung’s idea of the collective unconscious is perhaps his most misunder-stood 
concept.2  It has become associated with religious mysticism partly because so many 
occultists of the sixties counterculture latched onto the notion as if it were a scientific 
justification for mysticism.  Jung has been represented as offering “proof” of a 
Platonic realm of truth or a Plotinian notion of the One as a source of all wisdom.  
Such claims are misleading appropriations.  Jung’s writings cannot, for the most part, 
be characterized as mystical even where they are highly speculative.  Rather they 
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attempt to analyze mysticism and religious symbolism by integrating such feelings 
and experiences into a coherent theory of imagination. 
 Jung’s theory of a collective dimension to the unconscious does not require one 
to adopt a mystic metaphysics.  Indeed it does not require one to take more than a 
few steps further than Freud, who realized that there were elements of the psyche 
that all humans quite likely had in common, just as all humans have certain 
morphological features of the body in common.  If brain and psyche were related in 
any way, humans must be supposed to share certain structures.  Indeed the 
characteristically Jungian idea that such structures might show themselves in the 
anonymous, collective narratives we call myths and in the cultural productions of the 
visual arts is only an extension of Freud’s work on jokes and “slips” or his suggestion 
that the Oedipus myth formed an ubiquitous structure of the (particularly male) 
unconscious.   
 Like Freud who wanted to “transform metaphysics into metapsychology” (qtd. in 
J. C. Smith 53), Jung also treats myths as the projection of wishes and fears onto the 
external world.  Nature and others in society are viewed in part as reflections of the 
inner psychic reality.  The necessity of the student of culture, and indeed of all of us 
living in a highly destructive society, is to work to unmask our illusions and 
projections.  “[S]ocial order,” says Smith, “if indeed it is not in itself a mythic system 
of thought, must have at least a pervasive mythic dimension” (55).  Human 
extrojection of psychic contents onto the world “entails an ontological claim” (Smith 
54).  “Our world view or our view of nature will therefore almost always be a mixture 
of what actually is, to the degree that we can approach reality, and what we wish 
reality to be” (Smith 54).  The wishes that are gratified through the creation of 
illusions are so predominantly sexual, in part, as Smith notes, because humans as a 
species are unique among Animals in being always sexually active from infancy on 
(54).  As Karl Abraham suggests, humans permeate and impress everything in their 
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environment with their sexuality “and language is the witness of [this], at all times, 
creative sexual phantasy” (qtd. in Smith 54).  Myth, therefore, ”generally has a 
repressed sexual dimension which is expressed symbolically” (Smith 54) but is also 
heavily invested with symbolic fantasies about the social roles that structure sexuality 
in culture:  the roles of mother, father, son, daughter, husband and wife, and the 
Shadow-images of these roles in the shape of illicit lovers, rape, and incest.   
 Certain other embodied realities of the human species shape fundamental 
anxieties on individual and collective levels.  Factors such as the infant’s unusually 
long period of dependence on its parents, one’s awareness within language of sexual 
difference between men and women, and one’s awareness similarly, of one’s own 
mortality, each creates anxieties and fantasies in the human imagination.  Among the 
strongest of these are separation and engulfment anxieties that are products of the 
human infant’s realization (again, particularly through its introduction into language) 
of itself as a separate individual imbedded in complex social relationships.  In other 
words, humans perhaps experience separation and engulfment anxieties more 
strongly than other Animals because human psyches derive such a large part of their 
sense of self through language and the complex social relations language makes 
possible.  Knowledge of difference, as I will consider more fully in the next chapter, is 
most powerfully invested in the construction of gendered identities, an aspect of 
identity, one may safely presume, no other species possesses. 
 Postmodern theorists, prompted in part by Freud, have deconstructed the 
Enlightenment notion of a unified and autonomous individual.  Indeed some have 
gone so far away from autonomy as to dispense with the idea of a subject altogether.  
Jungian theory is valuable because its notion of a collective dimension to the 
unconscious permits one to theorize a subject-ego while recognizing the unending 
play of cultural images and narratives within each personality.  By this description 
what we call culture is itself the collective psyche and what is unconscious in that 
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psyche are the symbolic connections, the metaphors and images that form a kind of 
deep structure, to use Chomsky’s phrase, beneath the myths.   
 This is notably different from the notion of collectivity and myth held by the 
mystics among Jung’s disciples.  In this popular description the collective 
unconscious is like an underground aquifer from which all the houses in a city draw 
their water.3  As Smith remarks,  
Jung was clear in his early writing on the definition of the collective 
unconscious.  Some ambiguity arises in his later works, however, with the 
introduction of concepts such as “world soul” [Anima mundi] and 
synchronicity.  Later he seems to vacillate between viewing the collective 
unconscious as some part of a universal mind which dwells within each 
individual psyche, and something which can be explained in terms of the 
biological structure of the brain, a common genetic code, or collected and 
structured information.  (134) 
 Jung was caught in the ambiguity about the nature of mind itself, whether one 
should think only in terms of individual minds or whether individual minds are only 
manifestations of a universal mind.  As Smith puts it, Jung was “never clear as to 
whether and to what degree mind is atomistic or like a field” (134).  The mystical 
stance that unites God, mind, and individual, which Jung found so attractive in the 
Eastern view of reality as a field of undifferentiated mind, may be sidestepped or 
bracketed by considering the collectivity of the psyche in terms of “the organization 
and structure of information” (Smith 135).  This employs the distinction Jung made 
between the collective consciousness, which he equated to Freud’s idea of the 
superego.  Jolande Jacobi defines this collective psyche as “the aggregate of the 
traditions, conventions, customs, prejudices, rules, and norms of human collectivity 
which give the consciousness of the group as a whole its direction, and by which the 
individuals of this group consciously but quite unreflectingly live” (qtd. in Smith 
134).   
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 The problem I have with this formulation is that the adverb “unreflectingly” 
suggests a certain degree of unconsciousness in the individual’s relationship to 
collective materials.  Thus, I would like to dispense with the simple division of psyche 
(collective or individual) into two spheres.  Rather, I would suggest that psyche is a 
continuum of consciousness and unconscious “contents”—that is, images, scripts, 
rules, affects—and that the individual ego, as the center of consciousness, may at any 
given moment connect to these materials.  As Smith’s archival metaphor suggests, 
(though his reliance on a computer metaphor obscures this) cultural information may 
be only superficially unconscious or it may be buried very deep indeed.  The kind of 
obscure, alchemical images Jung claimed to have discovered in some of his 
analysands suggests that what is collective at bottom (so to speak) are very general 
patterns.  Smith uses as an example the persistence of the mythic figure of Pan in a 
modern expression such as “horny old goat” (140).  This is a good example because 
the expression’s deep meaning, its original connections to a complex of images, is lost 
on many people who aren’t familiar with the myth of Pan in its classical forms.  In 
order to postulate a collective unconscious composed of mythic images or patterns, 
one must postulate highly subtle forms of communication that work through such 
things as fairy tales and their modern adaptations in other children’s literature, films, 
television, comic books, and casual expressions. 
 All of this has implications for the ways one reads culture and interprets 
literature.  Anonymous myths and pop culture may give us the best insights into the 
collective dimension of psyche, but they are obviously not free-floating, disembodied 
phenomena.  They are connected to lived lives and to the sexual, digestive, 
alimentary, embodied nature of historical people.  Works authored by particular 
persons such as Jules Verne or Mary Shelley should not be taken simply (as some 
Jungian critics have done) as if they were written by a universal, disembodied mind.  
To do so ignores far too much what is of interest in the lives of the authors, and in 
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their particular historical milieux.  Worse still, it ignores the embodied nature of the 
readers of these authors here and now.  By the same token, biographical 
psychoanalysis must always be acknowledged as tenuous speculation and not taken 
dogmatically.  The biographer and the community of readers who accept a biography 
as valid, are engaged in an imaginative reconstruction of a dead psyche that is 
ultimately unknowable—far more unknowable than any living person with whom 
one could still have direct contact.   
 Still, it is interesting to speculate how a work of literature may have functioned 
in the author’s imagination and the imagination of his or her readers (then or now) to 
negotiate the typical problems of individuation as Jung defined it—that is, how texts 
function to help shape the inner drama of our own imaginal lives, as persons and as 
communities.  Such speculation is an attempt at the history of desire and (as Keats put 
it) of “soul-making.” 
(2) An Anatomy of the Self 
 To say that figures of technical man are “archetypal” images requires one to 
examine the concept of  archetype, the concept on which Jung’s theory of the 
collective psyche rests.  Before attempting to apply this or other Jungian ideas, it is 
necessary to examine Jung’s model of psyche and a range of important terms.  There 
is a long history of misunderstanding about most of these terms.  Jung avoided any 
kind of dogmatism and sought to remain true to the polysemous and ultimately 
unknowable nature of the unconscious by resisting clear definitions of most of his 
terms.  This stylistic strategy, as Demaris Wehr notes, is called amplification by 
analytical psychologists and is modeled on the analyst’s method of helping the 
analysand understand his or her dream images by making analogies and associations, 
coaxing out meaning by an oblique process.  As Wehr puts it, Jungians 
“circumambulate” a theme “thereby providing ever more possibilities of approaching 
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it.  [They] love suggestive, metaphorical language, and some even claim that to use 
any other kind of language is to succumb to the ego’s need for precision and clarity, 
thus losing the essence of the concepts” (49).   
 “Essence” is, as I have suggested, a tricky word because it may indicate the 
logocentric ego’s search for “essences” as a fantasy of a “center” or totality of 
meaning.  But circumambulation recognizes that this center of meaning can never be 
located or limited, but only pointed to through a collective symbolic action grounded 
in intuition, not linguistic signification.  This is a highly intuitive sort of “clarity” a 
seeing “around corners” which can give us a better perception of the richness of a 
phenomenon by looking at it from all angles at once, entertaining paradox, riding the 
flow of différance. 
 Nevertheless, for the sake of the impoverished logos-viewpoint of ego that is 
demanded by scholarship, let me begin by offering brief nuggets of definition, then 
circumambulate and consider the relationship between analytical psychology’s 
conceptions and those of other schools.  I will draw for my quick definitions mostly 
on Samuels, Shorter, and Plaut’s  Critical Dictionary of Jungian Analysis, a recent and 
lucid reference.4 
Archetype 
 James Hillman has argued that archetype is the most fundamental of Jung’s 
concepts because it refers to the deepest structures and processes of the psyche, 
processes which delineate how we perceive and relate to the world.  An archetype is 
“the inherited part of the psyche; structuring patterns of psychological performance 
linked to instinct; a hypothetical entity irrepresentable in itself and evident only 
through its manifestations” in typical images common throughout the dreams of 
analysands and the myths of many cultures (26).  Images connected to (or informed 
by) archetypes are identifiable by their numinosity, that is by a feeling of being 
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overwhelmed by some compelling force outside of one’s own will.  The numinous 
aspect of archetypal images is to be found in their power to move the individual or 
even a whole society.  Jung derives the term numinous from Rudolph Otto who 
employs it in a religious sense, the feeling of a presence of a “god-like” power.   
 Jung’s concept explains what are otherwise called “peak experiences,” 
demonic possession, or mystical communion with the divine.  “Archetypal patterns 
wait to be realised in the personality, are capable of infinite variation, are dependent 
upon individual expression and exercise a fascination reinforced by traditional or 
cultural expectation; and, so, carry a strong, potentially overpowering charge of 
energy which it is difficult to resist” (26).  (I will return to the energy metaphor in due 
course.)   Archetypes are in one sense empty of particular meaning and in another 
sense are richly polysemous.  They are to be found in social behaviors “especially 
those that cluster around the basic and universal experiences of life such as birth, 
marriage, motherhood, death and separation” (26) and they may be found in 
intrapsychic relationships, in inner figures associated with the Anima, Animus, 
Shadow, Persona, Self, and ego.  These “figures” correspond to complexes. 
Complexes 
 Jung identified complexes to be “fragmentary personalities” or “splinter 
psyches” (Jung Structure and Dynamics 97; ¶ 202-3) with a will of their own.  The 
concept is used to contradict the notion that the individual is a single, monolithic 
entity.  Individuals are, contrary to the denotative meaning of the term, divided.  It 
was in his doctoral study of “so-called occult phenomenon” that Jung began 
developing his theory of complexes theorizing a continuity between the spiritualist 
who speaks out of several personalities, the schizophrenic, and what are called 
“normal” human subjects.  Complexes are structural elements of psyche.  But the 
name itself begs us to ask “complex of what?”  According to Samuels et al.:   
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A complex is a collection of images and ideas, clustered round a core 
derived from one or more of the archetypes, and characterised by a 
common emotional tone.  When they come into play (become 
“constellated”), complexes contribute to behaviour and are marked by 
affect whether a person is conscious of them or not.  The idea of complex 
permitted Jung to link the archetypal (collective) and personal dimensions 
of psychic contents.  The “father complex” [for example] not only holds 
within it an archetypal image of father but also an aggregate of all 
interactions with father over time (34).   
 A semantic confusion to note at this point is that when analytical psychologists 
speak of one of the major components of the psyche (Anima, Shadow, Persona) they 
may be referring to three different aspects of this phenomenon:  that is, (1) the 
archetype, or developmental predilection to form the complex being named, (2) the 
complex of images itself in its totality, or (3) any particular image or figure that 
emerges in dream, fantasy, myth, or art as the representative of the whole complex.  
One should say that the Anima archetype is the unsoundable center of the Anima 
complex (see below) which produces numinous Anima figures (or archetypal images) in 
dreams and fantasies. 
Ego 
 The ego itself is a complex of images and concepts.  It is distinguished from 
other complexes only by its function as the “center of consciousness.”  Jung stressed 
that the ego was something less than the whole personality, a complex specifically 
concerned with “such matters as personal identity, maintenance of the personality, 
continuity over time, mediation between conscious and unconscious realms, 
cognition and reality testing” (50).  Since the definition, function, and status of the ego 
lie at the center of this whole study, I will not revise this definition just now.  
“Initially, the ego is merged with the [Self] but then differentiates from it… arising 
out of the clash between a child’s bodily limitations and environmental reality.  
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Frustration promotes islets of consciousness which coalesce into the ego proper” (50, 
51).  As Samuels et al. note, “Psychoanalysts and analytical psychologists now agree 
that an element of perceptual organisation is present at least from birth and that 
before the end of the first year of life a relatively sophisticated ego structure is in 
operation” (51).   
 Although this ego-complex becomes the center of consciousness, it is 
nevertheless sometimes considered to have an unconscious aspect in its defenses, those 
reactions it generates but does not recognize as part of the ongoing attempt to 
maintain its autonomy and coherence.  As I will consider, the inner figures known as 
ego-ideals may be thought of as unconscious products of the ego’s attempt to imagine 
a coherent “self.”  I consider such figures as the Senex or the Puer Aeternus to be ego-
ideals—that is, they are internalized images of how the ego wants to be seen which 
contain a moral power of motivation and restriction on the ego’s will.  Senex and Puer 
are in turn related to the archetypal Child or Father, so it is imprecise to call a Senex 
figure (or Crone figure, to give the feminine parallel) archetypes; they are archetypal 
images and may even represent whole complexes, but they should not be used as 
names for separate archetypes—the archetypes underlying these complexes will be 
variously (or even simultaneously) the Child, the Father or Mother, or the Persona 
(for which see below).   
 As I will explore more fully, it is worth noting that Lacan’s revision of Freud’s 
theory of the subject applies equally well to Jung, implying that the ego (the “I”) is not 
fully formed until it takes its place as a speaking subject within social discourse.  If 
ego (or subjectivity) begins in the infant’s recognition of the mother’s mirroring of its 
glances and expressions, its individuation comes to fulfillment in the ego’s integration 
of itself into the complexity of the linguistic, Symbolic order of culture.  Edward 
Edinger coined the phrase “ego-Self axis” to express the special relationship that 
adheres between the ego-complex and the Self as the more fundamental and 
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unconscious organizing center of the psyche.  The individual moves toward maturity 
by developing the ego as an independent “center” to the conscious personality during 
the first half of life.  During the second half, individuation (in Jung’s terminology) 
comprises the continuing development of the ego’s relationships to its unconscious 
components, its reconnection to the Self especially. 
Self  
 Self is one of the most confusing of Jungian terms and it requires extensive 
elucidation.  Self is used to mean “the whole psyche” but more clearly and specifically 
it is defined as an archetype of wholeness which occupies the center of the total 
psyche.  That is, Self is both “center” and “circumference” of the psyche, an image 
similar to Nicholas of Cusa’s geometric metaphor for God (Jung, Psychology and 
Alchemy  41; ¶ 44)5.  This is not surprising when it is noticed that the Self as archetype 
produces (as its archetypal figures) images of godhead, the imago dei, particularly 
monotheistic images of an all-encompassing God.  Thus the ego’s images, which are 
sometimes images of a “hero” are self-images in the ordinary sense of the term, they 
are images of one’s own personhood, one’s own individuality.  Because the imago dei 
is an expression of Self, if the ego identifies with the Self, it becomes inflated, 
mistaking itself for the whole of the psyche, and in extreme cases mistaking itself for 
God.  This identification is not a sign of connection between the complexes, but a sign 
of their disconnection, the ego’s loss of its relationship to the Self. 
 The Self is pre-egoic, the originary complex, one might say, and so corresponds 
in one dimension to Freud’s stage of “magical consciousness” or the infant’s belief 
that its wishes will always create reality.  But more fundamentally as the archetypal 
predisposition to a concept of wholeness, the Self is the “archetypal urge to 
coordinate, relativise and mediate the tension of the opposites” (136).  According to 
Fordham and his school, the Self begins as a primary selfhood containing “all the 
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innate, archetypal potentials that may be given expression by a person.  In the 
appropriate environment, these potentials commence a process of deintegration 
emerging from the original unconscious integrate.  They seek correspondences in the 
outer world.  The resultant ‘mating’ of an active infant’s archetypal potential and the 
mother’s reactive responses is then reintegrated to become an internalized object.  
Neumann argued in his studies The Child and The Great Mother that the infant’s 
mother carries  
the image of the baby’s [Self] in unconscious projection or even [functions] 
‘as’ the baby’s [Self].  Since in infancy the child cannot experience the 
characteristics of an adult self, the mother reflects or acts as ‘mirror’ of her 
child’s selfhood.  The first conscious experiences of the [Self] derive from 
perceptions of her and interactions with her.  Extending Neumann’s thesis, 
the baby’s gradual separation from his mother may be compared with the 
ego’s emergence from the [Self] and the image he develops of his 
relationship to his mother forms the basis of his subsequent attitude toward 
the [Self] and the unconscious in general.  (137)6 
 There is something inherently paradoxical in the use of the capitalized term 
Self to refer in some cases to the whole psyche and in other cases to a particular 
unconscious complex.  The paradox can be bridged, I believe, by understanding the 
Self archetype to be a predisposition to organization as a whole system, a 
predisposition to coherence of conscious and unconscious psychic factors.  In other 
words the Self archetype is the structure that permits the psyche to form a whole 
despite its inherent tendency toward fragmentation, and especially in the face of its 
radical division into ego and unconscious. 
The Shadow 
 Shadow is defined by Jung most simply as “the thing a person has no wish to 
be” (Jung Practice of Psychotherapy, ¶ 470; qtd. in Samuels et al. 138).  It is often 
conceived to be the “dark side” of the personality rejected by the ego, the potential for 
 
32 
evil.  It corresponds in content and function to the Freudian idea of the unconscious, 
what Jung specifies as the personal unconscious.  As Freud theorized, it is a repository 
of repressions, including guilty infantile fantasies and instinctual urges.  Contrary to 
Freudian theory, however, Jung did not believe that Shadow could be eradicated 
through analysis because it has an archetypal center.  Moreover, though the Shadow 
is like the Freudian Id, representing the bodily instincts society seeks to control, the 
concept of the Shadow is not uniformly negative, but has a creative potential.  The 
Shadow archetype can perhaps most generally be understood as the predisposition to 
opposition or polarity, to dividing things into “good” and “evil.”   The Shadow 
complex is not in itself good or evil because its contents exist partially in relation to 
the subject’s particular culture or subculture.  If the subject identifies positively with 
certain types of violence and cruelty, its shadow will contain, presumably, images of 
the subject’s own victimization, its repressed empathy with its own victims.   
 Everything in the psyche, including all other archetypes, is characterized by a 
polar structure and the dynamics of compensation and enantiodromia, the 
metamorphosis of an image into its opposite.  Figures of the Shadow may represent 
the unconscious generally, but are particularly expressions of its monsters:  guilt, 
shame, and feelings of frightening and overwhelming possession by forces beyond 
the control of the ego.  In the case of masculine psychology, it is worth bearing in 
mind that one of the most powerful bogeys of the Shadow is the fear of castration 
which manifests as a fear of bodily mutilation, but also as a fear of becoming a woman.  
As I shall elaborate below, Shadow figures are especially evident in projection upon 
others.  “Here Jung found a convincing explanation not only of personal antipathies 
but also the cruel prejudices and persecutions of our time” (139). 
The Persona 
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 The Persona may be thought of in one sense as the opposite of the Shadow.  As 
a psychic component, the Persona contains and organizes the ego-ideals, the ego’s 
imagination of itself according to social roles and representations.  It is the mask or 
face the ego puts on to confront the world (107).  As such, the Persona should really 
always be conceived as plural (as, for that matter, all complexes should be conceived).  
To say that the individual’s Personae have an archetypal foundation is simply to say 
that culture, the collective dimension of life, requires the ego to develop a socialized 
self, an introjection of the person’s place in society or the kinds of behavior dictated 
by social forces.  A Persona is the ego’s “external orientation” but it may be (and often 
is partly) unconscious.  That is, the ego creates and employs the mask without being 
fully aware of its introjected nature.   
 Persona pathology manifests as the complete identification with the complex 
and the consequent blockage of relationship with the other unconscious contents.  In 
this respect, Jung can be positioned among the psychologists who theorize a “true 
self” or “deep self” in antagonistic relationship to a socially imposed self, but neither 
the social self nor the “deep” Self, in Jung’s theory is reduced to a simplistic essence.  
On the contrary, the Self as the entirety of conscious and unconscious psyche is 
ultimately never completely accessible or explicable and the Persona-complex is in 
some ways highly complicated and unique to each individual.  It is not simply an 
imposition from an external social order, but the individual’s negotiation of 
continually changing and often contradictory social forms and power relations.  The 
study of gendered identity is the study of one aspect of Persona.  By the same token, 
however, it is the study of those elements set in opposition to the gendered Persona, 
not only the Shadow but what Jung called the “contrasexual archetype.” 
The Contrasexual Complex 
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 Implicitly then, if Persona can be thought of as the opposite of the Shadow, it is 
also opposed to the Anima/Animus complex.  I will return to Jung’s theory of the 
contrasexual archetype throughout this study, but here suffice to say that the Anima is 
the unconscious feminine complex of a man’s psyche.  Animus, similarly, is the 
unconscious masculine complex of a woman’s psyche.  The problem with these terms 
is the way they have been used to essentialize and universalize genders.  Jungians 
often uncritically speak of “The Masculine” or “The Feminine” as if these were 
unified, eternal, and free-floating essences.  If one starts with the premise the genders 
are separate, opposed essences, then one must speak of two archetypes, one 
masculine and the other feminine.  Gender theory, however, has demonstrated that 
masculinity and femininity are always defined in terms of each other and that traits 
associated with one gender or the other are culturally variant across a wide range.  
Moreover, psychological gender is not necessarily linked to biological sex in any 
“natural” way.  Given these facts, one cannot posit a gendered archetype, but only an 
archetype of gender; that is, the only predisposition in the psyche is to the 
construction of genders, their opposition, and essentialization, and the identification 
of ego with one or the other.  By saying this, I mean to affirm what feminist theorists 
have asserted, that gendered identity is learned and that the imposed identification 
with essentialized masculinity or femininity is socially imposed on a naturally 
polymorphous subject. 
 Gender images and behaviors are a part of the Persona-complex and in fact are 
arguably the foundation of Personae in a society that lays heavy stress on the sexual 
division of labor and heterosexual identity.  But if a man’s masculine complex (the 
collection of images of masculinity introjected from his culture) is incorporated into 
the Persona, then all those elements and images of selfhood marked culturally as 
feminine will be repressed into the unconscious where they will form the Anima-
complex.  This correlates clearly with Freud’s theory of infantile bisexuality and the 
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repression of homosexual fantasies imposed by a stringently heterosexist culture.  
That means that, in heterosexual men, the “feminine complex” or Anima, like 
Persephone, is relegated to the underworld of the Shadow.  Anima is, for a man, the 
love-object-ideal but incorporates images of femininity that are positively and 
negatively laden with affect.  Similarly the Animus complex is an ambiguous 
combination of wishes and fears associated with men.  What I would like to suggest, 
however, is that the customary polarization that suggests that men have Animas and 
women have Animuses is inadequate.  Clearly men also have an internalized complex 
of masculinity that is separate from their Persona, for not all types of masculine ideals 
can be incorporated into any single Persona-complex, no matter how plural.  If, as in 
the cases I will examine shortly, the man identifies with a highly intellectualized type 
of manhood, masterful, and brilliant in its manipulation of words and scientific 
concepts, then he will very likely not identify himself with a working-class type of 
masculinity based in physicality, fist fights, and hard drinking.  One stereotype or 
another will have to be relegated to fantasy life or repressed entirely into the 
unconscious where it will act as a shadowy and threatening, yet often alluring figure.  
Similarly, for the man who is strongly identified with a heterosexual model of 
manliness, homosexual men will occupy a repressed part of his Animus.  Either 
Animus or Anima may then be seen as complexes that have a certain autonomy but 
are also inwoven with the Shadow or the Persona, or else positioned as an ideal love-
object that will be projected outward.  I say this to emphasize that a man may, as we 
know, take either a man or a woman (of various types) as his love-object.  The same is 
true, I contend, of women, although the focus in the present study is on male 
psychology. 
 Jung considered the contrasexual component to act as a mediator of inner 
experience (that is, mediator between ego and unconscious) just as the Persona 
mediates ego and external experience.  One realizes pretty quickly however, that it is 
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more complicated than this, because the Anima is not only the rejected impulses to 
“feminine” behavior; it is, like the Shadow, an ubiquitous projection onto others.  
Both complexes are interwoven as aspects of the idea of the Other.  The concept of 
Anima is complicated further by Jung’s fascination with the Latin meaning of the 
word, that is, “soul.”  The puzzle that Jung confronted was an inner image of 
idealized femininity which was also closely associated with the idea of man’s soul 
(and hence with the medieval notion that women did not have souls).  When Jung 
writes about the Animus in women, he sounds as if he believes this medieval dictum, 
that for women soulfulness ought to come naturally.  One might expect that the Anima 
would be the complex about which Jung would have the hardest time writing 
objectively just as “feminine sexuality” is the subject where Freud’s objectivity seems 
most obviously to founder. 
 I will return to this in Chapter II, but suffice it to emphasize at this point the 
importance of seeing the contrasexual archetype as one archetype with more than the 
usual polar potential.  If the Shadow archetype generates the tendency for 
polarization into good and bad, the contrasexual archetype embodies the tendency of 
human sexual reproduction and secondary sex characteristics to split the world into 
male and female.  This does not mean that masculinity and femininity each have their 
own archetype; it means exactly the reverse.  The formation of separate complexes 
around masculinity and femininity is what is dictated by the archetype based upon 
the common human experience of sexual difference as an anatomical fact and a social 
construction.  This explains quite elegantly why images of androgyny are so 
prevalent in culture and dreams.  It is because the contrasexual archetype is itself 
androgynous as well as bisexual, that is, it offers the ego possibilities for splitting into 
one or the other gender, or finding some combination of the two.  Almost nobody 
actually embodies the extremes of either gender.   
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Father—Mother—Child Complexes 
 The Father, Mother, and Child complexes form another closely dependent set.  
This primal trinity is obviously related both to developmental psychology and to the 
gender complexes.  Of all the components of the psyche these are the easiest to grasp 
as psychic predispositions to the external realities of kinship groups.  It is the place at 
which Freud’s Oedipal psychology can be incorporated into Jung’s schema, not as the 
overarching determiner of everything and everybody, but as one among many 
complicated factors.  Moreover, what Freud tended to think of as an Oedipal moment 
in the history of his patients (the primal scene), Jung considers an ongoing negotiation 
between inner voices and the ego.  The introjected mother and father images form 
complexes to which the ego must relate during its whole life, integrating them as 
either images of “self” or “other.”  This is equally true of the internalized image of the 
child.  This complex is in part the remembered experiences of being a child, but also 
the cultural images of and attitudes towards children.  All of these will have positive 
and negative aspects.  In terms of their existence as complexes of images in the 
culture, they are very complicated indeed, as Neumann’s study of the Great Mother 
attests.   
 Freud’s concept of the superego resides in the Father and Mother complexes as 
the haunting voice of authority, power, and shaming.  The image of the phallus as 
symbol of cultural order, which Lacan has employed as a pivot-point in the Oedipal 
stage of ego-development, is also located as part of the archetypal Father complex.  
The symbolic phallus correlates with the association of  Nature with the mother and 
images of the mother’s body.  In this aspect, the Mother and Father complexes 
develop in tandem with the more general Anima/Animus complexes.  They form 
another pair and the Child a mediating third term—the “not-adult.”  The Child 
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complex is sometimes also divided into gendered components called the Puella and 
the Puer images.7  The version of these that will concern me most closely in the 
examination of the psychology of the technician-hero is the image of the puer aeternus, 
the eternal boy. 
Individuation and Libido 
 Finally, let me examine two terms that analytical psychology uses differently 
from classical psychoanalysis:  libido and individuation.   Analytical psychologists too 
often abuse the term “energy” as if it were a literal term and not a metaphor.  What 
Jung calls psychic energy or libido is an extension of Freud’s energy metaphor.  Jung’s 
appropriation and widening of the term libido was a major first step in his break from 
Freud’s theory of the sexual etiology of all neuroses.8  Although, as usual, Jung 
employs metaphor without always explicitly commenting on the fact that it is 
metaphor, I believe what he essentially did was to appropriate Freud’s literalized 
energy (or hydraulic) metaphors and recognize them for what they are—not 
psychology’s literal connection to physics or biology, but its metaphorical connection.  
“Energy” is the best word for what we are describing, whatever it may be to the 
physical sciences.   
 As Samuels et al. delineate in detail, this metaphor serves several purposes.  It 
permits us to “indicate the intensity of any particular psychological activity,” its 
“value and importance” to the individual.  (There is no means to measure this energy, 
however—no units of measurement.)  It also permits us to “demonstrate a shifting 
focus of interest and involvement” or “channels” in which mental activity might 
“flow.”  If one channel is blocked, psychic energy will “flow into another channel” 
taking a different direction.  This is a generalization of Freud’s theory of sublimation.  
The notion of psychic energy is related to the theory (or some would say this is also 
just a sort of metaphor) of instinct, a teleological aspect to the organism which leads it 
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in different directions (employing certain typical behaviors), towards different ends.  
One might add, however, that the concept of the will is also an aspect of this energy 
model.  Will is a kind of control or determination of the intensity and direction of 
psychic energy (particularly as directed by the ego). 
 Freud characterized libido as a life-energy, but because he insisted on a 
universal sexual etiology, he reduced the concept of “life” to sexual drive.  Jung was 
never satisfied with this reduction or with Freud’s reasons for performing the 
reduction, and so he sought a more comprehensive, or perhaps more basic notion of 
“life.”  One of the results of this quest is that the development of libido is not seen as a 
movement either confined to childhood or to an invariable trajectory from 
polymorphous perversity to heterosexual object-love.  Peter Homans summarizes 
Jung’s developmental model in three stages:  “a presexual stage in which nutrition 
and growth predominate (birth to age four); a prepubertal stage (age five to puberty); 
then a stage of maturity, in which the libido is gradually desexualized and adapted to 
the demands of social reality” (69).   
 All human behavior and fantasy was not reducible to erotic attachments, but 
could always be related to the erotic aspect of libido.  Or, put the other way around, 
Eros becomes a much broader concept of relatedness and attachment, connectedness 
and attraction which may manifest sexually or in other ways as homosexual object 
love, narcissism, or non-carnal varieties of friendship.  This illustrates Jung’s desire to 
sidestep Freud’s theory of sublimation with what seemed to him a more flexible and 
dignified theory of multiple goals—sexual, spiritual, or something else.  In such a 
theory, sexual fantasies can still be seen as of central importance to much of human 
imaginative life, but not as the ground.  Jung instead took the ground of psyche to be 
the development of the Self, a striving for a maturity represented by wholeness and 
the relation of ego and unconscious, not simply by the ability to take up a 
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heterosexual love-object without anxiety.  I will take up the theory of instincts again 
in detail in Chapter III. 
 For Jung individuation was something different from the ego’s precipitation 
from the unconscious, pre-Oedipal state, which Jung called integration of the ego.  
Jung remarks: 
[A]gain and again I note that the individuation process is confused with the 
coming of the ego into consciousness and that the ego is in consequence 
identified with the self, which naturally produces a hopeless conceptual 
muddle.  Individuation is then nothing but ego-centeredness and 
autoeroticism.  But the self comprises infinitely more than a mere ego, as 
the symbolism has shown from of old.  It is as much one’s self, and all other 
selves, as the ego.  Individuation does not shut out from the world, but 
gathers the world to oneself. (Jung, Structure and Dynamics, 226; ¶ 432) 
 That is, individuation is the assimilation of consciousness and the collective 
aspects of the psyche as well as the repressions.  Thus individuation is not 
individualism:  “Individualism means deliberately stressing and giving prominence 
to some supposed peculiarity, rather than to collective considerations and obligations.  
But individuation means precisely the better and more complete fulfillment of 
collective qualities of the human being” (Jung, Two Essays, 173-4; ¶ 267).  This 
distinction will prove crucial when I consider individualism as an aspect of 
stereotypic masculinity, a gendered imperative to be (or appear) separate from others, 
distinctive, and to this extent completely independent and self-reliant.   
 The Western ideal of individualism may be read in analytical terms as a kind 
of inflation of the ego.  As Homans puts it “Domination of the ego either by the 
collective consciousness [i.e. identification with the Persona] or by the collective 
unconscious [identification with an archetypal image] produces inflation” (103, 
emphasis added).  Individuation is precisely the deconstruction of these inflations 
and a realization that the Self contains and coordinates relationships between all these 
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different components of psyche.  It entails the withdrawal of projections, the 
unmasking of ego-ideals and Personae for what they are, and the establishment of a 
dialogue between the ego, its Shadow, and its Anima (or Animus—or, I will suggest, 
both).   
 The typical situation that precipitates the need for individuation, according to 
Jung’s clinical experience, is the disintegration of the Persona, the slipping of the 
mask one wears because social relations, parents, others in power have told one that 
this is who one is.  Homans translates this situation into the terms of self psychology:  
“the dissolution of the persona is a crisis in object relations in which the self loses its 
cohesion and becomes fragmented, and in which previously formed ideals are 
rendered questionable” (101).  In this case the Kohutian “self” correlates well with the 
Jungian “Self” permitting us to summarize the goals of individuation in terms of 
cohesion of the Self through the relatedness of its parts (both conscious and 
unconscious). 
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(3) Archetype and Stereotype. 
 Having briefly outlined the main Jungian terms, I want to devote the rest of 
this chapter to a further circumambulation of the most problematic Jungian term for 
many literary critics:  the archetype.  Although it had been used by mythographers 
such as Cassirer and Campbell, the term archetype became common in literary 
studies following the publication of Northrop Frye’s Anatomy of Criticism (1957).  It is 
often assumed that Frye’s usage follows Jung’s but, in fact, Frye pointedly avoids any 
appeal to psychology in his theory of literature.  Indeed, I would contend that Frye’s 
concept of the archetype as a universal image or motif in literature is precisely the sort 
of theory Jung found inadequate. The confusion of Frye’s use of the term with Jung’s 
and the subsequent dismissal of Frye by such writers as Fekete (whom I quoted in the 
introduction) has been detrimental to a full understanding of Jung’s psychology in 
literary studies.    
 I do not intend to offer a full explanation of Frye’s theories, a system of 
Byzantine complexity, but only to point out what Jung’s theory is not.  A full 
comparison of the differences and similarities between the two systems will have to 
wait for another occasion.9 
Frye’s Archetypology 
 Northrop Frye defines “archetype” as “a typical or recurring image… a symbol 
which connects one poem with another and thereby helps to unify and integrate our 
literary experience… Archetypal criticism is primarily concerned with literature as a 
social fact and as a mode of communication” (99).  This definition avoids the whole 
concept of an unconscious, either personal or collective, and in the context of the 
Anatomy its evocation of “social fact” and “communication” is an attempt to make 
Frye’s criticism seem hard-headed and connected to tangible realities.  But Frye wants 
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his readers to believe that one could talk about “social facts” without resorting to 
sociology and about “communication” without resorting to linguistics.  He insists that 
the correct study of literature is a discourse of poetry talking about itself and that all 
“alien” concepts and vocabulary can be expelled outside of this world.   
 Despite this goal of purity, one encounters terms from psychology and the 
social sciences at every turn, all appropriated without consideration of the theories 
and disciplines that produced them.  But Jung’s theory of the collective unconscious is 
about the unconscious nature of cultural semiosis, and this is, in effect, what Frye is 
talking about.  The difference is that Frye attempts to keep archetypes the property of 
a transcendent archetypal realm.  This conflicts with his insistence that they are “in 
the literature.”  Jung, coming from his work with schizophrenics and psychotics, and 
ultimately from his personal experience of intense fantasies and dreams, does not 
draw a rigid boundary around written texts but describes the intertextuality of poesis 
and mythos.  Words and images are the fabric of psyche as they are of literature or any 
other discourse.  Mythos is not an instrument for the salvation of souls; it is the soul. 
 For Frye, as for Harold Bloom, poems are always and only about other poems 
(Frye 97).  Melville’s Moby Dick is a powerful symbol because the whale is connected 
in one’s imagination with Leviathan in the Old Testament, that is, because the whale 
motif is a convention.  While Jung begins with the numinous feeling produced by the 
images he identified as archetypal, Frye focuses on this conventionality of literary 
motifs.  In one discussion he offers this example: 
[O]ne very common convention of the nineteenth-century novel is the use 
of two heroines, one dark and one light.  The dark one is as a rule 
passionate, haughty, plain, foreign or Jewish, and in some way associated 
with the undesirable or with some kind of forbidden fruit like incest.  When 
the two are involved with the same hero, the plot usually has to get rid of 
the dark one or make her into a sister if the story is to end happily.  
Examples include Ivanhoe, The Last of the Mohicans, The Woman in White, 
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Ligeia, Pierre (a tragedy because the hero chooses the dark girl, who is also 
his sister), The Marble Faun and countless incidental treatments.  A male 
version forms the symbolic basis of Wuthering Heights.  (101) 
 Frye’s observations are always interesting, but his interpretation is hampered 
by his academic agenda to prove the self-sufficiency of Literature as a scientific object 
by itself.  As a result, he ignores the way these images point to anything outside of 
“Literature” as he conceives it.  There is no hint that the dark and light women have a 
psychological meaning, and he pointedly avoids attributing particular significance 
even to incest—its only significance seems to lie in its conventionality.  But this 
pointed ignoring of Jung’s idea of Shadow or of Anima and Animus, right alongside 
the equally conspicuous ignoring of Freud’s preoccupation with incest, is one of 
Frye’s rhetorical moves intended to sweep the field clean of psychologists.  Having 
done so, he is free to erect his own theory of mimesis, one narrowly limited to 
something like Mircea Eliade’s myth of the eternal return:  “In its archetypal phase, 
the poem imitates nature… as a cyclical process” (105).   
 Circularity is Frye’s idée fixe, and he overgeneralizes when he claims that all 
archetypes are symbolic actions like rituals that deal with 
the principle of recurrence… the repetitions in nature that make time 
intelligible to us… cyclical movements of the sun, the moon, the seasons, 
and human life… dawn, sunset, the phases of the moon, seed-time and 
harvest, the equinoxes and the solstices, birth, initiation, marriage, and 
death…  (105). 
 Yet, after this catalogue, he makes a remark that points silently toward depth 
psychology and Jung’s description of the ego’s relationship to the Self:  “In the middle 
of all this recurrence… is the central recurrent cycle of sleeping and waking life, the 
daily frustration of the ego, the nightly awakening of a titanic self” (105). 
 It should be clear from the short definition of archetype I gave in the last 
section of this chapter that Frye never talks about archetypes in the Jungian sense.  
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What he does talk about are archetypal images.  This unacknowledged difference has 
caused extensive confusion in the discourse of literary study and has exacerbated the 
already extant confusion in Jungian discourse.  If the distinction is not maintained 
between archetypes and archetypal images, analysts run the risk of merely fetishizing 
ancient myths.  Unfortunately, Frye’s use of the word archetype has won out in 
common parlance even among many popular Jungian writers, so that one finds 
writers talking about the “archetype” of the Wild Man or the Puer, or the Wise Old 
Man, or the King, or the Trickster.  These are mythic figures and complexes, but not 
archetypes in the primary sense.  To confuse the terms results in a loss of touch with 
the fundamental psychic model Jung developed and accords to archetypal images a 
kind of grandiosity of “timelessness” that merely plays into their game, so to speak, 
for such complexes make it their business to try to overpower the ego and its relation 
to reality. 
 Jungian analysts frequently use of the names of Greek or Roman Gods 
(usually) to identify a particular complex and make this slippage, calling them 
archetypes.  This is often the confusion of a personification of a complex with the its 
archetype.  A good example of this, which I will discuss further in Chapter II, is 
Wyly’s use of Priapus to name a particular complex and its attendant neurosis.  He 
calls Priapus an archetype because certain dream-images and fantasies, and, in this 
case physiological priapism, constituting symptoms of the pathology, are similar to 
elements of the myth of Priapus.  This usage derives from the hypothesis that such 
images and myths are the center of complexes which correspond to particular 
psychological problems in male patients.  Priapus can be said to take on autonomous 
power over the priapic man, for example.   
 There is clearly an element of numinosity in such images, and the complex in 
question does not embrace the whole of, say, the Shadow complex, or the Persona, or 
the Puer complex.  What this fact suggests is that an archetypal image such as Priapus 
 
46 
can, indeed, act as the center of a complex for the purpose of compensating some 
conscious attitude—masculine ego inflation in the case of Priapus.  But do all humans 
have a fundamental predisposition to the formation of these images?  Clearly Priapus 
is an image mostly found in men.  What this should tell one is that archetypal phallos, 
as Wyly and Monick call it, is a crucial part of the Animus.  Like a uterine image or 
the image of the breast in the Anima-complex, the phallus is numinously archetypal, 
a nearly universal component of masculinity complexes in any society because it 
arises, if you will, from the physical sex organs.   
 For this reason, I consider archetypal complexes to be, as it were, nested.  
Anima and Animus are the large complexes including all feminine and masculine 
associations respectively.  They, in turn, contain such complexes as the Mother, the 
Father, Puer, Puella, Crone, Old Man, and so forth as different kinds of masculinity or 
femininity.10  This suggests that one would be clearer to view a Priapus complex as a 
type of Puer complex because of his typical adolescence, or a type of Father complex, 
because of his exaggerated phallus. 
 Arguably, the uterus and the penis are foundational images of Mother and 
Father complexes because of their association with sex and so with gender, however, I 
am reluctant to argue, as Monick seems to do, that the physical penis is the ultimate 
archetype of masculinity.  What may be true is that phallus, as a symbol, is made the 
center of the masculinity complex in most patriarchal cultures where it serves as the 
sign of social power.  In this sense, then, phallus is not the central motif of masculinity 
in any simple, natural sense, but is given that position because of the way the penis is 
used as a sign within adrocentric cultures.  I will return to this important problem in 
the next chapter. 
 An archetypal criticism goes nowhere if it does not explain the connections 
among figures in discourse, structures of the psyche, and structures of society.  The 
tendency of Jungians to simply revere ancient myths can lead to ignoring completely 
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the historical construction of sexuality, gender, and various kinds of Personae.  My 
concern, in this study, is with this type of historical and social construction, 
particularly the evolution of the Persona of the technical man, a new form of heroism 
in the nineteenth century, not merely a repetition of ancient models of heroism.  
Nevertheless, reference to the ego archetype’s representation in myth and literature in 
hero figures permits an understanding of the connection among social roles, 
ideological power, and the construction of subjectivity.  Where the figures themselves 
operate as conventions, they are best referred to as stereotypes. 
Gilman’s Definition of Stereotype 
 Feminist and racial theorists have turned critical attention to stereotypes in 
cultural representations and I find their analysis crucial to an understanding of 
archetypology and masculinity.  Sander Gilman, in Difference and Pathology, suggests 
that stereotyping is a system of representation that unconsciously underlies all works 
of art and literature, scientific discourses, and the very process of concept formation.  
This symbolic action is unconscious and collective and the images produced are taken 
as Real.  “We all create images of things we fear or glorify.  These images never 
remain abstractions:  We understand them as real-world entities.  We assign them 
labels that serve to set them apart from ourselves” (Gilman 15).  This kind of 
imagining is one side of creating what Benedict Anderson has called an “imagined 
community.”  The other side is the creation of images of ourselves.  The formation of 
the image of the technician-hero, as I will show, is the creation of an ego-ideal, but it 
operates in opposition to various shadow figures, among them the figure of the 
“savage” and the stereotypic representation of Woman as Nature. 
 Gilman cautions that the word stereotype, because of its history in printing 
technologies, connotes a certain rigidity that is not really true to the phenomenon.  
Stereotypes are only apparently rigid “on the most superficial level” (16), but are 
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actually tremendously fluid, shifting and adjusting to the needs of a culture’s power 
groups.  Stereotypes form structures but one mustn’t let that word connote an 
unshakable frame of steel girders.  The structure of stereotypic images is an evolving 
and in some ways organic structure, a set of shifting relationships between shape-
shifting parts.  It is not an exaggeration to say that the symbolic action of creating 
stereotypes is the fundamental process of psyche.  I quote at length Gilman’s 
description of the developmental role of stereotypes: 
The creation of stereotypes is a concomitant of the process by which all 
human beings become individuals.  Its beginnings lie in the earliest stages 
of our development.  The infant’s movement from a state of being in which 
everything is perceived as an extension of the self to a growing sense of a 
separate identity takes place between the ages of a few weeks and about 
five months.  During that stage, the new sense of “difference” is directly 
acquired by the denial of the child’s demands on the world… The world is 
felt to be a mere extension of the self.  It is that part of the self which 
provides food, warmth, and comfort.  As the child comes to distinguish 
more and more between the world and self, anxiety arises from a perceived 
loss of control over the world.  But very soon the child begins to combat 
anxieties associated with the failure to control the world by adjusting his 
mental picture of people and objects so that they can appear “good” even 
when their behavior is perceived as “bad.”…With the split of both the self 
and the world into “good” and “bad” objects, the “bad” self is distanced 
and identified with the mental representation of the “bad” object.  This act 
of projection saves the self from any confrontation with the contradictions 
present in the necessary integration of “bad” and “good” aspects of the self.  
The deep structure of our own sense of self and the world is built upon the 
illusionary image of the world divided into two camps, “us” and “them.”  
(Gilman 17) 
 This description of the pre-Oedipal development of the infant psyche draws 
upon the object-relations theory of Heinz Kohut and corresponds to the development 
which analytical psychologist Mario Jacoby explores in his book The Longing for 
Paradise.  Employing Jung’s distinction between ego and Self, I would suggest that 
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what Gilman describes as a “self” image is better thought of as the emergence of the 
ego from the Self, that is, the emergence of the subject in the pre-linguistic experience 
of bodily separation from the mother.  What I would prefer to call the ego-image is part 
of the subject’s Persona and/or its Shadow.  The ego-image represents the 
relationships the subject may have to socially condoned or condemned images of 
personhood.  The ego-ideal is yet another kind of image, which may or may not 
become an ego’s imagination of itself.  A boy’s ego, for example, will shift from 
identification with an ego-ideal of masculinity to doubt about whether he does live up 
to such an ideal.  These ideals will in turn resonate or create dissonances with what 
Kohut calls “selfobjects,” the introjected images of mirroring adults.  Selfobjects, 
introjected from the experience of actual adults, and ego-ideals introjected from the 
culuture’s symbolic order should be distinguished even though in practice they may 
merge.  Each can support the ego’s connection to its Self, the “self-image” of 
wholeness.   
 Gilman brings out a very important point in the passage quoted above:  that 
the very origin of the ego is in a fantasy of “control.”  Because one is referring to a 
moment prior to language in the infant psyche, putting it in these terms is a little 
paradoxical.  One might say that what exists in the first instance is the very precarious 
bodily sensation of separation, hunger, cold—sensations utterly alien to the newborn 
who has spent whatever psychic life it had during the previous nine months as 
literally a part of the mother’s body.11  The anxiety over control of the world becomes 
namable as such only as a concept of “control” and “world” emerge during the 
development of the ego as a subject within language.  Until the child learns to assign 
the cultural meanings to  “I” and “me,” this process of ego-formation cannot be said 
to be complete.12   What Gilman calls a “sense of order” is reconstructed from the 
images which emerge in the dreams and associations of adults. 
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The sense of order the adult maintains is much like the structure of order 
which precedes the earliest stage of individuation.  It is an unconscious 
sense of symbiosis with the world, a world under the control of the self.  
Anxiety arises as much through any alteration of the sense of order (real or 
imagined) between the self and the Other (real or imagined) as through the 
strains of regulating repressed drives.  (Gilman 19) 
Anxiety and the Longing for Paradise 
 Gilman’s stress on anxiety arising because of the ego’s alienation from its 
various Others (those introjected images or stereotypes against which ego imagines 
itself) is developed from Karen Horney’s theory of anxiety and neurosis.  Horney 
locates the roots of neurosis in the need for affection and the anxiety arising from the 
fear that the need will go unfilled.  Similarly, Jacoby describes primary anxiety as the 
cause of a “longing for paradise.”  Put in terms of its mythic representations, the 
emergence of ego from immersion in the Mother-as-Self is the fall from paradise.  
Jacoby follows Neumann’s landmark studies of the Child and Great Mother 
archetypes.  These archetypes are surrounded by images such as “Great Round,” the 
ouroboros serpent eating its own tail, and the enclosed garden. 
The striving for the experience of Paradise as containment within the 
“Great Round,” the “unitary reality,” is based on an archetypal pattern 
necessary to human development.  As an inner image or expectation it lives 
on within us, creating a nostalgia the intensity of which is in inverse 
proportion to the amount of external fulfillment encountered in the earliest 
phase of life.  Despite all the illusions and regressive tendencies it may 
entail, from the psychotherapeutic standpoint it is important that the 
longing for the positive aspect of the Maternal remain alive in the face of all 
experience to the contrary.  For that longing harbors within it the yearning 
for confidence in some solid, nourishing ground.  (Jacoby 8) 
 The Jungian viewpoint and use of the idea of an archetypal image reinforces 
the fact that this longing is not for the subject’s actual mother:   
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[U]ltimately the longing was not directed at the real, personal mother, but 
rather at a mother of the inner world who does not exist, or no longer 
exists—and perhaps never did exist—in external reality.  This is, at bottom, 
a longing for one’s own well-being, which originally was dependent upon 
maternal care and protection, a longing to be cradled in a conflict-free 
unitary reality, which takes on symbolic form in the image of Paradise. …In 
the best sense, the longing expresses a desire to overcome one’s own self-
alienation.  (Jacoby 9) 
 As I shall show, this longing for paradise and escape from self-alienation is an 
important factor in the figuration of the technical man.  Jacoby makes the Jungian 
distinction between Self as “the whole psyche” and ego, but Gilman, as I understand 
him, means ego when he says “self.”  When Gilman, in the last passage quoted, says 
that he is dealing with “an unconscious sense of symbiosis with the world, a world 
under the control of the self” this is not quite clear enough, for in the stage of 
development he is describing, the ego has not distinguished itself from the whole 
psyche (deintegrated from the Self, as Fordham puts it).  It is the ego, specifically, 
which fantasizes not only that it controls its world, but that it is the beginning and the 
end of selfhood.   
Primary Narcissism and the Ego-Self Axis 
 The ego’s selfishness, if one can put it this way, is a fantasy which it tries 
continuously to bolster, against pressures from “outside” (the world) and “inside” 
(the rest of the psyche).  Though it may seem a “mistake” because it is the root of the 
whole range of Narcissistic character disorders, this initial, infantile ego-Narcissus is a 
necessary aspect of its deintegration and the focusing of consciousness.  
Consciousness coalesces around the ego at its center and the ego, one might say, 
“naturally” must begin by thinking it is the center of the universe as well because it 
has no conscious concept of other subjects or the infinite extension of its environment 
beyond its reach.    
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 This process of fantasizing itself as the “whole person” is accomplished as the 
ego introjects selfobjects, inner images of “self” as mirrored in the looks and 
responses of others, especially the mother.  The Jungian concept of the Self archetype, 
however, is something more than this kind of internalized set of images of oneself as 
a whole and coherent being; it is the complex which acts as the “center” of the psyche, 
the organizing principle of the whole psyche encompassing all its conscious and 
unconscious elements.  For Jung the archetype of the Self represents a predisposition to 
wholeness inherent in the organism.   
 What Jung means, I believe, is that because adult humans interact with each 
other as persons, as wholes, not as collections of disconnected parts, human infants 
“inherit” a predisposition to this wholeness.  Such a predisposition makes possible 
the move infants make from seeing only “part objects” to seeing persons.  The idea of 
wholeness adheres structurally in the ways humans interrelate.  It is evolved and it is 
shared by all human beings, therefore it is “collective.”  It is something one takes 
entirely for granted, and therefore it is “unconscious.”   
 More than this, Self as the archetype of wholeness (one might say, an “instinct” 
for wholeness) encompasses consciousness and unconsciousness unifying them.  It 
does not seem necessary to claim in all this that wholeness is part of the human 
genome, because whether it is or isn’t, the fact remains that the psychologist is faced 
with an ubiquitous correlation between an instinct for wholeness and psychic health.  
Schizophrenia is precisely the breakdown of this wholeness, and Jung’s point is that 
this fragmentation of the Self is an exaggeration of another archetypal structure of the 
psyche:  the deintegration of complexes, particularly the ego-complex.  In other words 
the archetypes of Self and ego are the basic structures of wholeness and 
fragmentation and the tension that is produced by the ego’s formation as a center of 
consciousness leads structurally to anxiety, alienation, and as Gilman adds, the very 
basis of stereotyping.  Here, again, I find a key to the scientist-technician, for 
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technicism is founded on objectivity and control, the basic impulses of the ego’s 
deintegration.  It is, after all, this deintegrated state that permits human reflection—
the word “reflection” carries the act of mirroring so important to subject formation. 
 Analytical psychology’s definition of ego as a complex which functions as the 
“center of consciousness” (not necessarily the center of the whole personality) is 
different from the several Freudian conceptions of ego.  Most importantly, the 
Jungian model differs in placing the “unconscious” psyche developmentally prior to 
the emergence of consciousness.  Here again, however, one encounters a semantic 
tangle because it does not really make sense to talk about an “unconscious” in the 
absence of consciousness and it is hard to say what consciousness is before it has a 
center, that is before it is self-conscious.  What Jung’s formulation really implies is 
that there is, prior to the deintegration of the ego, another realm of experience in 
which external apprehension of the world through the senses is not distinguished 
from “internal” fantasies.  This corresponds to Freud’s idea of fantasy as the “primary 
process” operating according to the “pleasure principle.”  The primary process, in 
other words, is imagination as an activity distinct from sensory perception and “reality 
testing.”   
 Moreover, it is through “reality testing,” in Freud’s terms, that the ego 
negotiates its relationship to the Real.  The ego functions in the first instance to 
negotiate the formation of inner images through physical (including linguistic or 
symbolic) interaction with the world.  It is in this ability to physically manipulate the 
world—by baby’s fist or by words—that tests the “reality” of the inner conceptions of 
the world (and for that matter the inner conceptions of itself—the self-images 
constructed by the ego).  Classical psychoanalysis tended to view “self-image” as 
“ego-ideal,” part of the superego, but Kohut and Jung permit a distinction to be 
made.  They permit us to see ego-ideals as later accretions to the mirroring selfobjects, 
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which may be assimilated into the ego’s Personae, the masks which it wears when it 
looks in the social mirror.   
 The ego-ideal, in other words, is a kind of stereotype, an identification with 
social representations.  Ego-ideals are, as the term “ideal” suggests, always positive 
images to be striven after.  The self-image, by contrast may be positive, negative, or 
ambivalent, depending upon whether the ego believes itself actually to have achieved 
the social idealization.  It is easy to see from this description that most egos will have 
a doubtful or negative self-image if they cannot succeed in believing that they live up 
to the ideal, and as ideals are inherently hard to attain, few of us do.   
 This dynamic of idealization and “failure,” which characterizes the Persona-
complex, is of profound significance in the construction of masculinity around such 
ideals as the athlete or the billionaire, for the imposition of such unobtainable ego-
ideals dooms most men to feel they have failed to be “real men.”  Feminist scholars 
have critiqued the fashion and pornography industries for their representations of 
idealized women, representations that leave most women feeling inferior to the 
standards of sexual beauty.  A similar dynamic occurs for men, only the standard is 
less often one of beauty (though that is increasingly a issue) than one of strength and 
the ability to dominate others—to “win.”  Moreover, any ego will be more strongly 
oppressed by the need to identify with an ego-ideal if its connection to Self is weak. 
Self and (M)Other 
 When Gilman says that “self” emerges in concert with an idea of “other, ” he 
means the ego emerges oppositionally to the Self (and particularly to Shadow and the 
contrasexual complex, as these develop).  In the first, prelinguistic phase of ego-
formation, it is the Self, as unconscious matrix of the psyche, which is perceived by 
the ego as Other.  This is not only because the contents of the unconscious emerge 
spontaneously and often frighteningly in dreams and fantasies, but also because the 
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Self is imaginally identified with the mother and the unitary reality of the pre-egoic 
state.  The root of the concept of alterity, thus, paradoxically, lies in the separation of 
ego and Self, infant and mother.  Neumann describes his term “unitary reality” very 
elegantly: 
The paradisal pre-ego time is also characterized as “existence in unitary 
reality,” because in it there is not yet any polarization between inner and 
outer, subject and object, ego and Self.  The state of total exteriorization, in 
which the child has not yet separated itself from the mother and from the 
world, may be regarded as existence in a total participation mystique, a 
universal extension of being, which constitutes the psychic amniotic fluid in 
which everything is still “suspended” and out of which the polarities of ego 
and Self, subject and object, person and world, have yet to crystallize.  
(“Narcissism” 108)   
 This is not to imply that the pre-Oedipal life of any infant is devoid of conflicts, 
only that there are enough moments of this “oceanic” bliss to establish it as a 
powerful memory once the ego begins (through conflict and frustrations) to realize 
that the world is not under its control.  Neumann’s point here is pitted against the 
Freudian formulation of “primary Narcissism” as an “objectless self love” placed in 
opposition to “mature” object-love; in fact, as Neumann insists, what is called primary 
Narcissism is also a “subjectless” love, a passive “totally-being-loved.”  “In the 
completely instinctual condition of pre-ego universal extension, in which the infant’s 
world, mother and own body are undifferentiated, total connectedness is as 
characteristic as total narcissism” (108). 
 This lack of differentiation accounts for the structure of stereotypes Gilman 
identifies:  an association of unconsciousness, mother (generalized as Woman), 
paradise, Nature, body, and love.  Susan Griffin’s Woman and Nature and Pornography 
and Silence articulate the extent of this associative web.  Griffin also demonstrates the 
polarity of such images:  love versus hate; paradise versus hell; pure versus dirty; 
spiritual love versus sexual love; natural versus unnatural; Nature versus Culture.  
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Any one term in the web can slip into any other and take positive or negative forms—
a reversion to the primary morality of “good” and “bad.”  As Griffin argues, this 
mastering set of polarities is always hierarchical and employed to justify male 
domination and violence as “natural.”  As Derrida and Barthes have both observed at 
length, this fantasy of ideology as Nature is one of the chief functions of myth.  The 
myth of male dominance over Nature and over the feminine, as well as over those 
dimensions of “self” seen to be feminine, is the underlying mythos of the technical 
man. 
The Persistence of Infantile Fear and Longing 
 Jung offers a theory of the underlying psychic structures to which each culture 
attaches its particular stereotypic images.  The actual archetypes or nuclei of these 
collections of cultural images emerge in the pre-Oedipal, pre-egoic stage of 
development.  They are proto-concepts, one might say, triggered by child-rearing 
practices and culturally transmitted practices of interacting with infants.  Part of what 
it means to say that such images as mother images or images of an evil Shadow are 
“archetypal” is that they are deeply mysterious and trigger memories of this very 
early stage of development, memories which are both frightening and alluring to the 
ego.  Culture, from this point of view, is not something that is only learned 
consciously as a child grows to adulthood; it is also learned unconsciously.  Cultural 
complexes form the basis of the individual’s complexes through historical processes.  
Moreover, social relations are always colored and shaped by projections of these 
complexes in personified forms.  The archetypal complexes are personified, 
autonomous sub-personalities and thus one may say that in a very real sense 
prosopopoeia is the master trope of psyche.13 
Dramatis Personae, Grandiosity, and Shame 
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 When Jung employs the concept of Self to embrace the whole psyche it is 
precisely because the whole dynamic of self-personification involves the shifting of 
libido and ego-identification among all the complexes of the psyche.  It is as if one 
actor were playing all the parts in a drama, whether the play be Oedipus Rex, Death of 
a Salesman, or How to Succeed in Business Without Really Trying.  Sometimes the self-
image corresponds to one’s outward identification with idealized role models—for 
example, in the case I will be studying, the idealized role of engineer, physician, or 
scientist.  Sometimes, however, the self-image corresponds to the Shadow, the 
internalized image-complex of “badness,” the jetsam of consciousness constantly 
shamed by society.  Sometimes the ego may identify with (or be usurped by) its 
Anima or Animus complex, its Mother complex, or Father complex.  Each of these 
identifications may, in turn, be valued by the ego as “good” or “bad,” that is, as a 
cause for self-glorification or for shame.   
 Further, these evaluations may be turned inside-out, as it were, by the process 
Jung called enantiodromia, in which a negative form in the unconscious is acted out in 
its opposite, positive, form.  Conscious grandiosity may be a compensation for 
unconscious shame.  Conscious hatred directed at an Other may be the projection of a 
repressed hatred of some aspect of the Self.  Excessive identification with a father-
ideal or the idealized brotherhood may compensate for unconscious feelings of 
masculine inadequacy.  Perhaps most commonly, the ego’s identifications with its 
fellow complexes are marked by unresolved ambivalence, and it is this ambivalence 
that one finds acted out in the stories I will be examining in Part II.  The Promethean 
technician-hero is, as the myth of Prometheus suggests, a tortured figure of 
fragmentation and loss, as well as one of glorious perseverance and technological 
change.   
 In the next chapter, I will pursue in more detail the implications of this model 
for the study of representations of masculinity and elaborate the importance of 
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locating the significance of archetypal images in a psyche, or soul, that is conceived as 
embodied.  The body serves as the most important mystery to the human 
imagination, and the myths I will discuss function most powerfully to examine the 
mystery of embodied consciousness. 
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Notes 
 
1 J. C. Smith’s book Psychoanalytic Roots of Patriarchy is one of the best recent attempts to 
bring Freud and Jung back together for the purposes of cultural criticism.  For a thoughtful 
feminist treatment, see Demaris Wehr’s Jung and Feminism. 
2 Nagy’s Philosophical Issues in the Psychology of C. G. Jung describes the connections to 
Kant, Plato, and Schopenhauer, as well as to Freud.  See also Robertson’s C. G. Jung and the 
Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious and Brooke’s Jung and Phenomenology for other considerations of his 
philosophical antecedents.  One should always be aware, however, that Jung repeatedly denied being a philosopher or 
equipped to answer the metaphysical questions raised by his empirical observations.  This caution on Jung’s part has 
been ignored by many of his fans. 
3 I am indebted to Michael Hancher for the analogy.  I should say, too, that I do not mean to 
disparage mystical experience.  I do not contend that the structural, cultural analysis I 
pursue “explains away” mysticism.  I simply want to avoid the reverse:  that is, letting 
appeals to a transcendental signified explain away the interplay among culture, 
representation, and imagination.  I would contend that mystical experience is the deepest 
form of belief in one’s myths, and that myths are themselves those structures that give 
human lives meaning.  Nevertheless, sometimes myths and the mystical experience of 
them are insidious sources of collective violence and atrocity.  A useful discussion of the 
ways Jungian thought can be applied to Eastern mysticism may be found in Spiegelman 
and Miyuki’s Buddhism and Jungian Psychology.   
4 The page references in this section are to Samuels et al. unless otherwise indicated.  This 
dictionary is an invaluable reference to anyone who wants to study Jungian theory and the 
evolution of its discourses, especially in relation to psychoanalysis and later psychological 
theories. 
5 Samuels, Shorter, and Plaut cite this incorrectly as ¶ 444 (135). 
6 I am correcting Samuels et al. in their spelling of Self without its capital initial—a very confusing practice.  
What is under discussion here is the formation of what Kohut calls selfobjects from the initial experience of 
interaction with the mother leading to the mirror stage.  What is being described is the pre-ego or coalescing 
ego-complex forming through a meeting of the archetype of the Self (the predisposition towards coherence) 
with the external experience of the mother as the first example of a coherent whole person.  This involves 
conceptualization of the mother as a whole body (as opposed to what Klein has called “part-objects” such as 
the breast) and as a personality.  In other words Neumann suggests that the formative ego’s first experience 
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of the archetypal Self is an “external” experience, that the mother projects an image of wholeness onto the 
infant and this in turn is introjected by the infant as a numinous, godlike quality in the mother.  This leads to 
Neumann’s very detailed elaboration of the Great Mother as a figure comprising and standing behind 
religious conceptions of goddesses (female deity) and of Nature (the deification of the maternal environment 
extended synechdochally to the whole of the environment). 
7 Arguably, the Child complex is usually gendered, but there are cases in which the quality of 
being a child, a not-adult, is more important than gender.  The recognition of size and 
power differences probably precede recognition of gender and, indeed, are probably pre-
verbal, so that the Child archetype may be defined as that predisposition to forming a 
distinct image of childhood in opposition to adulthood.  It is easy to see, however, that 
most of such a formation must be social and retrospective, so that the contents of a Child 
complex are organized throughout life, but include the subject’s earliest experiences of 
innocence and powerlessness. 
8 See Jung’s Symbols of Transformation for the texts in which Jung first tried to articulate his revision of Freud’s 
libido concept, but also see Peter Homans’s Jung in Context, esp. 68-9.  Homans analyzes Symbols of 
Transformation as the frenetic product of the breaking of Jung’s narcissistic idealizing transference with 
Freud.  The claims are “grandiose” in this sense, that Jung’s mind was leaping ahead toward an 
comprehensive re-evaluation of psychology as a revisioning of religious thought.  Jung would continue to 
work along these lines, but without the anxious self-absorption of this work in which he was unconsciously 
preoccupied with validating himself in opposition to the idealized Freud as selfobject (in Kohutian terms).   
“In Symbols of Transformation Jung grandiosely and narcissistically idealized his own mental processes.  In 
doing so he urged upon the reader his conviction that his own ‘mythological fantasies’ provided the key to 
the meaning of the past, and he fused his own mental processes with ancient cultural productions.  He thus 
demonstrated a lack of experiential perspective upon his mental life at the time…” (Homans 67). 
9 A fascinating, if bewildering, explication and mapping of Frye’s system may be found in  Robert 
D. Denham’s Northrop Frye and Critical Method.   
10 This is, in fact, the kind of structure one sees Neumann employing in his complicated 
mapping of the Great Mother complex. 
11 In some—perhaps many—cases, of course, the fetal experience might conceivably include feelings of 
deprivation and even attack if the infant’s mother through consumption of alcohol or cocaine, or through 
illness becomes a “hostile” environment.  Obviously one is in the realm of very tenuous speculation when 
one tries to imagine intrauterine experiences leaving some trace on the psyche, but to place the beginning of 
psychic development arbitrarily at birth divorces psyche from body in a way that is inconsistent with the 
theory.  My point is simply that the “fall” from the pre-Oedipal paradise cannot be located at any single point 
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in the developmental chronology, but must be seen as a cumulative realization spanning the growth of the 
infant nervous system. 
12  It cannot be said to be “complete” even at this point in any absolute sense of the development of the ego and 
its functioning, but it can be said to be distinguished from the Self as the rest of the psyche.  It has, in other 
words, distinguished itself. 
13 A recent and interesting study on prosopopoeia is J. Hillis Miller’s Versions of Pygmalion.   
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Chapter II 
Masculinities 
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Men and women may be born with different reproductive organs, but 
societies make femininity and masculinity along with the norms that 
determine who meets the criteria of womanhood and manhood at any 
particular time and place and for a specific social group.  By the same 
token, sexuality is socially constructed.  We can never take terms like 
‘sexual’, ‘masculine’ or ‘feminine’ as either stable or self-evident.  The job of 
the historian is precisely to recover the fragile and fleeting significances 
they take on.  At the same time, however, there are striking historical 
continuities, held in place partly through the language of myth, literature 
and art, as well as of law, politics and kinship.  To say that something is 
socially constructed does not make it inherently evanescent, it merely 
signals that we are speaking not of a (natural) given but of a (human) 
construct.  (Jordanova 4) 
(1) The Essence of Masculinity 
 In the last chapter, I laid out some basic premises and terms of the 
psychological analysis I employ in this book.  In this chapter, I would like to focus a 
step more closely on my object of study, the dynamics of masculine psychology.  Part 
of my purpose in this chapter is to address the problem of essentialism, especially as 
it has encumbered Jungian thought.  As my discussion of archetypes in the Chapter I 
indicates, the misuse of Anima and Animus as a way to reinforce this essentialist 
myth is inconsistent with Jung’s actual theory.  The fact that Jung did not seem to 
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fully realize this is a testament to the power of gender as a naturalizing myth.  In this 
chapter I will look in more detail at this problem and point toward a revisionary 
theory of the contrasexual complex.  This discussion will lay the groundwork and 
clarify the terms for my analysis of particular figures of Promethean Desire in Part II.     
 Roper and Tosh in Manful Assertions have suggested that for the historian of 
masculinity, manliness can never be defined by itself as something simply written on 
the body by the hand of Nature.  It exists always in relation to the Other and always 
in relation to men’s social power (1-2). They point to the  
crucial problem… that women are almost entirely absent from [recent 
historical work on all-male institutions] seemingly on the assumption that 
masculinity takes on a sharper focus when women are removed from the 
scene… In the literature about Victorian public schools, for instance, there 
is scant acknowledgment that the typical schoolboy had been moulded by 
his mother or nanny for some years before he entered the school, and that 
feminine absence conditioned his emotional development during 
adolescence.  In a similar vein, historians of the scouting movement tend to 
be much more interested in Baden-Powell’s stress on imperialism and class 
deference than his insistence that boys attending day schools be removed 
from the feminine atmosphere of home.  (3) 
 The elision of women and the domestic sphere from the field of study 
particularly obscures the connection between a gendered identity and one’s access to 
power and agency within society.  The “shifting spotlight on Reason, Feeling, Purity 
and Athleticism within ‘manly’ discourse before 1914 reflected not just the play of 
ideas, but a contested understanding of the sources of masculine power” (Roper and 
Tosh 4).  Even within the male-dominated public sphere, men’s power is always 
structurally defined in relation to dominated groups, not merely in relation to “peers” 
and abstractions.  Moreover, social power is exercised not only in the privileged 
public sphere but also within the domestic realm. 
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 Still further, I would stress that the psychological corollary to social power is 
desire and any history of gender must attend to what historians of homosexuality 
have called “the expression and organization of desire.”  The shifting patterns of such 
expression do not constitute a linear evolution, but rather a series of historical 
moments and cultural contextualizations (Roper and Tosh 5).  In the nineteenth 
century, masculinity is increasingly implicated in the institutionalization of 
heterosexuality in the Victorian family, creating a spiral of tension resulting in a 
“medical and legal onslaught on homosexuality” that marshaled science and its 
Nature in the service of defining masculine identity. 
 Historians may write about “male dominance” or “patriarchy” in the abstract, 
but many men are not in fact “naturally” inclined toward dominance.  As a 
consequence they experience the culture of male dominance as a norm to which they 
must conform and aspire, or risk becoming social outcasts, non-men.  In this way 
patriarchal social order oppresses men and alienates them from their own feelings as 
it also oppresses and alienates women.  The beneficiaries of patriarchy often have 
highly complex motives for their complicity in the system.  Generalizing about men 
and their relationships to patriarchal power, or to the symbolic father, is less 
interesting than looking at particular men, or particular representations of this 
continual struggle of fathers and sons with their desires.   
British colonial rule was partly justified by a conception of English 
manhood as a civilizing force.  ‘Courage, independence, veracity’, qualities 
which Thomas Babington Macaulay found so lacking among Bengalis in 
the 1830s, were precisely those then regarded as integral to manliness in 
Britain and which it was the imperial mission to instill in lesser breeds.  At 
the same time the imagining of black masculinity was shaped by the 
multiple repressions of the dominant form of masculinity in Britain at that 
time.  The negative attributes of lasciviousness and idleness, which the 
colonizers commonly fastened on to both Indians and Africans, represented 
a projection of their own unacknowledged desires.  (Roper and Tosh 14) 
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 There is not one, unitary masculinity, but rather a spectrum of shifting 
configurations.  Clearly even within a particular culture there are variations over 
time, across classes, and from one ethnic or racial group to another.  At the same time, 
the gender system functions to impose a unitary norm of gender on individuals as an 
instrument of control.  To accuse someone of not being a “real man” has long been a 
powerful tool of manipulation, condemnation, and even a justification for execution.  
Thus, the idea of gender is an essentialist idea, its purpose is to suggest that there is 
some pure and natural form of masculinity and femininity comprising two proper 
spheres that are separate and incommensurable.   
 I do not want to reproduce that essentialism by claiming to describe a unitary 
and “true” masculine psychology.  My exploration of the particular representations of 
the technical man will, nevertheless, start with some of the general structures that 
have been identified by scholars studying white, bourgeois, European and American 
masculinity.  Without ignoring the importance of other configurations, I will argue 
that these structures are extremely widespread and may be described as archetypal in 
the sense that they arise from very basic social forms and generate variant myths. 
 One such structure that may be universal in patriarchal cultures is the 
definition of femininity as subordinate to masculinity.  This hierarchical 
incommensurability is bolstered by a mythology that is continuously being updated 
and re-argued, but which goes back at least as far as the Adam and Eve myth, or the 
many other creation myths that posit an original man and woman.  James Kavanagh 
defines ideology (following Althusser) as “a system of representations, perceptions, 
and images that precisely encourages men and women to ‘see’ their specific place in a 
historically peculiar social formation as inevitable, natural, and a necessary function 
of the ‘real’ itself” (310).  Clearly, a gender system is such an ideology.  But the stories 
I will examine do not merely justify and reinforce male dominance.  They also explore 
its unconscious anxieties and contradictions. 
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(2) Images and Ideologies 
 The psychodynamics of figures like the technician-hero must be understood in 
terms of social organization and power as well as in terms of childhood and infantile 
desire and anxiety.  Kavanagh defines the kind of study required at the intersection of 
psychological fantasy, artistic representations of masculine power, and the social 
practice of that power:  
Ideological analysis in literary or cultural study… is concerned with the 
institutional and/or textual apparatuses that work on the reader’s or 
spectator’s imaginary conceptions of self and social order in order to call or 
solicit  (or “interpellate,” as Althusser puts it, using a quasi-legal term that 
combines the senses of “summons” and “hail”) him/her into a specific 
form of social ‘reality’ and social subjectivity.  (310)   
 The sociological approach to literature looks at forms of social interaction.  
Images solicit us unconsciously to act out social roles, to believe the scripts we speak.  
David Freedberg in The Power of Images argues that the study of images—sculptural, 
painted, etched, written—cannot be thought of as simply the study of representation 
because we do not experience images simply as representations.  This is most obvious 
in the case of religious images.  A statue of the Virgin Mary, for example, evokes a 
response “predicated on the assumption of presence, not on the fact of representation.  
In such cases, what is represented becomes fully present, indeed representation is 
subsumed by presence” (Freedberg 28).   
 Derrida’s critique of the myth of presence in the “phallogocentric” language of 
patriarchal culture asserts that an ideology of the presence of an authoritative speaker 
masks the rhetorical nature of scientific and philosophical discourses.  While this is 
true, and justly exposed as one of the instruments of masculine power, “presence” is 
also an integral part of everyday life and communication.  Like essentializing and 
overgeneralization, the myth of presence in representation is part of our mental 
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economy and it is hard to imagine how, outside of rare philosophic moments, one 
could dispense with it.  The feeling of presence evoked by an image, the merging of 
image and what is being represented, is perhaps the most basic operation of the 
psyche.  It is the process of imagination in precisely the sense William Blake used this 
word  It is through imagination that humans can have not merely rudimentary 
memory as other animals have, but their sense of history and sense of a future.  
Imagination is the root of signification—the ability to merge the signifier and 
signified, as in the image of the Virgin and the imagined person of the Virgin herself.  
It is also the root of rational thought, the process of predicting consequences, the 
logical faculty, even the mathematical faculty.  This is why Blake devotes such 
passion to an insistence on the priority of imagination over reason. 
 As analysts, we mistake ourselves if we ignore the intense reality of Mythos.  
Sometimes the sense of presence is deceptive and dangerous because it is always a 
form of projection, but projection is not something we can hope to overcome by 
cultivating reason.  Let me give an example.  In the case of the statue of the Virgin 
cited by Freedberg, the viewer responds to her as if she were a person, an agent.  
From the psychoanalytic point of view this is easy to label as projection.  The signified 
is more a cultural construct, a deity imagined into life within the psyche, than she is 
(or was) a real person.  But calling the feeling of presence in such a religious 
experience “projection” drains all the blood from it.  Such a use of psychological 
terms, as Jung realized, is merely the assertion of one myth over another:  the mythos 
of scientific mastery over a numinous experience which contradicts the materialist 
foundations upon which the scientific mythos bases its authority.   
 Let me extend the example. What is the nature of the sense of presence when 
one looks at a statue on a tomb of some actual person now dead?  In that case the 
presence one feels is again projected, but this time from memory, which seems more 
indexical than symbolic, that is, the memory traces have an actual, past, physical 
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connection to the real object they come to represent.  Like footprints examined by 
Sherlock Holmes, memories have been left behind by a real presence.  But what, then, 
is the difference between the feeling of having experienced the presence of the Virgin 
and the feeling of having experienced the presence of ones deceased mother (for 
example)?  Or what if the effigy on the tomb is of one’s great-grandmother and the 
indexical traces of memory exist in other people’s minds?  Further, what is the 
difference between that and the sense of presence one has when looking at a 
photograph of one’s beloved?  Or when thinking of him or her?  The mental image 
itself evokes a feeling of presence.  When this is connected through the eye to a verbal 
or visual image, the feeling is intensified.   
 It should be apparent that this process is ubiquitous in our daily lives and that 
it is not possible to draw a neat line between Lacan’s two realms, the Symbolic and 
the Real.  Finally, one must admit that even when a person is present in the flesh, we 
are imagining them to be a person based upon the perception of so many outward, 
physical shapes and motions.  A spark of intellect passes between the eyes of two 
persons—be they lovers or strangers, father and son, mother and daughter—and 
brings them to life.  In each case the spark of recognition is a repetition of the 
mirroring of the mother and other adults which sparks the formation of the subject-
ego during what Lacan calls the mirror stage.   
 Mirroring is not merely a stage in the development of subjectivity; it is the very 
fabric of psyche, a process in which we project subjectivity and presence onto those 
we meet and receive it back.  Thus Lacan’s Imaginary is likewise not something in our 
infantile past or easily separate from the Symbolic register.  The Imaginary is a 
continuous operation of the psyche that may fool us into fantasies, may create 
shadow projections of hatred and bigotry or sexual projections of love and attraction, 
but one which also creates us and society in every moment, in every glance or 
memory. 
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 This is still Althusser’s interpellation, but it is far more intimate a matter than is 
suggested when the agent of interpellation is described as a “social form” or 
“institution.”  These dead structures live inside us—in our souls, passing through our 
eyes and tongues—as much or more than they can be said to exist “outside” on their 
own.  The sociological imagination that locates institutions and social structures—
patriarchy for example—in the air between individuals is a useful mythos, but also 
misleading.  We have no academic discourse that can fully describe the embodied 
passage of presence, personhood, Persona, or social power without abstracting it.  So, 
the best we can do is refuse to give over our allegiance to any single metaphor, any 
single image as the definitive description, and instead cling to a recognition of 
abstract social systems, but at the same time embrace in our minds the intimate, 
sensual play of mirroring in which all such systems have their material existence.  
Each of us is made up of a certain play of light in the eyes of another human being. 
(3) Mastering the Mother—Mastering the Body 
 The medical doctor in European and American culture is one of the primary 
technician-heroes precisely because he (for usually physicians have been men) is 
master over bodies.  Emily Martin, in her study of medical images of women’s bodies, 
has illustrated the pervasive association of the physical body with disorder.  This is 
particularly the case with women’s bodies, which are defined as deviant from the 
male norm.  By projecting bodily disorder onto women and assuming the doctor’s 
position as the observing and omniscient subject whose gaze unveils Nature’s secrets, 
the technical man performs a sleight of hand that divests him of his own body and its 
“disorderly” interior. 
 I follow such scholars as Catherine Gallagher and Thomas Laqueur in seeing 
the body as a socially shaped and shifting cultural formation written imaginally upon 
the physical body.  At the same time, the physical body is the very basis of the 
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Imaginary and our experience of its rhythms and urges, of hormones, endorphins, 
blood sugar, and adrenaline forms the pre-verbal substrate of our consciousness.  This 
substrate is what Julia Kristeva has called the chora.  As the choric body-unconscious, 
this aspect of the individual is repressed in masculine gendering, for the body and its 
embarrassing, messy, vulnerability are associated with the mother as the boy’s ego 
breaks away from its primary union with her. 
 Susan Griffin has studied the repression of the body and its erotic nature as the 
underlying dynamic of pornography and her clarity is worth quoting at length.  
Discussing the Oedipal realization that the mother's immediate, bodily power is 
subordinate to the father's abstract, social power, Griffin explains: 
[S]he is now less than the infant first perceived her to be.  The mother 
appears to be a sham, her power is secondary; and therefore the knowledge 
of her power—that bodily knowledge inseparable from one’s own 
embodied nature—also appears to be a frightening sham.  
    When [the son] first learns he is male, he learns that he is different from 
his mother, and will never take on the power which emanates from her 
body.  He cannot give birth or sustain life.  He may even imagine he cannot 
instill desire.  He loses a sense of his own natural power.  When he 
discovers he is not like his mother, he must fear he has lost a part of 
himself.  Culture accentuates this difference, but to this loss culture brings a 
means to perceive the mother as the lesser one, to reject and humiliate her 
as the son has felt himself humiliated.     
    Yet still the son must bear, in his inner soul, the same conflict which his 
sister faces.  Either he hates a lost self or he denies his true nature.  For he is 
human, and he is not really other than his mother; he shares with her the 
power of instinct, the powers of bodily desire, a powerful bestial love of 
being.  And he cannot ever be content to be without this shared nature, this 
lost self.   
     Only he has made this lost self into a phantom.  For culture has 
irrevocably identified the human qualities of femininity, of instinct, of the 
knowledge of the body, with beings who are “other.”  And because the son 
cannot reclaim the power of this knowledge as his own, a part of himself 
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which he does not recognize as himself comes back to haunt him.  He is 
terrified of women.  The bully is terrified of his “weak” victims.  The mind 
is terrified by the body.  What he has lost to himself exists for him only as 
nightmare, a continual and silent presence which is above all ominous.  
(Pornography and Silence 146-7) 
 Such a foundation of radical separation from the mother and her association 
with everything “non-rational” including the boy’s own body, explains the “fragility” 
Roper and Tosh locate in “masculinity at the psychic level” which contrasts with its 
apparent power and hegemony at the social level.  It suggests one reason for men’s 
repression of their feelings of vulnerability.  Exhorted to “be a big boy” or to “be a 
man,” one is forced to deny one’s bodily vulnerability, even mortality, and a large 
part of the socialization of boys across classes and cultures, involves more or less 
severe rites of bodily denial and control.  From ritualized fighting and violent sports, 
to subincision, masculine gendering involves the fantasy of immortality, and mastery 
over bodies.   
 The fact that many, if not all, boys still feel themselves to be vulnerable, to have 
weaknesses and fears, even after their initiation into manliness partially explains why 
social dominance is not always (or even perhaps usually) experienced as a sense of 
power in individual men.  “Indeed,” as Roper and Tosh point out, “the very process 
of acquiring social dominance may be subjectively experienced as oppression” (15).  
Moreover, having been granted dominant status over women, a man is nevertheless 
almost always still himself subordinated to other men, either because of his age, his 
class, his rank in a military or administrative hierarchy, or his exclusion from one or 
another brotherhood of power.  He is surrounded by imperatives, such as the 
imperative to produce offspring, and especially sons, to demonstrate his virility, or 
the imperative not to show fear. 
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 To address the constructed nature of gender requires an engagement with the 
imaginal dimension of the body, for it is gender’s appeal to physical sex that makes 
its claim to naturalness so powerful.  It is unarguable that biological differences 
between members of each sex have an effect on the psyche of men and women.  What 
is still being argued today, as it was in the nineteenth century, is which, if any, of the 
apparent psychological differences are determined mechanically by the body’s organs, 
hormones, and sexual functioning.   
 This question is complicated by the fact that the very mechanical, medical 
model of the body which generates such a search for “mechanisms” and “hard-
wired” behaviors is itself a product of the fabric of masculinity.  For the ideal of man 
as machine is intimately related to the technician master of machines.  The mastery 
over Nature exemplified by the scientist and engineer is made possible by a belief that 
Nature is a machine.  Self-mastery is made possible by devotion to a mechanical, 
disciplinary model of the body and the mind.   
(4) The Fortress Ego and the Brotherhood 
 The obsession with difference that adheres in the ideology of masculinity is, on 
an unconscious level, a denial of the ego’s dependence upon Others for mirroring 
(and indeed for physical health).  On another, more conscious level, the obsession 
with difference expresses itself in a desire to be mirrored by others who are conceived 
as the same.  In practice, this desire for sameness is the desire of dominant groups of 
men who exclude others (women and other groups of men) from their brotherhood.  
J. C. Smith, whose mapping of masculine complexes I will return to shortly, calls such 
elites Heraclean Brotherhoods, and it is this type of muscular and violent heroism that 
is analyzed by Klaus Theweleit in Male Fantasies.  Theweleit emphasizes the 
“hysterical” nature of masculinity as defined in the soldatischer Mann, or “soldierly 
man” venerated by the German exponents of fascism immediately preceding the rise 
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of Hitler.  These men were obsessed by the desire to be uniform, solid, rocklike, and 
unassailable.  They erected a fantasy of their bodies as muscular armor against the 
chaotic “masses” clamoring outside their racial brotherhood (Theweleit II: ch. 2).   
 Anthony Easthope invokes a similar image when he compares the masculine 
ego to a fortress drawn by Leonardo DaVinci.  This bastion consists of several 
concentric walls of stone commanded from a central watch tower.  The similarity of 
this image to Foucault’s description of the panopticon model for the ideal prison in 
Discipline and Punish is striking and instructive.  The commanding gaze of the ego in 
its tower is, in Easthope’s inversion of the panopticon, trapped within the walls it has 
erected.  Such a conception suggests that paranoia is, as it were, the leitmotif of the 
myth of ruling-class masculinity.  It is Theweleit’s “soldier-male,” a figure founded on 
paranoia, isolation, fortification, and enmity, that is the core of the myth of the hero, 
at least since the advent of mechanized warfare in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries.  Such a figure is not only part of the dream of mechanical man but it is also 
part of the nineteenth century’s veneration of discipline and duty. 
 At the same time, such a soldierly hero and “man of steel” shares with the 
older mythic hero that trait Jung and Campbell have both emphasized:  that is, a 
desire to separate from the mother, to conquer the monsters of the unconscious, and 
to maintain the walls between a masculine Culture and a feared and feminized 
Nature.  His lust for conquest is aimed at both possessing the feminine (as a prize, a 
mark of manhood) and to conquer the omnipotent Great Mother who threatens to 
engulf him. 
  The figures of the scientist and technician are icons of masculinity as the 
powerful controller and interpreter of Nature.  Not only is masculinity mythologized 
as natural, it is rationalized (tautologically) as the authoritative definer of what 
constitutes Nature.  It also, in an even tighter circularity, rationalizes itself as Reason.  
The scientist-male and the engineer-male are brother-figures, one might say, to 
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Theweleit’s soldier-male.  Each is an image of the ego’s isolation and mastery and of 
its obsessive desire to solidify boundaries thereby maintaining its own separateness.   
 The kinship of these heroes should not be surprising, given the historical 
linkage between engineering and militarism.  Indeed all our structures of hierarchical 
command and discipline originate in military institutions.  The mentality of warfare 
and violence against bodies perpetrated in the name of a masculine brotherhood is 
the mentality from which modern science and technology were born.  Antipathy 
against Nature and against the body as its representative (or representation) lies at the 
heart of the hegemonic masculine complex in western patriarchy.  In the figure of the 
technical man, transcendent mastery over Nature is conceived as the epitome of 
Nature.  Such desire for transcendence is the flight from a fear of Nature and the body 
as that part of a man which is Nature.  The striving to separate mind from body, spirit 
from flesh, is one of the pervasive archetypal motifs of the Promethean technician and 
one which renders him so irrationally destructive. 
 Klaus Theweleit in Male Fantasies has analyzed various forms of personal 
narrative (letters, diaries, semi-autobiographical novels) and popular images (posters, 
portraits, post cards, cartoons) connected to members of the German fascist 
organization, the Freikorps, in the period just before the rise of Hitler.  He examines 
the often grisly shadow projections and fantasies of men raised in a typically 
disciplinary form of masculine education.  Militarism and the mentality of the “soldier-
male” become the epitome of masculinity as it is shaped in the context of an 
increasingly totalitarian technologism.   
 The first volume of Male Fantasies, focusing on representations of women in 
connection to water, floods, and both idealized and demonized female figures, 
articulates modern expressions of the Anima and the Great Mother complexes.  In the 
images of the angelic nurse versus the working-class gorgon one can see how the 
complexes Jung termed archetypal are formed out of particular images developed 
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within a culture’s representational system.  These are images and narratives of an 
abstracted Woman—the “eternal feminine”—employed as a vessel for men’s soul-
image—that is, for the image his unconscious uses to represent itself, the mediatrix 
between the ego and the larger Self.  The figures of women which became stereotypes 
of the Nazi mythos, are paradoxically interdependent, the dark with the light, the 
soul-eater and the soul-savior.  Similarly the looming figure of the father as source of 
manly discipline and warrior virtue is polarized into a figure charged with erotic 
attraction and a figure charged with terror, masochism, and loneliness.   
 As masculinization reproduces and enforces these rifts between male egos and 
their unconscious complexes, denying their potential for feeling, intimacy, bodily 
jouissance, tenderness, submissiveness, and vulnerability, men will always feel 
ambivalence at some level, even if it is only in their nightmares and the hysterical 
messages of their tortured bodies.  Theweleit’s analysis suggests that the processes of 
masculinization at work in Western culture (and probably elsewhere) are processes 
which victimize everyone involved.  The patriarchs are victimized and brutalized 
(emotionally if not physically) when they are boys; they in turn exercise male power 
over their sons and perform acts of violence upon them—most horrifically in the 
institution of war—in much the same way as they perform acts of violence and 
aggression against women.  Such violence is aimed at the “woman within” as 
Theweleit puts it. 
  In the following sections I want to review Jung’s theory of the “woman 
within” in its oppositional relationship to the “man within,” the complexes of Anima 
and Animus. 
(5) Anima 
 As Jung defined it most simply, the Anima complex consists of the images of 
women carried in a man’s unconscious.  An Anima figure—in dreams, literature, 
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advertising—is a particular image of Woman (as a collective myth) which seems to 
represent the whole of the sex or its essence.  The operative word here is seems.  The 
Anima functions in the collective psyche and in the individual to integrate and 
organize the many separate images of women in the person’s culture and in his or her 
experience into an elusive personification of the mythical feminine.   
 As I indicated in Chapter I, Jung and many Jungians make the mistake of 
assuming that masculinity and femininity are unitary states of being, biologically 
determined and therefore natural.  Although Jung occasionally seems to have 
glimpsed the implications of his description of genders as complexes, more often he 
merely reproduces the assumptions of his time.  His theory was only radical enough 
to suggest that in addition to a natural masculinity that men had to express in order 
to be psychically healthy, they also possessed an “inner woman” with whom their 
egos had to be in relationship.  He recognized the projective aspects of the feminine 
complex but failed to fully grasp that it was introjected in the first place from the 
subject’s culture.   
 Jung’s Romantic predilection led him to embrace the myth of the “eternal 
feminine” as if this were something that could be simply described and found in all 
cultures across history.  It was not until the advent of the modern feminist movement, 
in the decade after Jung’s death, that some analytical psychologists began to try to 
reformulate the Anima/Animus theory and set aside its more obviously sexist 
fantasies.  Despite the ongoing debate, there has been, to my knowledge, little attempt 
to reformulate the theory of complexes and archetypes as I have attempted to do, 
bringing the model into line with current theories of cultural construction and 
representation.  Because of this, I want to take a closer look at the essentialist problem 
and some of Jung’s statements. 
 The Anima complex, like all complexes, is structured on polarities and 
diametric oppositions.  Not only is feminine always defined in opposition to 
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masculine, but each of these is internally split into idealized and demonized forms.  
The Animus is defined as the internalized image of masculinity or men in the 
unconscious of women.  If we conceive of the collective unconscious and the 
collective consciousness operating not in some transcendental realm, but in the 
cultural environment, as I suggested in Chapter I, then certainly both sexes must 
internalize an image of the masculine and of the feminine.  The difference between 
men and women lies in which of these two complexes is assimilated to the Persona, 
which is taken up by the ego as its socially conditioned mask.   
 Current understanding of the socially constructed character of sexuality itself 
indicates clearly that this process is not easy or simple but often involves considerable 
coercion on the part of parents and other social authorities and considerable fear and 
shame on the part of the individual.  Homophobia and the heterosexual imperative 
were, in the nineteenth century, as today, powerfully directed at men, so that a fear of 
not only homosexual intercourse, but even of masturbation was promoted with an 
intensity one can only call vicious.  The coercive character of male socialization as 
men and the always imperfect identification with masculine ideals (partly because the 
ideals themselves contain contradictory elements) leaves a surplus of the masculine 
complex, as it were, which remains an unconscious object of desire for men just as 
much as for women.  The heterosexual imperative forces this internalized lover to be 
approached through safe forms, such as brotherly love, friendship, camaraderie, and 
so forth.  The Animus, I am arguing, is a part of male psychology as much as it is of 
female.  In each sex they will take various forms—that is, the archetypal images and 
scripts that make up the complex will differ—but the complex remains an inescapable 
structural element with which the ego must come to some relationship. 
 Similarly, women maintain an erotic attachment to an internalized complex of 
the feminine as well as to an image-complex of the masculine, but the weight of the 
heterosexual imperative causes them to focus more consciously upon the contrasexual 
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complex while assimilating parts of the Anima complex to their Persona.  Other parts 
(and some of the same parts) may be projected on to same-sex friends, sisters, or 
lovers.  Indeed in the case of either sex, experiences of friends and family members 
will contribute to the formation of the images in their personal Anima and Animus 
complex, at the same time that idealized forms from literature, fairy tales, and the 
visual arts will be introjected.   
 The ego-Anima relationship and the ego-Animus relationship are not, 
however, (in either sex) symmetrical.  The fact that the Anima, in a sense contains (or 
at least is connected to) the Mother complex endows it with a different quality than 
the Animus containing its Father complex.  As the research of Nancy Chodorow has 
suggested, the mother’s imago is internalized before all other images as the primary 
erotic object.  Indeed at an even earlier stage, in the pre-Oedipal unitary reality, she is 
internalized as a selfobject undistinguished from the Self.  She is associated, as I have 
suggested, with the body, with Nature, and with various infantile fantasies of 
engulfment and deprivation.   
 The Father complex is—generally speaking—distinguished somewhat later, in 
the Oedipal stage, as a representative of social power to which the mother is 
subordinate.  This is, of course, to speak generally of the effects of a patriarchal social 
structure on these images and the meanings associated with them.  The father’s 
relative physical and emotional distance (if not absence) from the infant in its early 
years of experience creates a father imago which tends to be more abstract, more 
associated with transcendence, power, and freedom of motion.  The mother, by 
contrast, tends to be associated in the first instance with bodily warmth, food, 
comfort, erotic or sexual pleasure, closeness and constancy.  Again, this associative 
web will obviously vary according to the particular behavior of the infant’s actual 
mother, the father’s (or others’) involvement in caring for the child’s physical and 
emotional needs.  
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 The result of this asymmetry is that the mother imago—and because of this, the 
Anima—is almost always the primary object of erotic feeling (in each sex) while the 
father is the object of other, more distant, kinds of awe.  This is especially true of the 
typical Victorian patriarch whose involvement with his children was often distant 
and stern, if not actually violent.  The lack of erotic touch and nurturance from the 
father with whom the young boy is supposed to identify, and the emphasis on the 
father’s role as disciplinarian and lawgiver is, in part, what leads to the “father 
hunger” that has been observed by writers such as Robert Bly in a later generation of 
men.  Although cultural differences are significant, the root problem of father hunger 
is the structural taboo against homoeroticism, for if the father cannot be permitted to 
be an object of tenderness and love for his son, but only of distanced respect, or even 
sportive camaraderie, then as the boy grows to manhood and ultimately loses his 
father as his ego-ideal, the man will find it difficult to bring his ego into relationship 
to his Father-complex.  Ironically, it is often at the same time he becomes a father 
himself that a man is faced with this longing for a part of himself he has never been 
able to embrace. 
 Freud’s emphasis on the importance of the Oedipal triangle for the 
socialization of boys into masculinity, proposes that the father is associated in our 
culture with authority (even authoritarianism) and Law. This makes him radically 
Other from the young child’s standpoint in a way that the mother seldom is.  Even 
after the Oedipal separation, when a boy withdraws his primary identification from 
his mother and transfers it to his father, he is still caught in the sense of distance the 
figure of authority possesses.  He must associate himself—his own Persona—to the 
ideal of male authority—command, distance, violent action.  A woman, even as she is 
required by the Oedipal stage of development to transfer her erotic attachment from 
her mother to her father—from women to men—is at the same time told to be like her 
mother (or at any rate like the idealized archetypal mother of stories, fairy tales, 
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myths, and television).  To the extent that her actual mother invites her love, the 
daughter may continue to love and be erotically close to her mother in ways that the 
son cannot, unless he is able to endure being called a sissy or a “momma’s boy.”  For 
boys, to “be a man” has less to do with pursuing women as sexual or erotic objects 
than it does with pursuing a masculine ideal of independence, toughness, and power. 
From the retention of preoedipal attachments to their mother, growing girls 
come to define and experience themselves as continuous with others; their 
experience of self contains more flexible or permeable ego boundaries.  
Boys come to define themselves as more separate and distinct, with a 
greater sense of rigid ego boundaries and differentiation.  The basic 
feminine sense of self is connected to the world, the basic masculine sense 
of self is separate.  (Chodorow 169) 
 Chodorow notes that girls continue to experience themselves as “involved in 
issues of merging and separation, and in an attachment characterized by primary 
identification” (166).  This does not mean that women have weaker ego-boundaries or 
that rigid boundaries are a “strength.”  On the contrary, Chodorow suggests that the 
permeability of boundaries of the ego makes possible “a stronger basis for 
experiencing another’s needs or feelings as one’s own” (167).  She speculates that 
“[d]enial of sense of connectedness and isolation of affect may be more characteristic 
of masculine development and may produce a more rigid and punitive superego” 
resistant to “persuasion and the judgments of others” (169).  The social practice of 
mother-only nurturance of infants and the strict gender oppositions within Western 
culture set up an ego-structure in boys that is problematical even when not precisely 
pathological.  It tends to charge the male ego with fears of sexual inadequacy and 
associations of the beloved with the mother.  Moreover, it produces an ego that faces 
a threat to its status as “good” whenever it tries to connect to anyone else 
emotionally.  This basic structure can, obviously, take many forms. 
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 The asymmetry of the Oedipal stage may thus be said to produce an 
asymmetry in the Anima and Animus.  Because the Mother imago always retains a 
trace of that first unitary reality in which Mother and Self are undistinguished, the 
Anima operates paradoxically both as an image of Self and as an image of Other, 
leaving men with a disproportionate sense of alienation and longing.  This explains, 
to some extent, Jung’s confusing idea of the Anima as “soul-image.”  The “soul-
image” seems to be a product of alienation from one’s body and one’s unconscious 
roots.  Jung believed that men needed this image as a mediator between their egos 
and the unconscious.  This makes some sense if expressed in terms of the 
masculinized ego’s more rigid boundaries and more insistent preoccupation with 
control over feelings and emotions.  Jung was very concerned with what he perceived 
as modern man’s loss of his soul, that is, loss of relationship to the unconscious as the 
source of meaning.  It is this concern that has been taken up as the central doctrine of 
popular Jungianism:  the need for a soulless patriarchal culture to recover the 
feminine. 
 Part of the confusion of Jung’s association of Anima with “soul-image” is that 
psyche is itself the Greek for soul.  Thus, it is easy to misunderstand Jung to mean that 
the Anima actually is the Christian theological concept of “soul.”  Such an assertion is 
clearly not consistent with the rest of Jung’s theory.  Rather the traditional association 
of the idealized image of woman in men’s dreams or in religious art demonstrates 
that the Anima complex (as the introjected cultural ideal of woman) has been used by 
men to represent the essence of psyche, particularly, as Jung maintains, the 
unconscious.  But the import of this apropriation is not obvious until one examines 
the Christian concept of soul in its historical context.   
(6) Sex, Soul, and the Man-Machine 
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 Jamake Highwater has explicated this history at length in her excellent book 
Myth and Sexuality.  She traces Augustine’s development of the Greek idea of a 
“rational soul” as the true, inner aspect of human being.  Augustine, however, placed 
the soul into a rigid opposition with the body.  Augustine argued that it was Eve and 
exposure to sexuality that spoiled Adam’s original state of rational self-government in 
the Garden of Eden.  He believed that the punishment for Adam’s disobedience was 
the loss of this “self-government,” particularly over his sex organs.  Human misery is 
the result of the disobedience of the body against the rational soul, a “rebellion of the 
flesh” (qtd. in Highwater).  The result of these ideas was the Manichean war between 
the soul and the flesh and the association of the body with sexuality, sexuality with 
sin, and women with all three.  Moreover, the ideology that used this doctrine turns 
out to be a vicious authoritarianism that sees human government, even tyranny and 
slavery, as necessary to combat the essentially corrupt and “fallen” nature.   
 This is not the end of the story, however, for between Augustine and the 
nineteenth century a kind of inversion takes place in which Manich-eanism is 
combined with the new concept of mechanism.  This philosophy developed from the 
sixteenth century onward but crystallized in Cartesian dualism that saw the world 
and all animal life as mere machines.  Animals, according to Descartes, were soulless 
automata, but Christian human beings were different precisely because they 
possessed a soul, “a spiritual agency that is not itself part of the body” (qtd. in 
Highwater).  The incorporeal soul is what gives humans freedom of choice and 
rescues them from the determinism of an otherwise clockwork universe.  The 
Cartesian soul, like Augustine’s, is a fantasy of the transcendence of Reason and 
personality outside the flesh.  In psychological terms, it is the ego’s fantasy of itself as 
pure thought, independent of the natural world:  cogito ergo sum. 
 In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century this ideal of rationalism and 
mechanism had become the dominant ideology and as such elicited a rebellion of 
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feeling and sentiment in Romanticism.  Although the various cultural-aesthetic ideas 
and practices that are included under the rubric of Romanticism are diverse and 
sometimes even contradictory, one can identify the shift in attitude toward the soul.  
As feeling was emphasized over reason, and passion became admirable, the Anima 
image becomes increasingly associated with a new idea of soulfulness.  This is the 
context of Jung’s term “soul,” for Jung explicitly associates soul with Eros, with the 
ability to enter into relatedness with other human beings and to love.  Jung’s “soul-
image” is a romantic ideal, but it is more than this too, for even when the soul was 
explicitly considered to be rational, it was represented in feminine images.  This 
association of women with a divine element parallels the use of images of the Virgin 
Mary as a spiritualized feminine—the explicit antithesis (or remedy) for Eve but, in 
setting up this opposition of good versus bad mother, it splits off sexuality from love, 
thus engendering an idealized, spiritualized notion of love separated from the body. 
 The association of woman with sexuality is complicated in the medical and 
moral literature of the nineteenth century when doctors like William Acton asserted 
that women, unlike men, did not need sex.  It was man who was the moral 
battleground between spirituality and carnality.  Women were thus split as a class 
into the good wives and mothers who helped men overcome their “rebellious 
members” and bad women, such as prostitutes, who merely fueled male lust.  In 
either case, what had emerged was a configuration of Woman in the form of Eros—
both as an ideal, spiritualized sort of love, and as carnal sexuality and sensuality.  It is 
out of this cultural configuration that Jung and his analysands came and this is why 
he associates women and the Anima-image with Eros.   
 It was another theological term, spirit, that Jung used to describe Animus, and 
this he associated with Logos in opposition to Eros.  Logos-Spirit is the Cartesian 
Reason, the fantasy of transcendence of the flesh through signification and its 
attendant intellectualizations and abstractions.  Spirit is that ineluctable sense of a 
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force or genius driving one upwards to “greatness.”  If one considers that “greatness” 
in patriarchal culture usually refers to heroism or even a godlike quality of autonomy, 
power, and action, one can see clearly the androcentrism in the idea of spirit.  As 
Wehr notes, Jung adapted these theological terms to his psychological model because 
he was interested in the psychology of religion and religious images, but in the 
process he blindly resurrected (as Wehr puts it) “an old theological concern that was 
blind with misogyny” (64). 
 Use of the term soul is further complicated by James Hillman’s use of the word 
to denote a particular conception of psyche as embodied.  This usage inverts that of 
Descartes and the Christian tradition by restoring the capacities of erotic feeling to the 
body.  This is the way that I will use the term, for doing so allows one to talk about 
the mind-body unity without implicitly splitting it with a hyphen.  Soul, or for that 
matter psyche must be considered continuous with the body in any real conception.  
Accepting this assertion, one must acknowledge the corollary that the Cartesian and 
stereotypically masculine concept of Reason and Mind as disconnected from the body 
is an illusion fostered by a long history of ideological warfare on women and their 
sexuality. 
 To examine representations of scientists and engineers is to move directly into 
the center of this web of associations, for men of science in the nineteenth century 
formed their identities around the belief in a mechanical and soulless world which 
they were called upon to combat and conquer.  The Christian tradition that 
denigrated the body was not abandoned when modern science supplanted 
Christianity as the dominant episteme.  On the contrary, the war against the body 
seems to have intensified and this war was ultimately to strengthen the ideological 
apparatus of domination by particular male elites.  Victor Seidler summarizes this 
turn of history lucidly: 
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The body, in Western culture, is radically separated from a sense of 
personal identity;  the latter is defined in purely mental terms as a matter of 
consciousness.  This reiterates a Christian tradition which had often 
denigrated the body as a source of spiritual knowledge.  The male body in 
the Cartesian tradition was to be used as an instrument, rather than as 
something through which individuality could be expressed.  Men could 
only assert their humanity by mastery over the physical world, and by 
learning to dominate their passions and desires.  It is this inherited notion 
of self-control as dominance that has been so closely identified with modern 
forms of masculinity.  (qtd. in Highwater 160) 
 Masculine identity, for those men particularly socialized in nineteenth-century 
scientific thought, was in this way profoundly oriented toward a spiritual-rational 
ideal of Logos while repressing Eros and the body.  Given this, it should not be 
surprising that Romanticism with its powerful images of possession by demonic or 
divine Anima-images emerged as a seemingly contradictory current against the 
dominant ideology of instrumental reason.  Moreover, the sado-masochistic aspects of 
Romanticism, particularly noted on the Continent, but also apparent in the English 
Gothic tradition, are aesthetic expressions of an even more horrific body-hatred 
practiced in the emergent profession of scientific medicine.   
 Highwater considers this elite group to be epitomized by sexologists who 
assumed the mantle of the priestly arbiters of public morals and the enforcers of 
righteousness under the name of “normality.”  Acton, in his Function and Disorders of 
the Reproductive Organs, which, as Highwater notes, went through six editions 
between 1857 and 1875, wages all-out war against boys and the rebelliousness of their 
flesh in the form of masturbation.  A theory of male “energy” was developed from the 
body-machine metaphor and semen was considered the measurable gauge of that life 
force.  From this myth developed “the conviction that the more a man ejaculates, the 
weaker he becomes.  Thus, it was widely believed that men should refrain from 
sexual activity before events that called upon their best efforts, business transactions, 
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sporting activities, military confrontations, and political decisions” (Highwater 162).  
From this theory Woman emerges as a threat to men, a sort of vampire stealing their 
life force.  Yet misogyny is, in effect, an extension of self-hatred born of an anti-
corporeal complex of masculinity.  That is, it results from the Logos-Animus, which 
young men are forced to adopt as the model for their adult Personae. 
 It might seem that the nineteenth-century cult of the body and atheletics is a 
contradiction to body-hatred.  It may, however, be read as one of the chief expressions 
of a mentality that sought to celebrate (even fetishize) a distinctly masculine body-
ideal of toughness, instrumentality, and aggression bound by logical rules.  The love 
of the body expressed through organized sports is highly problematic in this respect, 
fostering a consciousness of the body while repressing its erotic (particularly 
homoerotic) and vulnerable aspects.  The cult of the body served Victorian Britain 
and America (at least) to reinforce the notion of masculinity as discipline and energy 
which was opposed to femininity constructed as indolence, softness, seduction, or, 
paradoxically, asexuality.  In the medical literature, the purpose of exercise to assuage 
male homo- or auto-eroticism is explicit. 
 Men were trained to perpetuate the sexual division of labor that assigns to 
them the work of assembling and commanding facts, rules, and Reason for 
instrumental purposes, while relegating intuitions, lusts, and tender feelings to 
women.  In terms of Jung’s four-function typology of personality, the technical man is 
taught to privilege Thinking and Sensing over Feeling and Intuition.  Sensing, one 
must remember, is not sensuality but an instrumental employment of the senses, a 
mode of perception grounded in tangible facts.  Intuition, the other mode of 
perception, tends to be associated with a propensity to be fanciful or imaginative.  It is 
more often seen (by men) as a misleading or even dangerous faculty that leads one 
astray from “reality.”  Along with feeling, intuition was deeply suspect and was 
always made to conform to the ideal of disciplined thinking. 
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(7) The Disciplined Spirit 
 Keith Hoskin and Richard Macve have suggested that the kind of formal, 
disciplinary knowledge produced by modern instrumental reason begins, in the mid-
nineteenth century, to partake of the structures and goals of management accounting 
and the “modern business enterprise” (26).1  The whole ideology of accountability, 
surveillance, and reporting comes to pervade public institutions from business to 
academia and the military as “depart-mentalized and divisionalized” corporations 
managed by a “hierarchy of salaried executives,” managers supervising managers, 
operational units, and workers in the hundreds or thousands.  Hoskin’s and Macve’s 
argument that such systematic accountability derives historically from managerial 
practices at West Point suggests its strongly gendered character as well as the 
intimate imbrication of military and more “civilian” forms of discipline (31).  
Managing “by the numbers” entails “expert knowledge:  knowledge that extracts 
from performance (whether of man or machine) objective measures that enabl 
management to define standars of and targets for performance” (30).  Such 
knowledge is disciplinary in the two senses Foucault described:  it is the knolwledge 
of specialized, academic disciplines and it functions to discipline other men (and 
women) in a hierarchical structure of power.  The same emphasis on statistics and 
performance develops in the organized atheletics that emerge alongside managerial 
accounting practices during the century.  Men are increasingly trained to conceive 
themselves as members of teams, whose performance is continuously being measured 
and graded.  As Hoskin and Macve argue, 
the first institutions that were “disciplinary” in the double sense were elite 
colleges in the late eighteenth century, where the power-knowledge 
innovation lay in bringing together for the first time three educational 
practices:  constant rigorous examination, numerical grading of examined 
performance, and an insistent presence of writing by students and around 
students. (29; see also Hoskin, “Education”) 
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 The intersection of education, military training, and modern management 
accounting practices (which would later be called “scientific management by F. W. 
Taylor) appears historically in the persons of George W. Whistler and Daniel Tyler, 
two West Point graduates who learned their methods under the tutelage of the 
academy’s fourth superintendent, Sylvanus Thayer.  Most interesting for my own 
study is the fact that Thayer modelled his system of numerical grading, detialed files 
of performance, and written orders and reports on the trends of the French Ecole 
Polytechnique.  Thus, I would suggest, management, the military, and engineering all 
form a complex of practices and a complex of ideas, images, and masculine ideals 
around the concepts of discipline and knowledge-power. 
 The dark side of discipline—as Theweleit’s study of the Freikorps suggests—is 
an integral part of patriarchal masculinity.  Institutionalized beatings in military 
academies, verbal beating in the structure of obeying orders, physical discipline in 
sports, or ritualized training in disciplinary discourses and practices in universities 
are all aspects of the same structure of violence, coercion, and subjugation designed to 
maintain the boundaries of the masculine ego.  Theweleit argues that the mentality 
that characterized the Nazis was a logical extension of the Animus of the man-
machine and the “soldier-male.”  But the iron soldier male is part of the same 
masculine complex that produces the managers discussed by Hoskin and Macve:  that 
is, manly power is associated with “action at a distance” (32), as much as the hand-to-
hand aggression of the warrior or athelete.  The image of the male body as a steel 
casing, a solid without softness inside or out, is maintained in a double move.  First, 
the male ego is identified with a distance, abstracted, and mathematically precise 
managerial ideal rooted in disembodied Logos.  Second, the body is conceived as 
disciplined machinery through the projection of softness, vulnerablity, mortality, and 
unpredictability onto women and enemies who are represented as floods or flowing 
“masses,” often of the body’s bloody interior.  This soft and liquid Other is both 
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reprehensible and powerful to an almost mystical degree.  It illustrates the intimate 
connection that can exist between the Anima and the Shadow when they are violently 
repressed.  Moreover, the move from clean and crisp manager, watch in hand, to the 
nightmarish fantasies of the body described by Theweleit, demonstrates the 
continuum I would like to assert exists between collective (and individual) fantasies 
and social institutions such as engineering and the academic disciplines, however 
removed from violence, sexuality, and the body’s lived reality they may appear to be. 
 There is a tragic irony in men’s perception of the Anima as a locus of “magic 
authority” and power, for this image bears no relationship to the social power of 
actual women in a patriarchal society.  It is a perception largely based on men’s 
continuing to carry a pre-Oedipal image of the mother as an omnipotent power who 
is at the same time the ultimate referent of their most deep-rooted erotic longings.  
The social dimension of erotic repression must not be overlooked, however, for the 
masculine ego is, as Theweleit suggests, a group phenomenon.  It is an ego inscribed 
into a system of men in formal and regimented relationship to each other, bent upon 
excluding all expression of Eros, except in the non-sexual relationship of the 
brotherhood.  Repressed feminine and repressed Eros erupt with explosive force in 
the form of compulsive infatuations and the Romantic image of the belle dame sans 
merci.  Such tantalizing sirens may ultimately be read as the seductive “bad mother” 
who refuses the infant boy’s demands for her breast or her enveloping bodily 
warmth, or who punishes him for his masturbating.  Any of these infantile desires 
because it is the whole world of sensation and feeling occupied in the first year or so 
of life, becomes titanic and the memory of the shock of the beloved mother’s refusals 
remains a powerful unconscious force of fear and loathing in the grown man.   
 It is the capacity of men to make wild and tragic projections out of such 
repressed materials that Jung refers to when he offers Rider Haggard’s novel She as 
an exemplary Anima story.  Ayesha, the immortal and excruciatingly beautiful queen 
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of an isolated tribe of black savages, does not hesitate to destroy anyone who opposes 
her desires.  She offers her suitors immortality and eternal bliss—the maternal 
paradise, or, mingled with it, the ecstatic moment of coitus and orgasm extended to 
eternity.  She is erotic object and absolute power rolled into one.  This fantasy woman 
does not correspond to any real women in the world, and it certainly doesn’t 
correspond to the typical image women have of themselves.  Women in the real 
world seldom experience themselves as powerful.   
 Neither, in reality, do most men experience themselves as powerful.  Instead 
they rely intensely on identifying with a fantasy of male power, a fantasy of access via 
their gender into the estates of social power controlled by a few men.  Men’s pursuit 
of power takes the form of financial conquests, sexual conquests, the conquest of 
those who disagree with jealously guarded ideas of truth; the conquest of their own 
bodies in athletics or work; the conquest of other men’s bodies in sports or war.  All 
these “manful assertions” of power are attempts to reinforce the ego’s fantasy of 
control against its fear that it is not in control.  In a sense the internalized mother 
imago nested within the Anima-complex is a kind of imprisonment of the man’s 
source of power—a consumption of the omnipotent Mother.  “She-who-must-be-
obeyed” is a mythic Great Mother who is contained and carried inside the man’s soul 
like a talisman to give him strength.  The fantastic over-valuation of the Mother in the 
unconscious is a product of the rigid repression of the ego’s first identification with 
her and the blatant oppression and subordination of women which small boys 
witnessed in every facet of the nineteenth-century bourgeois household.  
 Freud associated the weird feeling of the Uncanny (das Unheimlich) with the 
infant boy’s first sight of his mother’s genitals and his confusion over her lack of a 
penis.  The Uncanny is the sudden feeling of having the rug pulled out from under 
reality, so to speak.  In literature the classic Uncanny moment is when Hoffmann’s 
hero-lover in “The Sandman” sees his beloved Olympia torn limb from limb, realizing 
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in that moment that she is an automaton.  The fantasy of the Anima contains this fear 
of betrayal, of absence, emptiness, and abandonment.  The problem of “emptiness” is 
a central one in both sexes according to Jung.  At the end of his essay, “Psychological 
Aspects of the Mother Archetype,” Jung slips into a view of women that is clearly 
(and admittedly) colored by the Anima.  “Finally,” he writes,  
it should be remarked that emptiness is a great feminine secret.  It is 
something absolutely alien to man;  the  chasm, the unplumbed depths, the 
yin.  The pitifulness of this vacuous nonentity goes to his heart (I speak here 
as a man), and one is tempted to say that this constitutes the whole 
“mystery” of woman.  Such a female is fate itself.  A man may say what he 
likes about it; be for it or against it, or both at once;  in the end he falls, 
absurdly happy, into this pit, or, if he doesn’t, he has missed and bungled 
his only chance of making a man of himself. (Archetypes 98) 
 The ending of the paragraph, which Wehr omits in her consideration, includes 
an impassioned quote from Faust, “The Mothers, the Mothers, how eerily it 
sounds!”—the third quote from that play which Jung uses in this essay.  He calls the 
passage a “sigh, which seals the capitulation of the male as he approaches the realm 
of the Mothers” (Archetypes 98).  I agree entirely with Wehr when she concludes from 
the above passage that “[d]escribing women in these terms does nothing to restore 
their sense of worth, nor does it address the issue of the woundedness of women in 
patriarchy who end up ‘empty’” (106).  Jung slips typically into universalism in his 
rhapsody and his description cannot be taken as a description of real women.  Rather, 
it is an expression of a deeply-believed image included in the Anima-complex of the 
modern man of science. 
 The image of woman as “pit,” “chasm,” “unplumbed depth,” intersects with 
the nineteenth-century fascination with caverns and excavation.  Delving into Mother 
Earth became, as Rosalind Williams documents, a chief metaphor for science, 
engineering, imperialism, and the pursuit of truth through the practices of 
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disciplinary knowledge.  The image of the pit, the hole, the cave, or crack, are, of 
course, staples of pornography and men’s locker-room talk about women as objects of 
sexual conquest.  In Jung’s comments and his reference to the mystical Taoist, the yin, 
he indicates the archetypal numinosity which immeasurable emptiness conjures in 
the minds of men.  Jung’s seductive vacuum is, like Freud’s Uncanny, an absence the 
phallus longs to fill, but also a painful reminder of the possibility of the male’s own 
castration.  The Mother’s symbolic “castration” is her deprivation of the power of the 
fathers.  The boy’s fear of castration is both a literal anxiety over the vulnerability of 
his penis and a fear of being kept out of the elite bastions of male power.  On another 
level, however, the fear of castration and emptiness is the fear of the unconscious 
engendered in the boy’s ego when he is forced to exchange his identification with the 
feminine and the erotic body for an identification with the father’s abstract Law and 
violent body. 
(8) Animus and Phallus 
Oh, that I could glow like this mountain! 
Oh, that my heart bounded with the swell of the sea! 
Oh, that my soul were full of light as the stars! 
Oh, that it brooded over the world like the air! 
But no, this heart will glow no more; thou art 
A living man no more, Empedocles! 
Nothing but a devouring flame of thought— 
But a naked, eternally restless mind! 
—Matthew Arnold, Empedocles on Etna, II: 323-30 
 Like the Anima, the Animus is a creation of the masculine mind produced by a 
patriarchal culture.  In much Jungian writing the Animus, like the Anima, is thought 
of as some sort of “natural” organ of the psyche that just exists, corresponding to X 
and Y chromosomes in the gene.  This biological assumption has no warrant and is 
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too simplistic to explain the role of cultural representations in gendered identity and 
the imaginal life.  Animus is an idealization of manliness and such mental functions 
as reason, clarity, ambition, action, agency, which are associated with masculinity.  
For men, the Animus-complex is the cultural imperative to become the idealized 
father; for women, it is the imperative that they derive their value from association 
with symbolic or real fathers.  In this respect Animus is (or includes) what Lacan calls 
the Phallus, that mythologized erection that symbolizes male authority and presence 
in opposition to women’s lack of authority and lack of presence—what Jung 
described as their apparent “vacuous nonentity.”  Jung’s mysterious pit is in a way 
the mythic corollary to Lacan’s Phallus—the yoni and the lingam.  Jungian discussion 
of the Animus as an aspect of female psychology is perhaps the part of archetypal 
gender theory most reviled by feminists and so requires considerable revision before 
it can be reconciled with contemporary theories of gender and psyche.   
 In the same essay discussed above (“Psychological Aspects of the Mother 
Archetype”) Jung describes a woman with a “negative mother complex” as one who 
identifies with her father, fights against her mother and so becomes  
hostile to all that is dark, unclear, and ambiguous, and will cultivate and 
emphasize everything certain and clear and reasonable.  Excelling her more 
feminine sister in her objectivity and coolness of judgment, she may 
become the friend, sister, and competent adviser of her husband.  Her own 
masculine aspirations make it possible for her to have a human 
understanding of the individuality of her husband quite transcending the 
realm of the erotic. (98)   
 Jung is painfully bound by the expectations of his male readers in passages like 
this, reverting always to the woman’s husband or to the question of whether or not 
she will make a good partner in marriage.  Jung seems to have enjoyed the collegial 
companionship of many such “masculine” women, and yet given Jung’s own 
predilection to being “unclear” and “ambiguous” one can readily imagine why he 
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found such women’s criticism and questioning irritating.  When the Animus is not 
assimilated into the personality and remains unconscious, according to Jung, a 
woman becomes a kind of intellectual harpy: 
In intellectual women the Animus encourages a critical disputatiousness 
and would-be highbrowism, which, however, consists essentially in 
harping on some irrelevant weak point and nonsensically making it the 
main one.  Or a perfectly lucid discussion gets tangled up in the most 
maddening way through the introduction of a quite different and if 
possible, perverse point of view.  Without knowing it, such women are 
solely intent upon exasperating the man [with whom they are arguing] and 
are, in consequence, the more completely at the mercy of the Animus.  
“Unfortunately, I am always right,” one of these creatures once confessed 
to me.  (Two Essays 208) 
 Jung, as Wehr observes, betrays his own frustration with women who 
disagreed with and questioned him.  Jung unwittingly reproduces the very confusion 
of emotion and reason he criticizes when he remains blind to the highly subjective 
judgments implied by words like “tangled,” “nonsensically,” and “perverse.” 
 Wehr points toward the writing of Emma Jung, C.G. Jung’s wife and 
collaborator, for some important revisionary clues in our thinking about the Animus 
in women.  These will have a bearing on my own formulation of the Animus in men.  
Emma Jung identified the woman’s Animus as the source of two inner voices, first the 
“self-hater” from whom women hear “a critical, usually negative comment on every 
movement, an exact examination of all motives and intentions, which naturally 
always causes feelings of inferiority, and tends to nip in the bud all initiative and 
every wish for self-expression” (Emma Jung, Animus and Anima 20).  This is the voice 
of what feminists have called “internalized oppression” and it suggests that one of the 
crucial differences between the man’s Anima and the woman’s Animus is that the 
Animus represents the voices of the Law of the Fathers, the pronouncements of 
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patriarchy in all their misogyny.  C.G. Jung succumbs to the difficulty of standing 
outside this authoritative voice when he suggests that  the Animus is the source of 
women’s creativity, the “creative seeds” of the loo praioVVVVVVVV (logos 
spermatikos).  He develops this idea through the logic of his previous formulation of 
the Anima as the man’s muse.  Unfortunately, he distorts the implications of his 
hypothesis into self-parody when he goes on to say,  
Just as a man brings forth his work as a complete creation out of his inner 
feminine nature, so the inner masculine side of a woman brings forth 
creative seeds which have the power to fertilize the feminine side of the 
man.  This would be the femme inspiratrice who, if falsely cultivated, can 
turn into the worst kind of dogmatist and high-handed pedagogue—a 
regular “Animus hound,” as one of my women patients aptly expressed it.  
(Two Essays 209) 
 This is Jung at his misogynist worst.  His own logic indicates that because the 
contrasexual imago is such a powerful subpersonality in either sex, it functions as the 
alluring inner partner that can put us in contact (for good or ill) with the rest of our 
unconscious.  But rather than follow this logic, Jung is sidetracked into the stereotypic 
notion that the best a woman can hope for is to be a man’s inspiration.  If she tries to 
be brilliant herself, she becomes an “Animus hound,” and is reviled as a non-woman 
by men and women alike because of her failure to conform.  Jung is a step away from 
expressing this when he writes, “ A woman possessed by the Animus is always in 
danger of losing her femininity, her adapted feminine Persona, just as a man in like 
circumstances runs the risk of effeminacy.  These psychic changes of sex are due 
entirely to the fact that a function which belongs inside has been turned outside,” a 
state of affairs he calls a “perversion” (Two Essays 209).  He treats the Persona, in this 
instance, as something natural rather than socially formed, a supposition that 
contradicts his own theory but is the result of an inability to adequately theorize 
gender as a social construct.   
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 Emma Jung reproduced the same misogyny when she writes, “It is well known 
that a really creative faculty of mind is a rare thing in a woman.  There are many 
women who have developed their powers of thinking, discrimination, and criticism 
to a high degree, but there are very few who are mentally creative in the way a man 
is.  It is maliciously said that woman is so lacking in the gift of invention, that if the 
kitchen spoon had not been invented by a man, we would today still be stirring the 
soup with a stick!” (Animus and Anima 21; qtd. Wehr 142).  The joke betrays Emma 
Jung’s own internalization of patriarchal put-downs.  What most obviously goes 
unsaid here is that “a really creative faculty of mind” (whatever one may suppose 
that to be) is a rare thing in either sex, and there is certainly no objective proof that 
one gender has a monopoly on invention.  As Virginia Woolf suggested some thirty 
years prior to Emma Jung’s study, if women are less productive of art and invention 
than men, it is primarily a result of their being deprived of time, money, and a room 
of their own in which to think.  Creativity may indeed, as both Jungs suggest, arise 
from one’s ability to plumb the depths of the unconscious and its imaginal processes, 
but the opportunity to cultivate this capacity comes from leisure and so is intimately 
implicated with the distribution of power in society both along class and gender lines. 
 There is one further insight from Emma Jung’s essay on Animus that I wish to 
note.  In addition to the “self-hater” as an internal voice and sub-personality, there is 
also a seductive side to the Animus which may “dispense exaggerated praise” and 
give a woman “a blown-up sense of one’s own value and importance” (20).  This 
works in two ways.  First, the Animus voice, as the voice of patriarchy, is the 
internalization of the male gaze under which women are taught to find their value.  
This voice may tell a women that she is wonderful because she conforms to 
patriarchal ideals of female beauty, sexiness, virtue, style, and so forth—the sort of 
pseudo-power women are permitted to have under patriarchy.  The power of 
glamour and the imperative to cultivate it as the source of a positive self-image 
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become part of the Animus-complex in women.  But, notably, it is a male voice that 
makes reference to what we must call the woman’s Anima, that is her internalization 
of her culture’s definition of femininity. 
 The second aspect of the praising Animus is a voice that praises women for 
being like a man, that is, for exhibiting her reasoning and discriminating faculties, her 
power to command the discourses of reason or art, which the nineteenth century 
reserved for the masculine sphere.  From the point of view of Emma Jung, this voice 
offers false flattery because it praises a woman for something that undermines her 
“nature.”  From my point of view, however, it is a false flattery because it links the 
performance of these skills—reason, creativity, language—to masculinity.  The 
praising voice a woman might hear is only the echo of the much more insistent and 
exaggerated praise men give each other and so is a kind of back-handed compliment 
that denies women’s value generally as it praises a particular member of the sex. 
 One can see an example of this game today among female athletes, particularly 
bodybuilders who are cultivating the thing most intimately associated with 
masculinity—the muscle physis, as Theweleit puts it.  Bodybuilders, male or female, 
may in some cases be pursuing an ideal of muscle as a sign of personal power and 
invulnerability, thus acting on the ego-fantasies of self-control and control over 
others, which Theweleit describes.  But it is also possible that a powerful cathexis of 
this aspect of the cultural masculinity-complex is part of some men’s and women’s 
process of individuation.  Bodybuilding, like any physical discipline may be used to 
restore the ego’s connectedness to the body, leading one toward inner understanding 
and an actualized Self.  There is no reason to suppose that the jouissance of muscular 
size and strength, the pump of blood in the veins, carries the same psychic 
significances for women which it has seemed to carry for men.  It may, but at a basic 
level the experience of women may also be the reverse of men’s because the woman 
athlete or bodybuilder is breaking out of her stereotypic identity with the cultural 
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feminine-complex.  The male athlete, by contrast, is cathecting his appointed 
stereotype with all his might.  The result, as one could expect, is that women seem to 
find athletics and physical exertion liberating while men often come to find it 
stultifying, an imperative of the fathers which fosters fear and anxiety in an endless 
pursuit of “winning” and “being number One.”2 
(9) Inflation and The Puer Aeternus 
 Male bodybuilders symbolize in the flesh what James Wyly calls “masculine 
inflation.”  Ego inflation is a form of Narcissism, but in the masculinized 
consciousness, the trope of inflation carries particular poignancy, for men are 
conditioned to form their identity closely around the size of their bodies.  To the 
infant, the father is usually held in awe because of his relative size and his strength, 
and boys inevitably are raised with the constant admonishment to “grow up to be big 
and strong” or to be “a big boy.”  Tallness, big muscles, fast running speeds, high 
jumps, long distances, long and lengthy erections—the male body and its action is 
quantified and revered.  Those boys who cannot conform or compete may be able to 
content themselves with high grades in school, or big incomes, big houses, big cars, 
big business, but all carry significance because of their symbolic relation to masculine 
inflation.   
 In The Phallic Quest:  Priapus and Masculine Inflation Wyly argues that this 
inflated grandiosity of the ego results in the splitting-off of what he calls phallos from 
the conscious personality.  In his terminology phallos (spelled in the Greek form) is “a 
man’s libido, his sense of his ability to potentiate his own destiny, to create himself in 
accord with his inner image [that is, the Self]” (105).  Wyly follows Jung’s proposition 
that images of the erect penis in dreams or fantasies signify libido as Jung defined it, 
that is, creative psychic energy.  But phallos is also the embodied sense of connection 
to one’s physical phallus, an erotic male body.  If the capacity for tenderness and 
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relatedness is relegated to the feminine according to the imperatives of social 
stereotypes, the man’s relationship to his own genital sensuality is also lost amid 
fantasies of the phallus as the sign of male dominance.  Indeed, in the normal course 
of an adolescent boy’s socialization into “manhood” he is never given a chance to 
become a mature erotic being.  The continuous shaming of boys that is still so much a 
part of adolescent hazing today was, in the nineteenth century, even more cruel.  The 
boy’s ego is seldom if ever permitted to shamelessly unite with his bodily jouissance.  
The sublimation of erotic libido into spirit, the Animus of ambitions to “greatness” or 
“higher” things, is accomplished at the expense of the erotic phallus. 
 Wyly identifies split-off phallos as a “Priapic complex,” a fixation on an 
adolescent ideal of male sexuality focused completely in penile performance.  The 
Priapic complex and its attendant dream-images signal a fear of humiliation, 
particularly a fear that one is not really a male and will be exposed.  The ego invests 
its energy completely in an identification with its social Persona, its social power and 
success in controlling its world.  It denies the larger Self and assumes that its Persona 
is the whole self; in other words, the ego expands its self-image to the size of the Self, 
encompassing the whole psyche, or rather it fantasizes that it can do this.  The 
inflation is also a grandiosity of the penis, for the reality of the tender and sensitive 
physical organ is repressed in favor of patriarchy’s Symbolic Phallus.  Penis is 
identified with the Name of the Father, in Lacanian terms, that is, with male 
domination.  As the Phallus is used to give the ego godlike status and delusions of 
grandeur, the figure of Priapus emerges in the unconscious like a specter to declare 
war on the ego.  The result is what Wyly calls the “phallic quest,” a desperate 
searching for the lost connection between ego and Self. 
In some men it takes a sexual form, while in others it involves a search for 
an ideal mentor.  Others search for a substitute for a failed or absent father, 
or for an ideal job, or invention, or elected office, or fortune, or power.  The 
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common thing among them all is their exteriorization and concretization of 
what must at last become an inner quest. (88) 
 Marie-Louise von Franz in her classic Jungian study, The Puer Aeternus, 
describes the figure of the “eternal youth,” an archetypal image similar to the priapic 
man in the sense of endless questing and in the often exaggerated “Don Juan” 
complex that drives him from lover to lover.  Von Franz remarks that this mythic 
dream figure is identified with the child-god consort of the Goddess in the Eleusinian 
mysteries.  He is Dionysus and also the god Eros, son of Venus.  “He is a god of life, 
death and resurrection--the god of divine youth” (von Franz 1).  In analytical 
psychology, the type of man identified with this archetypal image is one who 
“remains too long in adolescent psychology,” who exhibits “too great a dependence 
on the mother” and an excessive idealization of love and the beloved which can, 
somehow, never be satisfied.  Both Don Juanism and male homosexuality are 
attributed by Jung to a domination of the ego by the mother complex.  The attribution 
to homosexuality is now recognized by many analysts as an overgeneral-ization 
similar to the view of Freud and his contemporaries that homosexuality was a 
neurosis of arrested development.  Analysts such as Hopcke and Corneau have 
significantly revised Jung’s treatment of homosexuality, depathologizing sexual 
preference.   
 Gay or heterosexual, the Don Juan mentality is the promiscuous flight from 
lover to lover where it appears to be motivated by an inability to be satisfied.  Such 
men choose short-lived relationships without commitment while secretly longing for 
the eternal embrace of an ideal lover.  It is this longing for the paradise of “unitary 
reality” that is the hallmark of the mother-complex.  Corneau suggests that among 
gay men, as among straight men, “being too much in love, or wanting too much to be 
in love, basically means not having enough love for oneself” (74).  This suggests that 
the puer personality3 is essentially Narcissistic.  In this case, a lack of adequate self-
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love is compensated for by a flight from connection and an unconscious pursuit of the 
primal union with the mother’s body.  The search for that union can take the form of 
pursuing women or pursuing men.  In either case the lover takes the mother’s place 
as idealized goddess or god-image, that is, as an image of the Self which completes 
and grounds the ego and bestows a feeling of wholeness.4  Corneau particularly 
locates this feeling of wholeness in the act of reclaiming one’s body.  Men who 
received negative or inadequate mirroring from their fathers, frequently (if not 
inevitably) have trouble holding on to their masculine identity.  The consequences of 
desire for and failure of male-mirroring is perhaps the most moving theme of 
Frankenstein. 
 The crisis originates in the Oedipal realization of gender and sex difference 
when primary narcissism (or the unitary reality of identification with the mother) is 
disrupted.  The transition from primary narcissism or self-love to post-Oedipal self-
esteem is achieved “through admiration of the parent of the same sex, but only 
providing that the parent reciprocates with a similar admiration.  When the father is 
absent this mutual admiration is not available to the boy.  The boy is left uncertain of 
his identity and remains frightened of sexual difference” (Corneau 69).  This kind of 
fear and uncertainty about the self-image results from the instability of the ego-Self 
axis, that is, the mature relationship between differentiated ego and the psyche as a 
whole.  If the Self and its wholeness remain imaginally identified with the mother 
complex, a boy’s ego is fundamentally alienated from the Self that sustains it, forcing 
him to approach his Self through the domination or possession of (or other merger 
with) the feminized Other.   
 To put this another way, the young man who falls passionately in love with 
women, idealizing them rather than embracing them as real persons is unconsciously 
trying to compensate for the weakness of his ego’s link to his Self.  He feels 
disconnection from concepts such as beauty and nurturance which have been 
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relegated to the feminine sphere.  Conquering Woman or conquering Nature 
compensates for this weakness, buttressing a masculine persona which has been 
overemphasized because the boy or man feels insecure in identification with it.  The 
homosexual counterpart to this, in which a young man falls passionately in love with 
another (often much older or younger) man, enacts the male-male bonding that was 
absent or inadequate between son and father.  Corneau follows Robert Bly’s thesis in 
Iron John, when he suggests that many masculine problems are a result of this 
inadequate mirroring or, as both writers put it, lack of initiation into manhood.  
Corneau observes that, 
[w]hen a man has suffered from the physical and emotional absence of his 
father, it is not surprising that he should attempt to rediscover himself 
through a physical exploration of the male body… [I]t is through gay sex 
that a gay man claims the right to love the male body, beginning with his 
own.  Most men, homosexuals and heterosexuals alike, do not consider 
they have the right to find themselves beautiful.  (72)    
 The corollary of this inability to feel oneself to be beautiful is to exaggerate the 
opposite direction and feel oneself to be a hideous and undesirable monster.  Such 
seeming self-hatred is actually a part of the Narcissistic complex brought out by some 
failure of transition from primary Narcissism into mature self-esteem.  In the 
nineteenth century, and perhaps still today, the problem is not simply an absence of 
initiation into manhood, but initiations that are all too often emotionally damaging, 
designed to create strong ego-boundaries—a “thick skin” or a British “stiff upper 
lip”—but instead merely erect the fearful walls of DaVinci’s fortress.  Afraid of being 
devoured—particularly by the mother complex—the puer aeternus cultivates a kind of 
“cool” macho wall:  intellectual aloofness, a careless attitude or detachment toward 
others, a romantic disdain for authorities and convention.  He may carry this 
Narcissistic defense to the point of  developing delusions of grandeur or fully-blown 
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megalomania.  He may, like one of Corneau’s analysands, remain “secretly convinced 
of his own genius and his own superiority [fantasizing] about revealing himself to the 
world in some dazzling manner” (Corneau 54).   
 The puer is frequently lost in his own dreams and stuck in inaction, yet may be 
fascinated by heights: “heights of inspiration, spiritual heights, mountain climbing, 
airplane flying, drug highs” (Corneau 54).  He may be supremely charming, witty, 
intellectual, cynical, and adventurous—the man von Franz takes as her model puer is 
Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, author of The Little Prince, famous aviator, and war hero.  
The pursuit of heroic danger, like the pursuit of sexual Eros, can be the displacement 
of the desire for a secure and embodied self-love.  It is the pursuit of physical thrills of 
the most intense kind in order to regain a feeling of embodiment in the very act of 
pursing transcendence.  The “death-wish” masks a longing for connection to life, that 
is, to Eros.  This configuration is perhaps the primary complex represented in 
adventure heroes, and, as I shall argue, in a figure like Percy Shelley, who, due to his 
early death, could easily become an icon of the upward-striving puer. 
(10)  Phallus, Symbolic and Sacred 
 The puer aeternus complex is a product of the interplay between two extremes 
of masculinity, the Dionysian and the Apollonian.  Eugene Monick, in his book 
Phallos: Sacred Image of the Masculine, arrives at a nomenclature of the phallus based 
upon the “solar” and the “chthonic”, which is another way of putting the 
Apollonian/Dionysian distinction.  Monick’s terms are based on a distinction 
between “Real” penis and “Symbolic” phallus like that made by Lacan, but employ a 
Jungian idiom that takes the feeling tone of religion and myth into account.   
 The Apollonian complex, according to Monick, is comprised of the 
transcendental, rational, and orderly side of patriarchal manhood, its striving 
upwards and onwards towards ideals such as law, authority, truth, and beauty 
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conceived as proportion and symmetry.  The Dionysos complex is comprised of 
opposing values:  a darker, bloodier side that connotes frenzy, drunkenness, sexual 
pleasure, and freedom from authority.  Chthonic phallos, as Monick puts it, is earthy 
male sexuality, the real male body, not the abstracting intellect that privileges Logos.  
Solar phallos, by contrast, is the spiritual sublimation of the physical urge for 
copulation into a driving force of creativity or dominance through discourses and 
their technical application.  This sublimation is itself an operation of metaphor, taking 
the upward-striving of the erect penis as a symbol for an economic and technological 
striving “upwards.”   
 The up/down polarity is one of the basic mythic oppositions that corresponds 
to the good/bad dichotomy identified by Gilman as the lodestone of psychic 
development.  On the other hand, “upwards” also connotes hierarchy and 
domination, an increasing mastery over one’s environment, increasing 
understanding, growth toward “greatness.”  The ego’s dream of its own potential 
greatness is a fixation in the period of transformation from Imaginary to Symbolic in 
Lacan’s terms.  Infantile realization of independence from the archetypal mother and 
mastery of the world through language is extended into a fantasy of magical power, a 
desire to usurp that omnipotence that was formerly imagined to belong to the mother.  
Such grandiosity is the inflation Wyly discusses.  An exaggerated faith in Logos can 
manifest as a belief in the transcendent mastering power of art, or the mastering 
power of technology, but both signify the power to create and manipulate the world 
through signs.  This upwards-striving “spirit” is essentially the striving after meaning 
or rational understanding that lies at the center of the human ego, the speaking 
subject, but its image of “being on top” is always suggestive of domination.   
 Neumann, in his Origins and History of Consciousness, represented solar phallos 
as the casting-off of a servitude to the body, a “lower” nature in favor of something 
“higher,” less bestial.  Monick argues, however, that chthonic phallos is not simply 
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servitude to the chthonic, ouroboric Mother (a kind of false masculine, as Neumann 
would have it).  Rather there is an earthy, bodily aspect of being male which must be 
named and valorized as a part of male being, not repressed and projected onto 
women.  This acknowledgment is particularly important because of the negative side 
of chthonic phallos, which grows as chthonic phallos is repressed.  This destructive 
shadow of chthonic phallos is the pornographic mentality of violence and sexual 
assault which Susan Griffin has described in Pornography and Silence.  The shadow of 
solar phallos, on the other hand, is the overextension of Logos into a malignant 
nightmare of domination using discourses of power.  Because human civilizations 
have been built on the power of legal discourses and the control of language, positive 
Logos may be described as the privileged instrument of poetic or scientific creativity, 
while negative Logos is the privileged instrument of oppression.  Monick wishes to 
make clear that the shadow of solar phallos is at least as “castrating” as the negative 
aspect of the feminine or maternal complex. 
The unconscious purpose of solar phallic shadow is to disenfranchise, to 
castrate the obstreperous and misbehaving inferior—male or female—
much as the witch-mother does.  Both understand themselves to be royal in 
their domains, and both behave in a similar manner.  (Monick 103) 
 What Monick’s four-fold scheme of masculinity suggests is that the pursuit of 
solar phallos is predicated on the rejection and repression of chthonic phallos.  This 
polarization tends to draw out the shadow side of both solar and chthonic phallos.  
There is a kind of rebound effect in Monick’s schema in which the rejection of the 
embodied and erotic sexual life in search of a pure, spiritual, symbolic creativity 
doubles back on the ego so that creativity becomes a desiccated megalomania, a 
displacement of the urge for sexual, bodily fulfillment not into literal rape, but rather 
into the various forms of symbolic rape Susan Griffin traces.  The womanizing (or else 
desexualized) corporate raider bent on destroying his male opponents; the 
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pornographer bent on the conquest of women or children through representational 
degradation; the profit-seeking CEO or national leader concerned more with the 
symbolic manipulation of money and “economic growth” than with the preservation 
and stewardship of the natural environment or the human value of work—these are 
all creatures of the repression of chthonic masculinity.  Put more broadly, such 
“masculine” behavior is the result of the repression and rejection of male Eros—love 
between men, but also men’s willing partnership with a lover of either sex in mutual, 
sensual pleasure that is not separated from actual, intimate, connectedness to the 
beloved.   
 The idea of Eros I am pursuing here is not limited to sexuality or even 
sensuality as it is so often understood.  One can worship and pursue sex and sensual 
excitement in positive or negative forms, motivated by deep caring or by Narcissistic 
desire to demonstrate prowess or domination.  But the erotic is not limited to 
sexuality.  It includes all degrees of physical and verbal expressions of love and 
caring.  Physical acts of love may take the form of building houses for the homeless, 
or taking the time to talk to someone in need of compassionate listening or feed 
someone who is hungry.  These acts, too, are expressions of the kind of Eros Monick 
wishes to include in the sphere of Chthonic, for to be earthy is not merely to be 
sexual, but to be in touch with all dimensions of the body’s needs, as Dionysos was:  
need for food, clothing, loving touch, a hug, a squeeze of the hand, laughter, wine, 
dancing, and celebrating the pulse of life under the forest’s dark canopy. 
 Monick writes in the same circle of modern mythmakers as Robert Bly and 
Sam Keen and the other leaders of the mythopoeic men’s movement.  Although they 
are ungrounded in constructionist theories of gender and identity, these writers do 
locate the “man problem,” as they put it, in the rejection of the body and embodied 
love I am describing.  Bly’s term, the “Wild Man” in Iron John, corresponds in many 
ways to Monick’s chthonic masculine.  He is “wild” in the sense of a wildflower.  He 
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represents a dream of being prior to domestication or “civilization.”  Such a figure is 
offered a contrast to Theweleit’s “soldier-male” who is “wild” only in the sense of 
violent and obsessed with blood, and who conceives himself as the defender of 
“civilization.”  Theweleit’s fascist masculinity is, in fact, the product of the repression 
of the imaginary Wild Man.  His “man of steel” is the monstrous result of Iron John 
being submerged in the bottom of the lake of unconsciousness.   
 As I will suggest, the mythopoeic desire to reconnect the male ego to this 
chthonic consciousness represents an important attempt to remove the sense of 
gendered alterity from what Julia Kristeva has called the chora.  It is (or can be) an 
attempt by men to remove the pre-linguistic basis of mind from its exclusive 
association with the “maternal.”  Media reactions to the mythopoeic men’s 
movement, as well as some of its own rhetoric, suggest how easily revisionary 
mythologizing can be mistaken for a reactionary return to the Boy Scout ideal of male 
separation from women through a mastery of the “wild.”  Appeals to a mystical 
“male energy” and the ideal of the “warrior” or the “hunter,” when they are 
employed uncritically, are unlikely to do more than reinforce the mythic 
underpinnings of militarism and the technological exploitation of Nature.  What I 
believe the mythopoeic writers intend to say is that the chora, the voice of the body, 
needs to be detached from its exclusive association with women’s bodies and restored 
to association with male bodies as well. 
 What is clear through all of this, is that the “virile member” signifies more than 
one thing so, it would be useful to have a terminology which extended beyond 
Lacan’s idea of the symbolic Phallus.  I offer the following combination of Lacan’s  
and Monick’s insights.  First of all I will employ the biological term penis to refer to 
the male organ in the flaccid state of rest.  In psychological discourse this usual, non-
potent state of the organ is often lost.  In this state, the penis is not devoid of sensation 
or the possibilities of pleasure, but neither does it (for the most part) become the 
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subject of myth.  For the actual, physical erection, I employ the uncapitalized Latin 
form phallus.  This is not Lacan’s symbolic member, which I distinguish by giving it a 
capital initial:  Phallus.  The physical phallus is a real thing, or rather a variety of 
individual things experienced by individual men as parts of themselves or by women 
as parts of individual men.  Actual erections are tangible and vulnerable, and indeed 
they have many parts and many zones that differ in sensitivity and sensation, as well 
as many differences from one individual to another or at different ages.  It is this 
uncapitalized but sexually aroused phallus that I associate with Monick’s term 
chthonic phallos.  But I want to reserve the Greek spelling employed by the Jungians 
for something distinct from Lacan’s Symbolic Phallus.  The Lacanian Phallus is 
something completely abstract that functions without even being seen directly—
indeed it is powerful precisely because it is invisible.  It operates in the discourses of 
logocentric patriarchy to signify social power.  By contrast, I use Phallos  (the Greek 
spelling)  to refer to an archetypal image of the active and assertive deployment of 
libido.5  I want to distinguish this more spiritual-creative significance from the 
signification of a place in the power structure of patriarchal society.  The two are not 
unrelated, but they are not the same thing either.   
 In Wyly’s use of phallos, he identifies the search for an unrestrained and honest 
flow of libido through and in the ego and the body.  He suggests that it is the socially 
enforced pursuit of the unattainably Symbolic Phallus (patriarchal dominance and 
stereotypic fantasies of male “success”) that results in Priapic inflation and what 
might be called a tyranny of the Persona.  This is also what Theweleit seems to be 
seeking when he suggests that men might break away from the structure of 
domination and self-control to permit a free-flow of libido that parallels Derrida’s 
desire for a freeplay of signification.  It is this creative awareness of freeplay that I 
associate with the healthy ego-Self axis, that is, the ego’s understanding and 
awareness of its relationship to the larger Self which includes the unconscious 
112 
(collective and personal).  In men it is possible to identify this rare state of health as 
one aspect of manliness and as such it may be signified by the phallus and the penis.  
Put another way, the penis and phallus are the signifiers while Phallus and Phallos, as 
I have designated them are the signifieds.  One will note that, apart from an arbitary 
association with the male sex, the qualities and attitudes I am designating by Phallus 
and Phallos just as easily characterize women.  The table on the following page (Fig. 
1) will, I hope, clarify the model I am developing.  Throughout this study I will use 
these terms according to the definitions I have laid out.  Some of the designations will 
make more sense after I lay out clearer definitions of Logos and Eros in the next 
chapter. 
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Notes 
 
1 Arguably the accounting mentality finds its roots much earlier in the mentality of confession 
found in Roman Catholicism or the Protestant self-examination of a writer such as Daniel 
Defoe.  Accounting methods themselves can be traced to the most ancient civilizations, but 
Hoskin and Macve identify a particular shift, both in the practices of accounting and in the 
application of accountability and scientific management to modern forms of disciplinary 
academic knoweldge-power. 
2 On the intersection of sports, discipline, and “success” as an assessment of male performance 
see Messner, “Meaning of Success.” 
3 I am setting aside the parallel formation in women which is sometimes called the puella 
aeterna.  Von Franz attributes this perpetual adolescence in women to a puer animus, an added 
twist that seems unnecessary, but may help explain, for example, Mary Shelley’s evident 
projection of her Animus-ideal onto Percy.  With an animus structured after the puer aeternus, 
a woman would seek out such a man rather than become like him herself.  As I have 
suggested, I think it best to use the word animus not for a psychic component of the female 
psyche, but a component of any psyche, male, female, and of any sexual orientation.  Animus 
is then the term for the internalized ideal of the masculine and may be a sexual object or an 
ego object equally well, or even both.  
4 It is important to emphasize here that when I say the grounding of ego in the Self bestows a 
feeling of wholeness, I do not mean to suggest any ontological superiority for the normative, 
bourgeois ideal of committed, single-partner love, much less for the romantic ideal of “one 
true love for eternity” etc.  The feeling of wholeness gained by adhering to these ideals of 
commitment is culturally contingent; that is, one’s need for a single-partner, committed 
relationship, fidelity, and so forth for life is constructed around an experience of mothering 
such as one finds in the nineteenth-century bourgeois household, where, as Gelpi suggests, the 
mother is conceived as a dominant, goddesslike figure in the child’s life, where the mother’s 
breast is highly fetishized, and where the mother-son relationship, especially, is highly 
eroticicized.  It is in such a cultural mother-complex that the struggle of the boy’s ego against 
an engulfing femininity exists unresolved beside an irrisistable longing for union with the 
mother.  While Jacoby’s work suggests that there are biological grounds for the “longing for 
paradise,” it also explicitly demonstrates how cultural forms of mothering (or parenting) can 
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draw out or quell the later, adult, manifestations of the complex in a desperate and destructive 
or debilitating form.   
  It cannot be emphasized too strongly that I am not advocating the desire for 
wholeness, which is manifest in the Self complex, as a privileged state sanctioned by 
bourgeois ideology.  The desire inevitably partakes of that ideology in the bourgeois 
individual, but  Jung’s idea of the Self as center and circumference of a “whole” is based in the 
recognition of fragmentation, multiplicity, and polymorphous desires as “healthy” and 
“natural.”  Jung began his career as a “psychologist by observing that the fragmentation of his 
psychotic patients was remarkably purposeful and not radically unlike a “normal” person’s 
dream states.  The bourgeois sense of “wholeness,” by contrast, usually means homogeneity 
and ego-centricity structured around Logos and control.  It is, in other words, the ego’s fantasy 
of “individuality” set against the Other, not Jung’s notion of individuation within the reality of 
perpetual flow, indeterminacy, polyvalency, and Mythos—what he called “the Symbolic Life” 
(see my discussion of Mythos in Ch. III). 
5 Wyly and Monick sometimes seem to claim that there is some sort of intrinsically masculine 
libido that is expressed through Phallos.  I want to be clear that I am not postulating such a 
thing.  Libido is not intrinsically gendered, nor is a man’s libido “naturally” different from a 
woman’s, but desire (or its sublimated form in “creativity”) may be imagined in gender-linked 
images such as the erect penis.  Because of this, it is useful to have a term to express the inner 
experiencing of creative energy as masculine or phallic. 
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Chapter III 
Satanic Reason 
 
__________________________ 
 
 
   Lo, a shadow of horror is risen 
In Eternity!  Unknown, unprolific! 
Self-closed, all-repelling:  what Demon 
Hath form'd this abominable void 
This soul-shudd'ring vacuum?—Some said  
"It is Urizen", But unknown, abstracted 
Brooding secret, the dark power hid. 
   Times on times he divided, & measur'd 
Space by space in his ninefold darkness 
Unseen, unknown!… 
   Dark revolving in silent activity: 
Unseen in tormenting passions; 
And activity unknown and horrible; 
A self-contemplating shadow, 
In enormous labours occupied   
—William Blake1  
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 Having examined masculinity and the symbolic Phallus, I would like to take 
this chapter to consider the question of solar versus chthonic masculinities in their 
relation to scientific reason.  Reason, that faculty so sharply satirized by William Blake 
in his visionary First Book of Urizen, is a kind of cognition but also the foundation for 
social order and, in the modern age, for male dominance.  In this chapter, I want to 
develop an understanding of the concepts of Logos and Eros within a paradigm of 
psychic energy based on Jung’s fourfold model of psychic activity.  Jung’s typology of 
two attitudes (extraverted and introverted) and four functions (sensing, intuition, 
thinking, and feeling) has become a field in itself.  The Meyers-Briggs type indicator, 
developed from Jung’s book Psychological Types, is well-known in the business world 
as a tool for understanding people’s different orientations and concerns, different 
styles of communication and work, and different aptitudes.  If not taken as a rigid 
system of classification, the Jungian typology can be a useful paradigm to understand 
the dynamics of psyche, and particularly the way these dynamics have entered into 
gender stereotyping. 
 In addition to this mapping of libido, or desire, I want to summarize another 
paradigm of masculinity developed by J. C. Smith in his book The Psychoanalytic Roots 
of Patriarchy.  Smith sets up another fourfold system to explain the various ego-ideals 
that may be taken by boys and men and the consequences of those ideals.  He offers 
an intelligent and critical use of mythological figures to wed the systems of Freud and 
Jung into a social psychology that is sensitive to archetypal imagination and to its 
effects in the realm of law and power.  The map of libido and the charting of Smith’s 
Apollonian, Dionysian, Periclean, and Heraclean complexes will serve as tools and 
guides for the exploration of the literary works examined in Part II. 
(1) Mapping Desire 
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 The term libido is a point of contention between Jung and Freud.  It is a word 
that has been incorporated into the American vernacular, as least among intellectuals, 
as a synonym with “sex drive.”  Freud called it the “life instinct” or drive but equated 
it with a drive toward sexual copulation, orgasm, and reproduction.  Jung objected to 
Freud’s narrow equation of life and sex and his myopic focus on the sexual drive as if 
that were the only one.  Freud built up a system around the opposition of Eros (life) 
and Thanatos (death).  Each was characterized by a “drive” that functioned 
unconsciously and compulsively.  Such a narrow definition of libido, shuttling 
between a desire for death and a desire for life, reduces intellectual and artistic 
activity to the mere sublimation of sexual Eros, valuable ultimately only within a 
Darwinian scheme of survival value.  Jung, by contrast, was far more interested in 
myths, art, religion and creativity and much less bound by a narrow Darwinian 
pessimism.  As a result, he developed a definition of libido that was significantly 
different from Freud’s. 
 In the mapping of libido found in Figure 2, I have started with Jung’s 
definition of libido as “psychic energy.”  The energy metaphor makes libido into 
something more abstract than sexual desire, and so capable of taking many forms.  
But the energy metaphor is a little too bloodless for my taste.  Instead, I propose that 
libido be defined as desire.  Desire moves in various directions, takes various objects, 
and is expressed in various forms.  In this sense it is like energy or driving force.  In a 
sense, it is a flowing of attention toward some object and some goal or process.  
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 The principles shaping libido were described by both Jung and Freud in terms 
of oppositions:  Eros and Thanatos in Freud’s case, Eros and Logos in Jung’s.  But 
Jung described many other oppositions, particularly in his personality typology.  
There he opposed two pairs of “functions,” the first pair were called intuition and 
sensation and were considered to be forms of perception.  The other pair, thinking 
and feeling, were the opposed forms of judgment or evaluation.  I have named the 
poles in more generalized form.  Thinking and Feeling correspond loosely to 
Symbolic Understanding and Embodied-Relational Understanding on my vertical 
axis.  The horizontal axis corresponds to Jung’s modes of perception, sensation and 
intuition.  I have called them Activity and Receptivity more generally, the first having 
to do with interaction in the world of objects, the second having to do with openness 
to those objects and one’s imagination about them. 
 Each of these four directions or processes through which desire moves, is 
subdivided into “positive” and “negative” charges.  Positive is not necessarily “good” 
but rather constructive, building and synthesizing.  Similarly, the negative charge is 
not necessarily all bad, but merely negative in the sense of denial, limitation, or 
splitting apart some established wholeness.  For example, the positive side of  
Symbolic Understanding is Mythos, the synthetic and metaphoric use of language.  
Metaphor united what was formerly separated.  Logos, by contrast, is considered the 
“negative” expression of the Symbolic because it attempts to make the meanings of 
words as narrow and literal as possible.  Mathematics and logic dissect and seek 
stable meanings, not poetry. 
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Activity and Receptivity 
 Instead of the vague and emotionally charged terms “life and death,” I have 
labeled the horizontal axis of my map Activity and Receptivity.  Each state is an 
aspect of “life” but the pole of Receptivity nevertheless captures what Freud 
described as Thanatos, a movement towards stasis, recurrence, or death conceived as 
a cyclic return to the earth.  Freud associated aggression with the “death drive,” 
Thanatos.  He set this “drive” in opposition to Eros, which he conceived in sexual 
terms as the “life drive.”  Freud’s theory of an opposition between a drive toward life 
and a drive toward death was predicated on the assumption that the basic dynamic of 
“life” was tension and the basic tendency of the universe was towards entropy, or a 
release of tension.  For Freud, sex epitomized this tension and release he believed to 
be inherent in the biological organism.  Life’s most fundamental expression was the 
drive to reproduce, an idea that shows the heavy influence of Darwinism on Freud.   
 Jung objected to Freud’s biologistic equation of life and sex and his hierarchical 
privileging of entropy over organic growth and increased complexity.  In Jung’s 
estimation, copulation and orgasm were only one expression of “life.”  Besides this, 
defining libido as “life” seemed too close to the vitalist belief in a life-force of some 
electrical or magnetic nature.  Instead of trying to define “life,” Jung took up Freud’s 
term libido and defined it in a more controlled manner according to the way it was 
used in psychoanalytic discourse.  Libido is “psychic energy,” (with “energy” 
understood as a metaphor rather than an ontological statement) that could flow into 
many forms including the sexual urge.  According to Jung, libido should be imagined 
not only as a fluctuation between tension and its release, but as a dialectic between 
opposites of any sort.   
 The four directions on my libido map are thus better thought of as compass 
points or applications of energy.  They are not distinct entities by themselves, nor 
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different energies.  Even the term “drive” suggests too much separation, for each is 
dependent upon the others and movement along one axis may create a corresponding 
or an opposite movement of energy along the other axis.  For example, there is a 
tendency for Phobos to spawn Thanatos.  One may fear one’s enemy and want to kill 
him or her.  Or, equally well, one may fear one’s future and grow depressed, 
despondent, or suicidal.  Turning this about, the cultivation of the positive pole of 
Receptivity in meditation may dispel fear. 
 It is also important to understand the contraries I am delineating not as 
mutually exclusive categories.  No one is entirely directed toward one end of a 
polarity, though it is usual to exhibit some predilection in one direction or the other.  
Jung’s four typological “functions” are usually understood as descriptors of 
psychological types:  for example, the intuitive-thinking type, who perceives more 
acutely through intuition than the senses and who understands or values the world 
through logical categories, and abstract theories rather than through relationships and 
feelings.  The opposite example would be the sensate-feeling type, who is inclined to 
perceive the world through the senses, factually in the here-and-now, and who judges 
that factual world subjectively, according to personal relationships and associations.   
 Each of these expressions will also tend to be either predominantly extraverted 
(directed outward towards objects) or introverted (focused inward to the subject’s own 
imaginal and emotional life).  The psychological types that most exemplify the 
attitude of the technician-hero are the extraverted forms of the intuitive-thinking and 
sensate-thinking types.  If this is granted, it suggests two conclusions.  First, that the 
relational branch of the chart is the shadow-side of the technician, the repressed 
function.   
 Second, that the repressed or avoided attitude is introversion.  That second 
point may seem to run against the grain of the scientist stereotype conceived as a 
loner, withdrawn to himself in the laboratory.  But that sort of withdrawal from 
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relatedness is characteristic of the repression of feeling.  The repression of 
introversion means, rather, that the subject avoids self-reflection and this is precisely 
the attitude one would expect of ego-centrism.  The egocentric psyche is one 
disconnected from Self, from the larger matrix of the unconscious and the archetypal 
complexes.  Such an attitude may manifest in conceited or autocratic behavior—
typical of what one commonly calls egocentric or self-centered personalities—but it 
would be wrong to mistake this behavior for inner reflection and connection between 
ego and unconscious.  If the person’s behavior seems “unconscious” in the sense of 
compulsive, that is because it is the emergence of repressed materials and attitudes. 
 Victor Frankenstein will serve as a good example of this lack of inner reflection 
and subsequent domination by the repressed (see Ch. V).  Seemingly withdrawn from 
others into a world of his own fantasies, he hardly seems like the common idea of an 
“extravert.”  The problem is that Jung’s terminology has entered into the vernacular 
in distorted forms.  Just as archetype has become a buzz-word that bears little relation 
to the term as Jung defined it, so extravert has been used in widely different ways.  
The usual association is to someone garrulous and friendly, outgoing, a party person.  
But this characterizes only the extraverted feeling type.  The extraverted sensate or 
intuitive thinking type should not be expected to thrive on other people as such.  
Rather, he or she thrives on objects to think about, to dissect, pick apart, analyze, and 
discuss.  In conversation, the extraverted thinker may be animated to a frenzy (one 
thinks of Victor Frankenstein’s feverish dialogue with Walton) but he or she is 
absorbed in ideas first, people second, and may have a hard time talking intimately 
about fears and desires of the heart.   
 I will take up the vertical axis of thinking and feeling again in a moment, but 
let me first return to Activity and Receptivity,  One can grasp the way the map works 
by looking at the Intuition end (on the right).  Receptivity is divided into Tranquillity 
and Thanatos.  I use Freud’s term to tie the map into Freudian ideas of a “death 
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drive” but also to revise that idea away from literal death into forms of ego-death, if 
you will.  Depression, apathy, a desire for entropy, contraction, stasis, inaction, all 
characterize the thanatic expression of desire.  Moreover, as the two branches marked 
E and I indicate, Thanatos can be extraverted or introverted.  It may be a desire for the 
death of others, or merely their absence, or their unchanging stasis.  Or it may be a 
desire for inner stasis and ego-annihilation, a withdraw to the point of autism or even 
suicidal tendencies.   
 All of these expressions constitute the negative side of Receptivity and have 
their mirror images in the branch labeled Tranquillity.  I chose the word tranquillity 
for its positive connotations and constructive possibilities.  One needs to point out 
that introspection, listening, respect, and so on, are qualities of this tranquil state that 
may be brought out more or less depending on whether an individual is thinking or 
feeling oriented.  The intensely thinking-oriented technical man, whom I have been 
describing, may not express his intuition as empathy, for example, even if he is 
primarily extraverted.  If thinking dominates to the exclusion of feeling and 
relatedness to other people, he may display a conscious intuition about things but lack 
the ability to empathize with another person.  His understanding may be quick and 
leap intuitively with seemingly great sympathy, and still be unable to open himself or 
understand his own embodied desires for love and affection. Listening and 
observation obviously have a great deal to do with science, and introspection is a 
crucial part of theorizing, but these are symbolically oriented forms of introspection 
rather than feeling-oriented forms. 
 When one turns to the Activity quadrant of the compass rose, one sees the 
qualities that more typically characterize heroes.  Just as Receptivity has its 
extraverted expressions, so Activity has introverted forms.  But what will concern me 
most closely in the psychology of the technician is the interplay between the large 
ideas of Liberation and Limitation and the practices of self-control and the 
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domination of others.  The negative side of Activity, Limitation is the region of the 
soldier-male who seeks to be physically enclosed, encased in steel, encircled by his 
own discipline or the discipline of his brotherhood.  The Liberation side of Activity 
can take many divergent forms, but in general is the celebration of the body and the 
senses, jouissance, and freeplay between others and one’s self.  This play can take the 
thinking form of intellectual exchange of ideas, or it can take erotic and sexual forms.  
It might take the form of a Dionysiac debauch, an orgy, or religious dancing.   
 One must observe, however, that despite the positive and negative labels, 
Liberation is not always “good” and Limitation always “bad.”  Similarly, even 
Thanatos is not always “bad,” even if death does conjure fear in most people.  In 
situations of self-defense or warfare, extraverted Thanatos is often seen to be a virtue, 
and when one is pruning dead branches from trees or raking leaves for compost, or 
even simply abandoning oneself to sadness or the starkness of a winter day, one is 
engaged with the “negative” side of receptivity in a way that cannot be considered 
unambiguously “bad.”  Death (figurative or literal) can be an opening into renewal.  
Similarly, our customary associations of Liberation with good and Limitation with 
bad are too simple (as well as dependent upon cultural prejudices).  For this reason I 
have included “loss of control” under introverted liberation and conservation under 
extraverted limitation.  Moreover, self-control is by no means a “bad” thing.  But 
what concerns me in this study is a kind of pathological obsession with self-control 
and domination, not simply as a way to make the ego or society function in an 
orderly, predictable way, but as an ego-defense against deeply repressed fears of 
disorder. 
 Activity can be understood in terms of power —the ability to take decisive 
action which may, or may not, interfere with the agency/power of others.  The 
distinction between positive and negative Activity is not simply between acting on 
others and acting for oneself (that is the introverted/extraverted distinction).  Rather, 
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it is a distinction between the free exercise of will and its inhibition.  This 
discrimination of forms of action permits one to theorize the emotion most 
problematically associated with masculinity—that is, anger.2   
 Anger emerges in this mapping as the affect resulting from the inhibition of 
will (or agency), and aggression is a reaction against such inhibition.  Anger is the 
combination of negative Activity with negative Eros and is imbricated with feelings 
of fear, hatred, and repulsion, or, more generally, the feeling of disconnectedness or 
unrelatedness.  Hatred may arise from a desire to separate, but it is also usually 
linked to anger as a reaction against the perceived threat to one’s control over self and 
world.  Positive Eros, because it leads to a loving sense of connection with others and 
with one’s inner life, fosters feelings of harmony with one’s environment and so 
strengthens the ego’s sense of agency (positive Activity).   It is important to realize 
that negative Activity is not inactivity but a form of action which is limiting or 
binding rather than expansive and liberating.  In the case of Activity, the negative 
character is an exercise of personal power which destroys the power of others.  
Aggression is usually directed outward toward an object, but like Eros it may also be 
directed inward in which case it becomes an urge toward self-destruction, or the 
destruction of some hated aspect of one’s self—frequently the shadow or the 
contrasexual complex.    Another possible reaction to inhibition of will is, of course, to 
become passive, or in my terms Receptive.   
 Receptivity, similarly, is not simply inaction.  In its positive form, Receptivity is 
its own sort of “action” but is distinguished from “Activity” because it is what we 
customarily call passive behavior, a movement in the direction of a center rather than 
outward, a movement directed toward stillness and a position of being acted upon.  
This description is admittedly paradoxical, but is necessary to articulate the positive, 
constructive side of Receptivity.  It is a receptive activity in the same way that the 
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oral, vaginal, or anal function in sexual intercourse is receptive action, or in the same 
way that listening and smelling or watching are receptive.   
 Vision, tasting, and touching, by contrast, seem more a part of positive Activity 
than Receptivity because they require the ego’s direction—the direction of the gaze, of 
the eyes’ focus, of the hand’s touch, of the mouth to taste (though the mouth is clearly 
both receptive and active).  That is why I locate listening and smelling on the 
receptive side because our physiology makes these ongoing senses that we cannot 
“shut off.”  In a way, the “senses” are all partly the result of Activity and partly (or 
sometimes, more or less) the result of Receptivity.  This is meant to suggest that 
intuition is not extrasensory (as its opposition to Jung’s “sensation” might suggest).  
Rather it is perception that goes on outside consciousness.  There is a great deal of 
hearing and smelling (as well as the more “active” senses) that occurs outside 
conscious awareness and might be considered a tool of intuition more than sensation.  
It is the receptive side of perception that is often lost in one’s inculturation, especially 
in the case of men.  Looking—scopophilia—becomes a constant imperative, a gesture 
of possession, judging, and mastery.  Smelling or tasting by contrast, and any form of 
touch that is tender and erotic is repressed in men the more fully inculturated they 
are into our culture’s macho ideal.  As Theweleit observes, the soldier-male cuts 
himself off from all sensations of pleasure.  The technician-hero permits himself the 
use of his senses only as instruments of his reason, his manipulation of the world.3   
Language and the Body 
 In setting up Eros and Phobos (love/fear; affinity/revulsion) in opposition, I 
follow Jung who objected to Freud’s use of the term Eros to mean life rather than love.  
If the term is taken in its usual sense, it might be defined as attraction or affinity, the 
opposite of which is not death, but fear, antipathy, or repulsion.  Jung also, however, 
set Eros and Logos to be polar opposites, the one having to do with synthesis and 
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feeling, the other with analysis and rational thinking.  Similarly, he opposed Logos to 
Mythos as two radically different forms of language.   
 I resolve these multiple oppositions by considering Eros and Phobos to be 
expressions of the larger process of Embodied-Relational Understanding, as the map 
indicates.  It is because love and fear are two halves of a larger whole that each so 
often resolves into its opposite.  Feelings of love are always mixed with fear of loss or 
domination.  Feelings such as jealousy and envy partake of such a mixture of love and 
fear, attraction and revulsion, that it is hard to say whether either is foremost.  I use 
the term feeling in the particular sense that has been developed in the Jungian 
personality typology.  Feeling is a form of “judgment.”  Along with thinking, feeling 
places value on what is perceived.  Thinking provides logical, abstract, and rational 
value, according to socially ascribed laws and rules.  Feeling, by contrast, ascribes 
value according to human relationship, to connectedness and its attendant affects. 
 The Logos/Mythos opposition is somewhat different from Eros/Phobos.  
Again, the “negative” side, which I have assigned to Logos, is not “bad” but merely 
negative in the sense that it is limiting.  Meaning is limited in rational discourses; 
words are closely defined, fenced about to try to control them.  By contrast Mythos is 
founded on the freeplay of metaphor and symbolism that goes beyond language per 
se to embrace visual and even musical symbolism.  Shelburne lays out Mythos and 
Logos as two contrary types of discourse as follows: 
 Logos Mythos 
 science mysticism 
 rational knowledge intuitive knowledge 
 reason imagination 
 literal truth metaphorical truth 
 philosophy mythology 
 expression through  expression through manifestations 
     conscious activity     of the unconscious 
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 Shelburne notes that Mythos and Logos are not “separate domains of reality, a 
natural versus a supernatural domain, for example”(4).  Rather, they are two aspects 
of the way human minds work.  Logos is a way of organizing experience by 
privileging  thinking.  Mythos, by contrast, is language in its more primitive, elemental 
form of narrative, story, picture, gesture, dance.  It is symbolic understanding but its 
epistemology can only be called Believing, which is how I’ve labeled that side of the 
Symbolic pole.  Now, in a sense, the operations of scientific Logos depend at some 
point upon belief.  One must believe one’s instruments are accurate, believe one’s 
authorities are true, believe signs can correspond to the Real.  So, in this sense, these 
two poles are just as interdependent as the others.  Just as Love and Fear are 
interwoven, so are Logos and Mythos.  But just as love tries to forget its roots in fear 
and vulnerability, so Logos strives to deny that it is a myth.   
The two modes interpenetrate each other with the logos never completely 
free of the mythos and the mythos likewise subject to rational influence and 
interpretation… Metaphor will be seen as permeating all languages and 
cannot be eliminated in favor of completely literal discourse.  Moreover, 
myths can themselves be seen as extended metaphors so that the 
archetypes could then be understood as an innate set of basic metaphors in 
terms of which humans can see the world.  (Shelburne 6-7)   
 The particular case at the heart of this study is the mythos of positivistic 
science.  The picture can be complicated further by suggesting that symbolic 
expressions and cognition of any sort is depended upon perception, and that these are 
in turn always colored by language and belief.  One sees what one is looking for.  On 
the other hand, one frequently intuits things that are entirely out of sync with 
conventional truths. 
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 Intuition, which sees into possibilities, can be equated with what is usually 
called imagination.  But forming and manipulating images is the basic process of all 
mentation, underlying the “facts” of sensing and the logic of thinking just as much as 
it produces intuitions of future possibilities.  Intuition is often the key function for 
those moments when one gets the “big picture” as opposed to the details of particle 
and structure.  In this sense it is intuition that is the process of essentializing, 
generalizing, and theorizing.  But it goes unsaid that the Coleridgean notion of 
imagination as fancy or as creative genius lies at the heart of artistic expressions in the 
zone of Mythos where they flourish in various degrees of liberty. 
 My emphasis here on the quality of connection inherent in intuition shows 
intuition’s affinity to feeling, which is fundamentally connectedness between subject 
and object.  That definition (like all definitions) comes from the thinking function and 
so seems too dry and abstract to capture the feeling of feeling, as it were.  This whole 
discussion and the neat mapping of quadrants is an expression of Logos in the 
Symbolic register.  In the Real, feeling wells up inside us, grips our hearts or our guts, 
makes us gasp or color in anger or embarrassment, scream in terror, moan in ecstasy, 
grunt in disgust. 
Spirit and Techne 
 Jung defined archetypes as “patterns of instinctual behavior” and as 
“categories of the imagination.”  One customarily thinks of instinct and spirit as 
opposite directions in which psychic energy can move—down and up, respectively.  
Freud’s theory of sublimation follows from his definition of libido as instinctual 
energy.  Jung added to this idea by suggesting that the “spiritual” side of human 
cultural attainment is a distinct deployment of psychic energy, an “instinct” in itself, 
if I may put it that way.  The spirit is a drive toward creativity in the arts and sciences.  
It is the human tendency to create new things out of nature, including sign systems, 
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the ultimate, and perhaps also the most fundamental, technology.  Spirit is also for 
Jung, as it was for Hegel, a description of an advanced form of cognition, the process 
Jung called individuation, the understanding of the Self.  Spirit, then, cannot be 
localized on my map of libido but must be seen as the whole system of libido striving 
for an awareness of itself and its possibilities for creative self-fulfillment.  
 Spirit is a term that is often used in a religious sense.  But even in that context, 
the Holy Spirit, or the spiritualist’s belief in ghosts, are expressions of inspiration, that 
inexplicable experience of ideas and feelings coming seemingly out of nowhere, or 
out of some other mind into one’s consciousness.  Spirit also represents genius, the 
astonishing ability of some individuals to strike on an idea that reshapes the world or 
makes the impossible suddenly possible.  In this sense spirit bears a connection to the 
techne or art at the root of the technician-hero.  It is this inspired quality of the 
inventor, as well as his mastery over machines and Nature, that gives him a kind of 
godlike quality.   
 In the term “spirited” one can see another aspect of the word.  It usually refers 
to someone, or even some animal, who has a powerful will of his or her own.  There is 
a kind of excess of energy, both physical and emotional in a spirited soul.  But the 
idea depends, like all the uses of the word, upon a notion of disembodied mind.  The 
spirits of the Victorian spiritualists appearing on film in the spirit photographer’s 
camera, or in the darkened room of the séance, were normally invisible and detached 
from their bodies.  The idea is deeply rooted in religious belief systems and I will not 
attempt to pronounce on its ontological veracity.  Psychologically, however, the belief 
in spirits, the immortality of the soul, and their linkage to the idea of genius and 
inspiration play an important role in the construction of the technical man.  For, like 
the poet, the technician is a “maker” and his techne is best when it is inspired from 
somewhere beyond.  Moreover, his belief in himself as essentially Mind acting upon 
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bodies depends on the conception of personality and agency as separate from 
embodiment, distanced, and godlike.   
 Thus spirit may refer to the admirable quality of striving for the good, for 
compassion, or for self-sacrifice in service to others.  These are part of the Christian 
tradition of “spiritual” virtues.  But it may also refer to the quality of striving after 
Heaven at whatever cost, a kind of compulsion for upward-mobility with its 
connotations of superiority and power.  Indeed the concept of upward movement of 
the mind and soul took on a new power after the publication of Darwin’s Origin of 
Species.  Darwin’s exposition of evolutionary theory was the crowning touch to a 
history of such ideas and it encouraged men of the Victorian period to see themselves 
as beings risen into the light from out of a bestial darkness.  This ideology is built 
upon the denigration and fear of the body expressed through an idea of separable 
spirit, or the rational soul struggling against mere flesh.  The ideology comes partly 
out of Romanticism’s propensity to Gnosticism, the radical split between the sublime 
soul and the common clay imprisoning it. 
 It is important to emphasize that the polarity of Symbolic and Embodied-
Relational Understanding on my map expresses a phenomenological split, not an 
ontological dualism.  The healthy psyche must be seen as avoiding dualism, healing 
the split through self-knowledge and a dynamic complemenarity between the 
Symbolic and what Julia Kristeva has called le sémiotique.  The sémiotique has be 
described as “the actual organization, or disposition, within the body, of instinctual 
drives… as they affect language and its practice, in dialectical conflict with le 
symbolique”  (Gora, et al.  in Kristeva).  Although I find Kristeva’s terms instructive, 
the term “semiotic” has too many ultra-scientific connotations in English, referring as 
it does, to the science of semiotics.  Kristeva’s term chora is better, signifying a kind of 
voice from the body itself, biochemistry as a silent, inner, language underlying all our 
feelings and thoughts in ways that science can only begin to comprehend.  The realm 
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of Eros and Phobos is a realm that is in the guts and the bones, that enflames the 
blood to passions and pounds out a heartbeat of assurance that one’s soul is 
intimately in and of the body.   
 Our medical and psychological discourses tend to disconnect psychic 
processes from their fleshly embodiment.  It is partly for this reason that I have 
identified Jung’s term psychic energy with Kristeva’s use of the term desire.  Libido, 
Eros, Logos, Spirit, are all desire, the expressions of longing across a divide, a 
separation.  The scientist may absorb himself or herself in examinations and 
considerations, from Latin considerare.  But behind this gesture lies desiderare, the 
longing.  The words both relate to Latin sidus, “star” the object of longing for the 
intense gaze of love, curiosity, and the upward-striving of the soul to take wing. 
(2) Male Fantasies of Anger and the Body 
 Benjamin and Rabinbach, in their introduction to volume two of Klaus 
Theweleit’s Male Fantasies, describe his work as “an analysis of masculine identity as a 
flight from the feminine, as fear of ego dissolution, and of warfare as the fulfillment of 
both a longing for fusion (with the military machine) and legitimate explosion in the 
moment of battle” (xvii).  This longing for fusion and ego-dissolution is an expression 
of Thanatos by men who cannot engage in positive Receptivity.  Unable to let 
themselves be passively acted upon (or unable to admit that they are acted upon by 
social forms that determine their militarized identity), the soldier-males can only 
express an exaggerated lust for Activity.  Receptivity is thus repressed and returns in 
the form of dream-fantasies twisted by aggression and fear.  Fearless, the ego is 
haunted by a shadow filled with fear, particularly unresolved fears of engulfment by 
the mother and Oedipal terror of slipping into feminine feelings or behavior.   
 Fear of the feminine, as Theweleit demonstrates, emerges from the 
unconscious “in a seemingly endless series of liquid images in which woman is 
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associated with all that might threaten to deluge or flood the boundaries of the male 
ego” (xvii).  Inside and outside become obsessions for the man who has troped his 
body as an impregnable fortress and his phallus as the ultimate weapon to penetrate 
others.  The “armored organization of the male self in a world that constantly 
threatens it with disintegration” (xvii) is not only the dream of military fascism but 
the dominant fantasy of modern boyhood integral to the imaginal process of turning 
infants into boys and boys into men.   
 The structures of discipline which Michel Foucault has studied so thoroughly, 
finds its apotheosis in military and penal institutions, but its fundamentally body-
denying violence is ubiquitous in patriarchal social formations, including modern 
science, medicine, and industrialism.  “The self is mechanized through a variety of 
mental and physical procedures:  military drill, countenance, training, operations 
which Foucault identified as ‘techniques of the self’” (Theweleit, II: xvii).  These 
operations are, however, only the most rigid forms of the whole web of interlocking 
apparatuses used to produce men who conform to the ideal of Theweleit’s “muscle 
physis.”  At base, such self-containment and self-regulation is motivated by a dread 
of anything perceived to be “outside” the ego-identified subject which may threaten 
to fragment its imagined “wholeness.”    
 The most urgent task of the “man of steel,” according to Theweleit, is “to 
pursue, to dam in and to subdue any force that threatens to transform him back into 
the horribly disorganized jumble of flesh, hair, skin, bones, intestines, and feelings 
that calls itself human” (II: 160).  The irrational horror of this jumble of fleshly parts is 
evident in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein.  Jules Verne’s Captain Nemo suffers from such 
compulsive self-armoring, desperately seeking isolation while at the same time 
longing, as Theweleit suggests, “for the moment when his body armor will explode” 
(II: 179).  The fear produces a conflation of aggression, Thanatos, and Eros, an 
eroticism of death:  “In killing there is a transgression against the boundaries of the 
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other while the inner cohesion of the [ego] remains intact.  The military formation is 
both a kind of fusion (mass) and a denial of all fusion and pleasure” (Theweleit, II: 
xviii).  For such men, pain becomes the index of self-cohesion, the need to feel the 
boundaries of oneself and, like the modern bodybuilder intoning “No Pain, No Gain,” 
to fortify them into “rock” or “steel” battlements with which to meet the world. 
 The technical man, like the soldier-male, struggles against the feminine and 
anything that can be identified with the female body—”with liquidity, with warmth, 
and above all with a sensuality that is responsive to other human beings” (Theweleit, 
II: xix).  His struggle is the projection of the masculine ego’s “fear of the desiring 
production of his own unconscious” (II: 6).  It is the same structural problem Jung 
identified as the need for individuation, the integration of ego with Self and the other 
complexes of the unconscious.   
 Jung’s theories of the fundamental fragmentary and “polytheistic” nature of 
the psyche rose out of his early work with psychotic and schizophrenic patients.  
Theweleit arrives at a similar description of the ego’s fragility through the writing of 
Margaret Mahler and her theory of self-other differentiation, which she calls 
“separation-individuation” (Theweleit II: xxi).  The fascist male is not simply longing 
for a missing ego-ideal or a missing father, though this may be part of the problem.  
“Rather, fear and longing for fusion, the threat of fragmentation and dissolution, and 
the inability to tolerate animate reality are concrete expressions of a failure to 
differentiate” (II: xxi).  Benjamin and Rabinbach continue, 
[Theweleit’s] argument that these men were not fully born [nicht zu Ende 
geboren] (as in Mahler’s concept of “psychological birth” from symbiosis), 
that they never entered the field of object relations between a whole ego 
and a whole other… explains much about what impels violence and 
destruction.  These texts document their consequent inability to distinguish 
self from other, the inability to feel the integrity of the self and sustain a 
sense of bodily boundaries without inflicting violence.  (II: xxi) 
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 The texts I have chosen to analyze in this study are not the sort of sensationally 
lurid narratives and images of Theweleit’s Freikorps writers.  They are the much more 
common narratives of violence and homosocial love that surround the figures of 
scientists and engineers in the literature of adventure.  Nevertheless, they exhibit the 
same basic problem: the masculine ego’s association of the feminine and the 
unconscious and the rejection of both from the ego’s self-image.  What Benjamin and 
Rabinbach call the soldier-male’s “frantic repudiation” of the mother is the ego’s fear 
of being dissolved back into the “mass” of the psyche, devoured by the Great Mother.  
Once this is realized, it becomes apparent that Freud’s claim that “paternal law” was 
to be seen as the sole force of individuation (or deintegration of the ego) is not 
adequate.  For the paternal law, in this formulation, is the agency that creates 
paranoia and the repudiation of the feminine that prevents the ego from maintaining 
its connection to the Self.  As Benjamin and Rabinbach observe: 
Theweleit does not set up the oedipal as the normal, the preoedipal as the 
pathological.  He never slips into the stance common to contemporary 
analysts, and to earlier Freudians, in which the father’s role is ultimately 
valorized in contrast to the mother’s regressive character as a temptation to 
fusion and regression.  Theweleit’s soldiering men do not act as they do 
because they are overwhelmed by a preoedipal desire to become one with 
the mother, but because they never experience union with another person.  
It is the repudiation of woman, not the identification with her as a primal 
nature, which typifies fascism.  (II: xxii) 
 Moreover, such a tendency to repudiate women is integral to the misogynistic 
and gynophobic structure of patriarchy.  Emotionally intimate union with another 
woman in a true Eros-relationship, after separation from the mother, is rendered 
problematic, if not impossible, by the intensity of the anima as a repressed complex.  
Fiercely denied in the process of becoming a man, the anima re-emerges in projection 
and men find themselves unable to see women as independent subjects, as whole 
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people.  Instead they are turned into angels or whores, bitches or goddesses, mothers 
or wives—any number of the “idols of perversity” studied by Bram Dijkstra.  The 
consequence of men’s divorce from feeling is that their ability to relate to others is 
reduced to relationships of dominance, rivalry, or disciplinary ritual.  Faced with 
physical and emotional intimacy, they defend their ego boundaries by relating to 
inner objects, to abstractions and archetypal-stereotypical fantasies.  This is also true, 
as Theweleit asserts, for their relationships with other men.  The man of steel achieves 
a kind of union with groups of other men and even individuals but does not 
experience them as whole persons.  Rather they are abstracted into father-figures or 
mentors or bosses, into machine-parts of institutions.  They are team members, school 
chums, colleagues—but the mask of the institutional Persona, of the symbolic Phallus 
and the Name of the Father, always prevents such men from seeing through to the 
vulnerable, irrational, but potentially loving complexity beneath the socially erected 
surface. 
 The figure I am calling the technician-hero describes a range of professional 
Personae—scientists, engineers, physicians, detectives, architects—who do not appear 
at first glance to be as brutal or bloody as the soldier-male.  But like the soldier-hero, 
the technician-hero grew into an idol for the bourgeois society of Europe and 
America, the conqueror not just of a transitory human enemy, but of Nature and of 
God himself.  He took up the mantle of Prometheus as the bringer of fire to Mankind.  
He is the mythologized divine source of technological genius and the instrument of 
that genius as a transcendental spirit of progress.  The several phases of the Industrial 
Revolution in the nineteenth century produced this new kind of revolutionary, this 
new Man.  I would suggest that the rise of this new paradigm of masculine mastery 
over Nature, the body, and the dark interior of the unconscious and its desires 
contributed to the escalation of the soldier-hero Theweleit studies in the period 
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between the World Wars.  The increasing mechanization of life and work found its 
apotheosis in military technology.   
(3) Heraclean Narcissism 
 Various writers have attempted to classify masculine types using the 
characters of Greek and Roman gods for their models.  Among the most sophisticated 
analyses is that of J. C. Smith who builds upon the Nietzschean duality of Apollonian 
and Dionysian.  To this pair, which I have already introduced in the last chapter when 
discussing solar and chthonic Phallos, Smith adds Heracles and Pericles.  Figure 3 
summarizes his quaternity of complexes.  In each quadrant I have listed the 
corresponding ego defense, ego-ideal, type of hero, and view of women.  Underneath 
these, I have listed characteristic expressions of the complex in pathologies and types 
of pornography.  The latter provide particularly keen insight into the fantasies that 
express the basic ego defenses at the root of each complex.   
 It should be apparent that each of the four complexes describes a particular 
kind of Animus-complex and, in the case of the Periclean Complex, the father-
complex within the larger Animus.  Smith defines each complex according to its ego-
ideal, which is included in the masculinity complex I am calling the Animus.  Any 
given psyche may internalize all or some of these patterns and move from one to the 
other, depending on the situation.  As Smith observes, a man may identify more 
strongly with the Pericles complex and its idealization of the father when he is at 
home or among his family.  At work, imbedded in the brotherhood of the collective, 
he may exhibit the Heraclean pattern, and so on. 
 The Dionysian complex corresponds to the pre-Oedipal ideal of the archetypal 
mother  when this is carried into gendered identity.  A man whose Animus is 
primarily Dionysian will, like the god, be somewhat effeminate and psychologically 
focused on merger with women, or at any rate with the idealized feminine, especially 
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in sexual abandonment.  The Dionysian male
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corresponds in some ways to Theweleit’s not-fully-born, in the sense that the desire 
for fusion with the feminine may stand in the way of mature relatedness between 
equal subjects.  In this case, the man conceives himself the inferior to Woman.  In the 
case of the Heraclean complex, the reverse is true.   
 The Heraclean hero is a destroyer, and particularly a destroyer of Woman 
conceived not as a benevolent goddess, but as the Terrible Mother, the devourer.  
Theweleit’s soldier-male can be understood to oscillate between the Dionysian and 
Heraclean impulse.  Heracles is his conscious Persona, the muscular and invincible 
warrior, inflated masculinity with delusions of grandeur spawned by identification 
with the brotherhood of the collective.  His ego takes on the size and strength 
associated with the collective, whether that may be an army, a trade union, a 
profession, a religious brotherhood, the mafia, the state, or, in the case of the 
technician-hero, the institution of science.  Where Smith associates Dionysian man 
with self-humiliation in the realms of pornography and pathology, he associates 
Heraclean man with violent denigration of women.  Theweleit demonstrates in his 
Freikorps soldiers how the idealization of the white woman as angel or nurse can 
coexist and support a violent disgust for the dark woman as devourer, enemy, sexual 
defilement, and so on. 
 The Periclean complex is the configuration most overtly associated with 
adventure heroes in their role as conquerors.  Woman appears to Periclean man, 
identified with the archetypal father, as a mere chattel, a child, or as part of Nature.  
She is to be conquered and held in humiliation, disciplined, her genitals exposed as 
male property, her sexuality absolutely subordinated to her husband’s.  The ego 
maintains its desire for omnipotence in this case by incorporating the Other into itself, 
just the reverse of the Dionysian abandonment of its ego to absorption into the 
omnipotent mother.  Periclean masculinity is the basis of the Oedipal complex and 
patriarchy’s enforced heterosexuality.  It is hierarchical and yet may entertain various 
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degrees of good feeling toward women, for the feminine is not wholly rejected as a 
threat, as it is in the Heraclean complex.  Rather, the feminine is subordinated and 
ruled, kept “in its place.”   
 In the Victorian period, one encounters the ideal of the “angel in the house,” 
who preserves a domestic sanctuary where a man could find refuge from the struggle 
of survival.  Her feminine virtues of softness and compassion were to soften her 
husband’s roughness and propensity for violence and anger.  Samuel Smiles, author 
of the highly popular Self-Help, exemplifies the Periclean ideology when he suggests 
that it is the influence of mothers that shapes character and inspires virtue in children.  
The place of women, in this system, is to reproduce the genders, making daughters 
who can become mothers themselves, and making sons who can become men of 
character and responsibility, men who can control their passions and do their duty. 
 Finally, the Apollonian complex, which takes disembodied mind as its ego-
ideal, is the most obvious model for the scientist.  This complex is the opposite of the 
Dionysian in the sense that it flees from the body into an ideal of disembodied reason 
and law.  This man is theoretical man whose absorption in the “life of the mind” 
protects his ego from contamination from the feminine.  Woman is associated with 
savagery and Nature here as well as in the Pericles complex.  She represents the body 
and so must be shunned.  The Apollonian forms of pornography seem mild by 
comparison to those of the Heraclean man, yet they form the justification in discourse 
for the acts of murder and control in the Periclean and Heraclean pattern. 
 One may note an imbalance in the four complexes.  The Dionysian complex is 
the odd man out, as it were, whose image of Woman, however unreal, is at least 
positive and reverential.  He is the only one of the four types who is capable of Eros.  
The others either flee erotic connection with women entirely or, in the case of the 
Periclean father, only engage in an erotic connection based on subordination and an 
arbitrary right to rule.  The result of this is that the Dionysian may be seen as the 
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repressed form of masculinity, the repressed and reviled possibility that forms the 
foundation of all the rest in the pre-Oedipal unitary reality.   
 The corollary of the Dionysian immersion in, and acceptance of, the feminine, 
is the fact that the other three complexes all take a masculine ego-ideal as their 
positive erotic object.  For Pericles, Heracles, and Apollo, the feminine is only a 
negative erotic object, a sex object, at best, but not an object of admiration.  This 
makes the three hegemonic forms of masculinity fundamentally Narcissistic.  They 
take up other men or, in the case of the Apollonian ideal, a masculine Logos, as the 
object of their desire.  This is one of the reasons I want to call the masculine ego-ideal 
the Animus, for much as in women, the masculine ideal is an object of intense desire, 
envy, jealousy, and all the rest of the feelings involved in Eros/Phobos.   
 William Doty has suggested that the figure of Narcissus is one of the dominant 
myths working to structure masculinity in modern culture.  The Narcissus Complex 
is not to be equated with simple “selfishness” or an excessive love of oneself, nor 
simply with superbia or excessive vanity.  These are symptomatic behaviors of what has 
come to be called a Narcissistic personality, but they do not constitute the complex in 
its unconscious dimensions. A Narcissistic person’s conscious vanity is a 
compensation for a lack of love for him or herself that has been repressed.  Insecurity 
about the worthiness and power of the ego, confusion about one’s identity, and an 
insecure connection between ego and Persona or ego and Self underlie expressions of 
grandiosity.   
 Grandiosity, or inflation, is fundamentally the expression of an infantile state.  
It is a fantasy of omnipotence and the perfect love of the mother retained in the adult 
personality as a defense against fully giving up the unitary reality.  The insecurity 
that results with the separation from the mother and the negotiation of engendering 
through the Oedipal phase lingers in the narcissistic personality.  Popularly one 
thinks of very beautiful men and women as narcissistic, but objective physical beauty 
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is neither a necessary nor a sufficient cause of excessive preoccupation with 
appearance.  The root of such behavior is the desire to be beautiful and it stems from a 
fear that one is not beautiful enough to earn the love of mother or father.  The ego that 
has convinced itself that it is beautiful has merely erected a defense against this 
insecurity.  With the emphasis that is placed upon beauty in our society it is not 
surprising that many people should feel themselves not beautiful enough.  Indeed, 
the more beautiful individuals are, by cultural standards, the more this trait is likely 
to be emphasized in their childhood as the quality that makes them lovable and 
valuable.  So heavily freighted with significance and identity, physical beauty 
becomes the locus of excessive anxiety.   
 It hardly needs to be said that in the nineteenth century the preoccupation with 
beauty as a sign of goodness and truth was no less than it is today (although the 
particular codes of what was considered beautiful was different).  From Romanticism 
to Pre-Raphaelitism, women were idealized as beautiful, and idolized.  I would 
suggest that the fact that the concept of beauty is projected onto women did not let 
Victorian men off the hook, for if masculinity becomes identified as the contrary to 
the “fair sex,” then men will be inclined to internalize and repress a fear that they are 
not only not beautiful because they are men, but that in fact there is something 
monstrous and ugly about manhood itself.  The more manliness is extolled on the 
surface, the darker its image in the Shadow-complex. 
 But physical beauty is not the only quality that can inspire a Narcissistic 
attitude, for one may be vain about one’s intelligence, one’s wit, one’s sensitivity or 
strength, and so on.  The essential element of the myth is the phenomenon of 
mirroring, and this should tell us that it is a myth about the mirror phase of subjective 
development, the very fundamental process of affirmation in another’s look, 
another’s whispered words.  Lacan lays heavy stress on the mirror phase as the point 
at which the subject is formed, entering the Symbolic order through the looking-glass, 
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so to speak.  Kohut considers the mirroring of the parents or caretakers of the infant 
to be crucial in his or her formation of a stable self-image, that is, in the ability to see 
oneself objectively and internalize an acceptance of that image as valuable and 
valued.  In the myth, Narcissus clearly hasn’t achieved this sort of stability.  His 
reclusiveness signals an undeveloped eroticism, a certain lack in the feeling function 
that inhibits his ability to connect to others.  The root of this fear stems from anxiety 
about the Oedipal separation from the mother.  Fear of being absorbed by another if 
he gets too close keeps Narcissus distant and aloof.  Yet the fear of absorption is at the 
same time a longing to be absorbed back into the safety of the mother’s embrace, the 
unitary reality.  This is a weakness in ego-formation, an insecurity that is 
compensated for by the erection of rigid ego boundaries and the avoidance of 
connection to others, especially to women because they more forcibly remind one of 
the mother.   
 It is often remarked that Narcissus’s self-absorption is typically adolescent and 
signifies a personality fixated on this stage of development characterized by the 
longing to find one’s self.  One can note in this connection that the adolescent search 
for self is really only an early stage of individuation, the desire to fit into society with 
a secure Persona.  This desire was, in the nineteenth century, felt with special 
acuteness by boys, for masculine identity was far more connected to the professional 
self, the mask of the expert, the authority, the maker.  Typically it is the Persona 
connected with a work-identification that precedes the Persona of the husband and 
father.  Adolescence is the masculine ego’s first anxious negotiation with the Persona, 
its allure of liberty, and its threats of limitation.  The midlife crisis is the other end of 
this negotiation, when a man comes to feel that his Persona is too constricting, or that 
he has merely become his father rather than become himself.   
 Such an equation of Narcissus with adolescence permits a further identification 
of the Narcissus Complex with that of the Puer Aeternus, the eternal boy, for Narcissus 
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does indeed remain a boy, dying and metamorphosing into the narcissus flower.  He 
does not achieve that goal Freud found so important, the goal of object love, which he 
opposed to narcissistic self-love.  Jacoby’s analysis, however, suggests that Narcissism 
is not simply selfishness, but an inability to relinquish the fusion of self with the 
primary love object, the mother.  Like Theweleit’s not-fully-born, Narcissistic man 
cannot overcome the fascination he witnessed in his mother’s eyes (or fantasized to be 
there?).  Caught in the mirroring stage of subject-formation, the ego is captivated by 
its own gaze whether in fact its reflection reveals a body that conforms to his culture’s 
standards of male beauty or not.  It comes as no surprise that Narcissus is so 
intimately associated with reflective water, a symbol of the Great Mother and the 
primary reality of fluidity and the boundless Self.   
 As Gaston Bachelard has observed, Narcissus sees his face in the waters of the 
forest pool, the face which is the most seductive part of the body, for seduction lies in 
the look, the expression of the face, the eyes, the whispered words of love of lover’s 
faces pressed close, or of the infant’s face pressed close to the loving lips of the mother 
or father.  “Looking at himself, man prepares, stimulates, polishes this face, this gaze, 
all these tools of seduction” (Bachelard, Water 21).  The choice of water as the 
reflective surface is important in the myth, for, unlike the smooth, cold, hard surface 
of the mirror, the natural mirror of the quiet pool is a mirror with depth.  It provides a 
reflection which, “a little vague and pale, suggests idealization” (Bachelard, Water 21).  
The depth behind the surface is precisely what fascinates in the reflection of the boy’s 
face; not his beauty merely, but the confrontation with the “I” and its mysterious 
embodiment.  It is a continuation of the infant’s first wonder when he or she realizes, 
still without words, “that is me!”   
 Bachelard remarks pointedly that classic psychoanalysis has underestimated 
the role of the idealization of the self.  “Narcissism,” he notes, “does not always 
produce neuroses.  It also plays a positive role in aesthetics and, by expeditious 
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transposition, in a literary work.  Sublimation is not always the denial of a desire; it is 
not always introduced as a sublimation against instincts.  It can be a sublimation for an 
ideal” (Water 23).  Narcissism as the contemplation of the still, crystal fountain, 
partakes of Tranquillity, that positive pole of Receptivity that holds one still in 
serenity, taking in the world through the eyes.  It is a stillness that contrasts to 
Narcissus’s own activity in the beginning of his story, for he enters the forest with his 
brother-band of hunters.  His abandonment of Activity for Receptivity is not all bad.  
One feels even his ultimate demise is symbolic, a contemplation of himself in nature, 
mirrored in the natural waters but also, in the image itself, seen in nature, against the 
background of trees and sky.  This cosmic narcissism, as Bachelard calls it—Nature as a 
great being perpetually reflecting itself—fuses with the individual narcissism of 
Narcissus.  Seeing himself reflected he also sees Nature reflecting her own beauty and 
so comprehends himself as part of Nature.   
 Such merging of self and Nature is, of course, the fusion with the Great Mother 
which Smiths calls Dionysian.  It is not only a death by contemplation but a 
contemplation of the cycle of death and life.  Bachelard remarks on the opposition of 
this state with virile Activity in a reference to Schopenhauer, who maintained that 
“aesthetic contemplation alleviates human sorrow for an instant by detaching man 
from the drama of will” (27).  And yet, as I suggested in my description of 
Receptivity, inner stillness in meditation is itself an act of will even as it suspends the 
struggle of will.  At the same time, as Bachelard notes, “[f]or the unconscious, there is 
only one act…” (Water 36), that is the old metaphoric fusion of orgasm and death.  The 
oblivion of the ego, even temporarily, is a momentary union with the eternal and the 
culmination of sexual desire. 
 Such contemplation of one’s self as an object of Eros that leads to death in the 
depths, is involved in what Freud called the Uncanny and its manifestation in 
doubling.  The uncanny likeness of twins or brothers, or of parents and children, the 
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sense of another self one finds in one’s shadow:  these doublings seem uncanny 
because they echo the foundational moments of mirroring that have brought the ego 
into being.  More deeply, still, they mirror the ego’s continuous dream-encounters 
with the Self, the Anima and Animus, and the Shadow complexes.  The individual 
discovers himself to be plural and plurality to be seductive. 
 Heraclean Narcissism has such a powerfully homoerotic and homosexual 
ethos precisely because it is plural Narcissism.  The assumption of the collective into 
the Persona of the ego permits the individual to imagine himself possessed of the 
same vast power as the collective.  The Heraclean ideal, as the huge and muscular 
body of the classical hero suggests, is bound to produce ego-inflation and its 
attendant feelings of exhilaration.  This, it seems to me, goes some way toward 
explaining the psychology of war and how individuals can feel a kind of jouissance 
defying death.  They do so because they have imaginally joined bodies with their 
fellow soldiers, their brotherhood, in a sublimated orgy of strength and fantasized 
immortality.  Unless the collective body is totally destroyed, the survivors of bloody 
battle feel this exhilaration of deathlessness rather than the surfeit of death one would 
expect them to have experienced.  The fantasy of immortality and omnipotence is 
characteristic of male adolescence, and it is no coincidence that the soldier mentality 
occurs in armies made up of young men, who are only a few years beyond 
adolescence. 
 Heraclean Narcissism, the grandiose masculine self, which is identified with 
the brotherhood of the collective, is ultimately homoerotic, seeking in the merger with 
his own idealized reflection to flee the terror of engulfment by the archetypal mother.  
He is, so to speak, the mirror image of the Dionysian hero.  His acts of murder upon 
the sacrificial altar of the brotherhood’s unity are the inversion of the sacrificial 
suicide of the Dionysian consort of the Goddess.  There is a kind of polarity, then, I 
will suggest, between the Dionysian and the Heraclean, and it is precisely between 
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these two Narcissisms that I wish to locate the third, and the one that most applies to 
the technician-hero, the Apollonian Narcissus. 
(4) The Desire of the Disembodied Logos. 
 Apollonian masculinity, as Smith defines it, is identified with disembodied 
Mind, Law, or Reason as its ego-ideal.  At first glance, this will not seem perhaps 
especially Narcissistic because Reason does not seem visibly masculine.  Moreover, the 
rational soul seems to be the very opposite of the Ouroboric union with the Mother-
Self, which Freud called primary Narcissism.  Yet it is this very opposition to the 
maternal and to the body that has given Reason its historical linkage to masculinity.  
As the boy’s ego is required to “transcend” the feminine and the realm of the 
mothers, so the rational soul is transcendent, rising on wings of imagination and 
Spirit, far above the body, sexuality, and their association with women. 
 Genevieve Lloyd has written a splendid little book that traces the history of 
gender metaphors in the discourses of philosophy and science.  She details the stages 
by which seventeenth and eighteenth-century men of science came to associate 
Nature with Woman and, at the same time, with the machine.  Francis Bacon led the 
scientific revolution by turning the attention of philosophers to matter rather than 
abstract “forms.”  As Lloyd relates, “[t]he understanding of physical Nature became 
for Bacon an understanding of the patterns in which matter is organized in 
accordance with mechanical laws” (10).  The world is “devoid of mind” but, as the 
creation of a rational God, “is orderly and intelligible” (10).  Rather than 
understanding Nature by analogy with an organism, Bacon developed the machine 
metaphor to describe a world that could be understood or misunderstood by 
application of the human mind.  Thus the mind of the scientific observer has the 
power to transform reality, to see what superstition or fancy may project, or to attend 
closely to the mechanisms of Nature and so discover her secrets. 
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 Bacon applied sexual metaphors “to express his idea of scientific knowledge as 
control of a Nature in which form and matter are no longer separated” (Lloyd 11). 
In Greek thought, femaleness was symbolically associated with the non-
rational, the disorderly, the unknowable—with what must be set aside in 
the cultivation of knowledge.  Bacon united matter and form—Nature as 
female and Nature as knowable.  Knowable Nature is presented as female, 
and the task of science is the exercise of the right kind of male domination 
over her.  ‘Let us establish a chaste and lawful marriage between Mind and 
Nature,’ he writes.  The right kind of nuptual dominance, he insists, is not a 
tyranny.  Nature is ‘only to be commanded by obeying her.’  But it does 
demand a degree of force: ‘nature betrays her secrets more fully when in 
the grip and under the pressure of art than when in enjoyment of her 
natural liberty.’ (11-12) 
 From the imagined “nuptual couch” of Mind and Nature are expected to 
emerge fruitful issue:  “assistance to man” and a “race of discoveries, which will 
contribute to his wants and vanquish his miseries” (qtd. in Lloyd 12).  In The 
Masculine Birth of Time, Bacon takes the tone of a father advising his son on the choice 
of a wife: 
My dear, dear boy, what I purpose is to unite you with things themselves in a 
chaste, holy and legal wedlock; and from this association you will secure an 
increase beyond all the hopes and prayers of ordinary marriages, to wit, a 
blessed race of Heroes or Supermen who will overcome the immeasurable 
helplessness and poverty of the human race… (qtd. in Lloyd 12) 
  In Bacon’s rhetoric, the ideas of man’s rightful domination over Nature, as 
proclaimed in Genesis, and a return to paradise through the restoration of a proper 
relationship between philosophy and Creation, are mixed with Plato’s image of 
knowledge subduing the body as the slave of the rational soul.  The combination of 
images, as Lloyd observes, formed a powerful new model of Reason as domination 
over Nature as an object of the masculine gaze.  Human knowledge and human 
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power are conjoined, so that the purpose of knowledge is to shape and manipulate 
the world for the better.  Scientific inquiry consists of “the search after causes” and 
“the production of effects” and the natural philosopher is described both as a “miner” 
and as a “smelter” of metals, that is pure science is, at the start, linked to engineering 
(qtd. in Lloyd 14).  Despite this emphasis on dominance and power, Bacon’s language 
is clearly intended as a remedy to the pride of earlier philosophers.  To observe 
Nature and to prefer hypotheses to theses is to be humble before God and to gaze 
chastely upon His Creation.  But, as Lloyd admits, “whatever may have been Bacon’s 
conscious intent in describing scientific knowledge in terms of the male-female 
distinction, its upshot was to build a new version of the transcending of the feminine 
into the very articulation of the nature of science” (16). 
 From Plato, Renaissance science inherited the idea that the pursuit of 
knowledge required control of the passions, particularly the frenzied “madness” of 
sexual love.  In its place Plato set generative Reason that “gives birth in beauty” (qtd. 
in Lloyd 22).  Philo, an Alexandrian Jew writing in the first century A.D., developed 
this rejection of both body and woman by associating Eve in Genesis with “bodily 
sense.”  Sense-perception is the cause of the Fall; “mind corresponds to man, the 
senses to woman; and pleasure encounters and holds parley with the senses first, and 
through them cheats…the mind” (qtd. in Lloyd 24).  From these philosophers, 
through the writings of St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, to Descartes, Western 
philosophy comes to view the rational, virtuous life as a process of becoming a man, 
“shedding the influence and intrusion of femaleness” (26).  Manliness is linked to the 
attainment of technical and scientific knowledge and discipline.  As Hegel remarked 
in The Philosophy of Right:  “Women are educated—who knows how?—as it were by 
breathing in ideas, by living rather than by acquiring knowledge.  The status of 
manhood, on the other hand, is attained only by the stress of thought and much 
technical exertion.” (qtd. in Lloyd 38).  In the thought of René Descartes, the split 
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between man as mind and woman as body, became “a stark polarization of 
previously existing contrasts” (Lloyd 45). 
Descartes strongly repudiated his medieval predecessors’ idea of a divided 
soul, which had Reason—identified with the authentic character of a 
human being—struggling with lesser parts of the soul.  For him, the soul 
was not to be divided into higher (intellectual) and lower (sensitive) parts; 
it was an indivisible unity, identified with pure intellect.  He replaced the 
medieval philosophers’ divisions between higher and lower parts of the 
soul with the dichotomy between mind and body.… the non-rational was 
no longer part of the soul, but pertained entirely to body.  (45) 
 As Lloyd notes, Descartes believed that women possessed the same private 
rational abilities as men, but the point was lost amid the larger cultural associations 
and the very practical fact that it was only men who had access to the collective, public 
endeavors of science and the developing institutions that organized them.  Neither 
did he maintain that humans are rational only when engaged in the assembling of 
chains of deductions.  Nevertheless, as Lloyd comments, through Descartes’ 
philosophy “Reason took on special associations with the realm of pure thought, 
which provides the foundations of science, and with the deductive ratiocination 
which was of the essence of his method” (49).  Moreover, his “influential and 
pervasive theory of mind” provided the ground for a “sexual division of mental 
labour” (50). 
 Peering beneath the cloak of philosophy, one can see the impulses of the 
Periclean complex, with its emphasis on subduing and mastering the feminine and 
feminized Nature.  Moreover, in Descartes, one sees particularly clearly, the 
emergence of the Apollonian complex from Periclean patriarchy.  The disembodiment 
of manhood is built upon the earlier structure of the patriarchal father.  The Law of 
the Father establishes male dominance, permitting the sons to separate themselves 
completely from women, fleeing off to universities and laboratories where they can 
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pursue pure reason, truth, and power without the corrupting temptations of Eros and 
sensuality, or the distortions of subjective feeling.  Hammered by mental discipline 
into instruments, the senses are no longer sensual in the Apollonian man, but provide 
a kind of ethereal jouissance of power over matter.  Turned away from women, Eros is 
sublimated into the disembodied love of discourse and male rivalry, a homosocial 
love that points toward the Heraclean ideal of the brotherhood removed from the 
feminine sphere but effecting a newly founded collective Narcissism.4  The separation 
of Logos from Eros in the Apollonian Animus results in a model of Reason as utterly 
passive in the philosophy of David Hume.   
 For Hume, the passions were the motivating forces behind Reason and the 
intellect has of itself no power to control passion.  Nevertheless, this momentary 
reversal of Reason’s primacy only leads Hume to assert that the “calm passion” of 
“enlightened self-interest” employs Reason to master the baser passion of immediate 
self-gratification.  Passion ends up controlled again, so that mind comes out on top.  
What is particularly important in Hume’s philosophy is the addition of the dichotomy 
between “public” and “private” interests to the discussion of dominance and control.  
Women, by their association with “private” passions, come to be seen as part of the 
problem of social ills rather than part of the solution.  Men of Reason, by contrast, are 
moved by enlightened self-interest that places the interests of the public before their 
immediate desire for wealth and family advancement.  The burgeoning Capitalism of 
the eighteenth century and its doctrine of acquisition was thus defended even as 
Hume sought to regulate it.   
 Acquisition, particularly in “enlightened” forms, is a central theme of the 
scientific adventure.  The technical man sets out from home and private interests to 
acquire knowledge and amass power over the wealth of natural resources.  He does 
so on behalf of the brotherhood of the state, or the even purer brotherhood of 
scientists themselves.  Moreover, his knowledge and inventions become commodities 
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in the market of ideas and tools of conquest.  Hume’s vision was of a world of 
peaceful cooperation, a vision Rousseau would take up and nostalgically project onto 
a golden age of “natural man” now spoiled by the vanities and competition inherent 
in science and technology.   
 Immanuel Kant, on the other hand, looked upon the “malice and 
destructiveness of civilized behaviour… as making possible the development of the 
species.  Rousseau’s insight into the ennobling potential of discord is developed by 
Kant into a celebration of social antagonism as the necessary precondition for the 
development of man’s innate rational capacities” (Lloyd 65).  Reason yields moral 
principles “universally valid regardless of contingent empirical inclinations, passions 
or interests” (Lloyd 68).  Kant’s emphasis on moral universals is an Apollonian ideal 
of law and justice, what Freud would call “super-ego,” the “point of access to the 
public space of [masculine] Reason” (Lloyd 70).  Morality and justice are conceptually 
divorced from subjectivity and mere “feelings of affection or hostility” (Freud qtd. in 
Lloyd 70). 
 In this brief outline of the history of Reason in relation to gender, one can see 
the discursive frame that permitted the nineteenth century’s preoccupation with 
evolution and progress.  The masculine attainment of Logos and its attendant power, 
was seen to be manifest not only in male dominance over women, who represented a 
lower, more sensual stage of development, but also their dominance over the natives 
of the lands they colonized.  Acquisition of empire and acquisition of knowledge 
were conjoined through the institutions of science and engineering, but also through 
the ideologies of Apollonian transcendence and Heraclean brotherhood.  What is 
pathological about these complexes is not either the idea of scientific inquiry or the 
idea of brotherhood, but rather the linkage of these ideas to Shadow and Anima-
projection.  The injustice of patriarchal formations may lie in their violence, 
exploitation, and denigration of Woman, Nature, and Other, but the pathology must 
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be explained in the radical splitting of the ego from the Self, from the unconscious 
springs of imagination.  Cut off, the ego identified with disembodied Reason or Law 
does not become invulnerable as it hopes, but rather more vulnerable to the violent 
intrusion of irrational longings and pornographic fantasies.  Inflated and grandiose, 
seeking, like Prospero, to control his unconscious demons and to deny that they are 
part of himself, the masculine ego inevitably fails.  For the ego cannot control the rest 
of the psyche; it can only find health by relating to the unconscious creatively and 
accepting the play of darkness and light, flesh and imagination. 
 The poet William Blake would write, in nightmarish images of blood and fire, 
of the consequences of Reason’s usurpation of the ego.  Urizen, one of Blake’s four 
“Zoas” supplants his three fellow faculties, Urthona, Tharmas, and Luvah.  This 
splitting of the unified body of the Giant Albion may be read as the elevation of 
Reason in a tyrannical and unnatural rule over Intuition, Sensation, and Feeling.  
Blake’s image of the Fall is precipitated by Urizen’s withdrawal into his dark and 
private sphere, out of which he manufactures a Newtonian-Cartesian world of 
mathematical Law.  It is most interesting that Blake chose to dramatize this Fall into 
division and discord as the emergence of gender.  Each of the four Zoas, ostensibly 
genderless when combined in the form of Albion, splits into male and female halves 
(the female part called an “Emanation”) in an echoing of the emergence of Eve from 
Adam.   
 Blake’s visionary mythology is too complex and extensive to analyze within 
the scope of the present study, but I touch upon him as a voice which captures the 
quality of the technical man in the demiurgic figure of Urizen.  Against Urizen is set 
fiery Orc, the son of the poet Los and the personification of the Revolutionary spirit.  
Orc is Blake’s version of Prometheus, a god who has no place in the quaternity of 
Smith’s masculine paradigm.  Prometheus is the Oedipal son set against the ideal of 
Periclean manhood.  He is associated with knowledge like Apollonian man, and he is 
161 
a loner, which is something like the mythical Heracles, though it is unlike Smith’s 
Heraclean brother.  Keeping Smith’s models in mind, alongside Narcissus and his 
watery mirror, it is to Prometheus that I will turn in Part II.  For it is Prometheus, the 
thief of fire, who is the god of the technician-hero.  Mary Shelley provides the hint in 
the subtitle to Frankenstein, but before turning to her mythos, I will examine the 
Promethean complex in Percy Shelley’s lyric drama Prometheus Unbound. 
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Notes 
 
1 The First Book of Urizen 3:1-10, 18-22 
2 For an historical tracing of this association in male education see Stearns, “Men, Boys and Anger.” 
3 On masculinity and active versus receptive perception see Duroche, “Male Perception.” 
4 I am not arguing that homosexuality or homoeroticism is Narcissistic, but rather the reverse.  That is, I am not 
following Freud in the assertion that homosexuality is a “Narcissistic character disorder,” but rather that 
Narcissism, as a pathology and as a normal complex, is founded in homosexuality.  I say this because I believe, 
first of all, that primary Narcissism is “self-love” at the same time that it is unitary love with, and of, the mother-
caregiver.  As the pre-Oedipal state precedes not only gender identity but ego deintegration itself, the Ouroboric 
state can only be conceived as a kind of androgynous or genderless homogeneity.  Second, for boys, the Oedipal 
break produces masculine identification out of this primal fusion with (what is only later labeled) the feminine.  
But it also produces an erotic engagement with the father even as it overtly takes the mother as a new Oedipalized 
love object.  In other words, as the infant boy comes to see himself as like his father (that is, a male), his love for 
his mother assumes the particular shape of gendered, sexual love of a male for a female, however that may be 
culturally constructed.  But the adoption of masculine identity requires, first of all, a transfer of the primary love 
we call identification to the father.  Thus, homoeroticism is intimately imbricated with self-love because the boy 
is being asked to love himself as a man.  Heterosexual object choice is introduced into the picture as a part of 
loving oneself as a man; that is, when manliness is defined in terms of a boy’s ability to attract and hold the love 
of a woman, his self-esteem comes to depend upon his shifting love of men into the love of women as signs of his 
masculinity.  This shift in the signification of Woman is the essential difference between a boy’s “love” for his 
mother before and after the Oedipal complex has been invoked.  Consequently, I would argue, homosexuality is 
at the root of masculinity but is violently repressed as heterosexual object choice is forced.  Narcissism emerges 
both out of the pre-Oedipal fusion with the mother and the Oedipal fusion with the ideal of masculinity.  The 
myth of Narcissus expresses the latter well as it imagines a boy loving an intangible image of manliness rather 
than engaged in embodied, homoerotic embrace with another man.  Narcissism is, one might say, the suspension 
of a primary homoeroticism.  This formulation is not intended to rule out the possible genetic-organic 
predisposition to homosexual object choice.  There may be, as many gay activists insist, a biological imperative 
involved.  I merely wish to suggest that the contrasexual archetype and the negotiations of the Oedipal stage 
involve homoerotic and Narcissistic complexes that may manifest in multiple ways. 
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Chapter IV 
Promethean Fire 
_____________________________ 
 
 
 Go, set the Titan free; 
And let his torment be to wander wide 
The ashes of mankind from sea to sea, 
Judging that theft of fire from which they died. 
— A. D. Hope, “Prometheus Unbound” 
 
 I turn to Prometheus because of Mary Shelley’s invocation of that fiery Titan in 
her subtitle to Frankenstein:  The Modern Prometheus. Victor Frankenstein is a pivot 
point in the development of the technician hero, a midpoint between a mythic and a 
realistic representation.  Blake’s mythology, Percy Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound, and 
even Goethe’s Faust represent a supernatural world in which characters are symbols 
of inner struggles.  Victor Frankenstein is the first step toward the realistic 
representation of scientists as men.   He marks the combination of the Faust figure 
with elements of Prometheanism in an attempt to represent the psychological drama 
of a real scientist tempted by his identification with the god-image.  Faust’s “science” 
is magic and demonology mixed with a bit of civil engineering, but Frankenstein’s is 
the emerging positivist discipline of modern chemistry and biology.  His dream of 
creating an artificial human being in the laboratory is still a dream fostered by real 
biologists and roboticists today. 
 From Prometheus to Frankenstein and, finally, to Jules Verne’s Captain Nemo, 
one can trace a continuous arc from the mythic mode to the realistic.  Through this 
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metamorphosis of literary style, the figure of the magician puts on the lab coat of the 
emerging professional class of technocrats.  He is “demythologized” in terms of 
representational style, but this is really to say that the technician-hero becomes a new 
myth. In the first half of the nineteenth century, the Gothic hero-villain, the Magus, 
full of ambivalences and supernaturalism, becomes the sublimely controlled and 
empirical engineer of Jules Verne and Samuel Smiles.  The process of 
demythologizing is a remythologizing. 
 A moment’s reflection on the Greek and Roman myths should be enough to 
realize that the personalities of the gods are almost all representations of pathologies.  
They can be read as a epic cycle of the collective unconscious, the shared dread and 
longing of men and women at the roots of Western culture.  The Romantic fascination 
with Prometheus as a symbol of the power of individual genius and invention, as the 
creator of Mankind, and as the rebel against the paternal tyranny of Olympian Jove, 
points toward the archetypal roots of the technician-hero.  The Titan is the 
unconscious Animus, an ego-ideal intermixed with the ideals of the Heraclean, the 
Periclean, and the Apollonian complexes described in Chapter III.  His fire is set in 
elemental opposition to both the waters of Narcissus and the wine of Dionysus, and 
yet, striving against the Sky-Father, Prometheus secretly drinks from those deep 
springs. 
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(1) The Romantic Heroic Ideal 
 Self-consciousness is perhaps the major trait that characterizes Romantic 
heroes.  As James Wilson has observed, “the celebration of self-consciousness is 
hardly unique to romanticism, [but] only during the romantic period does self-
assertion become an explicit artistic credo” (3).1  Novalis remarks that “the supreme 
task of human development is to take possession of one’s transcendental self, to be, in 
a sense, the quintessential ego of one’s ego” (qtd. in Wilson 3).  Novalis’s phrase, the 
“transcendental self” points towards an intuition of something larger than the 
conscious, socially constructed Persona, and the ego that hides behind it struggling to 
repress any aspects of itself that are incompatible with social adaptation.  His 
formulation, “the quintessential ego of one’s ego” might have served as inspiration 
for Jung’s own model of the Self as the progenitor of the ego and the source of its 
creative powers.   
 For Samuel Smiles, Victorian advocate of self-help, adaptation and the 
strengthening of the ego’s identification with its Persona are the requisites of 
“success” defined by duty and humility.  The Romantic sentiment, was a struggle 
towards a larger idea of subjectivity, which nevertheless often fell back into ego-
inflation.  The centrality of the Prometheus myth to the Romantic hero is evident in 
his veneration of the imagination’s “godlike power to remake the world in his own 
image” (Wilson 4).  Like Prometheus, he insists upon creating himself, and his own 
world, regardless of the sanction of patriarchal authority.  Prometheus, in his 
rebellion against the restrictive chains of Jupiter as tyrant-father, insists upon the 
freeplay of passion motivating the creative imagination, a passion represented by 
elemental fire.  Imagining reality is not to be the privilege of the hegemonic 
discourses of science or religion, but must be seized and liberated, returned to the 
masses by the Savior-poet.   
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 The difficulty comes, however, when the “self” claiming this godhead is 
merely the ego rather than the ego in connection to the Self.  Without that connection, 
individualism and subjectivism becomes ego inflation.  For the Jungian Self is not 
“individual” but paradoxically plural and at the same time whole as the parts are 
interconnected in their very fluidity.  Only ego is “individual” in the sense of 
indivisible because by definition it is a point, a center to consciousness.2  Ego, one 
might say, is the Self’s fantasy of being an atom rather than a field interpenetrated by 
the larger field of culture and other people.  Individualism is too easily the denial that 
selfhood is always constructed in relation to others.  If the Romantic ego is identified 
with the Apollonian Logos, then Romantic self-consciousness becomes merely the 
reinforcing of the ego’s fantasy of disembodied control over its world.  Imaginal 
shaping through creative interpretation and reverie is literalized into domination over 
a mechanized world.  In the figure of the engineer as hero, Apollonian identification 
with Logos combines with an essentialization of Activity as energy and artifice.  The 
Promethean over-emphasis on fire and Activity, the power to impose change on the 
world, throws up a shadow on the other side of the Libido map, a thanatic shadow 
that longs for the dissolution of the rigid boundaries of ego.   
 Wilson quotes a passage from Hölderlin’s Hyperion that captures the ideal of 
ego-dissolution in the Self:  “There is an oblivion of all existence, a silencing of all 
individual being, in which it seems as if we had found all things.”  The realization of 
the Self is an oblivion to the ego, for consciousness must return to the uncentered pre-
egoic state.  All things seem to be found in this oblivion because the unconscious 
holds the keys to unlock the world of perception and archetypal meaning.  Hölderlin 
contrasts such a positive Receptive state to the negative oblivion of Thanatos:  “there 
is a silencing, an oblivion of all existence, in which it seems as if we had lost all things, 
a night of the soul, in which not the faintest gleam of a star, not even the 
phosphorescence of rotten wood can reach us” (qtd. in Wilson 21).  The first state,   
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is the romantic ideal; the second is the tragic consequence befalling those 
unable to progress beyond solipsism.  Union with cosmic consciousness 
requires an annihilation of self, a condition in which, as Emerson claims, 
“all mean egotism vanishes” and man becomes “part or particle of God.”  
Having transcended self through the self, the romantic poet or hero is 
prepared to assume his role as prophet, receiving then communicating his 
vision to mankind.  (Wilson 21) 
 The Romantic hero is not the chivalric miles, but the Biblical vates, who speaks 
not for an elite ruling class, but against the arrogance of rule as a social expression of 
egocentrism.  The Romantic prophet’s “god” is not the father ideal of the Periclean 
complex but the liberated image of the  Divine Child, Dionysus.  The Romantic’s 
dream is the positive aspect of the Dionysian complex, in which a man is open to the 
feminine, striving for individuated wholeness by embracing love, community, 
compassion, tenderness, sensual pleasure.  The transition from Divine Child to 
Messiah does not mean abandoning adult strength, for Dionysus is a terrible, dark 
god as well as a beautiful boy.  The transition lies in refusing to let the Father complex 
kill the Puer Aeternus, but also in refusing the puer tendency to fly off into alienation 
from other men and an endless despairing dependency on the idealization of woman 
as his ego-ideal.  Some of the most typical romantic heroes go too far in rejecting the 
Father imago, ending merely as sensitive young men alienated from the “adult” 
world of Activity and true relationship.  Wilson observes that  
The romantic hero seems to emerge from the tradition of sentimentality 
permeating late eighteenth-century fiction and drama.  Buffeted by ill 
fortune, rejected and ignored by a callous and repressive society suffering 
with the abuses of an ancien régime, the first romantic heroes are typically 
passive, introverted young men whose intense sensitivity and belle âme 
necessitate their own destruction. …Byron’s Childe Harold is “as a weed,/ 
Flung from the rock, on Ocean’s foam to sail/ Where’er the surge may 
sweep, the tempest’s breath prevail,” left to become “the wandering outlaw 
of his own dark mind.”  (Wilson 51) 
169 
 The image of Childe Harold underlies characters such as Victor Frankenstein 
or Verne’s Captain Nemo.  Like Goethe’s Werther or Chateaubriand’s René, they are 
essentially failed romantic heroes, whose desire for transcendence leads them from the 
calm Narcissism of introspection to the deadly Narcissism of solipsism.  They long for 
feeling and Eros, but achieve only a neurotic and paranoid kind of anaesthesia.  They 
are cut off from true embodied relationship by their Apollonian dream with the soul’s 
transcendence of mere “clay.”  But much of Romantic literature’s power lies in the 
tension between a longing for Eros, which is rooted in the longing for the pre-Oedipal 
paradise, and the longing for sublime masculine transcendence through disembodied 
language.  Fire serves as a symbol both of the light of Logos and the flame of 
passionate Eros.  Prometheus is the personification of knowledge and the Logos-fire. 
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(2) Prometheus, Jupiter, and Phallological Fire 
The satyr, says an ancient fable, wanted to kiss and embrace fire 
the first time he saw it, but Prometheus cried out to him, “Satyr, 
you will mourn the loss of the beard on your chin, because fire 
burns when it is touched.” 
— Jean-Jacques Rousseau3  
 
The Giant Man 
 In such poems as Goethe’s “Prometheus,” the eighteenth century had already 
established the thief of fire as a central emblem of human defiance of natural 
necessity.  He became an emblem, particularly, of masculine perfection and 
independence.  “The true Romantic hero,” according to Wilson,  
is neither the melancholy, maladjusted introvert with the “belle âme” nor 
the satanic, monomaniacal figure of prodigious intellectual powers; rather, 
the ideal hero of the age emerges as a titanic individual who, after rejecting 
and overthrowing a corrupt social order, struggles on behalf of his fellows 
to inaugurate a new culture.  Faust and Prometheus are the prototypical 
romantic heroes; submitting to a providential destiny that calls them to 
heroic action, both become agents of social and cultural redemption.  (65-
66) 
 The image of the titan is an ego-ideal, a giant man, and so linked imaginally to 
the father archetype.  The huge masculine body carries such mythic power, whether 
in the illustrations of Blake or in contemporary body-building magazines, because it 
idealizes the infantile memory of the father’s body, far larger and more powerful than 
the infant’s own smallness.  How much of the dream of a godlike ascent and flight 
into spiritual heights is the continuing memory of a father’s strong hands tossing our 
tiny bodies into the air and catching us as we fall earthward?  This father represents 
physical power, but more than that, an all-embracing control or mastery of 
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movement.  If the mother is troped as Nature in the cultural unconscious, then the 
father is troped as the master of that nature, he who transcends it and is free to come 
and go.  In bourgeois capitalist culture, as it evolved in the nineteenth century, the 
father was the source and fount of riches, which means freedom.  His income was the 
nodal point at which the family’s members were plugged into the machinery of 
economics by which means Nature was to be mastered and freedom gained.  In the 
broadest sense, the father’s Logos, his knowledge or techne, was his connection to the 
bourgeois economy of individual earning, the technology of the market system. 
 Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound and the myth upon which it was based are 
concerned, at a deep level, with the problem of the idealized father.  The story of 
Prometheus has several parts.  At the center is the struggle between two generations 
of divinities, the Titans and the Olympians.  Prometheus, as Graves writes, “was the 
son either of the Titan Eurymedon, or of Iapetus by the nymph Clymene; and his 
brothers were Epimetheus, Atlas, and Menoetius” (II:143).  Grimal notes that 
Prometheus’ mother is also called Asia, daughter of Oceanus.  Asia is, of course, an 
important figure in Shelley’s drama and I shall return to her.  One must note at the 
outset that although Prometheus is normally identified as a Titan, he is, in fact, like 
Zeus, the son of a Titan.  This makes him Zeus’ cousin, if his mother is taken to be 
Asia, but in the version of the story that identifies Eurymedon as Prometheus’ father, 
his mother is none other than Hera, the wife of Zeus, who was raped by the “giant” 
(Grimal 148).  The variant is interesting because it seems to point to the ambiguity of 
Prometheus’ position once he has be subjected and bound by Zeus.  He takes on the 
position of the punished son of the castrating father.   
 In Shelley’s drama, Prometheus has been imprisoned by Jupiter (Zeus) for 
stealing fire from the gods and giving it to men.  Prometheus is credited with both the 
creation and the salvation of mankind:  he fashioned them in the first place and he 
later argued with Zeus to spare them.  The aspect of his character as savior and 
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mediator with the supreme deity—the father-god—resonates with the myth of Christ.  
The image of Prometheus bound to the cliff, his liver being torn by the eagle of Zeus 
each day, resonates with the image of Christ on the cross, his side stabbed by the 
Roman guard to see if he is dead.  A major difference, however, is that Prometheus is 
being punished eternally for his own act of theft, an act of subversion that transmits 
one of the secrets of the Olympians to men—the secret of fire. 
Fire-Knowledge 
 But what is this fire?  Literally, it is the knowledge of how to make fires, but 
also how to maintain them.  Prometheus is said to have stolen into Olympus and 
taken fire from the wheels of the Sun’s chariot.  According to Graves, he lit a torch 
from the wheel and then “broke from it a fragment of glowing charcoal, which he 
thrust into the pithy hollow of a giant fennel-stalk” (144).  By this means, he 
preserved the fire and could deliver it to mankind.  Fire is not simply the means by 
which humans could thenceforth cook their food and keep themselves warm; it is, 
more broadly, the first human technology.  Prometheus’ preservation of fire in 
charcoal is a sign of the foresight his name implies (Greek prmmhJeia, forethought) 
and this in turn represents a crucial aspect of the knowledge the fire signifies:  it is 
Reason, the ability to think ahead and solve problems, the ability to plan for the 
future.  It is this element of reasoning that justifies the traditional association of 
Promethean fire with knowledge.   
 I prefer the Germanic word lore to “knowledge” because it moves one away 
from the modern academic idea of formal learning to something more culturally 
primitive, more ordinary.  Sons learn their father’s lore, whether it be the farmer’s 
understanding of seed and rain, the specific craft of an artisan or artist father or, as is 
the case with my own father, conventional masculine lore such as how to change the 
oil in a car or replace an electrical outlet.  Much of fatherly lore is explicitly 
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technological—the use of machines or tools, how to build a barn or make a slingshot, 
how to hunt or plow, or to play a sport according to set rules.   
 Linguists trace the word lore to the Proto-Indo-European root leis- which they 
identify as a track or furrow, and thence to Old English last, or læst, “sole, footprint” 
(Watkins 36).  This gives birth to the words meaning “to follow a course (of study)” 
(Germanic liznon) and “to learn” (OE leornian) which suggests both learning to hunt 
by following tracks, and learning to plow, but also disciplinary knowledge 
production in which the sons are led in their courses by following the footprints of 
their ancestors.  The connection between these knowledges is still very much present 
in library research in which one feels the excitement of the hunt, of discovering traces, 
following footnotes, and engaging the help of interlibrary loan to procure an elusive 
and crumbling quarry.  The logos spermatikos sprouts in the furrowed brow of the 
reader. 
 Likewise, Logos itself is rooted in Indo-European leg- which begets the 
compound meaning in Greek legein, “to gather or speak” and Latin legere, “to gather, 
choose, pluck, read” and lex, “law” from which derive lexicon and legislation 
(Watkins 35).  Logos, in the sense employed by analytical psychology, partakes of all 
these meanings.  It is the law, a collection of rules, a code, a way of reading—which is 
to say, an ideology and its interpretative practices—but also, more simply, the 
gathering and collecting of things, an activity which corresponds well to hunting and 
suggests the roots of our bureaucratic and legal systems in hunting and gathering:  
filing triplicate forms; sorting different seeds. 
 The fathers’ appropriation of lore, law, and the authority to determine correct 
reading practices is a merging of the Periclean and Apollonian complexes and should 
not be thought essentially masculine in any ontological sense.  Nor do I mean to 
suggest that the mother has no lore of her own, or that finding the myths of such lore 
in literature and art is in any way a secondary pursuit or irrelevant to male 
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development.  Mothers, after all, are chiefly responsible for passing on the “mother 
tongue” the fathers shape into their authoritative discourses.  The archetypal father is 
the proprietor of Logos because in patriarchy the father is associated with legal 
power.  Boys are constructed as boys by being taught the particular kinds of 
knowledge marked as male in their particular society.  On an affective level there is 
little structural and emotional difference between the “primitive” lore of the father—
as hunter and gatherer of food, lawmaker and enforcer—and the more elaborate and 
impersonal forms one encounters in the modern world—the father as accumulator of 
capital, or as engineer, the master of machinery.  Each is erotic, establishing affective 
bonds between father and son in socially acceptable, homosocial exchange. 
 Connell observes that a quantum leap in social complexity and abstraction has 
occurred over the last five hundred years.  In this period, empires of unprecedented 
size spawned new rationalized bureaucracies, rationalized agriculture, industrial 
manufacturing, a revolution in mechanized transport, and powerful state structures 
“which have developed not only an unprecedented capacity to educate and control, 
but also an unprecedented capacity for mass killing” (155).  This thorough-going 
transformation of culture also required a transformation in masculinity and the myths 
justifying its social power.  Connell notes that the “rationalization of administration is 
incompatible with forms of masculinity that were hegemonic in the aristocratic ruling 
classes of the old regime.  Even in the military branch of the state, heroic personal 
leadership is steadily displaced by the calculating masculinity of General Staffs and 
logistics experts” (155). 
 Beneath the complexity of social forms and practices, the deep imagining of the 
senses and the elements forms complexes that structure dreams and feelings about 
the social roles and professions one enters.  The “imagination of matter,” as the 
philosopher Gaston Bachelard put it, is a mediation between the imaginal processes 
of psyche and the practices of the social plane.  It is at this level that the lore of the 
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father becomes attached to the phallus as a symbol.  It is also here that his lore 
becomes associated with fire.  In The Psychoanalysis of Fire and his other books on the 
“reveries” surrounding the four elements, Bachelard develops a theory of knowledge 
and cognition rooted in the waking dream.  Reverie accompanies even the most 
supposedly objective and rational thought rising from the chora, the voice of the body.  
The material imagination finds its beginning in sensation, and the four elements 
provide a framework in which Bachelard examines the “material reveries,” which 
“precede contemplation.”  “Dreams,” he says, “come before contemplation.  Before 
becoming a conscious sight, every landscape is an oneiric experience.  Only those 
scenes that have already appeared in dreams can be viewed with an aesthetic 
passion” (Water 4). 
The first psychic interests which leave indelible traces in our dreams are 
organic interests.  Our first ardent belief is in the well-being of the body.  It 
is in the flesh and organs that the first material images are born.  These first 
material images are dynamic, active; they are linked to simple, surprisingly 
primitive wants.  Psychoanalysis has caused many a revolt by speaking of 
the child’s libido.  The action of this libido would perhaps be more clearly 
understood if it were allowed to retain its confused and general form, if it 
were linked to all organic desires and needs.  The libido would then appear 
to be responsible for all desires and needs.  One thing is certain, in any case, 
and that is that the child’s reverie is a materialistic reverie.  (Water 8-9) 
 Bachelard describes his search in The Psychoanalysis of Fire as the tracking down 
of “the old man in the young child, the young child in the old man, the alchemist in 
the engineer” (4).  He examines texts throughout the history of natural philosophy 
that demonstrate the various reveries surrounding fire, reveries which later 
positivistic writers cannot entirely shake off because they have become embedded 
over the centuries in the human Imaginary.  “[T]he fascination exerted by the object 
distorts inductions” (5), writes Bachelard, and not only substances but also “the notion 
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of totality, of system, of element, evolution and development” are built on the 
unconscious foundations of unquestioned values and associations.  They are, in short, 
complexes of metaphors as well as scientific terms. 
 Within the Logos-complex in our culture, knowledge is intimately associated 
with fire, perhaps because fire is seen to be a substance which hides within objects, 
within the human body, and which upon flashing out, transforms the world, 
illuminates it, destroys it. 
Fire and heat provide modes of explanation in the most varied domains, 
because they have been for us the occasion for unforgettable memories, for 
simple and decisive personal experiences.   Fire is thus a privileged 
phenomenon which can explain anything.  If all that changes slowly may be 
explained by life, all that changes quickly is explained by fire.  Fire is the 
ultra-living element.  It is intimate and it is universal.  It lives in our heart.  
It lives in the sky.  It rises from the depths of the substance and offers itself 
with the warmth of love.  Or it can go back down into the substance and 
hide there, latent and pent-up, like hate and vengeance.  Among all 
phenomena, it is really the only one to which there can be so definitely 
attributed the opposing values of good and evil.  It shines in Paradise.  It 
burns in Hell.  It is gentleness and torture.  It is cookery and it is 
apocalypse.  It is pleasure for the good child sitting prudently by the hearth; 
yet it punishes any disobedience when the child wishes to play too close to 
its flames.  It is well-being and it is respect.  It is a tutelary and a terrible 
divinity, both good and bad.  (Psychoanalysis of Fire 7) 
 Bachelard follows his own reveries about fire, memories from his childhood 
and the ubiquitous flames of the fireplace and the candle that were the primary 
sources of comfort and illumination until scarcely more than a generation ago.  In the 
time of Blake and Shelley, it is worth recalling, fire was a much more common and 
omnipresent substance in daily life and, as in Bachelard’s childhood, the lighting of 
the hearth-fire was a special and important skill and ritual.  Who can build a fire yet 
today, in the fireplace or alongside the rocks of Lake Superior under the stars, as I 
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have often done, without feeling its mystery?  Indeed, fires of this sort may be 
considered the very source of reverie.  Bachelard writes that “the reverie in front of 
the fire, the gentle reverie that is conscious of its well-being, is the most naturally 
centered reverie” and exemplifies the general difference between the linear, narrative 
quality of the dream and reverie that “is always more or less centered upon one 
object… The reverie works in a star pattern.  It returns to its center to shoot out new 
beams” (14).   
The fire confined to the fireplace was no doubt for man the first object of 
reverie, the symbol of repose, the invitation to repose.… [T]o be deprived of 
a reverie before a burning fire is to lose the first use and the truly human 
use of fire.… [O]ne only receives comfort from the fire when one leans his 
elbows on his knees and holds his head in his hands.  This attitude comes 
from the distant past.  The child by the fire assumes it naturally.  Not for 
nothing is it the attitude of the Thinker.  It leads to a very special kind of 
attention which has nothing in common with the attention involved in 
watching or observing.  (14-15) 
Empedocles and Thanatos 
 Such attention is more akin to the gaze of the lover than to the gaze of the 
scientist, and yet the two are imaginally linked in a cycle of love and fear and 
fascination.  What Bachelard calls “respect” for fire, which allows it to be controlled, 
arises from fear of its capacity to destroy as well as preserve life.  What Bachelard 
calls the Empedocles complex 4 is the union of “the love and the respect for fire, the 
instinct for living and the instinct for dying” (16).  The contemplated fire suggests not 
only “the desire to change, to speed up the passage of time, to bring all of life to its 
conclusion” in this instrument of sudden change, it also suggests the “funeral pyre,” 
the contemplator’s own ultimate consumption by Nature.  The “life of a log” is linked 
metaphorically to “the life of a world” in the reverie before the fire (16).  “Death in the 
flame… is truly a cosmic death in which a whole universe is reduced to nothingness 
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along with the thinker” (19).  This symbolic union of love and death in fire, the use of 
fire as a metaphor for love and as a literal instrument of death, is of course an 
ubiquitous motif in literature and in dreams.  Romantic love is felt as a death; the 
withdrawal of love’s fire or its feeding equally cause the flames and anguish and 
ecstasy of passion. 
 If the Empedoclean impulse toward self-immolation is one response to fire’s 
association with passion, the Promethean impulse is in one sense its opposite.  
Prometheus reaches out to the fire not to be possessed by it, but to possess it.  He does 
not throw himself into the cosmic conflagration that signifies the infinite and ever-
changing energy of the cosmos.  Rather, Prometheus seizes the sun’s fire and finds it 
within himself.  The fire is in him rather than he being in the fire.  The gesture of 
Empedocles is ultimately a private gesture of renunciation, a relinquishment of 
society in the embrace of the Infinite.  The gesture of Prometheus, by contrast, is 
intimately social.  It is a theft, the violation of a primitive prohibition.  Bachelard 
meditates on the fact that children are almost always forbidden to touch fire, to 
respect its power, before they actually experience that painful, destructive touch.  
“Whether this fire be flame or heat, lamp or stove, the parents’ vigilance is the same.  
Thus, fire is initially the object of a general prohibition” (Psychoanalysis of Fire 11).  
Bachelard goes on to point out that such a litany of angry voices and interdictions 
comes to surround fire in our childhood that  
the natural phenomenon is rapidly mixed in with complex and confused 
items of social experience which leave little room for the acquiring of an 
unprejudiced knowledge.  Consequently, since the prohibitions are 
primarily social interdictions, the problem of obtaining a personal 
knowledge of fire is the problem of clever disobedience.  The child wishes to 
do what his father does, but far away from his father’s presence, and so like 
a little Prometheus he steals some matches.  (11) 
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Fire of Logos, Fire of Eros 
 Bachelard distinguishes what he calls the Prometheus complex from the 
Oedipus complex, but the relationship to the father is very similar and it is not quite 
so easy to separate sexual desires from the desire he finds most properly Promethean, 
that is, the “will to intellectuality,”  the desire “to know as much as our fathers, more 
than our fathers, as much as our teachers, more than our teachers” (12).  As he puts it, 
“The Prometheus complex is the Oedipus complex of the life of the intellect” (12).  But 
I would go further:  the desire for the father’s knowledge is also the desire for his 
Law, his power of interdiction, his control over the physical and mysterious power of 
the fire to bring comfort, to inflict pain or threats of pain (in the myths of the fires of 
Hell, if not through literal employment of burning in torture or punishment).  The 
fiery word of damnation or the fiery outbursts of anger:  these are the actions, 
symbolically and literally violent and dominating, that the young boy longs to steal 
from the father.  The act of theft, of defiance and disobedience and cunning, is itself a 
gesture toward domination, for it is in resistance to domination.  Fire is, then, not 
merely the source of reverie; it is also the source of action, anger, hatred, defiance, and 
domination.  In Classical myth, fire is the lightening strike of Jupiter’s vengeance.  In 
the Pentateuch, it is the burning bush and the pillar of fire in the desert, the holy 
presence of an omnipotent and omniscient Lord.  In the hands of Prometheus, 
however, the fire of the Sun’s chariot is the instrument of creation, comfort, 
technological mastery over the weakness of the human body pitted against the 
elements. 
 Prometheus and Oedipus are especially brothers through the sexual 
connotations of fire, for it is here that the Law and Logos of the symbolic Phallus are 
grounded in the bodily sensations of the physical phallus.  The eighteenth-century 
philosopher Robinet expounded the theory that fire was alive and reproduced itself.  
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Whether lightening, volcanic flames, or the burning of phosphorus, fire seems to 
possess life, the ability to grow and multiply.  Its sparks act like seeds to start new life.  
Fire is fecund, claimed Robinet, as evidenced by the proliferation of new volcanoes 
charted in his century (Psychoanalysis of Fire 44).  The medieval theory of elemental 
spirits, the salamanders as the elementals of fire, is scientized by Robinet into 
postulated “igneous animalculae” (45).  These may be full of energy or recalcitrant; 
like a reluctant lover or a fatigued phallus, fire is sometimes hard to arouse; at other 
times it bursts into a conflagration against the wishes of its handler.  Fire is taken up 
in this complex of metaphors for human passions, both sexual and intellectual, 
because of the unconscious origins of passion.  Passion and ardor feel in the body like 
energy, like excitement; they make the adrenaline flow, the hot blood pulse, and this 
feels like (and is) a heightening of energy.  Passionate Eros makes us perspire, gives 
us a warm feeling inside, makes us uncomfortable, consumes us—all the 
contradictory traits of fire. 
 Such reveries led scientists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to 
theorize an equation between masculinity and heat.  The metaphoric association of 
seed and spark combined with the alchemist’s supposition of different types of fire to 
produce the idea that men were men because they were hotter than women.  The 
organs of generation extruded from the body in men, rather than being retained 
within it because of their greater heat.5  The male sexuality is an inner fire that is all 
the more powerful because it is contained and must be coaxed out into its eruption.  
Bachelard quotes the seventeenth-century chemist Pierre-Jean Fabre as saying that 
masculine fire is the source of wisdom and prudence and is most intense in men with 
a vigorous constitution, a thin body, and a dry disposition because then it is in its 
most concentrated form:  “nothing in nature that is scattered and diffused is ever 
strong and powerful.  Force needs to be compact and compressed; the strength of fire 
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is seen to be all the stronger when it is compressed and contracted.  Cannons 
demonstrate this fact…” (Psychoanalysis of Fire 49).   
 Masculinity is metaphorically identified with power, compression, 
containment, and the image of the gun, increasingly the instrument of violent 
authority in the eighteenth-century armory.  The gun is not only phallic in shape, but 
it operates by the control of explosive fire.  Fire is a form of power and of wealth and 
must be guarded.  Alchemy intimately links fire and gold.  The enclosed fire of the 
crucible, the furnace, and the cannon are the predecessors of the internal combustion 
engine and the atomic pile,6 the technological substantiation of the sexualized hearth 
fire.  Bachelard notes that some of the vessels and receptacles of the alchemists were 
called “the Breasts” or “the Testicles” suggesting that the types of fire are explicitly 
sexualized and gendered.  An anonymous seventeenth-century text describes 
feminine fire as “a white smoke” that may easily disappear through the alchemist’s 
negligence:  “It is almost impalpable, although, through physical sublimation, it 
appears to be corporeal and resplendent.”  The masculine fire, on the other hand, “is 
so torpid and so strongly concentrated within metals that it cannot be set into action 
without persistent effort” (52).  It is at the center, concentrated, essential.  As 
Bachelard puts it, “The feminine principle of things is a principle pertaining to surface 
and outer covering, a lap, a refuge, a gentle warmth.  The masculine principle is a 
principle of the center, a principle of power, active and sudden as the spark and the 
power of will” (53).  He remarks that such formulations arise from the reveries of 
lonely men producing a doctrine “strongly polarized by unsatisfied desires” and not 
directly informed by the reveries of women.  The “initiate cut off from society” is the 
Promethean male in this case; the superman is at essence a figure of the super fire.  
This is the fire, particularly, which because of its inwardness, can open up bodies, can 
possess them from within.  Bachelard notes that in the alchemical texts such 
possession of the body is obviously sexual. 
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 Here, in the musings of early scientists one discovers the same pattern of 
reverie Theweleit finds in his Freikorps soldiers.  Masculinity is defined in terms of its 
secret, inner power, but correspondingly becomes obsessed with the containment of 
this fire.  Lust for the penetrating phallic fire is lust for the warmth of the inside of the 
human body.  The soldier-male dreams of disemboweling and exploding his enemy, 
and in the end, himself in the final, Empedoclean explosion of the phallic volcano or 
cannon.  So Prometheus, tied to his rock, is punished for his rebellion by being 
repeatedly disemboweled by the eagle of Jupiter.  His liver, seat of the soul’s fire, is 
consumed in a symbolic act that is a repeated violation of his body by the archetypal 
father and, at the same time, a castration, the theft of his soul’s fire.  The inward and 
outward qualities of fire give it an inherent ambiguity.  Its inwardness—felt in the 
fundamental sensation of the heat of one’s own body, the fiery process of digestive 
acids, the heat of blood—produces reflection.  
[T]he mind in its primitive state, together with its poetry and its 
knowledge, had been developed in meditation before a fire.  Homo faber is 
the man of surfaces, his mind is fixed on a few familiar objects, on a few 
crude geometric forms.  For him the sphere has no center, it is simply the 
objective counterpart of the rounding gesture he makes with his cupped 
hands.  On the other hand the dreaming man seated before his fireplace is 
the man concerned with inner depths, a man in the process of development.  
(Psychoanalysis of Fire 55-56) 
 Rodin remarked that “Each thing is merely the limit of the flame to which it 
owes its existence.”  To this Bachelard responds:  “Were it not for our conception of 
the inner, formative fire, of fire understood as the source of our ideas and our dreams, 
of fire considered as a seed, the usual concept of an objective and completely 
destructive flame could not explain the profound intuition of Rodin” (56). This 
intuition is much like Blake’s doctrine of Reason and Energy.  Energy is the true fire 
of imagination; Reason its circumference, its limit.  The way that such reveries of fire 
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intermingle with actual technologies is beautifully illustrated by a passage from 
D’Annunzio’s Le Feu in which he describes the annealing oven of a glass works in 
explicitly gendered terms.  The “shining vases” newly removed from the oven are 
“still slaves of the fire, still under its power” but  
Later, the beautiful frail creatures would abandon their father, would 
detach themselves from him forever; they would grow cold, become cold 
gems, would lead their new life in the world, enter the service of pleasure-
seeking men, encounter dangers, follow the variations in light, receive the 
cut flower or the intoxicating drink. (qtd. in Bachelard Psychoanalysis of Fire 
56) 
 D’Annunzio captures the gendered quality of fire as it is perpetuated by the 
cultural myth.  Fire is masculine power acting on a feminized Other, shaping it for the 
pleasure of men.  From this specifically gendered image the taming of fire becomes a 
metaphor for all technology and artifice, indeed for all thought, for it is fire that 
impresses the primitive mind with the idea of radical transformation.  “[T]hat which 
has been licked by fire has a different taste in the mouths of men.  That which fire has 
shone upon retains as a result an ineffaceable color.  That which fire has caressed, 
loved, adored, has gained a store of memories and lost its innocence” (57).  Fire must 
be watched, and so it is imaginally at the root of all intense watching, all regulation, 
all understanding.  As the Sun, it is the all-watching and unblinking eye, the divine 
gaze that cannot be met.  This is its connection to Logos and discipline.   
 But its connection to Phallus and Eros is also rooted in a fundamental 
metaphor:  the production of heat in rubbing.  The rubbing of bodies in sex or in 
tranquil relaxation around the bonfire of the primitive tribe, the sharing of body 
warmth against the cold:  these are the archetypal roots, the “common human 
experiences” that operate along the longest and slowest wavelength of history, 
hovering with seeming changelessness, yet taking on new forms in every generation 
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as the primal associations are applied to new cultural forms.  These are the 
experiences that deepen our associations of fire with passion, warmth, and love. 
 If Promethean fire is the stolen Phallic fire and seed of the father, it is in a sense 
representative of both Logos and Eros.  The passion of Prometheus for humankind, 
the desire to give them comfort and happiness, moves him to the theft.  It is Jupiter’s 
lack of Eros that makes him a tyrant and causes his fire to be usurped.  The love and 
rivalry (Eros/Phobos) between the two male gods is played out in the field of Logos, 
each trying to outwit the other, until Jupiter moves the game into the realm of brute 
force.  Logos which is supposed to be supreme, must be dethroned and returned to 
the fire that unites it with Eros.  The Law of hierarchy and subordination erected by 
Jupiter must be broken down through the Promethean act of defiance and cunning, 
even a deception engineered with the help of Athene, who lets Prometheus in 
through the Olympian back door.   
 The artifice of the Titan is important in two ways:  first, as deception, but also 
as the archetype of the plan, the blueprint, the representation.  The fire of Logos 
implies not only consciousness and contemplation, but the application of this 
consciousness to the future, to manipulation, to art and engineering.  Even as Jupiter 
resorts to force in binding Prometheus, he does so by calling upon that other fire-god, 
Hephaestus, to forge the tools of his torture—the unbreakable chains meant to end 
the freeplay of Promethean thought.  The Phallological fire is thus the desire of the 
fathers and the sons, as well as the techne which is employed to prevent the freeplay 
of Eros between them.  Instrumental Reason and its technologies are an intervention 
of Law, the Logos-desire against the desire of Eros.  As such, it is a symbolic 
castration or sacrifice of the sons by their fathers. 
Father-Son Rivalry 
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 In the myth of Prometheus, Jupiter occupies the role of archetypal father, the 
patriarch who has seized social power by killing his own father, Cronus (who, in turn, 
dethroned his father by literally castrating him).  The genealogy of the Greco-Roman 
gods illustrates the foundation of patriarchy in anxieties over castration and the son’s 
usurpation of his father. It is a better model than the myth of Oedipus, which Freud 
chose as his model.  Freud found the Oedpius Rex to be a model of the unconscious 
processes of father-son rivalry because in that story the son does not know he has 
murdered his father.  But Oedipus never knew Laius was his father while the infant 
boy, when he fantasizes patricide and possessing his mother, knows perfectly well 
who he is thinking of.  The fantasies are only unconscious in the sense that the boy’s 
ego has not yet fully formed or in the sense that such reveries may be repressed 
almost at once out of guilt (though this is putting the cart before the horse a bit, since 
guilt emerges only from the development of the super-ego).   
 The great conundrum in Oedipus Rex is the protagonist’s lack of intention in his 
crime.  That, after all, is what makes it tragedy.  Oedipus is, thus, an imperfect 
analogy of the actual ruthlessness of father-son rivalry, even if it does give a 
particularly vivid example of the father-mother-son triangle.  The history of Uranus, 
Cronus, and Jupiter, by contrast, points toward the way the patriarchal social order is 
structured upon symbolic murders or castrations.  Indeed, the violence is often not 
symbolic, even today when masculinity is especially constructed as essentially violent.  
Moreover, Jupiter’s genealogy points to the father’s fear of his own castration, not just 
his threat of castration directed toward the son.   
 The myth of Prometheus can be read as an attempt to break the chain of 
unconscious Oedipal murders.  The theft of the fire of the gods may be read as a 
symbolic castration of the father, but it is a castration with a difference, for 
Prometheus leaves Jupiter in power and replicates the fire through a clear 
understanding of its nature.  The symbolic fire, like libido, is not a finite, limited 
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commodity, but a natural force that can be produced.  The lore of the father may 
always fuel the creative impulses of the sons, but that fueling can be seen as growth 
and perpetuation of the father’s power, not the extinguishing of it.  Such an 
interpretation translates “power” to mean ability—power to do rather than power over, 
in the classic feminist formulation.  It is only if libido and the father’s Phallic power 
are conceived as domination that they become finite and limited and must be usurped 
to be possessed. 
 Bettina Knapp points out that Prometheus is not the typical hero identified by 
Jung and his followers.  The archetypal hero usually represents the ego’s emergence 
from the ouroboric unity of the pre-Oedipal paradise, the necessary separation of the 
child’s identity from its mother.  By contrast, 
In Prometheus’ situation a patriarchal struggle was being fought, father 
against son, as compared to the case of many heroes that fought against the 
Great Mother archetype…  Prometheus had already separated himself from 
the unconscious, which was regarded as the feminine principle and had 
been equated in hero myths with the dragon forces.  Prometheus was now 
struggling against the patriarchal order; an overly conscious, cerebral, 
rational attitude that the father figure stood for.  (Knapp, Prometheus 28, 
note 33) 
 Prometheus, chained to the cliffs above the Scythian desert, symbolizes for 
Knapp the exile from social relations that is attendant on the child’s initial ego 
growth, its separation and realization of itself as an individual capable of self-
fashioning.  The image of Prometheus is a moving one from this standpoint, for he is, 
like Oedipus, chained and abandoned in the wilderness in order to subjugate him to 
the father’s fundamentally paranoiac authority.  As a true fire deity, his response is 
not passive acceptance or death, but anger, bitterness, and feelings of violence.  
Chained, as the boy is chained by his physical smallness and lack of knowledge in 
comparison to his father, he responds with verbal violence—the curse. 
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(3) The Shelleyan Reverie of Fire 
 Percy Bysshe Shelley opens Prometheus Unbound with the filial curse of the 
bound son and enemy.  Shelley wrote his great lyric drama in the winter and spring 
of 1818-19 when he was twenty-six.  He was living in Rome at the time, enduring a 
painful self-exile from the English society that had scathingly condemned him for 
atheism and political radicalism during the tumultuous period of the Napoleonic 
Wars.  Shelley was born into an upwardly-mobile family of the Sussex gentry, the heir 
to substantial estates carrying his father’s hope for social advancement of the family 
name.  It is in part against such a patrimony that the radical Shelley rebelled as an 
undergraduate at Oxford.  There his friendship with Thomas Hogg, their anonymous 
publication of a tract called The Necessity of Atheism, and Shelley’s subsequent 
expulsion for insubordination earned the young Percy the infinite disappointment of 
his father Timothy.  Paternal censure only enflamed Shelley into open revolt against 
the injustice of his family’s lack of sympathy stacked on top of the injustice of the 
expulsion.   
 One can hardly read Shelley’s biography without seeing in this early part of his 
career the lineaments of Promethean desire.  Seizing the lore of the fathers from his 
dons at Oxford, he turned the reasoning of Hume and Rousseau against the 
complacent theologians of that aristocratic refuge, demanding freedom of thought 
and expression.  His expulsion was, in the official language, for “contumacy in 
refusing to answer certain questions put to” him (Holmes 55), and thinking of 
Prometheus’ refusal to tell Jupiter which of his sons would overthrow him, one 
cannot fail to see the ironic resemblance.  The son refuses to discipline his use of 
Logos to the will of the fathers.  The young Shelley was fired by the cause of liberty 
and equality promulgated by the American and French Revolutions, and the younger 
poet having the additional fuel of a sheltered genteel upbringing and boyish naiveté, 
he turned Jacobinism into an engine to drive his Oedipal rebellion. 
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 Richard Holmes traces Shelley’s angry correspondence to his father asking for 
money after he had eloped with his first wife Harriet Westbrook.  The letters are shrill 
in their denunciation of his father’s abandonment of him and culminate in one which 
contains what Holmes calls “not finally an accusation, a blow, or even a threat [but] a 
kind of self-consecration… a curse” (82).  Shelley wrote to his father on 15 October 
1811 from York: 
I shall take the first opportunity of seeing you—if you will not hear my 
name, I will pronounce it.  Think not I am an insect whom injuries 
destroy—had I money enough I would meet you in London, & hollow in 
your ears Bysshe, Bysshe, Bysshe, aye Bysshe till you’re deaf.  (qtd. in 
Holmes 83) 
 Shelley’s own name—which was also his grandfather’s family name and a sign 
of the patrimony—becomes itself a curse, a word of power turned against the men 
who gave it to the young poet.  The Oedipal dimension of the struggle can be felt very 
clearly in a later letter in which Shelley accuses his mother of adultery.  His own 
ambivalence about his sexuality—pursuing free love, yet seeming to disdain the 
physicality of sex with his new bride, is wound up in the skein of his idealistic 
attachments to his mother and father.  The intense affection he developed for Hogg 
was in one respect typical of English undergraduate love affairs in this time, but in 
Shelley’s case it was particularly a way of transferring the pent-up Eros he would like 
to have directed at his father into a peer, a soul-mate of his own age, who accepted 
him and agreed with him and who had no power over him that could be abused.  
Similarly, his elopement with the sixteen-year-old Harriet seems like a mother-
substitution combined with sister-substitution, for Shelley had grown up as the 
master and adored deity of his younger sisters.  He had been trying for some time to 
create a romance between Hogg and his sister Elizabeth (whom Hogg had never even 
met) and after his elopement, Shelley took his bride to live with Hogg who was 
staying in York.  The three made up a kind of ménage à trois that self-destructed 
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when Hogg wanted to turn the homosocial exchange of Harriet into an actual sexual 
exchange.  Harriet, by this time joined by her elder sister who intervened, was 
horrified and Shelley, siding with her, broke off his intimacy with Hogg to the 
accompaniment of passionate recriminations and obvious suffering.  I dwell on these 
details of Shelley’s early life in order to suggest the deep unconsciousness with which 
Shelley approached erotic relations—both his male friendships and his sexual liaisons 
with women.  This is especially pertinent to the discussion of how his Promethean 
images and ideals interacted with those of his second wife, Mary.  Behind Percy’s 
Prometheus and Mary’s Frankenstein lies the problem of male friendship, both the 
ability of two men to love each other expressively, and the ability of men and women 
to be friends.   
 The philosophy of free love was, on the one hand, a rejection of the cornerstone 
of patriarchy and institutions of property and inheritance upon which the old regime 
and the bourgeoisie was founded.  But it was also a philosophy that conveniently 
permitted men to have vicarious sex with each other by sharing women.  Even the 
sharing of female friends on a Platonic level could carry the erotic charge between 
men that was otherwise highly taboo.  One should not be misled on this point by the 
prevalence of the Man of Feeling as an ideal of masculine romantic interest.  The work 
of Louis Crompton on Byron has forcefully demonstrated the violence and danger 
directed at male homosexuality in Regency England and the non-phallic exchange of 
Eros among men cannot be simply separated from sexuality.  The homosocial 
exchange, at its most extreme form, articulated by Smith, is the Heraclean 
brotherhood that completely dispenses with heterosexual relations and treats women 
only as enemies.  But there is a continuum of homosociality from this extreme all the 
way to the Dionysian complex in which men effectively disappear as they become 
immersed in the feminine.  It is a mistake, however, to think of the Dionysian male as 
a loner without connection to men just because his Persona is based in pre-Oedipal 
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infancy.  Adult men can bond with other men in a Dionysian spirit through their 
shared immersion in the worship of the feminine.  It is worth considering how 
common in an ideology of Romantic love it is for men to desire to “lose themselves” 
in their beloved.  But one must stress that such a sentiment has very little to do with 
real connectedness to women in a positive sense and more to do with male 
Narcissism and Anima projection   
 Shelley’s refusal to submit to the sexual morality of his culture and class took 
the form of an early rejection of marriage.  In a letter to Hogg he remarked, “marriage 
is hateful detestable—a kind of ineffable sickening disgust seizes my mind when I 
think of this most despotic most unrequired fetter which prejudice has forged to 
confine its energies” (qtd. in Holmes 68).  Such a remark operated unconsciously to 
cement the homosocial bond between Shelley and Hogg, their mutual desire to lose 
themselves freely in the archetypal feminine, the mother’s body, without the 
interference of the Periclean father and his laws.  His hatred was aimed at Christianity 
as the source of the institution of marriage, but one must recognize in his extreme 
boyhood disgust the shadow of Oedipal jealousy—the boy’s rage against the father’s 
prohibition that he could “marry” his mother.  I do not mean to reduce Shelley’s 
politics to Oedipal rage, but rather to suggest that the two levels of affect were 
operating together.   
 On a conscious level, Holmes’ estimate of the position is correct:  “In attacking 
marriage as it was formulated at the beginning of the nineteenth century, without 
legal protection for women and without provision for divorce, Shelley was attacking 
a nexus of fundamental social values: inheritance, property, possession and legal 
representation” (69).  Yet, as Holmes is quick to add, “Shelley was largely mistaken in 
reading his own personal problems into Harriet’s life” (69).  Indeed, not only was 
Harriet’s father no particular tyrant, but Shelley’s father wasn’t either.  Yet, on an 
archetypal level, these ordinary fathers could come to represent patriarchy in all its 
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violence and limitation on the freeplay of libido in the form of Eros or Logos.  When 
Shelley retaliated for his father’s lack of support after his expulsion from Oxford by 
resigning his claim to the family inheritance of Sir Bysshe Shelley’s property, he 
particularly insisted that the remainder (after his annuity) be divided among his 
sisters and mother.  As Holmes remarks, “Shelley had instinctively struck at his 
father’s most sensitive point:  the ambition, inherited from grandfather to father, to 
secure the family name in the undivided and orderly inheritance from generation to 
generation of a solid body of English landed estates” (60).   
 This war between father and son was being played out on the level of the 
collective unconscious—Shelley seeking to reject the Periclean ego-ideal that he 
consciously despised and unconsciously longed after.  The arch-rebel against 
patriarchal authority could nevertheless, in a different, equally volatile mood, write to 
one of his female correspondents, “I have long been convinced of the eventual 
omnipotence of mind over matter; adequacy of motive is sufficient to anything, & my 
golden age is when the present potence will become omnipotence” (qtd. in Holmes 
89).  Like his Prometheus, the rebel wishes to supplant the god in his potency, yet 
there is something Dionysian in his belief that he could do so through the assertion of 
free love.  This rebellious liberty draws its strength from a dependence upon an 
infinitely loving mother.  Shelley’s dream of omnipotence is a remnant cloud of glory 
trailing from the realms of the Ouroboros. 
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Body Politic and Body Erotic. 
 Knowing how his first feelings of financial and intellectual abandonment by 
his father and his mother wounded Shelley, one feels the significance of the opening 
scene of Prometheus Unbound, which focuses on the curse of Prometheus.  Shelley’s 
Prometheus begins his own transformation and the release of himself from Jupiter’s 
Phallic power by recognizing that the wording of his curse included a dare to let Jove 
rain down his fury on Mankind.  He intended to show Jove that even torturing those 
he loved would not make him yield to tyranny.  The Titan’s hatred for his persecutor 
blinds him to the fact that he has invited suffering not only on himself but on those 
for whom he originally carried out the theft of the Father’s fire.  The revolutionary 
hero conceives himself as a savior of his fellow men.  He gives them hope of power, 
but may only bring down on them pain and suffering through the violence of 
revolution and counter-revolutionary reaction.  For the second generation of 
Romantics in England, the lesson of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars 
was frustratingly clear:  it was not so easy as Rousseau had implied to exercise the 
will of the people through the will of individual leaders.  Enlightened self-interest did 
not seem to work.  The political problem of rebellion finds its resonances very clearly 
in the son’s rebellion against his father’s power and the men of his father’s generation. 
 Without suggesting that the complex events of history can be reduced to 
psychological formulae, I do wish to suggest that this problem in politics resonates 
strongly with the problem of the father’s law and the benevolence it is supposed to 
provide for the father’s family.  The tyrant’s absolutism is based on a particular idea 
of patriarchal authority, yet this authority is continually subject to the split between 
the father’s desire for personal gratification and the basis of his authority in a 
supposed love and connection to his dependents.  Olympian Jupiter originally 
disavowed any love for humankind.  It was Prometheus, after all, who had created 
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Men.  Jupiter in retaliation for Prometheus’ theft of fire, ordered the manufacturing of 
Pandora, the prototypical ideal woman made on the forge of Hephaestus.   
 The myth has it that Pandora went to Epimetheus as a wife against the better 
judgment of Prometheus who, representing foresight, could see the trouble it was 
intended to cause.  The insertion of Woman in the form of Pandora—a sort of Greek 
Eve, manufactured as an after-thought (Epimetheus meaning, of course, 
“afterthought”)—highlights the fact that all of the transactions in the forefront of 
these myths are between males of various generations.  “Men” are the grandsons, so 
to speak, of the Oedipal drama between senex and puer.  The important division in 
patriarchy is a division of age from youth, and the empowered few from the 
subjugated many, personified archetypally as the senex and puer complexes in the 
Self.  Whether or not the players are represented as literal fathers and sons is not the 
question.  The existence of a hierarchy of men that inflates some of them into “gods” 
and subjugates others is sufficient to permit us to recognize the lineaments of 
patriarchal desire. 
 Lewis notes that tyranny, in the political theory of Locke so dear to Shelley, is 
“a monarchy voluntarily entering a state of war (enmity and destruction) against its 
people” (Locke’s Second Treatise of Civil Government qtd 158).  The body politic troped 
as a Titanic human form, an organic unity, is fragmented when the leader, whether 
elected or selected through an hereditary system, asserts his own self-indulgent will 
against that of the body.  The imagery of Mind or Will in rebellion against Body, 
which underlies these political metaphors, is a problem at the heart of masculine 
consciousness, for as I have suggested, the masculine ego is constructed to dissociate 
itself from the body and Nature as Other, as feminine.  In a sense, one might read 
Shelley’s Prometheus Bound as the myth of the bound phallus (with a small p)—
particularly in the sense that a man’s erection is always subject to the appropriation of 
castration.  Before he, as an infant, has a chance to claim it as part of his Self, it is 
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objectified and made taboo.  To play on the double meaning of “subject,” the phallus 
is subjected in the same way the subjects of the monarch are subjected.  Eros, the 
dynamic of connection and relationality, is replaced by an instrumental rationality 
whereby the King-ego is abstracted into a complete autonomy from its People-body 
which is, in turn, objectified and instrumentalized.  Such an operation is the assertion 
of Logos over Eros—Reason over Love. 
 Prometheus, then, in his polysemic openness, is both the rebelling people 
pitted against the tyrant in his role as political savior, but also he is Jupiter’s beloved, 
rejected.  This erotic relationship may be thought of as brotherly love or the love of 
father for son.  In either case, it is the denial of relationship that is the problem and 
which precipitates violence.  Lewis notes that Shelley’s Prometheus is drawn in 
distinction to Milton’s Satan or the classical notion of Titanic character:  “he is 
innocent of Titanism, the excesses of arrogant pride, fraud, and lust for power, and 
the potentiality for violence that Hesiod, Dante, and Milton condemn” (160).  All of 
these qualities are instead placed onto Jupiter as the personification of absolutism.  
Lewis also notes that Shelley’s ideas about tyranny as a social contract derive from 
Volney’s Ruins of Empire, the same book from which Frankenstein’s monster receives 
his political education.  In this work a convocation of the people declares tyrants to be 
“rebels” because they rebel against the popular sovereignty, the will of the people.  
“In A Philosophical View of Reform Shelley echoes Godwin by maintaining that a man 
has the right to ‘impersonate’ the role of king or lord only so long as the people judge 
it to be beneficial that he do so” (Lewis 159).  This “impersonation” is the basic mental 
process of prosopopoeia—personification—that underlies the formation of the major 
components of the Self.   
Archetypal King and Solar Phallos 
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 The techne, which Prometheus represents, is intimately imbricated with the 
Oedipal struggle against the archetypal father and the image of the King was, in 
Shelley’s day, the locus of much ambivalence about patriarchy.  Under the Regency, 
anti-royalists had a particularly good example of the injustice and waste of kingship 
as an institution.  As an idea, however, the image, like the father imago, carries 
positive and negative symbolism.  The positive archetypal King, as Moore and 
Gillette describe it, is the masculine generative power, the ability to create oneself as 
the center and source of a nurturant order, a community, family, or nation.  This 
generative King is a mythic image for what Monick calls positive solar Phallos.  As I 
described in chapter III, this “solar” image of masculinity is only part of the masculine 
spectrum.  The sun’s fire is, in many ways, the ultimate fire.  It is the source of light 
and life.  It is the mythical center.  It represents fire’s glory, which, like a god, cannot 
be looked at directly without going blind.  Moore and Gillette describe an image of 
the Egyptian boy-king Akhenaton which captures the generative-relational quality of 
this masculinity as well as the solar symbolism. 
There is a beautiful ancient Egyptian painting of the Pharoah Akhenaton 
standing in his royal balcony, splendidly embraced by the rays of his Father 
god, Aton, the sun, throwing rings of gold down to his best followers, his 
most competent and loyal men.  By the light of the masculine sun-
consciousness, he knows his men.  He recognizes them, and he is 
generative toward them.  He bestows upon them his blessing.  Being 
blessed has tremendous psychological consequences for us.  There are even 
studies that show that our bodies actually change chemically when we feel 
valued, praised, and blessed.  (61) 
 They go on to say that young men are often starved for blessing from older 
men.  There is a psychodynamic in this action of praise across generations and across 
the power hierarchy that causes psychic healing and wholeness in the younger man—
or indeed in both.  The King is another image of Self, the imago dei that signifies 
wholeness against the fragmentation upon which the ego is constructed.  
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 But the negative King wields a destructive fire, Jovian lightning, the sudden, 
destructive, and violent fire directed at particular individuals, sometimes with wrath 
or punishment, sometimes with mere caprice—the shadow-side of solar phallos.  The 
fire Jupiter withholds from men is the fire from the wheels of the Sun’s chariot, the 
fire of life.  Jupiter’s rule is an expression of Phallus, the Law and Logos, that cuts itself 
off from chthonic phallos, the spirit of male sexuality and embodied Eros.  The non-
generative king is thus an autocastrating father; that is, phallus (the actual sexual 
organ and the polymorphousness of bodily sensuality) is sacrificed to achieve the 
kingly powers of control over others and law.  Kingship thus expresses the 
ontological split of Enlightenment science that separated the rule of Mind from the 
Body as, at best, an obedient slave.   
 Shelley depicts this quality of the tyrant father enslaved by his own addiction 
to enslaving others.  Asia, in her dialogue with Demogorgon in Act II of Prometheus 
Unbound, observes that even after chaining his enemy to the mountain, Jove yet 
“trembled like a slave” (II.iv.108) and when she asks the shadowy spirit if Jove too 
has a master, if he too is a slave, Demogorgon replies, “All spirits are enslaved who 
serve things evil:/ Thou knowest if Jupiter be such or no” (II.iv. 110-11). If one 
answers yes to this enigma, one sees that, like Theweleit’s soldier-male, Jupiter is a 
slave to his own defenses.  He is paranoid and consumed with fear that he will be 
overthrown as he overthrew his own father.  He is preoccupied with the need to 
inflict pain on others in order to reinforce his own bodily boundaries, his separation, 
his negative-erotic stance.  The Logos of law must be seen in this configuration as a 
compensation for the negative-erotic stance.  That is, the use of words and reason to 
control and dominate others is caused by the assumption of negative-Eros, the 
rejection of relatedness. 
 It is important to note that in Shelley’s revisioning of the myth Prometheus is 
Jove’s creator, in a sense, before he is his enemy, for it was he who  
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Gave wisdom, which is strength, to Jupiter 
And with this law alone: “Let man be free,” 
Clothed him with the dominion of wide Heaven.  (II.iv.44-46) 
 Jupiter desired to have omnipotence, which, according to Shelley, required that 
he “know nor faith nor love nor law” and be “friendless” (II.iv.47-48).  It is this 
prerequisite of omnipotence that made the omnipotence of Milton’s God so 
paradoxical and unacceptable to his Romantic readers.  Omnipotence required the 
rejection of love, for to love is to be powerless against the beloved, to bend one’s will 
to that of another.  The mentality of conquest and domination that produced the 
notion of an omnipotent deity was, in fact, rooted in love’s opposite, Phobos, or fear.  
This is the contradiction that resulted in the Romantic interpretation of Satan as the 
hero of Paradise Lost, for he was rebelling against a father-god whose nature was anti-
Eros and whose claim to be the god of love was incompatible with his claim to his 
own omnipotence.    
 In the sphinxian dialogue between Asia and Demogorgon, the latter repeatedly 
replies to Asia’s queries about who is responsible for the world’s evils with the 
enigmatic “He reigns.”  This leads Asia to ponder just what it means to “reign,” and 
she comes to see that reigning is a state of being into which anyone can enter, an 
egocentric state of lovelessness and alienation that is the corollary of the 
objectification of the Other and the exercise of social power for self-gratification.  The 
central problem of the play is that Prometheus himself, in refusing to submit to Jove’s 
omnipotence, thereby implicitly asserts his own “reign” and becomes like his enemy, 
locked in hatred.  Like the typical Byronic hero—most notably Manfred—Prometheus 
is locked in alienation from others.  This is the significance of his realization of the evil 
contained in his curse: 
 Let thy malignant spirit move 
 Its darkness over those I love: 
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 On me and mine I imprecate 
 The utmost torture of thy hate 
And thus devote to sleepless agony 
This undeclining head while thou must reign on high.  (I.276-81) 
 This indirect curse of those he loves is an act of hubris, to make his defiance all 
the more powerful because his suffering is great.  It neatly illustrates the Periclean 
mentality that subsumes family and loved ones into the circle of the ego.  To Jupiter 
he aims his direct venom when he says: 
  all-prevailing foe! 
 I curse thee! let a sufferer’s curse  
 Clasp thee, his torturer, like remorse, 
 Till thine Infinity shall be  
 A robe of envenomed agony; 
And thine Omnipotence a crown of pain 
To cling like burning gold round thy dissolving brain.  (I.285-91) 
 Jupiter is to accumulate his evil deeds in his “self-torturing solitude” until the 
hour comes when he “must” of necessity “appear to be/That which thou art 
internally” (I.295-99).  But this statement is not so much curse as Promethean 
forethought, for the Titan knows that, like Blake’s Urizen, the omnipotent god is 
cutting himself off from all connection with others.  Jupiter’s own autocastration 
dooms him to make himself a Satanic Hell within his own psyche.   
 Lord Byron, whom Shelley greatly admired despite their philosophical 
differences, had resigned himself to skeptical alienation, the heroic defiance of society 
that ostracized the Promethean who would wield fire.  The defiance of Byron’s poem 
“Prometheus” would never find reconciliation.  Ego and Other (whether this was 
conceived as society, a lost beloved, or Nature herself) were irrevocably alienated 
from each other.  It was partly in response to this Byronic reading of Prometheus as 
the heroic defiance of a hated fate that Shelley composed his lyric drama.  As Charles 
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Robinson has argued, “the differences between Byron’s and Shelley’s Promethean 
poems are metaphysical.  Shelley could agree with Byron that man was ‘in part 
divine,’ but for him the ‘divinity in Man’ was equivalent to the imagination, a 
liberating and integrating power of the mind, whereas for Byron the ‘Faculty divine’ 
was the reason, ‘chained and tortured’ by the body” (116-17).   
 Prometheus Unbound  is fundamentally a drama of this “divine” imagination—
divine in precisely the sense of the Jungian imago dei, because it could resolve 
fragmentation into wholeness.  The philosophical position of Shelley, that Man could 
perfect himself, was a claim that he could become whole, could restore a prior 
wholeness for which he longed.  But the Promethean masculine, alienated from Eros, 
is only defiant hatred and enduring suffering.  This alienation is enacted in Shelley’s 
drama in the separation of Prometheus from Asia, his Anima, and the personification 
of Love.  Jupiter’s parallel alienation is figured in his brutal perversion of union with 
Thetis in rape.  The result of this alienation is the emergence of that most shadowy of 
shadow figures, Demogorgon. 
 Yet we may well ask:  whose shadow is Demogorgon?  As is to be expected of 
any mythic image, he is not simply reducible to allegory.  What is certain at the outset 
is that Shelley’s Demogorgon captures the fact that the shadow is not necessarily evil.  
Rather it is those impulses that have been rejected from the conscious personality, 
those qualities that lie in darkness because they are denied.  From the standpoint of 
Jupiter, Demogorgon represents the power of the body politic which lies behind the 
power of the King—he is the lie given to Jupiter’s claim to omnipotence.  He is, in this 
reading, the oppression implicit in Jupiter’s tyranny, and the power that oppression 
gives to overthrow the pretender King.  But this oppression is explicitly directed at 
the feminine.  Demogorgon is the offspring of Jupiter’s rape of Thetis, who is not only 
the personification of the feminine complex in her identity as a sea goddess, but is 
specifically one of the daughters of Nereus, the Old Man of the Sea.  If the sea 
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signifies the maternal feminine, Nereus personifies the immersion of the masculine in 
the oceanic feminine.  Chthonic Demogorgon likewise signifies the repressed oceanic 
union with the Mother which undergirds the masculine Sky-father.  Formless, he is 
the unconscious merged with the archetypal mother out of which the father-complex 
as well as the hero is born.  In the elemental reverie, the unconscious, the ocean, and 
the cave all come to be associated with the Great Mother. 
 Read another way, however, Demogorgon signifies Prometheus’ own 
repressed desire for omnipotence, the desire contained within his theft of the solar-
phallic fire.  As Robinson notes, “When Prometheus heard his own words repeated by 
the Phantasm of Jupiter, he recognized that he had grown like the selfish and proud 
Jupiter or, in other words, that his own intellectual and moral errors were 
externalized by Jupiter’s existence and tyranny” (122).  Prometheus, representing the 
imagination, demonstrates 
that the imagination itself… can increase its comprehensive circumference 
through virtuous action or confine itself within a narrow limit by 
selfishness [and so] is responsible for man’s liberation or enslavement.  
(123) 
 This is to read Shelley’s psychodrama as an epiphany in which the ego 
(Prometheus) realizes its imaginal potential to open outward into the Self rather than 
to identify with the father’s Law.  Prometheus, in this final play of the tragic cycle, 
realizes that Jupiter is indeed his creation, a projection of his own desires, and that he 
has been enchained by that projection—or more specifically by the projection’s being 
unconscious.  Paul Cantor puts it this way: 
Prometheus symbolizes the way man has created gods like Jupiter to 
account for his suffering.  Because he forgets their source, man ends up 
subjected to the divine images he has projected out of his own brain.  (82-
83) 
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 The unconsciousness of the projection of the tyrant-god binds the subjected 
worshipper or rebel alike in the self-division of fear, envy, and hatred.  But it is still 
clearer to realize that it is not so simply “man” that is prone to this illusion, but the 
ego which succumbs by repressing its own origins in, and vulnerability to, the 
multiple personalities of the unconscious matrix.  Demogorgon, in this respect, 
personifies the dark secret that Prometheus and Jupiter are doubles—each in a sense 
the projected and denied half of the other.  In Monick’s terms, they are the mutually 
denying positive and negative poles of Solar Phallos.  Both of them can only come to 
know this brotherhood through the agency of Chthonic Phallos—the embodied 
Dionysian man. 
The Mother and the Man of Reason 
 The body of the Promethean man is chained by his willful striving after the 
Apollonian ideal of disembodied Logos.  As a god of techne, he has repressed the 
potential evil and destruction in his gift of fire and this evil returns to him from the 
region of negative Chthonic Phallos in the form of the Furies and the inner demons 
they evoke.  From within Prometheus come images of humankind and the evil it has 
wrought with fire.  He sees the use of fire in the Inquisition against “The wise, the 
mild, the lofty, and the just” who are “impaled in lingering fire” (I.612).  The sons of 
men are “kneaded down in common blood/ By the red light of their own burning 
homes” (I.614-15), and, finally, Christ is crucified in imitation of the agony of 
Prometheus himself.  Christ who is both the positive solar King and the archetypal 
Savior Hero, suggests vividly the way the Titan’s curse has taken in the whole world 
into his suffering.  The dual nature of fire is captured vividly in the Furies’ tortures, 
for fire is knowledge that permits creation and destruction; it can warm or it can burn 
and consume.  Moreover, the fire of imagination can give agony from knowledge of 
evil, or it can be turned into Hope.   
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 This is in fact what happens after the Furies have been dispelled.  The female 
Furies are traditionally the spirits of vengeance for crimes against the mother.  
Prometheus, in his hatred, has effectively become a matricide in his repression of 
Chthonic Phallos, for it is the instinctual nature of the male erotic body which 
connects it to the feminine and the maternal.  It is appropriate, then, that the 
tormented Prometheus is restored by his mother’s love.  Mother Gaia, the Earth, 
sends her son spirits of the Earth who minister to him with visions of the good and 
compassionate acts of humans who imitate Promethean self-sacrifice.  In this way the 
return to the nurturance of earth and Mother represent the ego’s return from 
engagement with the grotesque perversion of nurturance proffered by Logos and its 
renewed involvement with Eros.  As Gelpi puts it, “the Mother Goddess acts as 
Prometheus’ ally in contesting patriarchal power” (137). 
 Prometheus makes the actual return to his origins in the chthonic unconscious 
through the mediation of another pair of females, the two sister Oceanids, Panthea 
and Asia.  Panthea is something of a supporting chorus secondary to Asia, but the 
particular image of the pair of sisters (Ione and Panthea in Act I) is important to 
Shelley.  In that crucial period of turmoil as an undergraduate, the young Bysshe 
remarked to Hogg that although “The love of the sexes, however pure, still retains 
some taint of earthly grossness… [t]he love a sister bears towards a sister… is 
unexeptionable” (from Hogg’s Life qtd. in Holmes 44).  This purest of spiritual loves 
is, in Shelley’s drama, the setting in which the love of Asia and Prometheus can find 
its symbolic perfection and it is worth considering Shelley’s habit of placing himself 
within a loving pair of sisters in his several domestic menages.   
 Asia is the personification of embodied love as Prometheus is the 
personification of disembodied thought.  She is Feeling to his Thinking.  Or, perhaps 
more fully, she emerges as his second double thereby breaking down the logical 
categories of Thinking and Feeling to permit their union.  They are each the “soul” of 
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the other, for Asia calls Prometheus her soul (II.i.31).  Asia’s “transforming presence,” 
which makes frozen vales flower like gardens, is dependent upon her mingling in 
spirit with her masculine Animus (I.832-33). 
 All of this psychodrama of mysterious doubles and shadows may seem to have 
precious little to do with nineteenth-century engineering or science.  However 
rarefied and poeticized, Shelley’s drama is an attempt to represent the fragmented 
nature of psyche and the Dionysian masculinity which runs like a shadow beneath 
the surface of the philosophy of science and instrumental reason.  The association of 
the instinctual, the dark, the sexual, and the wilderness with women forms the myth 
underlying theories of “solar” rationality as the essence of the masculine.  Shelley 
seems to argue in Prometheus Unbound that this Promethean and exalted Reason or 
Mind is bound and enslaved to tortures until it is reunited with its Erotic, feminine 
half. 
 William Ulmer discusses Shelley’s brief essay “On Love” in which the poet 
“locates desire in the self’s thirst for an antitypical complement, a beautiful other 
pursued for its promise of wholeness” (4).  The image is taken from Plato’s 
Symposium, which Shelley translated.  In that work, Plato has Aristophanes tell the 
story of the androgynous beginnings of human life and how the original being is split 
into male and female halves, which are then doomed to search for each other.  Shelley 
develops the mythic image into a reflection on the propensity of the Romantic lover to 
idealize his beloved.  Jung used the same tradition as a psychological allegory for the 
splitting of the whole personality into gendered halves charged with alterity.  Ulmer 
notes that “as a pursuit of integral likeness, Shelleyan Eros is metaphorically 
constituted and structured” (6), that is, Eros seeks likeness, and draws together unlike 
things in a metaphoric identity.  The contrasexual complex is, to employ Ulmer’s 
analysis, a Derridian “supplement” that complements, completes, and ultimately 
replaces the ego.   
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 This experience of supplementarity is what Jung captured in studying the 
Anima as a “soul-image.”  Anima images are not simply the internalized ideal of the 
feminine with which a man falls in love through projection.  They are experienced as 
images of the man’s soul, that is of his essential, transcendental Self.  The Anima is a 
psychopomp and indeed, Asia in Prometheus Unbound takes the active role against 
Prometheus’ enchained passivity.  It is she who descends to the underworld of 
Demogorgon.  She is not merely another double for the Promethean male ego (the 
first being Jupiter who is a Shadow double), but actually takes the place of the ego in 
order to bridge the gap between consciousness and the unconscious.  It is also 
significant that Shelley names Prometheus’ Anima-beloved “Asia,” for in the Greek 
myths Asia was not the spouse of Prometheus, but of his father Iapetus.  Shelley’s 
revision connects Asia to the Mother-complex, just as the Anima-complex is, in fact, 
an outgrowth of the mother complex.  In the Romantic imagination, too, the continent 
of Asia is set in opposition to the seats of rational and legal culture, Greece and Rome. 
 In her ascension and transformation in the chariot of the Spirit of the Hour, 
Asia is described with the iconography of Venus.  The chariot that conveys her into 
the heavens is shaped like a shell and driven by a spirit with “dovelike eyes.”  Born of 
the spermatic foam, Aphrodite is linked to the myth of the Oceanids.  Watery by 
nature, Venus is linked to the phallic fire in love and marriage with two other gods:  
Ares and Hephaestus.  Panthea’s description of the chariot evokes the fire of desire: 
An ivory shell inlaid with crimson fire 
Which comes and goes within its sculptured rim 
Of delicate strange tracery—the young Spirit 
That guides it, has dovelike eyes of hope. 
How its soft smiles attract the soul!—as light 
Lures winged insects through the lampless air.  (II.iv.156-62) 
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 The charioteer says, “My coursers are fed with lightening… / And when the 
red morning is brightening/ They bathe in the fresh sunbeam” (II.iv.163,165-66) and 
again at the beginning of the next scene, “…their flight must be swifter than fire:/ 
They shall drink the hot speed of desire!” (II.v.4-5).  Even the “lampless air” evokes 
the temple of Prometheus with its eternal lamps fallen into disuse.  The lamp of 
Promethean wisdom is thus linked imaginatively to the transformative fire of sexual 
passions.  Love, not subject itself to change, changes all.  Asia, after descending under 
the impetus of an irresistible impulse to the Cave of Demogorgon, ascends and 
becomes imbued with such light that she replaces the Sun as the source of 
illumination.  Her beauty becomes so radiant that Panthea can no longer look at her, 
but only “feel” her “unveiled” presence (II.v.17-18).  The image is a symbolic shift of 
the symbol of the Solar glory from the Apollonian reason to the goddess of love. 
Through the story of her first emergence from the sea on a “veined shell,” Asia is once 
more identified with Venus and with fire when, as Panthea says,  
love, like the atmosphere 
Of the sun’s fire filling the living world, 
Burst from thee and illumined Earth and Heaven 
And the deep ocean and the sunless caves.  (II.v.26-29) 
 The solar similes parallel Asia’s own description of Prometheus’ liberation 
when he “shall arise/ Henceforth the Sun of this rejoicing world” (II.iv.126-27).   
Panthea sees this transformation in one of her dreams in Act II.  She describes how in 
the dream 
   his pale, wound-worn limbs 
Fell from Prometheus, and the azure night  
Grew radiant with the glory of that form 
Which lives unchanged within, and his voice fell 
Like music which makes giddy the dim brain 
Faint with intoxication of keen joy… 
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  …the overpowering light 
Of that immortal shape was shadowed o’er 
By love; which, from his soft and flowing limbs 
and passion-parted lips, and keen faint eyes 
Steam’d forth like vaporous fire; an atmosphere 
Which wrapt me in its all-dissolving power 
As the warm ether of the morning sun 
Wraps ere it drinks some cloud of wandering dew.   
I saw not—heard not—moved not—only felt 
His presence flow and mingle through my blood 
Till it became his life and his grew mine 
And I was thus absorbed…           (II.i.62-67,71-82) 
 This dream image contrasts pointedly with the actual release of Prometheus by 
Hercules in Act III, scene iii.  The Promethean salvation is most pointedly not the 
product of the burly son of Jupiter’s feats of strength and daring.  Nor, if one reads 
Hercules as the Smithean Heracles-complex, is salvation to be credited to the alliance 
of one titanic male hero with another.  Instead an erotic merging of masculine and 
feminine is the psychological-symbolic event operating behind the material action of 
Heraclean rescue.  That is, this symbolic transformation and spiritual union in the fire 
of love is an experience of the soul which lies behind the fleshly experience of love.   
 The passage is strikingly erotic, a kind of mystical-sexual union that transcends 
the body and yet which reproduces the passive and subordinated position of the 
feminine partner who is “absorbed” in ecstasy like St. Teresa in the famous statue by 
Bernini.  She is water, “the cloud,” and drunk by the solar hero in an image that is 
appropriately oral for the apotheosis of Logos.  The sexual mingling in the blood 
stands in contrast to Jupiter’s rapes (and yet in ambiguous similarity to other stories 
of Jove’s passionate coupling—for example the story of Leda and the Swan).  The 
tropes of the vision involve Prometheus in a kind of elemental synaesthesia in which 
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he exudes “vaporous fire.”  His limbs, “soft and flowing,” seem liquid, and the 
steaming atmosphere of love shadows his light.   
 This image parallels the sublime vista Panthea and Asia enter as they are swept 
by the force of Desire to the volcano which is the entrance to the Cave of 
Demogorgon.  The vapors from this cave are also intoxicating and the poet likens 
them to the “maddening wine of life” sacred to Dionysus.  The “oracular vapour” is 
taken by “lonely men” for “truth, virtue, love, genius or joy,” but the voice they lift up 
like the Mænads is a sinister, even perhaps venereal, “contagion to the world”  
(II.iii.4-10).  This is the voice of false prophecy and religion that breeds senseless 
destruction instead of love and beauty.  It is religion mistaken for spirit, literal wine 
mistaken for libido, the true intoxicating fire.7  Yet, the reader learns, after the 
transformation of the world is completed by Demogorgon’s dethronement of Jupiter, 
that this oracular volcano and its fire were perverted by that reign of terror and 
violence of the “Sceptred Curse,” Jovian tyranny (IV.338).   
Earth Father 
 Earth, who is represented as the Great Mother in the first half of the play, is 
represented in Act IV by a male spirit who is the celestial guiding intelligence of the 
planet.  This avatar of Earth courts the female Moon as a lover in parallel with 
Prometheus and Asia.  He is described in words that echo the terms of Prometheus’ 
transfiguration in the dream of Panthea.  The Moon speaks to him as a brother: 
Some Spirit is darted like a beam from thee, 
 Which penetrates my frozen frame 
 And passes with the warmth of flame— 
With love and odour and deep melody 
 Through me, through me!—  (IV.327-331) 
 The imagery clearly evokes the connection between Eros, Spirit, fire and the 
melody which is poetry.  The inclusion of odor is a delicate touch of embodiment that 
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resonates with the sexual metaphors at the same time that it enhances the intangible 
quality of the spirit world.  The change in the gender of the Earth’s representative 
draws one’s attention to the Phallic connotation of this spiritual and radically 
transforming agency.  It is the male generative principle, the agency of life in the 
planted seed as a mystery.  The Spirit of Earth is her Animus, who sets his own 
generative power in opposition to the destructive negative Phallus of Jupiter: 
Ha!  ha!  the caverns of my hollow mountains, 
My cloven fire-crags, sound-exulting fountains 
Laugh with a vast and inextinguishable laughter. 
    The Oceans and the Desarts and the Abysses  
    And the deep air’s unmeasured wildernesses 
Answer from all their clouds and billows, echoing after. 
 
 
    They cry aloud as I do— “Sceptred Curse, 
    Who all our green and azure Universe 
Threatenedst to muffle round with black destruction, sending 
    A solid cloud to rain hot thunderstones, 
    And splinter and knead down my children’s bones, 
All I bring forth, to one void mass battering and blending… 
…stamped by thy strong hate into a lifeless mire  (IV.332-343, 349) 
 The anger and violence of Jupiter’s patriarchal alienation seeks to reduce the 
Other—in this case all Nature—into a bloodied mass.  Theweleit discusses the psychic 
significance of this mass as not merely the revolutionary masses but the linking of 
these class fears of the Other with a fear of the soft and liquid insides of the human 
body.  For the masculine ego, the boundaries of the body, like the boundaries of the 
ego, must be rigid, solid, impenetrable.  The press of “the masses” of humanity 
threaten the individualism of the soldier-male. 
The emergence of revolutionary masses into the public arena…threatens to 
undermine the internal dams of these men, as if their bodily boundaries 
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might collapse under the pressure of the masses without.  Their own inner 
mass “dissipates” into the mass which is outside, and the external mass 
comes to embody their own erupted interior.  The man is “inundated.”  
(Theweleit II.3) 
 One of Theweleit’s Freikorps sources describes the face of the revolutionary 
mass as “formless, the face of the mass, rolling sluggishly onward, prepared to suck 
anything that offered no resistance into its mucous whirlpool.  I had no wish to 
succumb to the maelstrom” (II.4).  The image of the maelstrom is one I shall return to 
in discussing 20,000 Leagues Under the Sea.  It is part of the larger complex of 
associations between “the flood” and archetypal Woman.  But the whirlpool that 
sucks one inside is also the fearful image of penetration, the fear of which is, in men, 
particularly a fear of the very identification with masculinity upon which the 
gendered male ego is founded.  For it is the phallus that is the instrument of 
penetration and the vulnerable member that is sucked inside and thereby potentially 
conquered or lost.  The trampling lust for death exhibited by Jupiter, alongside his 
brutal rape of Thetis, comes back to him in the shadow of Chthonic Phallos:  the 
formless darkness of Demogorgon.   
 I would not wish to pretend to a definitive reading of such a mysterious figure 
but, in the context of the present reading, Demogorgon seems most remarkable as a 
figuration of the bounded ego’s shadow-body.  Demogorgon, in his very lack of 
shape, signifies the lost male body repressed as the mass, or mere “clay”—that is, 
Earth and Water mixed.  His awakening by Asia signifies the reanimation of the male 
body discovered by Eros.  He sits upon a throne in the deep, a mirror image of 
Jupiter.  He is the dream shadow that can only by met by traveling, as the spirits say,  
To the Deep, to the Deep, 
  Down, down! 
Through the shade of Sleep… 
Through the veil and the bar 
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Of things which seem and are  (II.iv.54-56, 59-60) 
 The images of the veil and the bar are suggestive as symbols of the barrier the 
ego fears to cross.  Sleep and death are one in their frightening dissolution of 
consciousness in the “cloud of unknowing.”  Demogorgon’s form is described as 
veiled (II.iv.1) and yet as soon as Asia gazes upon him the veil falls (as the reader also 
sees the veil fall from Asia and Prometheus).  As Panthea describes him in this scene, 
Demogorgon is the antithesis of her later vision of Prometheus.  He shines with “rays 
of gloom” that are “as light” but dark.  He is “Ungazed upon and shapeless” as 
Prometheus, in his effulgence, is only to be felt as a presence, a “living Spirit.”  It 
would be incorrect to see Demogorgon as evil for all his devilish appearance.  
Shelley’s antipathy to the philosophy which dualistically made of evil a fundamental 
principle of the universe, led him to this more classical image of the underworld king 
of darkness.  Just as Promethean fire paradoxically “shadows,” so the darkness of 
Demogorgon enlightens.  He is Receptivity to Jovian Agency, and between the two 
stands the Promethean Logos.  Demogorgon’s enigmatic answers to Asia’s queries 
force her to find the answers in herself.  This is a representation of how the 
unconscious operates:  even when we descend into its depths, it remains unknown 
and unseen.  And yet this ultimate Unmanifest is the source of all manifestation in 
consciousness.  This silence is the source of all words.  This passivity enables the ego 
to be an agent in the sunlit world. 
 The Cave of Demogorgon and the Cave of Prometheus both represent a 
feminine, chthonic space—or rather a chthonic dimension that can be found within 
masculinity without losing the masculine.  The cave is filled with the “bloody mass” 
in the form of volcanic lava and fire, but this is a sign of life not death:  the libido that 
transcends any individual death.  Which brings me from the Prometheus Complex of 
Bachelard back to the Empedocles Complex.  The former is driven to know; the latter 
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to cast itself into the Unknown and thereby offer itself up to the flow of life that exists 
in all things—animate or inanimate by scientific standards.  For while the scientist 
insists that he will judge what is animate from that which is inanimate, the poet-vates 
breathing the fire-vapours of the volcano sees that imagination makes all things 
animate by projecting our Anima into them, that is, by bestowing them imaginally 
with soul. 
 Jung, in Alchemical Studies, gives a gloss on “Daemogorgon” while discussing 
Ares as the spirit that bestows “form” upon all things.  
Mars is also called the Daemogorgon, “ancestor of all the gods of the 
Gentiles.”  “Surrounded on all sides by thick clouds and darkness, he walks 
in the midmost bowels of the earth, and is there hidden… not begotten of 
any, but eternal and the father of all things.”  He is a “shapeless chimaera.”  
Daemogorgon is explained as the “god of the earth, or a terrible god, and 
iron.”  (For Paracelsus, as we saw, the body purified by the fire was 
associated with iron, in so far as the residue was “without rust.”)… 
Daemogorgon, or Mars, thus corresponds to the Ares of Paracelsus.  
Astrologically, Mars characterizes the instinctual and affective nature of 
man.  The subjugation and transformation of this nature seems to be the 
theme of the alchemical opus. (141, n. 39) 
 Given Percy Shelley’s reading in Paracelsus and other medieval and 
Renaissance alchemical writers, it does not seem far-fetched to connect the traditional 
descriptions quoted by Jung and the Demogorgon of Prometheus Unbound.  As I noted 
above, Mars is the lover of Venus as opposed to her lame husband Hephaestus; he is 
male sexuality, as well as aggression, and while it is true that the alchemical opus 
seeks to “subjugate” this animal Eros, the subjugation is also a sublimation that 
elevates chthonic Phallos in a positive form.  Only as negative chthonic Phallos, 
alienated and fragmented, is Mars the source of war and violence.  In that role, he 
turns the physical phallus into an externality, a weapon or tool.  In conjunction with 
the Self, on the other hand, Mars is, as Jung puts it, “the principle of individuation” 
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(140) that makes the personality grow and transform itself.  What Jung is articulating 
is the interdependency of the ego as agency (Activity) and the Self as its opposite, 
working from below, unfolding the psyche’s possibilities in the unconscious 
accessible only through tranquil introspection.  The fiery Spirit, manifest in the 
passion and sensation that moves one to action is set in counterpoise with the earthy, 
centered, and silent intuition. 
 Resist not the weakness— 
 Such strength is in meekness— 
 That the Eternal, the Immortal, 
 Must unloose through life’s portal 
The snake-like Doom coiled underneath his throne 
  By that alone!  (II.iii.93-98) 
   Agency, or Mars, gives all things form by naming them, but only after 
imagining them, and these mental images are the product of desire, the liquid fire 
that rises of its own accord out of the body’s interior, the volcanic darkness.  Desire is 
that “deep truth [which] is imageless.” 
 But in the Prometheus myth, Mind and Body are interdependent.  It is, after 
all, another figure of masculine brute strength and body—Hercules—who ultimately 
unchains Prometheus.  Logos does not of its own power alone unchain itself from its 
mind-forg’d manacles.  The ego’s turn toward Love and compassion, toward 
relatedness and away from rigid rational defiance and distinction of self from Other, 
leads it to open outward into Self, the whole, embodied psyche.  Bettina Knapp 
considers the suffering of Prometheus as a rite of passage.  “The word initiation, from 
the Latin in ire, means ‘to go within,’ to reconstruct one’s knowledge of life” through 
the “ordeal of psychological dismemberment, mutilation, and purification” (29).  But, 
as Theweleit suggests, psychological mutilation is rooted in the body, so it is only in 
actual physical pain that Prometheus can open himself, drop his boundaries, and be 
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restored to those qualities of love, compassion, feeling, and vulnerability represented 
by the archetypal Anima.  Prometheus’s body, one recalls, is daily violated, its 
boundaries torn open and the bloodied liver, seat of the soul and vehicle of the augur, 
consumed. 
 The polarization of the Self into ego and shadow-body, animus and Anima, 
and the resultant paranoid fears this splitting produces is the problem of the 
Prometheus Complex.  The knowing masculine agent, absorbed in Logos, loses his 
soul and cannot regain it without recovering his body and his shadow.  To do this, he 
must reconcile himself to the Paradise of the Mother, not by regressing into Dionysian 
self-effacement but by recreating his own masculinity into a self-conscious art.  He 
must draw together the positive qualities of the Dionysian and the Apollonian man, 
of Logos and Eros.  Demogorgon is, according to the alchemists, after all, the ultimate 
Father-Chaos that precedes even Ouranos, the Sky-Father and the line of Oedipal 
murders that leads to Jupiter.  It is fitting that Shelley resolves this history of 
bloodshed and usurpation through the intervention of the primal, chthonic Father 
awakened by Love to rise up from the unconscious unknown of the Earth Mother’s 
body.   
Language and the Chora  
 It is possible to read Demogorgon the Terrible Mother herself, as Thomas 
Frosch has done.  It is hard to say whether Percy Shelley was able to distinguish 
consciously between the omnipotent Mother and that male counterpart which is 
effectively the recognition of Eros in the male body.  Reading Shelley’s life, I find him 
(when he’s not writing poetry, at least) to be markedly Narcissistic and blind to his 
own extreme Dionysian dependence on the archetypal mother as his ego-ideal.  
Frosch argues that the journey of Asia and Panthea to Demogorgon’s Cave is 
essentially “regressive, a return to the mother and to an original sense of 
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oneness”(72).  It is Beauty that is the “revolutionary force in the world of the father 
because it brings us back to a different, earlier world from which we feel we have 
fallen, the archaic world of the mother” (72).  Like the speaker in Wordsworth’s “Ode: 
Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood,” Asia and Panthea 
are driven to Demogorgon’s cave “As inland boats are driven to Ocean” (II.ii.46).  The 
image of the archetypal Ocean, like the image of the dark and formless presence in a 
cave, is essentially uterine.  Regression takes Asia and her sister “past Age’s icy 
caves,/ And Manhood’s dark and tossing waves/ And Youth’s smooth ocean… 
Beyond the glassy gulphs…/Of shadow-peopled Infancy,/ Through Death and Birth 
to a diviner day…” (II.v.98-103).   
 But such regression is felt as a leap forward toward a utopian future.  It is a 
journey from the material world of “shadows” into the divine world of Platonic 
forms, which we may read psychologically as the adult intimation that the archetypal 
longings for union with the maternal body are somehow more “real” than the adult 
order of the Symbolic, which mediates consciousness and reality.  To pass through 
death or through birth is to pass out of the Symbolic and by implication into the roots 
of language in the Imaginary.  At the same time, it is through the poetic manipulation 
of language and image in the Symbolic register that Shelley evokes this “Paradise of 
vaulted bowers/ Lit by downward-gazing flowers/ And watery paths that wind 
between/ Wildernesses calm and green,/ People by shapes too bright to see” 
(II.v.104-108).  The Symbolic thus becomes a medium through which the adult 
imagination can return to the Imaginary—or put differently, the Imaginary can be 
shown to coexist within the Symbolic sphere.  The Imaginary is the “formless” 
interior of the body of symbolic understanding.   
 This inner core or stratum of language and semiosis beneath the rationalism of 
scientific fire-knowledge is the Mythos.  It is a poetic understanding of language and 
symbolism that accepts the freeplay of meaning and the openness of variant myths, 
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which in their fictional quality dispute all claims to control and mastery.  Where 
Logos insists that its meaning is the correct and scientific one, Mythos understands 
that Logos is itself merely a useful myth.  I believe Percy Shelley understood this 
quality of the Symbolic intuitively, or in his creative imagination.  It is not clear, 
however, that he was able to accept, in his everyday life, the play of myth and 
relinquish his own lust for power over others through the medium of language.  The 
recognition of the Self as the prime mover of the psyche, rather than the ego, seems to 
give way in Shelley’s own life to mere ego-inflation.  I read both of these psychic 
configurations in Prometheus Unbound.  On one level, Shelley seems to have grasped 
that Promethean ego must let go and, by embracing connectedness rather than 
separation, unchain the power of Demogorgon, the deep Self.  Yet, in the images of 
light and fire that fill the culminating release of Prometheus from his mountain top, I 
wonder if he completely escapes the philosophic appropriation of fire to masculine 
libido that denies its embodiment in the flesh.   
 As Asia is transformed into her original radiance in her upward journey from 
the cave, a spirit voice sings praises to Prometheus as he is unbound.  As in Panthea’s 
premonition, his limbs burn through the body that “seems to hide them” as dawn 
burns through the clouds at the horizon (II.v.54ff).  He is called “Lamp of Earth” and 
the spirit, fainting in ecstasy at his beauty, exclaims, “where’er thou movest/ Its dim 
shapes are clad with brightness.”  This is the same image as those “shadows” who 
people Infancy and are transformed in the “diviner day” into “shapes too bright to 
see.”  Shelley’s point is not, I think, to valorize infancy or an existence before infancy 
that lends its “clouds of glory,” to use Wordsworth’s phrase.  Shelley believed that 
such glories were not out of the reach of the adult mind, but that the “shades of the 
prison-house” could be burned away by the fire of imagination which is the fire of 
liberated desire.  The image itself, however, treads very close to simply repudiating 
the body, burning the clouds away, the better to see the purity of the sun.  Potentially 
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the restoration of Prometheus and Asia is an apocalyptic heirosgamos, a sacred 
marriage of the opposing categories associated with male and female.  The chthonic 
Earth Mother is joined to the Solar Father and the imagery of swans on water, the 
rocking boat, and the return to the deep interior—all is potentially sexual and 
embodied, yet in Shelley’s hands remains ethereal. 
 In her closing hymn of Act II, Asia sings, “My soul is an enchanted Boat/ 
Which, like a sleeping swan, doth float/ Upon the silver waves of thy sweet singing” 
(II.v.72-4).  She conjures an image of the Anima as a boat conducted by the soul of the 
pilot spirit, “like an Angel” sitting at its helm, through “A Paradise of wildernesses” 
(II.v.81) “Till,” she says, “like one in slumber bound/ Borne to the Ocean, I float 
down, around,/ Into a Sea profound, of ever-spreading sound” (82-4).  She says, the 
“instinct of sweet Music” drives the “boat of my desire” to “Realms where the air we 
breathe is Love… Harmonizing this Earth with what we feel above” (II.v.90, 94-5, 97).  
Erotic desire is the ego’s motive force and the waters of the unconscious Imaginary 
act on consciousness through the enveloping music with all the mystery of that 
“envelope of sound” Julia Kristeva has described as the precursor to language.  The 
Anima of the hero, thus transports him to the realm of the Mother’s chora.   
 This image of the ocean and the vessel carried across its mysteries is one that I 
shall return to again, particularly when examining Captain Nemo and his submarine.  
Here, as in the case of Nemo, the return to the Mother is the act of a male figure 
intimately associated with language.  Asia’s boat is “enchanted,” that is, moved by 
words in poetic, magical song.  The spirit who is her guardian angel-helmsman is the 
Symbolic imagination which produces such songs.  Thus Shelley tells his reader that 
not only is the liberation of Logos dependent upon Erotic motivation, but the 
liberation of Eros into the endless “paradise of wildernesses” is dependent upon the 
enchantment of Logos, the “Lamp of Earth.”  The voyage from the mirrorlike “glassy 
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gulphs” of Infancy into the world transformed into the Promethean lamp is the 
epistemological shift delineated in M. H. Abrams’ The Mirror and the Lamp.   
 Abrams traces the evolution of Romantic theories of the imagination from the 
eighteenth-century metaphor of the mirror reflecting the world, to the Romantic 
metaphor of the lamp.  The Promethean Lamp symbolizes a transformative power of 
imagination that renders perception itself possible and shapes the world as it 
illuminates it.  One feels that it is this ethereal shift of understanding and perceiving 
that gets most of Shelley’s attention.  Love, reduced to the symbolic representations of 
his poetic myth loses its flesh and blood.  The impression is supported when one 
turns to the poet’s life, for Shelley’s attitudes about sexual love and relatedness were 
wildly out of joint with his ability to actually engage in a connection that united 
feeling and body. 
 When Shelley was writing Prometheus Unbound in 1818-19, his life was 
wrenched by extremes of joy and sorrow.  His sexual affairs with Claire Claremont 
and Mary’s maid Elise, as best the biographer can estimate, left him with possibly two 
dead children—Elise’s daughter by Shelley and, Holmes speculates, a miscarriage by 
Claire.  These erotic and sexual wanderings left his relationship to Mary strained and 
seems to have caused both of them recurrent pain and physical depression.  Asia’s 
hymn of her soul as a boat is haunting in the context of Shelley’s growing fascination 
with sailing while in Italy, a fascination that was to be the indirect cause of his 
drowning in 1822.  The young man who could write so passionately about the union 
of love and reason, and the power of imagination to create a new world, was to die in 
the midst of his Byronic adventuring leaving his second young wife with her children 
abandoned in his wake.  There is something about Shelley’s wild racing about 
Europe, searching for utopia, that seems to court death.  Chasing his dreams of 
transcendental power, the poet was careless, even heartless, towards the women he 
professed to love.  When I say that his vision of the union of Logos and Eros fails to 
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truly unite them in the body, I do not, of course, mean that Percy Shelley was not 
sexually active.  Rather, the very frenetic activity of his amorous escapades betrays its 
cerebral quality.  Shelley, like so many men, was searching in “free love” for the lost 
pre-Oedipal union with the mother.   
 What I have tried to suggest in the images I have highlighted from Prometheus 
Unbound, is the unconscious representation of this dream.  Seemingly a young man 
who could not escape his puer aeternus complex, Percy Shelley could nevertheless 
capture the complex itself in the web of metaphors as he wrote his myth.  The longing 
for the maternal, the ambiguity of the shadowy Demogorgon beneath his fiery 
volcano, bespeak the lack of resolution, the lack of consciousness, in the poet’s own 
Prometheus complex.  Jupiter, the father against whom the son’s rage is directed, is 
all too easily overthrown and the Mother gained as reward.  When Shelley decided to 
end his drama differently than Aeschylus apparently ended his, he was rebelling 
against the reconciliation of the Titan to the tyrant.  However, as I have suggested, the 
underlying psychological drama in the myth is the reconciliation of father and son, 
notably through the intermediary son-figure of Heracles.  One can thus read Shelley’s 
revisioning of the myth as the refusal of Heraclean and Periclean masculinity in favor 
of an Animus which strives for the Apollonian veneration of disembodied mind even 
while longing for Dionysian engulfment by the mother’s body.  In a sense the 
Apollonian, intensely solar Prometheus Shelley produces is a compensation for his 
Dionysian longings.8  He longs for the spiritualization of the mother’s body, so that he 
can join it in the purity of fire, rather than in the Earth or the Water.  He thirsts for the 
mother’s breast, her nurturance, rather than being able to find it in other men. 
 Let me be clear on this point.  I am not suggesting that men need to have sex 
with each other, or for that matter with women, in order to live in their bodies.  I 
mean, more generally, that they need to recognize their bodies as mortal, imperfect, 
vulnerable, and capable of intimacy in all the daily, nurturant acts one human may 
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perform for, and with, another.  What is needed is the acceptance of loving touch as 
an expression, not just of Narcissistic “depth of feeling” as in the stereotypical Man of 
Feeling, but of empathic connection.  Much of the cult of “feeling” and “sensibility” 
that captivated the Romantic movement was a Narcissistic cultivation of emotion, 
spontaneous outbursts from the unconscious and the pleasure that can be derived 
from allowing one’s ego to be swept away as if by overpowering forces outside itself.  
Even in the ideal of Romantic love, the lovers may have no interest in actually 
nurturing each other and in loving each other without simply reacting to projections 
of Anima or Animus ideals.  Striving after the Mother is, to a large degree, the thirst 
for a truly empathic link, but sex difference and the socialization built upon it, as I’ve 
suggested, make it hard for men to get out of the position of the infant, the position 
that receives empathy rather than gives it.  It was towards empathy and connection 
that the images of Prometheus Unbound flow, even if the poet himself could not realize 
the goal outside his imagination. 
 Percy was instrumental in capturing the psychological dynamics of the 
Promethean myth and intimating the dependence of the rational ego upon the erotic 
depths of the maternal chora.  But it would be Mary Godwin Shelley who would most 
vividly represent the horrors attendant on his idealistic pursuit of omnipotence and 
his failure to bring his own Logos down to earth in the body.  In Frankenstein, she 
would create a study of the Man of Reason, the technical man, his masculinity 
disconnected from connection.  She would, in fiction, permit the dreams of the man 
seeking to be a new Prometheus to come to life in the flesh and reveal his incapacity 
to deal with them in that form.  Percy Shelley was such a man, dreaming of the 
magical omnipotence promised by science.  He was an amateur chemist and natural 
philosopher, enchanted by his childhood fantasies over Paracelsus and other 
medieval alchemists.  Welburn suggests that he may have met and read The Magus of 
Francis Barrett, one of the classic compendia of early nineteenth-century ceremonial 
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magic and alchemy.  It is this Faustian side of Shelley that I wish to take up next in 
pursuing the transformation of Prometheus into Victor Frankenstein and his creature. 
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Notes 
 
1 Peter L. Thorslev’s The Byronic Hero: Types and Prototypes (1962) is the classic study. James D. Wilson’s The 
Romantic Heroic Ideal (1982) is a more recent and excellent study building upon Thorslev.  Neither these writers 
nor I take “Romanticism” as a simple construct.  One cannot write of the Romantic ideology without being 
asked, “But, which Romanticism?”  The great debate between René Wellek and Arthur Lovejoy over the 
unity or plurality of Romanticism(s) has left proponents on both sides.  For my part, I believe that the term 
Romanticism is a convenient category into which a diverse and sometimes contradictory array of cultural 
motifs and interests are collected.  To say “the Romantic Hero,” for example, must be considered a kind of 
shorthand.  I am concerned in this chapter mostly with British Romanticism as opposed to the Continental 
varieties, but certainly there were points of communication among Germany, France, the United States, and 
England, where the main strands are customarily identified.  Much of what is Romantic in the Shelleys is 
carried over into the France of Jules Verne and it is on these common threads that I wish to focus.  Certainly 
much could be said about differences between cultures as well.   
2 But even this is not the whole truth if the ego is recognized to be itself a complex of images and affect.  It is 
questionable whether the metaphors of “center” and “indivisible” point of view need to be components of a healthy 
ego-complex at all. 
3 Discourse on the Arts and Sciences, note 5 
4 The fifth-century Greek philosopher Empedocles developed the theory of the four elements as well as the idea that 
nothing is ever destroyed but merely transformed by the unifying force of Love and the separating force of Strife.  
He brought about his own death by throwing himself into the volcanic fires of Mount Etna. 
5 As Eugene Monick observes in Castration and Male Rage (24), the modern biological theory of prenatal development 
posits something surprisingly similar when it says that all fetuses are female until the presence of the male 
chromosomes triggers the production of testosterone and the male genitalia develop out of the primary morphology 
which is closer to the female genital arrangement--labia become scrotum, clitoris becomes penis.  Testosterone, in 
this explanation, replaces fire as the element which produces the “externalizing” effect in the male.  Monick 
remarks that the new scientific mythos supports the traditional association of maleness with “change” or, one 
might say, Activity, the departure from a prior state of being.  It also supports the association of Woman with 
the natural from which masculinity is created as a “higher” expression, a “further” development.  One is only 
a step away from the Victorian doctrine of Man as the evolutionary advancement over more “primitive” 
forms, among which were associated women and “savages.”  
6 Promethium, interestingly, is the name given to one of our century’s artificially created radioactive metals. 
7 On the intoxicating fire also see Bachelard, Psychoanalysis of Fire, ch. 6. 
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8 Barbara Charlesworth Gelpi in Shelley’s Goddess: Maternity, Language, Subjectivity, performs a detailed 
biographical and psychological reading of Prometheus Unbound and Percy Shelley’s mother-complex.  
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Chapter  V 
Frankenstein and the Monstrous Subject 
 
__________________________ 
 
 
I am not a mechanism, an assembly of various sections. 
And it is not because the mechanism is working  
 wrongly, that I am ill. 
I am ill because of wounds to the soul, to the deep  
 emotional self 
and the wounds to the soul take a long, long time, only  
 time can help 
and patience, and a certain difficult repentance 
long difficult repentance, realisation of life’s mistake, 
 and the freeing oneself 
from the endless repetition of the mistake 
which mankind at large has chosen to sanctify. 
— D. H. Lawrence 
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(1) Approaching the Monster 
 Frankenstein is a key revision of the Promethean myth, the intersection of 
Prometheus with the figure of the modern “mad scientist.”  This intersection 
reshaped both Prometheanism as an attitude and our culture’s view of the scientist as 
a masculine role.   The machismo of scientific professions becomes a dominant theme 
of twentieth-century science fiction and of popular movements to curb the power of 
science conceived as a particular philosophic attitude and, in this context, the 
Frankenstein myth becomes a cautionary tale about the power of new technology,  
But for its author, the young Mary Godwin Shelley, I believe it was a foreboding 
meditation on the mentality of technicism and the Apollonian masculinity that I have 
suggested Percy Shelley exemplified.   
 The novel cannot, of course, be reduced to this theme.  Indeed a host of scholars 
have offered many fascinating readings of this particular text.1  Veeder conveniently 
summarizes many of the points of consensus in the psychological and biographical 
interpretations.  Among the points many critics have repeated are: “that Mary 
expresses through Victor Frankenstein her responses to Percy and to [her father, 
William] Godwin; that the monster bodies forth both Victor and Mary; that Victor and 
the monster are in various respects ‘doubles’”; and that Victor and Percy share many 
characteristics, suggesting that Mary was, in part, writing a portrait of her Quixotic 
husband (Veeder 230).  Moers and Rubinstein are two of several feminist critics who 
have analyzed images of the mother and motherhood in Frankenstein, suggesting, 
among other things, that Victor represents Mary’s horror of the experience of 
childbirth and the death of her daughter Clara.  Another major line of interpretation 
focuses on birth and scientific creation as allegories or analogies for the process of 
artistic creation and the artist’s feelings of alienation from society.  There are political 
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readings, as well, that focus on the Godwinism of the novel and see the monster as a 
representation of the monstrous lower classes rising in revolution or, alternatively, as 
Napoleon.  I will touch upon some of these readings at more length than others, but it 
is not my intention to form a comprehensive synthesis, nor to examine the issue of 
masculine identity that is more or less implicit in other interpretations. 
 Frankenstein derived its immediate power, in its time, from its echoes of 
Aeschylus, Milton, Rousseau, and Godwin, as well as the poems of earlier Romantics, 
such as Coleridge’s Ancient Mariner or Byron’s Manfred.  Nameless, Frankenstein’s 
monster has become a kind of blank into which readers may insert Prometheus in his 
rebellion, Adam in his creaturely relation to God.  Satan as demonic rebel wronged by 
an omnipotent tyrant, the wandering, exiled Byronic hero along the lines of Manfred, 
or equally well, the Shelleyan hero of Alastor, or the Spirit of Solitude.  Victor, likewise, 
can be interpreted as the exile haunted by crime, and also as Prometheus the thief of 
the fire of life (or knowledge) and maker of man, but he also resembles the 
withdrawn and obsessed Faust.  Such polyvalence is compounded as the century 
unfolds after 1818 and the protagonist and antagonist of Frankenstein merge in the 
cultural imaginary with the “mad scientists” of Hawthorne, Hoffmann, Poe, and, 
perhaps most significantly, Stevenson’s Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde.  Baldick has observed 
that the myth of Frankenstein and his monster derives as much meaning today from 
later works that it influenced as it does from works that preceded it.  The entire 
complex of images and narratives which have come to comprise the Frankenstein 
myth serve as a meditation on masculine identity as it has evolved alongside the 
professions of modern science and engineering. 
 One may see Mary Shelley not merely launching a critique of Percy, nor 
merely a critique of Romantic Prometheanism, but a critique of masculine ideology as 
it is constructed within scientific ideology and practices.  Like Percy, Victor 
Frankenstein enacts the tension between the Man of Feeling and the Man of Reason as 
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two masculine types.  This tension can be examined in its historical moment within 
Europe in the first three decades of the nineteenth century, but it should also be 
examined as a recurrent tension that persists to this day and has emerged in the 
popular forms of the men’s movement.  I will suggest that Prometheanism, as a myth 
of masculinity, comes to be expressed and examined through literary figures of 
magicians and scientists, and that during the Romantic period a transformation took 
place in which the modern scientist was invested with the alchemist’s starry robe at 
the same time that he was set up as an opposition to the ancient magicians and 
necromancers.  The “Modern Prometheus” was a new order of masculine power over 
the natural world, and the modern physicist, physician, or technician is elevated by 
representing him as a modern magus.    
 The hegemony of the Man of Science as icon of male power in the nineteenth 
century is constituted within a process of merging and polarization—he is both the 
magician and the positivist dispeller of magicians.  Scientist and magus are archetypal 
figures operating in the masculine mythos as Mary Shelley encountered it in men like 
Percy, Byron, Godwin, and the heroes of the new technocratic culture.  In 1818 the 
role of magus existed as a viable career Persona for few men (if it every did).  Francis 
Barrett and a few others preserved the old image on the liminal verge of fiction and 
fact,2 but the new role of scientist that emerged in the Romantic period would insist 
upon its secularity and materialism and so become one of the dominant role-models 
for subsequent generations of boys. 
(2) The Inner Demons of the Romantic Scientist 
 The term “scientist” did not yet have any currency when Frankenstein was 
published, not entering the public vocabulary even as a reviled neologism until 1834.  
It is interesting to note that Whewell’s coinage of the term “scientist” on an analogy 
with “artist” follows within two years the publication of the second edition of 
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Frankenstein (see Ross).  Victor Frankenstein is a transitional figure who, in his 
romantic sensibility, represents the artist.  In his attempts to privilege empiricism and 
technical rationalization, he epitomizes the new scientist who promised to unlock and 
seize all of Nature’s secrets.  His likeness to Faust lies principally in his solitary and 
“unhallowed” arts and in his association with the raising of demons, but one must 
immediately notice that there is as much dissimilarity as likeness, for Victor’s “devil” 
is not a Mephistopheles offering him power;3 Victor’s devil is his creature, whom the 
reader is moved to accept as more man than devil, more human in his feelings than 
his creator.4  Frankenstein’s creature is, after all, not a spirit but all too much flesh and 
blood, and this excess of fleshliness is a quality that I wish to keep foremost in mind.  
The creature is not an evil spirit, even if he likens himself to Satan metaphorically and 
Victor calls him “devil.” 
 Frankenstein’s intention in calling his creature a devil seems almost literal 
rather than metaphoric, a reversion to his earlier belief in devils and magic.  Victor’s 
literalization of the identification the creature feels with Milton’s Satan (an 
identification he also feels for Adam) signals a breakdown in his ability to keep a grip 
on reality, which might be called psychotic.  He spiritualizes his adversary and turns 
him into a personification of enmity, of alterity, rather than giving him individual 
personhood.  In a sense, Mary Shelley has made Frankenstein suffer the slippage 
between Gothic magic and scientific empiricism.  Victor is lost in his own fantasies of 
the supernatural.  Percy Shelley appears to have suffered from his own hypersensitive 
imagination nurtured in a childhood, which Richard Holmes describes as full of 
“magical and monstrous creations” (3) that gave young Bysshe the aura of “a kind of 
magician” to his younger sisters (2).  The Faustian overtones of Frankenstein come in 
no small part from the narrative of the hero’s boyhood fascination with Paracelsus, 
Albertus Magnus, and Cornelius Agrippa, a fascination that parallels that of young 
Bysshe. 
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 Looked at from another angle, of course, Frankenstein’s calling his monster 
“daemon” is quite correct in the Jungian sense of the word.  A daemon is a psychic 
“object” with whom Victor has relations that never escape the fantasy of the 
bedeviled sorcerer fleeing the thing he rashly evoked from Hell, and at the same time 
this “fantasy” is “psychologically real” to the subject experiencing it.  The brilliance of 
Mary Shelley’s presentation is that the uncanny dichotomy of reality and 
hallucination is maintained perfectly throughout the book.  The monster is a fleshly 
being, but Frankenstein can only relate to him as part of himself—a “brainchild” who 
has taken on an autonomous subjectivity.  The reader hears of the monster almost 
entirely through Victor’s unreliable narration, except in the two moments when he 
appears to Walton.  The story is, in one sense, a case study of an autonomous complex 
come to life in the exterior world, a projection made manifest. 
 Callahan has noted that when Frankenstein leaves home to pursue knowledge 
in the solitude of the laboratory, he is like “the traditional types of the sorcerer” in 
that “his soul has already [as he leaves the sphere of domestic relatedness] been 
somewhat partitioned into intellectual avarice on one hand, his humane emotion and 
conscience on the other” (43).  In Marlowe’s Dr. Faustus the germs of the 
Enlightenment present in the Renaissance were already shifting the image of the 
magician’s tragedy across the “metaphysical boundary” from sin, the legal 
transgression of God’s prohibitions, to a question of social behavior.  As Slusser and 
Guffey remark, “the substitution of moral quandary for sin… marks the turning point 
between the magician answerable to heaven and hell and the scientist terrifyingly 
alone, responsible only to the world and the self” (187).   Alchemists were consigned 
by Dante to the Inferno because they were antisocial, damned alongside thieves and 
con men as types of the trickster or prankster (Slusser and Guffey 187-88).  Magic was 
frightening to the mentality of the Renaissance because it was “knowledge as pure 
instrumentality… morally indifferent” and disconnected from Christianity’s official 
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laws of conduct and punishment.  The magician’s mentality is similar to the attitude 
of Machiavelli’s Prince, providing a Promethean “instrumentality by which the egotist 
can realize his increasingly unchained will” (Callahan 42).    
 The literary tradition upon which Mary Shelley drew was concerned with this 
shift toward the secularization of the problem of antisocial pride and the pursuit of 
knowledge as power over other human beings.5  The Christian attitude viewed magic 
and witchcraft as transgression into territory forbidden to human knowledge—it was 
a repetition of the eating of the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge.  Such transgression 
was bound to reap God’s punishment.  The Promethean myth of the theft of fire is 
similar.  Prometheus, the trickster, encounters the wrath of a deity with pretensions of 
omnipotence because he has stolen the god’s property and given it to a lower class of 
beings.  The transgression against Jupiter can be seen as an essentially antisocial one, 
in the sense that it is rebellion against paternal law, that is, against the conventional 
privilege of the ruling group—in this case, the Olympians—and their leader.  
Prometheus withdraws himself from the society of the gods in this betrayal of the 
secret of fire.  What is more, his ardent framing of the conflict between Jupiter and 
himself purely in terms of two rival male wills is a fundamentally antisocial 
conception.  He renders himself a solitary individual and his tortured state of chained 
individualism becomes an alluring icon for the Romantic will.  As Prometheus 
Unbound suggests, Prometheus’s act is one of hubris, an attempt to make a fool of 
Jupiter, not simply to aid humanity.  In other words, the act rises from a desire for 
glory, and is not a communal action considered by the whole social group to be 
affected.  Fire, as I have argued, represents life, technology, change, security, comfort, 
and sexual love.  Each of these has the potential to hold groups together or split them 
apart, the potential to be pursued for communal good or for individual gain.  The 
seemingly worthy act of Promethean salvation, choosing martyrdom instead of 
submission, contains all of fire’s ambiguous gifts and potential dangers.   
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 Frankenstein’s Prometheanism repeats the trickster’s antisocial quality as it 
explores the role of creator of human beings and technician of electrical fire.6  His 
actions are motivated by an overt desire to bless humanity with expanded life, but, 
more deeply, by a desire for self-aggrandizement and power over others through the 
possession of secrets.  Frankenstein is a modern empirical experimenter, but by 
keeping his work secret, he shuns the scientific community and the very social contact 
that grounds mature reality-testing.  Frankenstein’s secrecy is one of his greatest 
mistakes, second only, perhaps, to his rejection of the monster.  Science is predicated 
on the sharing of results, so Victor’s solitary pursuit of knowledge and mastery is, on 
an intellectual level, antithetical to scientific method.  On an emotional level, 
however, it is entirely consistent with the competition built into science as the pursuit 
of glory.  Walton’s rhapsodies on this subject serve to illustrate the point.  The 
emphasis on solitary thinking in science is shown to draw the thinker away from 
others and into himself—that is, away from extraverted feeling. 
In a solitary chamber, or rather cell, at the top of the house, and separated 
from all the other apartments by a gallery and staircase, I kept my 
workshop of filthy creation… my eyes were insensible to the charms of 
nature.  And the same feelings which made me neglect the scenes around 
me caused me also to forget those friends who were so many miles 
absent… I wished, as it were, to procrastinate all that related to my feelings 
of affection until the great object which swallowed up every habit of my 
nature, should be completed.  (Frankenstein 55)7 
 Even in the real, institutionalized practice of science in the time of the Shelleys, 
one can read the isolated removal of the thinker as master, although within a 
hierarchical community of laboratory technicians and assistants.  Sir Humphrey 
Davy, one of the natural philosophers read by Mary and Percy, looks back on his 
laboratory work in his Consolations in Travel, or the Last Days of a Philosopher (1830).  
The following passage gives an indication of the “philosopher’s” Apollonian isolation 
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in his identification with pure mind, detached from the body and free of its 
vulnerabilities to error, damage, and death. 
The chemist… requires also a good eye and a steady hand; but these 
qualities would probably be lost in the dangers of the laboratory, and 
therefore assistants who know nothing of what one had in mind on 
commencing an experiment, should be employed.  (qtd. in Knight 80) 
 The eyes and hands of the assistants are expendable.  In Davy’s own laboratory 
notebook, used to convey instructions to his lab assistants, he writes, “No 
experiments are to be made without the consent and approbation of the Professor of 
Chemistry and the attempt at original experiments unless preceded by knowledge 
merely interferes with the process of discovery” (Notebook, August 30, 1810; qtd. in 
Knight 81).  Ross comments that men like Davy and Faraday, who earned their 
livelihood from science in this period, nevertheless maintained the attitude of the 
gentleman amateur for whom “the thought of… pursuing science for money was 
distasteful” (66).  This was one of the reasons they so vehemently resisted the 
neologism “scientist” as a label.  Professionals as well as amateurs regarded 
themselves as “benefactors of mankind” (Ross 66) and the term “scientist” “implied 
making a business of science; it degraded their labors of love to a drudgery for profits 
or salary” (66, my italics).  Amateur of science literally denotes a lover of the feminized 
and personified Nature they sought to master. 
 The Eros that inspires this sort of love-mastery is antithetical to the faculty of 
feeling which draws persons together as equals in a mutually connected embrace.  
William Veeder, in his analysis of androgyny and the Shelleys, reserves the term 
“Eros” for an “acquisitive” and “ego-centric” love, a love of love itself.  Such desire 
either absorbs the beloved into the lover’s ego (its Platonic form), or else the lover’s 
ego seeks to be absorbed into the beloved (its Dionysiac form) (25-26).  Veeder’s 
“Platonic” love corresponds to Smith’s Periclean complex and its erotics of 
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domination.  His Dionysian love which treats women as a “goddess-projection” 
rather than an “integral other” corresponds, of course, to Smith’s Dionysian complex, 
though Veeder emphasizes the point that the Dionysian attitude, in its negative form, 
is itself a kind of domination over women when it exists within a society structured 
on Periclean patriarchy.  Woman on a pedestal, fantasized as omnipotent, is ironically 
a component of a patriarchal arrangement of social power.  In the terms of my libido 
map in Chapter III, one can speak of the Periclean complex as introverted Eros 
combined with extraverted Limitation, that is, the archetypal father incorporates his 
beloved into his own Narcissistic ego-complex while, at the same time expressing this 
Eros as domination over the beloved.  Similarly, one can speak of the extreme 
extraverted Eros of the Dionysian complex which is combined with introverted 
Limitation, which is to say that the ego is projected outside itself into the sphere of the 
beloved.  The unconscious corollaries of these manifestations of love are introverted 
Phobos (self-loathing and shame) on the part of the Dionysian complex and the 
inverse, extraverted Phobos (fear or loathing of the Other), on the part of the Periclean 
complex.  One must stress that both the Periclean and the Dionysian expressions of 
Eros may manifest in various degrees of pathology, even when it is the normative 
Eros within patriarchy.  Bram Dijkstra’s Idols of Perversity suggests that dominance, 
fear, and exaggerated adoration were all interwoven in the century’s ideology of love.  
Moreover, the Heraclean Eros, which is violent towards women and to some degree 
homosexual moved as a silent shadow of the Periclean and Dionysian masculinities. 
 The ideal of androgyny that Veeder finds operating in Mary Shelley’s writing 
is, as Jung’s analysis of the androgyne suggests, a striving for psychic wholeness.  In 
my terminology, this is a constructive form of introverted Eros, free from its Phobic 
shadow to direct the forces of love and connection between the ego and the Self.  
Similarly what Veeder describes as Agape, the Christian ideal of non-dominating love 
between empathic equals is a constructive extraverted Eros that cultivates connection 
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to the Other without becoming absorbed.  I agree with Veeder that the Shelleys strove 
for the ideal of Agape but Frankenstein is an exploration of the failure to achieve this 
healthy Eros.  It deals with the fourth quadrant of Smith’s chart, the Apollonian, its 
extraction of Eros out of the realm of human relation.  Instead of loving others as 
persons, the Apollonian lover adores abstract ideas and the technical passion for law 
and order.   
 Periclean Eros conforms to the dominant marital model of love in the 
nineteenth century, a model based in male dominance.  By contrast, the Apollonian 
love of problem-solving and pure mentation is a sublimated (or one might say, 
sublime) form of the patriarchal Eros, one dependent on the withdrawal of the father 
into his private study.  Such sublimated father-passion in turn produces 
professionalism as a particular expression of the Narcissistic Eros of Heraclean 
brotherhood.  Men of science move from the gentlemanly clubbiness of the amateur 
into hierarchical institutions and corporations comprised of masters and servants.  
Professionalism is an identification with the collective and its ideological authority or 
its physical force.  It creates a sense of belonging and often a sense of genuine 
affection and attachment among the “insiders.”  Even the men at the very bottom of 
the organizational chart may feel a warm love-rivalry for the men above them, with 
whom they identify as apprentice to master.  Heraclean complex describes the 
relationship of captain to crew and also that of mentor to student.  Iconographically, 
the arrangement of men into offices and laboratories, antechambers and inner 
sanctums, resembles Easthope’s image of DaVinci’s castle and its concentric, fortified 
walls.  At the center, the Heraclean ego feels what security it may within an existence 
structured on competition between men, and initiations that often consist of ritual 
abuse (emotional or physical).  But the ego security of the Heraclean brotherhood is 
always already undermined by its fear of the Other—the excluded female, racial, or 
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sexual Other upon which the brotherhood is based, but also, just as darkly, the rival 
men within the brotherhood. 
 Prometheus exists largely in contrast to the Heraclean identification with the 
collective.  He is a lone figure who represents the combination of the Apollonian and 
Dionysian complexes.  He combines Liberating Activity with pure Logos in the act of 
scientific innovation and in his knowledge-power.  His rejection of the body is 
apparent in his thousand years of torture on the mountain top, and in his 
transformation into a being of pure light after his release in Prometheus Unbound.  But 
this Apollonian apotheosis is achieved through Asia and Demogorgon and a love 
whose symbolism suggests a Dionysian immersion in the Mother.  It is the light, the 
brilliant solar fire of Prometheus, that captured the imagination of Mary Shelley and 
others in the first few decades of the nineteenth century, for artificial light was 
becoming the most conspicuous and magical wonder of the new machine age.  In 
Frankenstein, the young student of natural philosophy, who seizes the fire of 
electricity, symbolic of a universal force of life and machine-energy, is transformed 
from a trickster-magus into a “technologist,” the “scientist-hero… who engineers 
tricks” (Slusser and Guffey 189).   
 During the nineteenth century the etherealization of manliness into energy 
became an ubiquitous trope of literature on boys, anger, physical fitness, and the 
ways men might channel the energy of boys into socially productive Activity.8  But 
the Promethean technician rejects Heraclean channeling of his fire into the projects of 
the collective, and instead reaches to the sun to steal the Phallus for himself and so 
satisfy his own Narcissistic longings for paradise.  He longs for the transcendence of 
the feminine into the disembodied light of Logos, but is, at the same time, shadowed 
by the Dionysian longing for the opposite extreme, the immersion of ego in the 
feminine and the Mother’s body.9  This tension in the Promethean technician between 
transcendence of and immersion in Mother Nature is the basic dynamic that 
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Frankenstein explores.  It is, in Bachelardian terms, the persistence of the reverie of fire 
underlying scientific theorizing, a reverie that preserves the contradictory dual nature 
of fire, its constructive and destructive associations, and its associations with both 
Eros and Logos, sex and reason. 
(3) The Puer Aeternus and Desire for the Father 
 I have suggested the extent to which Percy Shelley rebelled against and 
antagonized his father Timothy and his grandfather Sir Bysshe.  Mary did not 
reproduce that painful feud directly in Frankenstein; her hero does not lose his violent 
temper against his father’s perceived complicity with patriarchal tyranny, as Percy 
did; but Frankenstein admits to having a fiery temper and his sublimation of it into 
the pursuit of power-knowledge may be read as the sublimation of his Oedipal 
rebellion.  Such a boy may seem to embrace the world of the fathers, the ambitions to 
power appropriate for a young man, but when such ambitions take an intensely 
introverted form they may express more a feeling of rivalry and rejection than of 
identification and acceptance.  The desire to be like the father, to possess the father’s 
power and so gain his respect, may mask an involvement with the symbolic Phallus 
that does not remove the boy from the Imaginary.  Half initiated into the world of 
Logos, the boy remains unconsciously captivated by the world of the maternal chora 
from which he nevertheless feels profound alienation.  His flights of ambition seek 
fantastic heights of male achievement, a desire to transcend the father rather than to 
follow him.  The result is a man arrested in the dreaming aspirations of youth, a type 
that may be harmless enough, or even charming, but one who may also be one of 
Theweleit’s not-yet-fully-born, whose flights to embrace Logos can raise up a spirit of 
violence and death. 
  A critique of the puer aeternus mentality and its elevation as a masculine ego 
ideal seems implicit in Frankenstein, where the struggle to embrace the father’s Logos 
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masks an adolescent Dionysian complex.  Percy Shelley almost epitomizes the puer 
aeternus personality.  Friends frequently remarked how unusually young he looked 
even after he was an adult and he clearly could not settle down in a career, a 
relationship, or a single location for more than a few months at a time.  He was prone 
to fantastic and utopian schemes and the Don Juanism that would endear him to 
Byron.  Yet, in Mary Shelley’s novel, one finds more than just a veiled critique of her 
husband’s waywardness.  The meditation on this masculine problem was 
undoubtedly inspired by Percy, but goes beyond him.  Victor Frankenstein is 
different from Percy Shelley most strikingly in that he is a scientist working with flesh 
and blood matter, and not an idealist working in the ephemeral medium of words.  
One might interpret this difference as Mary’s fear that Percy’s brand of idealism 
could become more than just talk.  This is, after all, quite literally, how Frankenstein 
was given its genesis:  Mary listened in silent wonder or skepticism as Percy and 
Byron talked the night away at the Villa Diodati expounding the possibilities modern 
science held forth for Man’s mastery of Nature—a mastery, moreover, that would 
lead to transcendent power and ultimate paradise.  This latter is a particularly puer 
sort of aspiration:  leaping in the imagination far beyond the experiments of men like 
Davy and his apprentice, Faraday into dreams of godlike power.10    
 The early decades of the nineteenth century generated romantic euphoria over 
the new molecular theories, the electrical battery, and the electrical nature of the 
nervous system.  But it was also the period which saw the practical application of coal 
gas in lighting (notably the installation of street lights along Pall Mall in 1820) and the 
development of steam engines.   Engineering schools were becoming formalized and 
engineering as a profession was emerging in stature alongside the wonders of the 
scientific laboratory and the daring of world explorers.  Instrumental reason 
combined with the romantic attitude of transcendental genius to feed the mentality of 
the puer aeternus in both its positive and negative manifestations.  Aspirations and 
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dreams led to wonderful inventions but, at the same time, encouraged the Narcissistic 
idealism and fantasies of omnipotence inherent in Romantic masculinity.  Thus the 
puer aeternus complex, a variety of Animus or Persona for a man, is deeply rooted in 
infantile magical thinking.  Roberts persuasively argues that such feelings of a lost 
omnipotence or lost connection to one’s environment are intimately implicated in 
Romantic theories of creativity and imagination.  He sees Romanticism as an 
oscillation between the poles of infinite hope in a world which, like the infant’s, “can 
be fulfilling and satisfying,” and unspeakable grief and guilt over the failure to 
achieve this hoped-for unity with the external world (Roberts 8). 
 Captain Walton and Victor Frankenstein each represent the puer mentality.  In 
the opening scenes of the novel, one can see Romantic hope and Romantic despair 
meet face-to-face.  Each seeks to conquer Nature through his transcendent male 
activity, his intimations of immortal boyhood.  In his youth Frankenstein was 
absorbed in dreams of omnipotence, first overtly magical, then the pursuit of godlike 
powers through chemistry.  But in the beginning of the novel when he is telling his 
tale to Walton, Frankenstein is a wreck of his former power, driven past all human 
endurance and on the verge of death.  Against his creature’s superior speed and 
agility, Frankenstein seems impotent even in his pretended determination.  The sense 
of impotence lies in the fatalistic way in which he sees his life, as if it were directed by 
an omnipotent agency outside of himself, and this agency is troped in feminine terms, 
indeed in the imagery of the Goddess Destiny.  Such imagery signals Frankenstein’s 
self-abandonment to an archetypal mother imbued with omnipotence.  Such a mother 
is the Terrible Mother aspect of Neumann’s Great Mother complex, a fantasy of 
suffocation and abuse.  The fantasy is an autocastration, a reduction of self to infantile 
helplessness.  For all Frankenstein’s bluster, he has reduced himself to this state.  In 
an echo of Percy Shelley’s constant hypochondriacal illness, Victor drives himself to a 
point where he must be nursed.11 
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 As Frankenstein looks back on his life, he has come to believe that his tragedy 
is due to a battle between his (female) “guardian angel” and a more powerful, evil 
goddess, “Destiny.”  In retrospect, he interprets the lightning bolt that destroyed the 
tree outside his family’s house as a sign of predestined destruction through his 
attempt to harness that same elemental force in galvanic energy.  It is this incident 
that is the seed for his pursuit of the study of electricity, but he now sees it as a 
doomed act:  “Destiny,” he says, “was too potent, and her immutable laws had 
decreed my utter and terrible destruction” (Frankenstein 42).  Rather than see his 
situation as the logical consequence of his irresponsible abandonment of his creature, 
or even of his hubris in creating an artificial man, Frankenstein avoids all 
responsibility, by declaring his fate sealed by an omnipotent Goddess.  Jupiter, the 
omnipotent deity projected by Prometheus in Percy’s drama, is here transformed 
from the terrible father into the terrible mother. 
 Asia, the Goddess figure, and Prometheus’ reunion with her in his turn from 
hate to love, are the source of apocalyptic salvation in Shelley’s drama.  But Mary 
Shelley suggests that idealization of women may be rooted in imaginal absorption in 
the idealized mother and that such absorption can lead to a paranoid delusion of 
powerlessness and, alternately, omnipotence—each of which is irresponsible.  Percy’s 
vision of masculine Logos reunited with feminine Eros, in Prometheus Unbound, may 
miss the mark if it does not fully recognize that both Logos and Eros are powers of 
the Self, not powers inherent in each gender exclusively as its essence.  I suspect, 
whenever I read Percy Shelley, that he never escaped the projection of divine Eros 
onto a mother goddess.  One may even see this in Prometheus Unbound, in which 
Prometheus is reduced to an almost mute and inactive figure after his reunion with 
the dynamic and powerful Asia.  He moves from enchained rage to unchained 
retirement and withdrawal. 
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 Knoepflmacher is among the critics who consider images of the mother and 
father in Frankenstein.  He calls it a “novel of omnipresent fathers and absent mothers” 
(90), but I would contend instead that both fathers and mothers are effectively absent.  
Victor’s mother may die as a result of nursing Elizabeth, her adoptive daughter—in a 
situation that echoes the death of Mary Wollstonecraft—but Alphonse Frankenstein’s 
indifference toward his son’s feelings and lack of understanding of his inner life also 
echoes William Godwin’s inability to relate to Mary and Timothy Shelley’s “failure of 
fatherly love” (Holmes 105), as Percy perceived it.  Victor himself reproduces this 
emotional absence in his own act of “fathering” a motherless “child,” making him 
another echo of Mary’s experience of her father.  One can see Victor Frankenstein 
when Christopher Small remarks of Godwin, “Like most rationalists of his time he 
regarded infants as mere parcels, to be handed from one person to another without 
adverse effect.”  Small quotes from Political Justice a remark that captures this careless 
attitude toward the PreOedipal stage of development:  “The mature man seldom 
retains the faintest recollection of the incidents of the two first years of his life.  Is it to 
be supposed that that which has left no trace upon the memory can be in any eminent 
degree powerful in its associated effects?” (Small 70).  Knoepflmacher quotes a 
striking remark by Mary herself as she reflected on her father’s disconnection:   
My Father, [she writes in her journal] from age and domestic 
circumstances, could not ‘me faire valoir’.  My total friendlessness, my horror 
of pushing, and inability to put myself forward unless led, cherished, and 
supported—all this has sunk me in a state of loneliness no other human 
being ever before, I believe, endured—except Robinson Crusoe. (95)  
 It seems likely that Mary’s exile (for her health) during the sensitive years of 
adolescence just prior to her elopement with Shelley set the stage for desperate 
rebellion against her father.  Her apparently sincere surprise when Godwin displayed 
outrage at her elopement (the same sort of outrage Timothy Shelley had displayed 
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after Percy’s first elopement) suggests the degree to which her rebellion was 
unconsciously motivated.  In Percy, Mary seems to have sought a surrogate father, 
the Romantic and passionate lover she imagined her father to have been when he was 
the lover of Mary Wollstonecraft.  Percy’s inability to take the place of a father and his 
own emotional absence became quickly apparent over the following few years of their 
exile together.  The Crusoe feeling Mary suffered is due to a lack of ego-reinforcement 
from both parents, which left the boundaries of her ego vulnerable.  It is that 
castaway feeling of the Romantic artist-exile, cut off from relatedness and taking 
refuge in a compensatory fantasy of romantic love or dreams of one’s own genius 
reforming the world.  Frankenstein expresses the romantic longing for paradise 
through an idealized representation of motherhood, which, nevertheless, seems to 
result in a damaged sense of self on the part of her son. 
 Victor Frankenstein’s mother, Caroline, is a meditation on the idealized good 
mother.  She is represented as the nineteenth-century “angel in the house,” perfectly 
self-sacrificing and devoted to the men and children in her life—first her destitute, 
fallen father, once a great merchant, then Alphonse Frankenstein, her savior, and 
finally to her son Victor, who calls her a “guardian angel to the afflicted” (34).  She is 
occupied solely in the roles of mother and wife.  There is a hint of the Goddess in the 
way Caroline reproduces herself, in a kind of parthenogenesis, by taking in the 
orphaned Elizabeth Lavenza, while her husband is away, to be “a pretty present” for 
Victor.  When, on her death bed, she gives Elizabeth to Victor and simultaneously 
bids her to take become the mother’s to her younger children, the gesture is 
uncomfortably incestuous.   
 Looking for “bad” parenting in Victor Frankenstein’s parents may seem 
unwarranted when both are described as doting and unblemished in their 
benevolence.  Yet Victor’s representations of the past have the fantastic glow of a 
fevered nostalgia for paradise lost.  The same dying man who reverted to magical 
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thinking in attributing his hubris and incapacity to a malevolent Goddess Destiny 
turns his childhood into a perfect paradise of Narcissism. 
My mother’s tender caresses, and my father’s smile of benevolent pleasure 
while regarding me, are my first recollections.  I was their plaything and 
their idol, and something better—their child, the innocent and helpless 
creature bestowed on them by heaven, whom to bring up to good, and 
whose future lot it was in their hands to direct to happiness or misery, 
according as they fulfilled their duties toward me. (33-44) 
 That this memory is more dream than reality is also suggested by the powerful 
irony it takes on when set beside Frankenstein’s terrified rejection of his own “child.”  
He attributes to his parents a “deep consciousness of what they owed towards the 
being to which they had given life,” the very consciousness he lacks toward his 
creature.  Childhood is a lost paradise of omnipotence for the adult Frankenstein, to 
think of which gives him “exquisite pleasure” (38).  It is a time of “bright visions of 
extensive usefulness” contrasted to his life after he has created his monster which is 
consumed in “gloomy and narrow reflections upon self” (38) and bouts of madness 
culminating in the madhouse (198).  Such a turn follows the pattern of Narcissism:  
the inflation of the ego in the young boy rising to a crescendo in adolescence and 
followed by disappointment.  The grandiose ego is prone to depression as it reflects 
constantly either on its own failure to live up to its dreams or that failure projected 
onto a universe which fails to cooperate in the pursuit of greatness. 
 The Narcissism of the puer aeternus is evident in Victor’s withdrawn and 
introverted character:  “It was my temper to avoid a crowd,” he says, ”and to attach 
myself fervently to a few.  I was indifferent, therefore, to my schoolfellows in general” 
(37).  Henry Clerval is his only recorded male friend and is characterized in Romantic 
terms:  “a boy of singular talent and fancy.  He loved enterprise, hardship, and even 
danger, for its own sake.  He was deeply read in books of chivalry and romance.  He 
composed heroic songs, and began to write many a tale of enchantment and knightly 
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adventure” (37).  Clerval is another type of aspiring eternal youth, the more 
traditionally heroic type, and Clerval matures into a young man seeking his fortune 
much in the manner of Captain Walton.  He is a puer who may grow up to direct his 
energies towards industry, politics, or trade—that is, towards human society.  He 
pursues the virtues of Apollonian, Solar Phallos, or what Smith calls the Periclean 
Complex.   
 Victor’s own Apollonian attitude can be glimpsed when he attributes all 
goodness and virtue in himself and Clerval to the influence of the idealized feminine 
embodied in Elizabeth.  For Clerval, she “unfolded… the real loveliness of 
beneficence, and made the doing good the end and aim of his soaring ambition” (38).  
She “subdues” Victor’s natural “ardour” and prevents his becoming “sullen” and 
“rough,” and he deifies her in almost the same terms Percy Shelley used for Asia in 
Prometheus Unbound:  Elizabeth “shone like a shrine-dedicated lamp… She was the 
living spirit of love to soften and attract” (38).  Mary Shelley is precise in her 
representations of the Shelleyan type—his Promethean aspirations of omnipotence, 
his desire for a community of worshipful disciples.  His flights of genius depend 
upon a dream of the feminine embodied in a beloved who is kept at home while he 
struggles against the chains of the flesh, nailed to the heights, and in this way the 
feminine is troped as Other than the ego, a mysterious (unconscious) and 
overpowering salvation or doom. 
 The aspiration of Frankenstein is not, however, Shelley’s desire to become the 
archetypal visionary poet, but to be a visionary scientist.  Mary Shelley suggests that 
the psychological etiology of both careers may lie in the same fantasies when she 
makes Frankenstein, like Shelley, begin his course in the study of the alchemists, and 
when she makes Walton’s career as an explorer follow a failed career as a poet.  
Shelley’s transformative vision lay in a mystical union with Nature through Eros, 
both personified by Asia.  Frankenstein’s vision lies, likewise, in sexual mastery over 
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feminine Nature achieved through “ardour” or “passion” of a completely intellectual 
sort—the Logos represented by Prometheus whose fire penetrates the father’s Law 
and steals its power.   
 Victor describes himself “as always having been imbued with a fervent longing 
to penetrate the secrets of nature" (39).  He cites Isaac Newton’s remark about feeling 
“like a child picking up shells beside the great and unexplored ocean of truth,” a 
feeling which leaves him discontented.  The writings of the natural philosophers held 
no glory, only an elaborated version of the peasant’s practical knowledge.  “The most 
learned philosopher… had partially unveiled the face of Nature, but her immortal 
lineaments were still a wonder and a mystery.”  
He might dissect, anatomise, and give names; but, not to speak of a final 
cause, causes in the secondary and tertiary grades were utterly unknown to 
him.  I had gazed upon the fortifications and impediments that seemed to 
keep human beings from entering the citadel of nature, and rashly and 
ignorantly I had repined.  (40) 
 Albertus Magnus, Agrippa, and Paracelsus, however—whom he discovered by 
accident in a moment of “apathy”—“were men who had penetrated deeper and knew 
more” (40).  Nature is couched in the traditional tropes of the feminine and the male 
scientist's activity (both physical and mental) is described in terms of penetration and 
as the siege and conquest of a “citadel,” imagery common to sexual euphemism of the 
time.  Scientific knowledge is troped as the interior of a female body, the hidden 
recesses of Nature or the watery interior of the body from which we come.   The 
alchemists become Victor’s surrogate fathers—ego ideals taken from the archetypal 
Magician-Senex; they are the magically mature men who have penetrated the female 
body and become masters over it.  Nature, the Dark Continent, the sea, all become the 
vehicles of this metaphor in the discourses of adventure and empire in the nineteenth 
century.   
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 The magus personifies the magical omnipotence associated in the infant mind 
with the father—an omnipotence significantly based in magic words, that is, in the 
Symbolic.  But the father’s mastery is, in a sense, secondary, for he achieves his 
Oedipal status as symbolic and physical master over the mother, who carries all the 
pre-Oedipal associations of omnipotence, magic, and enveloping Nature.  The magus 
is consort and commander of the Goddess—everything the puer aeternus longs to be.  
Like the puer personalities described by Corneau and von Franz, Frankenstein 
suffered several traumas to his fiery and intense temperament.  The most obvious of 
these, to which Victor himself points, is the death of his mother while nursing 
Elizabeth through a bout of scarlet fever.  Victor was at a crucial moment of his life 
when this happened, almost the worst conceivable moment for a boy whose life had 
been so “remarkably secluded and domestic” (45), the moment of his leaving home at 
seventeen for the university at Ingolstadt.  The loss of his mother causes a powerful 
transference of the idealized feminine onto Elizabeth.  Caroline Frankenstein ensures 
this transfer of Anima projection when she tells Elizabeth, “you must supply my 
place to my younger children” (43).  She looks forward to the marriage of Elizabeth 
and Victor as the remaining “consolation of your father” (43), a replacement for the 
wife’s as well as the mother’s Eros. 
 This dramatic—even melodramatic—loss of the mother obscures another 
wounding sense of loss, that of the father, who, one might note, is completely 
dependent on his wife and later Elizabeth for his own emotional support.   Alphonse 
Frankenstein is not physically absent.  Indeed, he seems unusually present when he 
resigns his intense involvement in Genevese politics and commerce to devote himself 
to his new wife.  But he is remote in other ways.  First, he is unusually old, having 
married late in life.  Second, he is, like most men of his time and class, not involved 
with the day-to-day raising of the children.  Victor remembers his smiling regard as 
an infant, but in the one instance where we are afforded a glimpse of his intercourse 
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with his son, we find him to be typically abrupt, derisive, and lacking in empathy.  
The moment is remembered by Victor as full of fatal consequence, for it is the 
moment when, as a boy of thirteen he discovers his alchemists.   
A new light seemed to dawn upon my mind; and, bounding with joy, I 
communicated my discovery to my father.  My father looked carelessly at 
the title page of my book, and said, “Ah!  Cornelius Agrippa!  My dear 
Victor, do not waste your time upon this; it is sad trash.”  (39) 
 Had his father taken the time to explain why he considered his son’s 
wonderful new knowledge to be “trash,” Victor says, he would have thrown Agrippa 
aside and returned to the study of natural philosophy.  “But the cursory glance my 
father had taken of my volume by no means assured me that he was acquainted with 
its contents; and I continued to read with the greatest avidity” (39).  This vignette is 
the main one by which Mary Shelley permits her readers to imagine what Alphonse 
Frankenstein is like.  First of all, he seems to be little interested in what his children 
are doing.  It was assumed by fathers of this time that their wives or governesses were 
regulating the children’s lives.  Second, however, one senses that he is permitting 
complete freedom to his son’s pursuit of books.  He does not become overly 
concerned that Victor is reading “sad trash” or take the book away from him.  Nor 
does he offer a substitute and when they return home from their trip to the baths at 
Thonon, where this momentous incident occurred, Victor has no trouble procuring 
his own copies of “the whole works” of Agrippa along with those of Paracelsus and 
Albertus.  This suggests a remarkable lack of supervision, not to say careless neglect.  
Victor’s mother is apparently not supervising his studies either, but it is the act of 
seeking the father’s approval and being rebuffed that I find most significant for 
Victor’s later behavior.   
 Frankenstein describes his parents’ style of child-rearing as “indulgent” and 
possessed of no spirit of tyranny.  He intends this characterization to be an admirable 
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one, but at the same time his father’s lack of interest in what his son was reading is 
identified as one cause of his strange obsession with “the elixir of life” (40), which 
would later be replaced by the chemical and physiological “principle of life” (51).  
Alphonse Frankenstein’s emotional distance from his son and the relative neglect of 
any of the usual initiations into manhood prevalent at the time,12 left Victor to his 
introverted fantasies of grandiosity:  “what glory would attend the discovery, if I 
could banish disease from the human frame and render man invulnerable to any but 
a violent death!” (40).  How much this dream is carried over into his later pursuit of 
natural science may be seen in his description of his feelings as he discovers the secret 
method of “bestowing animation upon lifeless matter” (52): 
Life and death appeared to me ideal bounds, which I should first break 
through, and pour a torrent of light into our dark world.  A new species 
would bless me as its creator and source; many happy and excellent natures 
would owe their being to me.  No father could claim the gratitude of his 
child so completely as I should deserve theirs. (54) 
 The fantasy is absorbed in the idea of fatherhood, as well as the image of the 
Promethean bringer of light.  Moreover, Victor dreams of a father good enough to 
deserve absolute love from his children, implying that his father failed in this respect, 
although Victor would never admit it consciously.13  As has been observed, 
Frankenstein’s act of creation is fatherhood without a mother.  It is, in other words, a 
dream of escaping the mother entirely and assuming the power of the archetypal 
Father’s Logos.  Frankenstein’s “torrent of light” in this passage is the bringing of the 
Promethean fire and its link to procreation in fatherhood is a particularly vivid 
example of the associative link between fire, patriarchal power (or Jupiter’s “reign” as 
Demogorgon put it), semen, and libido. 
 Perhaps the most striking image of the phallological fire comes in the lightning 
bolt which first introduces Victor to modern theories of electricity.  At fifteen, after 
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studying the occult and trying to raise ghosts for two years, Victor watches a violent 
storm over the mountains of Jura with “curiosity and delight” rather than fear. 
As I stood at the door, on a sudden I beheld a stream of fire issue from an 
old and beautiful oak, which stood about twenty yards from our house; and 
so soon as the dazzling light vanished, the oak had disappeared, and 
nothing remained but a blasted stump.  When we visited it the next 
morning, we found the tree shattered in a singular manner.  It was not 
splintered by the shock, but entirely reduced to thin ribands of wood.  I 
never beheld any thing so utterly destroyed.  (41) 
 Victor’s psychological shock is contrasted with the reaction of “a man of great 
research in natural philosophy” who was with Victor and his father at the time.  He, 
“excited by this catastrophe… entered on the explanation of a theory which he had 
formed on the subject of electricity and galvanism, which was at once new and 
astonishing to me.  All that he said threw greatly into the shade Cornelius Agrippa, 
Albertus Magnus, and Paracelsus, the lords of my imagination” (41).  It is significant 
that Victor’s reaction to this overthrow of his father surrogates is to completely 
reverse his ardour for knowledge.  He withdraws into despondency rather than 
embrace the actual “fathers” represented by the scientific friend.  It is interesting that 
this passage from the 1832 edition of the novel is a revision.  In 1818 Mary Shelley 
wrote: 
The catastrophe of this tree excited my extreme astonishment; and I eagerly 
inquired of my father the nature and origin of thunder and lightning.  He 
replied, “Electricity;” describing at the same time the various effects of that 
power.  He constructed a small electrical machine, and exhibited a few 
experiments; he made also a kite, with a wire and string, which drew down 
that fluid from the clouds.  (235) 
 Written this way, Alphonse becomes a much more powerful figure, the actual 
father representing the new discourse and practices of the masculine, scientific Logos 
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and much closer to his son and to Victor’s interests.  Instead, Mary Shelley distanced 
this power from Alphonse and distance Alphonse from his son, so that in the 1832 
edition, Victor complains that “My father was not scientific, and I was left to struggle 
with a child’s blindness, added to a student’s thirst for knowledge” (40).  The effect of 
this distancing and the symbolic emasculation of the father, who in the earlier version 
was an amateur of science, creates the vacuum of father-absence.  The powerful 
archetypal myth of the father remains untouchable and Victor must travel away from 
home to Ingolstadt before he encounters a surrogate father in the flesh in M. 
Waldman.  Unable to obtain the father’s power in an intimate emotional-embodied 
connection that could rival the primary attachment to the mother, Victor withdraws 
from natural science as well as magic.  Faced with a vivid enactment of the transitory 
nature of bodies in the exploded tree, he tells us:  
I at once gave up my former occupations; set down natural history and all 
its progeny as a deformed and abortive creation; and entertained the 
greatest disdain for a would-be science, which could never even step within 
the threshold of real knowledge.  In this mood of mind I betook myself to 
mathematics, and the branches of study appertaining to that science, as 
being built upon secure foundations, and so worthy of my consideration.  
(41) 
  Mathematics is a retreat into the pure abstraction of reason.  Victor’s dismissal 
of natural history as a “would-be science” fully accords with the use of the term 
“science” at the time.  The university professors insisted that the only real “sciences” 
were those that could be logically proved using deductive reasoning rather than 
empirical induction or experimental demonstration (Ross 66).  But mathematics is 
also a mental discipline that is completely removed from the world of living things 
and human relationships.  In Frankenstein’s case the retreat to math is part of an 
adolescent withdrawal.  Embarrassed by what appears to be a mistaken loyalty to the 
wrong magical father, Frankenstein decides natural philosophy is all a sham.  The 
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turn from natural science to math is not, as he represents it to Walton, the 
renunciation of Logos-power, but an even more intensified attempt to attain its purity 
as the polar opposite of feeling, relatedness, and the sensual world of embodiment.  
He does not wish to be reminded of his fear of vulnerability. 
 It is only after the traumatic loss of his mother that Victor finds in the lectures 
of M. Waldman in Ingolstadt a idealized male self-object.  Now, fully removed from 
home and his actual father, Victor’s careless attitude belies the lingering thirst for an 
image of powerful Solar Phallos.  Waldman’s name seems to evoke both the “walled 
man” (Veeder 83) of the DaVincian ego and the “wild man” that the disciplined 
subject wishes to deny.  He extols the accomplishments of modern scientists in 
simultaneously sexual and spiritual terms: 
“They penetrate into the recesses of nature and show how she works in her 
hiding-places.  They ascend into the heavens; they have discovered how the 
blood circulates, and the nature of the air we breathe.  They have acquired 
new and almost unlimited powers; they can command the thunders of 
heaven, mimic the earthquake, and even mock the invisible world with its 
own shadows.” (47-48) 
 These words, says Victor, in retrospect were “the words of the fate—enounced 
to destroy me.  As he went on I felt as if my soul were grappling with a palpable 
enemy; one by one the various keys were touched which formed the mechanism of 
my being; chord after chord was sounded, and soon my mind was filled with one 
thought, one conception, one purpose.”  That night he cannot sleep.  He says, “My 
internal being was in a state of insurrection and turmoil” (48). 
 The beginning of his career as a scientist is the first of a number of scenes in 
which Frankenstein loses control of his mind.  He behaves as if possessed and 
describes the sensation in images that speak of madness or hysteria as well as 
demons.  He places himself in the passive, “feminine” position as if he were being 
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raped—ravished by female Fate or by the words of his fatherly mentor.  He describes 
his body as an “organ” upon which the ravishing power plays.  It is not merely a pipe 
organ but an ecstatic sexual organ that is “touched,” for it is the phallological fire that 
is being once more offered.  The trope renders his body a “mechanism” like the 
uncanny doll, Olympia, of Hoffmann’s “The Sandman.”  Such feelings lead directly to 
Frankenstein’s laborious studies of anatomy, in which the passive attitude is 
repeated:  he is “forced to spend days and nights in vaults and charnel-houses” by his 
desire (52).  He tells us that his rationalist “father had taken the greatest precautions 
that my mind should be impressed with no supernatural horrors” (51), but this 
attitude of professionalism and lack of feeling will turn in an instant to hysterical fear 
and paranoia directed at the living body he has manufactured.  As he builds the 
artificial man, he says “often did my human nature turn with loathing from my 
occupation, whilst, still urged on my an eagerness which perpetually increased” (55).  
It is not hard to read in these phrases the kind of split emotional response to sex that 
many men experience:  driven by their body’s lust, they are nevertheless, at some 
removed level, disgusted with their body and the act.  Objectification represses 
embodied sensuality and imaginal empathy with the object of love. 
 Imagination encompasses the full range of psychic functions—sensation, 
feeling, intuition, and reasoning—it is, one may say, an awareness of the imaginal 
basis of cognition.  Frankenstein’s denial of feeling as he observes the decomposition 
of human bodies and their dismemberment is a repression of imaginal identification, 
of the metaphoric process that permits us to identify with other human beings.  Victor 
represses his feelings of horror and disgust by refusing to acknowledge his likeness to 
these Others, and viewing the body (including his own body) as Other is the 
fundamental denial of connectedness between ego and body, ego and Self.  Such 
denial is configured by masculinity because the erotic and sexual body is culturally 
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defined as feminine territory.  In the Urizenic act of creation, Frankenstein walls off 
his transcendent intellect from bodies, from feeling, from connection of any sort. 
 Seeking to take on the mantle of idealized fatherhood as the creator of a new 
race, Victor conjures himself as an object, a solitary pinnacle to the hierarchical 
arrangement of male power.  He thus objectifies himself in the act of making himself a 
perfect objective reasoner, ignoring the complexities of psyche and its fundamental 
inability to be fully controlled by ego.  Desiring to be seen as an ideal father himself, 
Frankenstein tries to make an ideal son.  Upon animating it, however, he realizes that 
it only dwarfs him, making him feel ugly and wretched and completely overmastering 
him.  He longs for a boundless source of love and seeks it in a “larger-than-life” man, 
but he cannot embrace his beloved because he is unable to see love as an act he must 
perform, rather than an infantile state of passively being worshipped.  The scene is 
vividly pornographic in a Dionysian mode trapped between a desire to be absorbed 
into the sublime body of the mother and a desire to become the sublime body of the 
father.   
 Mary Shelley’s vision explores a male psychology founded on the wound of 
separation from the mother and the inadequate mirroring of an emotionally absent 
father.  She certainly felt this herself and for this reason may have recognized, 
perhaps half-unconsciously, the wounds in the men she encountered.  She had ample 
experience with the puer aeternus and to some extent may have identified with that 
ideal herself.  In that respect, then, I would like to place Frankenstein and the psychic 
formations I have been describing into the context of the lives of the men Mary 
Shelley knew, the models for her critique of the masculinity expressed and 
constructed in the technician-hero. 
(4) Heracles and the Victors 
Volcanoes be in Sicily 
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And South America 
I judge from my Geography — 
Volcanoes nearer here 
A Lava step at any time 
Am I inclined to climb — 
A Crater I may contemplate 
Vesuvius at Home. 
   — Emily Dickinson 
 Percy Shelley went by the nickname “Victor” in the time just prior to the 
summer of 1816 in which Frankenstein found its genesis.  It is not difficult to see that 
in many ways Victor Frankenstein is an oblique exploration of Percy’s psyche and 
struggles.  I have found a reading of Percy’s biography and his troubled relationship 
to his father instructive for the interpretation of the fictive representation of the 
monstrous failure of paternal loving.  This “failure” is not simply an individual 
failure, but a systemic problem that derives from mother-exclusive child-raising.  This 
system separates men from the embodied affectual relatedness most infants have 
with their mothers or other women.  Without intimate, bodily contact, subjective 
stresses result in the dissonance between idealized images of masculine power and 
the actual experience of the real father.  I believe the male infantile wound to result, in 
the first place, from the general taboo, particularly enforced in the nineteenth century, 
against babies’ exploring the male body with the same level of physical intimacy and 
tenderness as they are permitted to explore the body of their mother.  The corollary of 
this, moreover, is that fathers have seldom been permitted to touch and caress and 
care for the bodies of their babies to the same extent and with the same tenderness as 
mothers.   
 These are generalizations, to be sure, and one should not lose sight of 
differences across race, class, and culture, as well as from one family to the next.  It is 
nevertheless worth considering the extent to which a wound may be created as the 
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masculine body is abstracted to the realm of myth as a distant object.  The female body 
is certainly idealized as well, but not in the same way.  Where the androcentric 
culture of the male gaze abstracts women’s bodies, it is a repetition of the young boy’s 
longing for a forbidden body, a forbidden sensuality that may be for the father’s body 
as well as, or even more than, the mother’s.  For while the Oedipal taboo against too 
much sexuality or sensuality with the mother may force the boy’s mind to idealize the 
female as a longed-for but somehow inaccessible dream of paradise, the same 
structure leaves him fundamentally forbidden to relate that way to the male body too.  
This prohibition is in some ways perhaps more important psychologically, for it is a 
prohibition against sensually and sexually and emotionally knowing his own body.14 
This prohibition is an aspect of the prohibition against touching the phallological fire.   
 In western society during the nineteenth century boys’ relationships to their 
bodies and to each others’ bodies were increasingly channeled into physical activities 
such as sport.  Yet, as Sam Femiano observes, “[a]lthough men seem to be very body 
oriented through their participation in competitive sports and other types of 
bodybuilding exercise, in fact, most of these activities require that the body be treated 
like a machine to be controlled, regulated, and used” (122).  The struggle that emerges 
is, thus, one between the boy’s ego and two idealizations or abstractions:  the idea of 
paternal power, on the one hand, and the idea of the male body as an instrumentality 
of the mind, on the other.  To an extent the two are united in the symbolic Phallus 
which may take many forms in the symbolic meditations of the unconscious. 
 Percy Shelley’s experiences of a distant and antagonistic father-relation are 
part of the context for Frankenstein.  Timothy Shelley was a wealthy and influential 
landowner and M.P. and fit the ideal of male power separated from the domestic 
sphere into its own mythologized realm.  His authority was relatively lax but 
nevertheless perceived by young Bysshe as tyranny.  The son fell into deeper and 
deeper adolescent rebellion against him, and indeed against the whole concept of the 
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father’s Periclean power over his children.  Percy’s furious atheism in his brief stay at 
Oxford (for which he was expelled) was, beneath its politics, an attack upon the 
archetypal father in the form of the Christian deity.  His refusal to submit to the 
censure of the faculty was also a rebellion against the fathers and their law.  Oxford 
dons were, at this time, still very closely associated with the church establishment.   
 That God was also particularly associated with Percy’s actual father is 
suggested by Holmes’ reiterated references to the picture of Christ that hung in 
Timothy Shelley’s study.  Timothy was, for all his power, entirely subject to his father, 
Sir Bysshe, and so, like Christ, could be construed as a puppet of the patriarchal 
hierarchy.  It is the fact of the father’s subjection to bigger and more powerful 
“fathers” that is perhaps the ultimate disillusionment for his sons.  The “name of 
father” is a title that withholds power at the same time it grants it, so long as the 
“grandfathers” (symbolic or literal) live and hold sway.  For the puer aeternus 
personality, rich fantasies of omnipotence and admiration from all around them make 
submission to others seem intolerable.  Percy’s violent antipathy for the traditional, 
submissive Christ may stem from the mythic connection between the puer aeternus 
and the sacrificial consort-god that lies behind the Christian mythos.  Such seems to 
have been the case with Percy Shelley, and to some extent with Mary Shelley too.    
 The image of the medieval magus or the lone scientist in his laboratory are 
images of escape from that odious submission to the patriarchal hierarchy.  They feed 
the boyish fantasy of superseding the power-knowledge of the father.  Victor 
Frankenstein rapidly outstrips his mentors and, while he engages in his solitary task 
of parthenogenically reproducing the ideal masculine, Victor’s professors have no 
idea what he is up to.  The situation is Promethean because it provides an image of 
absolute freedom, the freedom to seize the father’s fire, to wield the phallus as a 
solitary Sun god independent of any Heraclean brotherhood or social institution.  
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Frankenstein’s adoption of the role of God the Father combines with his name to link 
him to Christ the Victor, as opposed to Christ Crucified.   
 The myths of Prometheus and Christ each depend on the transmission of the 
archetypal father’s freedom to a new generation.  In the case of Christ, freedom comes 
through a martyrdom that obeys the father’s desires—the Oedipal desire of father to 
kill his son—in the case of Prometheus, freedom devolves from martyrdom that is a 
refusal to obey.15  Both Prometheus and Christ martyr their bodies to a vocation and 
so transcend all other men, but Prometheus’ vocation comes from an internal 
“fatherhood,” his own potential to become and supplant the father.  Christ, by 
contrast, is prevented from realizing this fact of human biology by remaining 
eternally the Son and keeping his “fatherhood” externalized, projected into the form 
of an eternally Other father.  Yet, even in the case of Christ, Trinitarian doctrine 
makes Son and Father, in a sense, One, which points toward the same archetypal 
pattern of Oedipal interchangeability.  Obedience or rebellion may thus be seen as 
two responses to the need for sons to transform into fathers (symbolically, if not 
biologically).  Yet in both the mythos of Christ and that of Prometheus, the male body 
is sacrificed to a higher ideal of immaterial and immortal existence that is particularly 
set in opposition to Woman as Nature and flesh.   
 It seems remarkably significant that Timothy Shelley should have had, besides 
the picture of Christ on his study wall, a picture that symbolized this opposing power 
of Mother Earth in the eruption of Mount Vesuvius.  Vesuvius is not Empedocles’ 
Ætna, where the philosopher chooses to reunite his body and soul with the elemental 
unity.  But it is that Titanic force associated with Hephaestus, divine technician and 
the forger of Prometheus’ chains, a destroying fire from the interior of Mother Earth.  
As the Dickenson verses quoted at the beginning of this section suggest, the image of 
the volcano is a vividly sexual image, an image of the passionate, eruptive Eros of the 
body’s interiors. 
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 Percy and Mary would visit Vesuvius in 1818 during one of the most sexually 
trying periods of their life in Italy.  Richard Holmes describes how Vesuvius wove its 
rumbling fire in and out of their lives at a time when love and fidelity seemed to be 
crumbling, and the death of children sapped the hope from life.  Holmes delineates 
how Percy, out of these personal catastrophes, created his Promethean apocalypse in 
images of volcanic eruption.  The father’s fire—that image of Vesuvius—is stolen by 
Percy to be formed into the symbol of Demogorgon’s chthonic power of 
transformation.  Holmes reads the eruption of spirits from the underworld in physical 
terms as “a Vesuvian explosion, and the restoration of Nature to her golden 
equilibrium of fruitful and seasonal fluctuations” (504).  He reads them in 
psychological terms as “Love, the private creative and sexual part of human 
relationships… freed from its inhibitions and repressions, and recombined with the 
social elements” that are “the Promethean aspect of man’s mind.”  The eruption 
“forms the unity of mind which Shelley believed could alone produce the great 
scientist, the artist, the doctor, the architect, and the law-giver.  The divine nature is 
healed” (504).  In other words, the reunion of the chthonic and the solar aspects of 
being is brought about by the overthrow of the tyrannical authority of the fathers.  
This occurs through the descent of the son’s Eros to the source of transformative Fire: 
the body of Mother Earth. 
   What is most fascinating to me when juxtaposing Frankenstein and Prometheus 
Unbound is that Mary Shelley depicts a modern man utterly failing to make this bold 
reunion.  Instead of glorifying idealization and imagination as the road to the reunion 
of Reason and Love, she sees idealization as the perversion of imagination, which, in 
its flights of fancy, flees the body.  The story envisions men caught in the gears of a 
masculinity fabricated from Enlightenment Reason and Romantic Idealism—the 
cultural currents that constitute solar Phallus and Apollonian manliness.  Percy 
Shelley is an exemplary child of this transitional age, as precociously fond of 
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pyrotechnic and electrical experiments as he was of ghosts and monsters.  Indeed 
Holmes suggests that electrical fire, conceived as the universal life-energy, is the chief 
symbol of Promethean fire in Acts III and IV of Prometheus Unbound, and image 
which, in the final analysis, fails to be convincing. 
Electricity would be the great new power source to liberate man from 
physical servitude.  But as a metaphor of the liberation of spiritual and 
political energies it suffers, like the whole of Acts III and IV, from 
irresolution.  [It] could signify any kind of vague radiation of goodwill. 
(507) 
 He goes on to argue that from the beginning of Act III “the poem completely 
disintegrates.  The dethronement of Jupiter is a piece of creaking epic stage 
machinery; there is no confrontation between him and Prometheus, and thence no 
reconciliation.  The evil principle is merely dismissed” (507).  In the terms of my 
reading of the family drama enacted in the play, there is no confrontation or 
reconciliation of father and son.  The son’s fantasy of overthrowing the tyrannical 
father is accomplished, in the play, by calling up the dark force of destiny in which I 
have traced both the chthonic Mother and the chthonic phallus.  Read in this way, the 
dénouement of Prometheus Unbound exalts Eros but yields a Prometheus who is 
reduced to utter passivity, who is, in effect, reabsorbed into the PreOedipal uterine 
paradise.  “Prometheus’s reaction to his liberation and the revolution of human 
society,” writes Holmes, “is to retire into a kind of rural hermitage, ‘a cave, All 
overgrown with trailing odorous plants, Which curtain out the day with leaves and 
flowers’… a hortus conclusus [that] symbolizes a rejection of the world rather than 
universal social revolution.”  The actions of Prometheus “are those of a leader who 
has escaped defeat and gone into a jaded exile, rather than those of a genuine victor” 
(507).16  The masculine Spirit or Mind is symbolically restored to union with 
embodied Eros, but Shelley’s symbolism is conventionally gendered:  the body is 
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Asia’s and the male body, so spectacular when chained to the rock in agony, may 
now be completely ignored. 
 In Victor Frankenstein Mary Shelley describes a man who also tries to cast off 
this living body to master a world of dead matter, despiritualized by modern 
chemistry.  His attempt backfires driving him deeper and deeper into madness, loss 
of his conscious faculties, and an obsession that dismantles even his capacity to 
reason.  Indeed, she seems to say, the longing for a hortus conclusus of Reason and 
mastery is in the first place irrational because it is self-destructive.  What is most 
significant, however, is that she locates both the perpetuation of this myth and its 
possible solution in the very thing that is most conspicuously absent from Percy’s 
mythology:  that is, friendship between men.17  Captain Walton’s dream of a tropical 
paradise at the North Pole expresses that Longing for Paradise that Jacoby links to the 
pre-Oedipal state of blissful unity with the Self-Mother-Environment that embraces 
the infant psyche.  Frankenstein’s desire for the ultimate Victory over his shadow-self, 
like Walton’s desire for glory and immortal fame, is symbolized by the pursuit of the 
pole.  The pole represents the perfect singularity, the ultimate Narcissistic point, the 
ego’s desire for a purified, Euclidian Reason that will make the Imaginary become 
Real.  This dream is the child who is father to the man’s waking devotion to grand 
schemes and plans.   
 But the dream of paradise played out in lonely desire for glory must implicitly 
exist in a mythos of male brotherhood.  Heracles, rescuer of Prometheus, is the 
archetypal brother as well as the archetypal muscular hero.  In contrast to Percy’s 
Dionysian salvation, Mary Shelley’s Promethean hero is not rescued by his beloved 
Elizabeth.  The feminine, indeed, is ruthlessly destroyed by the struggles between two 
male characters.  These rivalries, as well as the friendship that offers salvation to 
Victor, are all Heraclean in their objective orientation towards the work of men.  The 
Heraclean body is a liminal body that may be the object of homoerotic desire, but is 
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most often, under the homophobic imperatives of modern western culture, eroticized 
as a terrible machine.  One can see the inverse of Victor’s hatred of his monster in the 
erotic chord that runs beneath his conversations with Walton.  He exhibits the relief of 
Narcissistic longing in a mirrored self-object in the frame narrative surrounding his 
central struggle against his shadow.  It is significant that the metaphors in which 
Walton expresses his Promethean enterprises are metaphors of fire and sacrifice, the 
two prominent motifs of the Promethean myth.  Describing Frankenstein to his sister 
in his fourth letter, Walton says: 
[A]lthough unhappy, he is not so utterly occupied by his own misery, but 
that he interests himself deeply in the projects of others.  He has frequently 
conversed with me on mine, which I have communicated to him without 
disguise.  He entered attentively into all my arguments in favour of my 
eventual success, and into every detail of the measures I had taken to 
secure it.  I was easily led by the sympathy which he evinced, to use the 
language of my heart; to give utterance to the burning ardour of my soul; 
and to say, with all the fervour that warmed me, how gladly I would 
sacrifice my fortune, my existence, my every hope, to the furtherance of my 
enterprise.  One man’s life or death were but a small price to pay for the 
acquirement of the knowledge which I sought; for the dominion I should 
acquire and transmit over the elemental foes of our race.  (28) 
 In this conversation, Frankenstein is lifted out of his Narcissistic self-
absorption and self-pity by discussions of scientific adventure and exploration.  How 
many boys and men have experienced that shift of consciousness from the inner 
world of confused emotions and ambivalences over one’s self-image to the outer 
world spread out as a map on which a military or pseudo-military campaign can be 
waged?  It is a gesture of abstraction as the two men retire into the familiar masculine 
world of logistics and supplies, ships and manpower.  Victor is removed from feeling 
into thinking as he listens to and appreciates Walton’s argumentative reasoning.  The 
move is from a state of masculine insecurity to a state of masculine power in which 
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Logos and power are experienced as one.  The element of power is socially 
constructed between men, and embodied in images of muscular force such as 
Heracles.   
 Because of this, Walton, who in his temperament combines intellect and heroic 
action the way Henry Clerval does, grows passionate.  He couches his feelings in 
images of fire and points toward a shift in his discourse from one “language” to 
another, from what we may call the language of the mind or the spirit, to the 
“language of the heart.”  This “language” expresses “the ardour of [his] soul… the 
fervour that warmed [him]”—significant tropes for a man speaking in a frozen, ice-
locked waste land to a companion who has almost frozen to death.  It is worth noting 
that the “elemental foes of our race,” of which Walton speaks, are water and ice (or 
earth).  The two intellectual explorers of Nature’s secrets exchange this fearful 
embodiment of Mother Nature in the form of rational “projects,” that is, bodies of 
ideas formulated through reason, mathematics, scientific theories of natural laws.  I 
am struck by the alternative meaning of the word itself beyond its ordinary sense of 
“plans” or “exploits,” for it can also be read as projections, or “project” as the noun 
opposed to “introject.”  The masculine love of projects is one through which the love 
of men can be exchanged in socially acceptable form—that is, exchanged in a 
homosocial rather than homosexual form, in which Eros is disembodied even as it 
evokes Heraclean muscle.  For projects or adventures such as Arctic exploration 
emphasize—on the level of their commanders and backers—logic, mathematical 
precision, and invulnerable mastery in opposition to feeling, openness, and 
vulnerability. 
 I read Percy Shelley in these conversations because he too was characterized by 
an intense love of projects and a sad inability to fully realize them.  The sailboat that 
was the instrument of his demise was one such beloved project, for Shelley had 
always had a love of boats—a love notoriously expressed in his habit of floating 
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paper boats on any available liquid surface.  The desire can be seen as archetypal.  
One could venture that toy boats or real ships both carry the archetypal fascination of 
fragile mastery over the liquid medium from which the human being emerges at 
birth, the enveloping water associated with the archetypal mother.  It is also a 
mastery of the sublime, the feeling of being dwarfed before a beautiful and terrible 
Mother Nature.   
 The significance of the voyager who takes his ship into the frozen waters of the 
polar regions is something I shall return to in Chapter VII where I discuss 20,000 
Leagues Under the Sea.  The significant factor here is Mary’s adoption of the ship-born 
adventure as a parallel “project” to Frankenstein’s construction of an ideal man.  She 
recognizes that mastery of the feminized element of water is also expressed in 
physiological chemistry.  That is, Victor seeks to conquer the body as a symbol of 
Nature intimately associated with the feminine.  The physical excitement of technical 
accomplishment expresses the embodied desire that underlies sailing, Arctic 
exploration, and the intricate work of the surgeon, cutting and stitching human flesh.  
The rush of adrenaline is a feeling of power over forces larger than the ego and its 
self-image:  ship, sea, the complexity of organisms, complexes of abstractions, 
complexes of people, in short, the sublime.  All of these are controlled and 
manipulated by the technician’s “plans.” 
 Such instrumental planning carried to the level of sublimity is a signature of 
the puer aeternus.  The plan, however elaborate, is valued for its visionary quality, its 
magical ability to transform the objectified world.  The pursuit of egoic grandeur lies 
at the root of Apollonian complex and its striving for the heavens, the poles, the 
heights, or, indeed, the depths, as we shall see with Captain Nemo.  Prometheus 
Unbound captures the importance of sublime heights and depths in its journeys from 
the Heavens of the Sky father to the underworld of Demogorgon.  The adventurer’s 
identification with sublimity fulfills a psychic need for self-confirmation, and the 
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more inadequate the empathic mirroring a young boy receives from his father, the 
more desperate will the need for confirmation be.  In its milder, more ordinary forms, 
such as the boy’s striving for attention, as well as in its extreme forms, such as 
megalomania, the pursuit of Apollonian or Heraclean power is a struggle to recapture 
the lost feeling of infantile magical omnipotence.  As Smith suggests, the Heraclean 
identification with the body of the collective and the Apollonian identification with 
the infinity of disembodied Mind, are each sublimations of the Dionysian desire to 
merge ego with archetypal Mother.  Percy Shelley’s dream of establishing a utopian 
community of friends and lovers, sharing ideas and sex in free love was another kind 
of puer project.  It bears the signs of the PreOedipal paradise in its longing for 
enclosed wholeness and polymorphous connection between bodies.  It is significant 
that Shelley desired to surrounded himself with women, as if unconsciously 
reproducing the audience of mother and sisters who worshipped him as boy. 
 Captain Walton and Victor Frankenstein are drawn to each other instantly 
through the sense of brotherhood they share through their Apollonianism.  The 
embrace of this kindred spirit after so many months of loss and death, evokes from 
Frankenstein the well of repressed emotion beneath his obsessive façade.  Victor’s 
response to Walton’s “language of the heart” is to lose control of his feelings.  He 
becomes gloomy and the emotion is expressed only in his face—that is, silently.  Then 
he tries “to suppress his emotion” by placing his hands over his eyes.  There is a 
striking echo in this gesture of another scene later in the narrative, though earlier in 
the story’s chronology:  the encounter on the Mer de Glace between Victor and his 
creature.  Victor cannot stand to gaze upon his creation and when he tells the 
monster, “Begone! relieve me from the sight of your detested form,” the creature 
(rather wittily, one has to feel, given the situation) places his hands over Victor’s eyes 
saying, “Thus I relieve thee, my creator” (101).   
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 When he covers his own eyes before Walton, Frankenstein attempts to wall 
himself up, to stop his bodily orifices, which threaten to let escape his vulnerable 
interior fluids.  But he cannot repress them:  tears flow and a groan escapes him.  
Walton responds empathically with a quivering voice and silence.  Frankenstein’s 
breast heaves and at length he cries out “Unhappy man! Do you share my madness?  
Have you drank also of the intoxicating draught?” (28).  Notice how desire is troped 
as liquid too, and how the scientist’s eruption echoes the convulsive “birth” moment 
of the monster (and, perhaps, Vesuvius as well?).  Walton describes Victor as the 
passive victim of an inner agency in this moment of explosion:  the “paroxysm of 
grief” seizes and overcomes him.  “Many hours of repose and tranquil conversation 
were necessary to restore his composure” whereupon “[h]aving conquered the 
violence of his feelings, he appeared to despise himself for being the slave of passion” 
(28).   
 This is the final in a series of episodes in which, after being overcome by 
emotion and self-loathing, Victor must be nursed tenderly by a man who cares for 
him.  In these scenes of nursing one can glimpse the embodied father caring for the 
bodily needs of his son.  Sickness and immanent death breaks through the 
homophobic walls that divide men to make possible a homoerotic caring of a healing, 
empathic Eros.  The sequence of presentation is important too, for Mary Shelley gives 
us first Walton, essentially a stranger, then Clerval, Victor’s childhood friend and 
virtual brother, and finally, Alphonse Frankenstein, his father.  Walton, who may be 
perceived not only as a stranger, but also as Victor’s encounter with himself, offers 
Frankenstein the last chance of male embrace.  Victor opens himself, but only in 
hysterical loss of control.  In the first two instances of male nursing the “feminine” 
father is eventually killed.  In the final instance, Walton is spared, but only as Victor 
himself and his monster-lover-son perish in the suicidal flames of longing. 
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 Walton cannot save Frankenstein because they suffer from the same illusion of 
rational quest.  Neither perceives that his “ardour” is rooted in a repression of Eros, 
indeed in the fear and loathing of embodiment and Nature.  Frankenstein objects to 
Walton’s passion principally because the explorer is willing to kill himself to achieve 
his glory.  Victor, who has come to regret his own self-sacrifice through the 
abandonment of domestic affections, expresses self-pity in his apparent concern for 
Walton.  He feels the deaths of his loved ones, not empathically, but egotistically, as 
features of his own misery.  By turning the monster into an aspect of himself and the 
monster’s murders into his own fault as its creator, he denies the creature’s 
independent subjectivity, and this is the very problem that precipitates so much 
death.   
 The objectification of the Other is, in a sense, the problem of the Heraclean 
complex.  Other men are seen less as subjects in their own right than as mirrors or 
rivals.  What Walton and Frankenstein feel is a recognition of brotherly likeness, but it 
is not founded on actual intimacy so much as on the potential for intimacy.  At the 
point of this conversation, before Victor has told his bloody story, Walton does not 
seem to even know the man’s name.  This detail suggests how Walton is idealizing 
the man as a mystery, projecting all his own shadowy and unarticulated emotions 
onto him.  His namelessness also connects Victor to his monster who never receives a 
name or names himself and thus never achieves full stature as a subject.   
 Walton’s Promethean love of self-sacrifice implies another evil overlooked by 
the two technicians in their tête-á-tête:  Walton’s crew is being set up to die along 
with him.  This is the blindness of the master, a class bias, to be sure, but also an 
attitude built into masculinity defined in terms of mastery and administration.  Other 
people can only be seen and valued in relation to the master’s ego.  And that ego is 
inflated to its grandiose proportions, subsuming others in its scope, by identification 
with “projects.”  Put another way, the project in all its material complexity and 
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administrative detail is a material and practical expression of the masculine ego-ideal 
founded on instrumental reason. 
 What such projects have in common is the Enlightenment belief in “the 
perfectibility of humanity, rationalist or apocalyptic, or both, as in the French 
Revolution” (Levine 28).  D. H. Lawrence in his essay on Benjamin Franklin in The 
Symbolic Meaning, calls this the idea of “man created by man” (43), the idée fixe that, 
broadly speaking, motivates science imaginally.  It is the corollary to the desire to 
control Woman and Nature.  According to Levine, Lawrence believed that the 
monstrosity of masculine dominance and control lay in “the attempt of consciousness 
[that is, the ego] to impose itself on the world, either in the form of morality or 
science” (Levine 29).  Scientific laws are thus, like moral laws, forms of masculine 
control, rule, dominance.  They are, in Shelleyan terms, Jove’s “reign”; in Lacan’s 
terms, they are the Symbolic order, the laws of the father. 
 The irony and tragedy of this formula lie in the fact that masculine obsessions 
with control arise from the fear of vulnerability and this fear, in turn, arises from the 
common infantile fear of abandonment.  One needs to note that alienation from the 
stereotypically feminine entails an alienation from vulnerability, weakness, and 
softness, all of which are the very feelings this wholesale alienation is likely to evoke.  
A boy’s identity is on the line:  he is in tears, feels abandoned, and the response from 
his father, or from the voice of the masculine pronounced by his mother, tells him not 
to be a “mama’s boy” or a “girl.”  Forcibly wrenched from a comfortable androgyny 
where this didn’t matter, he must control his tears, repress his fear of being 
abandoned, and “be a man.”   
 The deep significance of Frankenstein’s paranoia and hysteria arises from a 
fear of abandonment that takes the fairy tale form of his being perceived as a monster.  
Victor’s flight from the huge, ugly, male creature he has fashioned, can be read as a 
moving representation of a boy’s repressed hatred of his own masculinity as that 
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thing that has caused his mother to reject him and then, in turn, has caused his father 
to treat him with the soldier-male’s discipline, in order to “toughen him up.”  On the 
immediate level of authorial experience, the mirror of monstrosity reflects Mary 
Shelley’s own fears of being perceived as a monster, perhaps because of her own 
depressions and perceptions of her own infants as monsters.  The imaginal dynamics 
should be seen operating in both ways, as an expression of her own monstrous 
feelings and the fears she had occasion to observe in her husband and other men. 
 Feminist theorists have remarked upon the cultural tendency to equate the 
feminine and the monstrous.  At the same time, I believe, the obsession with female 
monsters, especially in the writing and artwork of men, masks a fear of both feminine 
and masculine embodiment.  Fear of the feminine produces a fear of the masculine as 
well because of the fear of being perceived as feminine.  Machismo turns a man’s 
anxiety about his masculine Persona into hostility toward anything perceived as 
feminine.  The male gaze that objectifies the Other always hangs as a threat over the 
male subject as well, producing a paranoia that betrays a fear of being objectified.  To 
become an object of the male gaze always runs the risk of embodying homoerotic 
desire. 
 The obsession with fetishized surfaces that, according to Susan Griffin, 
characterizes the “pornographic mentality,” is a product of the masculine ego 
constructed in the likeness of DaVinci’s castle.  The Walled-man, Urizen, maintains 
his impregnability by reducing himself to surfaces.  He masters other men by forcing 
them to do the same.  That this potential is inherent in the way masculinity is 
constructed around the objectifying gaze (of scientist or of the consumer of 
pornography), is attested to by the emergence in the last generation of increasing 
numbers of images of the naked, or nearly naked male body.  Both in gay porn and in 
bodybuilding magazines and videos, the celebration of the male body’s surfaces 
expresses both the fear of being penetrated and the desire for it.  The male muscle 
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physis is challenged particularly by male homosexuality which admits that men can 
be, and are, penetrable, but it also celebrates the act of penetration and reveals what 
may be the fundamental dynamic of masculinity in western culture (at least)—that is, 
a ritual drama of self-fashioned walls and threats of penetrating the walls of others.  
This dynamic, of course, describes warfare as it has been conducted through most 
of history. 
(5)  Controlling Nature, Controlling the Body 
 While the cult of physical fitness, energy, and masculine muscular surfaces 
emerges in the nineteenth century, the myth of the man-machine is a legacy of the 
Enlightenment.  Pollin notes how the motif of the animated statue runs through the 
writings of “the Encyclopaedists and their English followers” to illustrate the “whole 
development of perception and of complex and abstract ideas” as, for example, set 
forth most famously by Condillac in his Traité du Sensations (1754) (qtd. in Vasbinder 
19).  Ovid’s Metamorphoses and de Genlis’ Pygmalion et Galatée have been identified as 
inspirations for Frankenstein’s monster and the way his mental development unfolds.  
The myth of Pygmalion is, of course, the story of an artist who makes an artificial 
women—or, more precisely, one whose perfect statue comes to life.  The theme of the 
man-made woman is important in itself as a representation of the masculine ego’s 
idealized Anima projections.  It is particularly intriguing in a story like E. T. A. 
Hoffmann’s “The Sandman,” in which the perfect woman is a silent automaton.  The 
automaton is held forth as a fetish, the objectified beloved, but in the case of 
Frankenstein’s monster, the gender of the machine is the same as his creator’s and his 
status as a mechanical construction is rendered ambiguous by virtue of all his parts 
being organic.  Unlike the several obsessed and self-destructive artists of Hoffmann’s 
stories, Victor Frankenstein builds a creature who is, except for his strange composite 
appearance, a living, breathing, thinking, and feeling human.  The creature is a 
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mechanism to the extent that he is artificial and composed of parts as a machine is 
assembled.  But making him flesh and blood rather than metal and electrical current 
(or wind-up springs), Mary Shelley created an allegory of the fragmented way 
Cartesian science looks at human beings.  The monster is, more than anything, the 
anatomist’s diagram come to life; that is, he is man reduced to an assemblage of parts.   
 This view of the human body is still the dominant medical model and informs 
the way we all talk about our bodies—as if we were made up of parts assembled by 
some sort of manufacturing process.  Daniel Segal, in a 1988 study of medical 
students in their anatomy classes, points to anatomy and dissection as a central 
practice constituting the modern medical doctor’s mentality.  Trained to operate on 
dead “patients” first of all, the students become hardened and learn to repress their 
initial squeamishness when called upon to cut up cadavers.  The cutting is both 
physical and mental, as they are drilled in nomenclature to internalize an image of the 
human body as a fragmented aggregation of parts.  This despiritualized body is the 
professionally constructed object of scientific medical “management” mastered 
through routine.  This is the view that is rendered as monstrous in the film 
adaptations of Frankenstein where the monster is depicted as stitched and bolted 
together, and in which the brain, particularly, is installed by the technician-hero.  The 
brain, in the films, is the fetishized object of science, the personality, agency, and 
psyche reified as an interchangeable part.  The brain, supposedly the seat of Solar 
Phallos, turns out to invest the movie monster with nothing more than masculine 
aggression and strength, a fearful image of Chthonic Phallos.  Segal notes that it was 
in the dissection of the penis that the medical students particularly showed a chink in 
their professional armor.   
To dissect the genitals the students were instructed to uncover the body 
from above the waist to the toes, and then using a large saw, to sever the 
body at the waist, and cut the lower portion into a right and left half, 
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thereby bisecting the sexual organs.  While they performed this “trisection,” 
as the operation was named, the students joked more loudly than usual, 
commenting in particular on the sight of disconnected limbs and trunks.… 
The students who were most visibly disturbed were the male students with 
male cadavers, many of whom refused to cut their cadaver’s penis, leaving 
the job to the female students.  This was particularly striking since the male 
students generally sought to perform a disproportionate amount of “the 
surgery.” (Segal 22) 
 It is interesting to consider that at the time Mary Shelley was writing, a student 
of anatomy such as Frankenstein would not have had the opportunity to pass off this 
particular organ to the women in his class.  Frankenstein obviously gave his artificial 
Adam genitalia, even though the subject is never mentioned.  Mel Brooks, in his 
parody film, Young Frankenstein, picks up on this elision.  When in the end of the film, 
the monster is given some of Frankenstein’s brain to make up for his mental lack, it is 
revealed that in exchange Frankenstein received the creature’s penis, the implication 
throughout being that the eight-foot monster’s phallus was proportionally 
impressive.  Though the intention is bawdy humor, the revision contains an 
interesting insight into what appears only symbolically in the original story.  It is the 
Phallus (big P) that the scientist lacks and needs to become fully a man, and it is this 
lack that his technical inventions seek to fill. 
 Victor clearly created a fully functional male, else why be concerned about its 
propagating itself if allowed a mate?  Yet, following the conventions of polite fiction, 
the phallus is erased, repressed into the unconscious of the text, there only for the 
reader to imagine as the creature stands naked before his maker.  The monster, 
especially in his initial inarticulate state (which is the only one he tends to achieve in 
the film treatments), is the bearer of the chthonic phallus—the actual reality of the 
physical organ with all its refusal to obey the conscious ego and all its vulnerability to 
castration or mutilation.  The polarization of brain and phallus in Young Frankenstein 
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suggests that the latter, objectified as a “tool,” is a rival of the ego-consciousness.  In 
pornography most notably, the phallus is described in terms of a pure, and usually 
unfeeling, instrumentality.     
 Musselwhite has observed that the shameful act Frankenstein performs in his 
garret apartment bears less resemblance to birth (as Moers contends) than to 
masturbation.  The “secrecy, the haste, the furtiveness, the delay, the guilt, the 
addiction—plus the supposed symptoms of paleness, emaciation, and eye-strain” as 
well as its “filthy” character, are all the marks accorded to masturbation by 
nineteenth-century medical opinion (Musselwhite 62).18  The strange sense of a 
release of “ardour” in the moment his act of creation is completed, followed by 
shame, does sound like masturbatory frenzy and subsequent loathing.  Moreover, the 
loathing is directed at an idealized male body, which, as I have suggested, is a 
Narcissistic object.  The creature, looking like a shriveled mummy with long, 
effeminate locks and pearly teeth, but transparent skin and colorless eyes, is visibly 
the expression of how Frankenstein has come to view his own body.  The transparent 
skin that “scarcely covered the work of muscles and arteries beneath” (57) seems a 
particularly vivid representation of Anatomical Man—L’homme machine, as Le Mettrie 
put it in the title of his famous study. 
 Baldick pointedly rejects the reading popularized by Brian Aldiss of the 
monster as a mechanical man, precursor to the many robots of later science fiction.  
He claims that the creature has no mechanical characteristics and is a fully human 
creature:  “Although the monster is the result of what is formally a ‘mechanical’ 
assembly, once animated he is as unexpectedly human as he is unexpectedly ugly.  To 
read him even allegorically as a machine at this stage would be more than just 
premature; it would mean missing the monster’s most disturbing immediate 
significance” (45).  Baldick is both wrong and right.  The creature is very human, if 
not “fully” so, and certainly is intended by Mary Shelley to appear as fully capable of 
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human thought and feeling as anyone else in the story.  He is a true man in the 
tradition of Condillac’s animated statue capable of all sensations and consequent 
rational thought.  Yet, the fact of his assembly by a man and his having been 
animated by “the working of some powerful engine” (as the author puts it in her 1832 
introduction; 9), makes him unnatural—made, not begotten.19  The fact that, even 
after animation, the monster remains an artifice, contrived by a human technician 
gives him precisely that quality of the uncanny  automaton that nineteenth-century 
readers would surely have seen as his “most disturbing… significance.” 
 Recent studies such as those in Gallagher and Laqueur’s The Making of the 
Modern Body have suggested the ways in which the discourses of anatomy and 
medicine constituted a new collective imagining of the body.  In the eighteenth 
century changes in scientific discourse focused on the differences and the 
incommensurability between male and female bodies (Laqueur 3, and passim).  
Women’s bodies become increasingly associated with their sexual function, and so 
with Nature.  The development of the diagnosis of “hysteria” as an essentially female 
malady—a neurosis rising from the uterus—contributes to the association of the 
feminine with madness or “nervousness,” and loss of rational control over the 
emotions.  The state of nervousness “coincides, if one is a man, with the nineteenth 
century’s classic definition of the homosexual:  a woman trapped in a man’s body” 
(Gallagher and Laqueur xi).  It is in the context of these cultural codes that one should 
read Mary Shelley’s inversion of the Pygmalion myth. 
 To Frankenstein, his man is a “wretch” most often, and in a particular moment 
of disgust, a “filthy mass that moved and talked” (147).  Bette London, in an article 
that focuses on masculinity as “spectacle” in Frankenstein, reads the monster as a 
“lover” and the male body thus rendered as “the cite of ineradicable materiality” 
whose “discomposing presence… is preeminently visible but persistently unseen”  
(255).  The elision of the monster’s genitalia in Frankenstein’s description, “leaves the 
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creature incomplete, facilitating its installation in the feminine economy—the 
traditional locus for ‘the monstrous’ and ‘the body’” (London 256).  Gilbert and Gubar 
took the femininity of the monster-as-body to the point of arguing that he is Eve 
rather than Adam.  Yet “in exposing all the novel’s characters as ‘female in 
disguise’… they cover over Frankenstein’s investments in male exhibitionism… [its] 
insistent specularization of masculinity, its story of the male creator making a 
spectacle of himself” (London 256).  Victor’s “excess of sensitiveness” leads him to 
repeated hysterical breakdowns in which his own body is “discomposed” as an 
inversion of the process of composition through which the monster was created from 
dead matter. 
 When Frankenstein says of his monster, “[h]is yellow skin scarcely covered the 
work of muscles and arteries beneath” (F 57), he describes an anatomized male body 
rendered transparent, its bloody insides and its fragmentation rendered inescapable.  
On the one hand, the image demonstrates the anatomizing power of Logos which 
reduces all wholes to parts, all objects to names and categories, yet on the other hand, 
it describes the liquid “mass” that is so inescapably changeable and material, so 
“feminine” incorporating bodies, blood, mortality, libido (in its intimate connection to 
sexual life), and thus vulnerability.  In Antonie, E. T. A. Hoffmann writes, 
There are people from whom nature, or a special destiny, removed the 
covering beneath which the rest of us go on less noticeably in our own 
strange way.  They are like thin-skinned insects, which, in the quick visible 
play of their muscles, appear malformed, in spite of the fact that everything 
soon fits into its proper place again.  (qtd. in Tymms 62) 
 According to Tymms this passage describes “those men sensitive, or over-
sensitive, to the voice of the unconscious” (62).  Certainly this last phrase might 
describe Percy Shelley or Victor Frankenstein, and their Romantic ideal of sensibility 
and genius.  Yet it is the image of the insect-skinned man that interests me, for 
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Frankenstein addresses his creature on the cliffs above the Mer du Glace as a “vile 
insect” (F 99).  The resonance between Hoffmann’s metaphor the description of the 
monster’s skin catches the Imaginary significance of skin as boundary and medium of 
relatedness.   Transparent skin signifies vulnerability, but placed in one who is 
superior in strength and endurance, it turns that vulnerability back on Victor, merely 
reminding him of his own interiors and his self-anatomizing. 
 The linking of Frankenstein’s self-decomposition with the monster’s 
assumption of independent life—the maker’s body waning into helplessness as the 
body of the monster waxes into full animation and power—is the element of the story 
that most strongly evokes the tradition of the Double.20  That Frankenstein is 
structured on the motif of the Doppelgänger has become a critical commonplace, but I 
should like to take a moment to examine the significance of this motif for gender-
construction, particularly as an archetypal image of the Shadow.21 The Shadow, as I 
have suggested, is that complex to which the subject’s actual male body is banished to 
be replaced in the daylight world by idealized forms of the male body.  Such forms 
are spiritualized (or deified) and so essentially disembodied in their very physical 
beauty—like the famous monuments to Percy Shelley by Weekes and Ford, which 
London analyzes.22  Such idealized Animus-images are soul-images, personifications 
of the masculine Eros for which men long.  The languid, flaccid, lunar penis 
complements the striving solar Phallus.  Lunar perhaps describes the quiet and 
receptive possibilities of the actual male organs, penis and testicles, but it masks the 
violent aspect—the dark side of the Moon, if you will.  Andrew Griffin observes how 
the monster is linked to the Moon as well as to the destructive fire when he burns 
down the abandoned DeLacy cottage (A. Griffin 69).  This, his “last grand offering in 
his year-long series of love-gifts of fuel” is a magnification of his love, the fire desire 
raging out of control, just as the physical force of male sexuality can become 
destructive (A. Griffin 69).  The imagery of the scene captures the libidinal quality of 
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the flames embracing the cottage, flames “which clung to it and licked it with their 
forked and destroying tongues” (135).  The lunar-chthonic dragon is also a serpent-
consort to the Goddess Moon.  This is a dragon whose deep longing is to lie 
peacefully in the warmth of the hearth.  The blind, old DeLacy’s hearth is fire “in its 
social dimension” (A. Griffin 67), the primal link with comfort and affection as 
Bachelard posited.  As Levine observes, “[t]he theme of the overreacher and the 
rebel—the Promethean theme—is the other side of the theme of ideal domesticity. 
(6) Mass, Matter, Mastery 
 Considered in the terms of my libido map, Frankenstein’s loss of Eros and the 
monster’s eruption into an aggressive and phallic Phobos derive from negative 
Receptivity, a fear of (and attraction to) death, stasis, receptivity.  The wish for self-
annihilation so apparent every time Victor sinks into unconsciousness or immobility 
is a sinking into Thanatos.  His egotistical desire to conquer death through chemistry 
is one still pursued in many forms today in medical laboratories as well as in science 
fiction novels.  The repressed fear of death as part of life and Nature is linked to 
Victor’s feelings of having been abandoned by his mother at her death.  The 
connection is clear in the dream that immediately follows Frankenstein’s act of 
generation.   
I thought I saw Elizabeth, in the bloom of health, walking in the streets of 
Ingolstadt.  Delighted and surprised, I embraced her, but as I imprinted the 
first kiss on her lips, they became livid with the hue of death; her features 
appeared to change, and I thought that I held the corpse of my dead mother 
in my arms;  a shroud enveloped her form, and I saw the grave-worms 
crawling in the folds of the flannel.  (58) 
 Later, he compares the creature to a reanimated mummy to reinforce its 
connection to dead bodies.  But Thanatos and Eros are inseparable.  Waking, Victor 
discovers that the creature has come into his bedroom and is peering through the 
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curtains of the bed at his sleeping form.  This scene particularly illustrates the 
intricate pattern of doubling that underlies the story’s structure.  Elizabeth doubles 
Victor as the receiver of his idealized Anima projection as well as his mother-
complex, Yet Elizabeth is both beloved and idealized womanhood, and also the 
unwitting killer of the mother.  The monster assumes the place of both, demonstrating 
most clearly the association of woman, body, and death with the repressed 
physicality of naked masculinity.  The prior scene in which the monster is the 
spectacle of “a man stretched out,” is reversed, and the monster becomes the 
intellectually curious, perhaps admiring voyeur to Victor’s displayed body. 
His jaws opened, and he muttered some inarticulate sounds, while a grin 
wrinkled his cheeks.  He might have spoken, but I did not hear; one hand 
was stretched out, seemingly to detain me, but I escaped, and rushed down 
stairs. (58) 
 He escapes the embrace, the touch, of embodied relatedness, fleeing in terror 
like a new mother terrified rather than overjoyed at the queer mix of wonder and 
ugliness of her baby.  Victor has not, like a mother, produced this child from the 
inside of his body, but the creature figuratively occupies that space in the cultural 
Imaginary.  He is the bloody mass of insides that the soldatischer-Mann projects 
outward and so fears, “a mass of diverse consistencies, from fluid to viscous, in which 
the soldier male “sinks and is irretrievably lost” (Theweleit II.3).  This “victor” is, 
though not so obviously martial as the violent, destructive warriors Theweleit studies, 
nevertheless like them in his intellectualized and scientific aggression.  Victor 
displays a violent temper as a boy, and, as Knoepflmacher observes, is capable of 
torturing “the living animal to animate the lifeless clay” (49).  He drives himself 
obsessively to “penetrate” Nature’s “recesses.”  Like the fascists of the German 
Freikorps, he is Romantically fascinated with corpses.   
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 Yet as Theweleit remarks:  “It is not corpses that this man loves; he loves his 
own life.  But he loves it… for its ability to survive.  Corpses piled upon corpses 
reveal him as victor, a man who has successfully externalized that which is dead 
within him, who remains sanding when all else is crumbling” (II.19).  Like the soldier 
male, Frankenstein experiences  
the mass and whatever lives, teems, or decays within it… as an 
embodiment of his own “interior” [because he experiences] his own “inner 
life,” the state of his inner drives, as a separable entity completely divorced 
from him.  He experiences the force that from time to time threatens to 
erupt and express itself from within him, as the Alien per se, as “primitive 
man.”…[He] is forced to turn the periphery of his body into a cage for the 
beast within.  In so doing, he deprives it of its function as a surface for 
social contact. (Theweleit II.20).     
 In the case of Frankenstein, this erection of the rigid boundaries of the ego, and 
its Urizenic isolation is not represented symbolically, but quite realistically, as the 
young and ambitious scientist cuts himself off from the beauties of nature, from his 
mentors, from everyone he formerly loved.  Having become a man and left the 
protective womb of the domestic sphere, Frankenstein erects a new and more 
desperate protective sphere of masculine independence.  He enacts the very Crusoe 
feeling Mary Shelley felt so painfully, by exiling himself for the sake of his desires for 
power.   
 That these desires for power are ultimately rooted in fear of vulnerability, 
abandonment, and death, is apparent when, having evoked the living flesh he so 
fears, Frankenstein relinquishes all ability to control it and becomes “timid as a love-
sick girl” (F 51).  As Theweleit observes of one of the Freikorps writers who claims 
that one can never fully “know” the Other unless one breaks open his or her skull:  
“His only means of discovering how his body functions is to take bodies apart, as a 
child might dismantle a mechanical toy” (II.23).  Yet, faced with the actualized Other 
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in the form of the monster, Victor cannot overcome his fear of his own body.  Instead 
of killing the monster, he makes it go away by fainting into unconsciousness, and 
then running away.  Theweleit discusses the “black-out, and loss of fleshly reality” as 
a defense against the soldier male’s “most intense fear… his fear of decomposition” 
(II.40).  Victor’s repeated “discompositions” are moments in which he becomes again 
helpless as an infant and wholly or partially removed from the world of the father’s 
Logos (because he is either unconscious or unable to write).  They are moments of 
defense against his fear of decomposition.  
 Because decomposition and the process of decay seems to have something to 
do with Frankenstein’s secret process for animating dead matter, one may be tempted 
to take the term too literally, but “decomposition” signifies psychic disintegration, the 
fragmentation of the psyche into a “mass” of schizoid parts unrelated to each other.  
One can fear this internally—the loss of relationship between ego and Persona or 
Anima or shadow complexes (or all the rest)—and one can fear it externally as a loss 
of relationship between self and others, culminating in its most extreme form in the 
kind of fears that swept the upper classes in Europe during the Napoleonic Wars, that 
is, the complete fragmentation of society, the “masses.”  Both inward and outward 
disintegration is expressed in the symbol of the archetypal “monster.” 
 Monster, as Foucault notes, derives from the Latin monstrare, “to show,” a 
demonstration or sign of some moral corruption or sin.  Madness and deformity were 
thus associated with the demonic and the morally corrupt (Madness 68-70).  The 
eighteenth century viewed physical deformity as a sign of unreason.23   The concept of 
monstrousness as a demonstration before a lecture theater, is in effect the Shadow of 
the scientific medical doctor.  As Segal’s modern study of medical students suggests, 
the doctor’s Persona is a mask which education encourages the young student to put 
on and adopt as his (or her) own.   
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 The essential feature of this Persona is an attitude toward bodies and nature.  
Segal argues that “medical education resolutely maintains a double image of the 
physician’s relationship to the bodies of others:  representing this relationship as 
something managed routinely by ‘professionals’ and as something inspiring awe in 
others” (17).  He concludes that “this double image reifies not only ‘the patient,’ but at 
the same time ‘the doctor’:  the first as an object that can be known and handled 
through technical routines and the second as an agent who performs these routines 
impersonally and unemotionally—that is, ‘professionally’” (17).  The splitting and 
objectification performed by medicine as a profession informs other technical 
professions as well, “the patient” being in other instances a passive, feminized Nature 
(or matter) more generally.  Segal notes that the “coincident reification of ‘doctor’ and 
‘patient’” and the “radical division of authority” between the two, “instantiates the 
most extreme potentialities of technical rationalization: it creates both a person who is 
an object to be acted upon like any other object, and a person who follows rational 
routines no matter what the human circumstances” (24).   
 Division of the world into rational subjects and irrational, inanimate objects, 
disenchanted and deprived of “sovereignty” has been extended since the eighteenth 
century into many, if not all, professions.  Eros is reduced, in such a scheme, to only 
destructive relationships, whether Narcissistic colonization or violent enmity.  In an 
effort to make the rational subject—the technician-hero—master of his (or 
increasingly, her) world, technical rationalization deanimates and decomposes 
Nature and us along with it.  For human bodies and their instinctual life, their 
pleasures and desires, are ultimately inseparable from Nature and become subsumed 
to objectification.  Thus, the modern ego, the more it assumes the Persona and the 
attitude of the technician, becomes increasingly alienated from its body, from Nature, 
from the Other, driven further into its walls of imagined separation and 
transcendence and the belief that all things should conform to its beliefs.   
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 In the mind of the individual whose self-image is that of a rationalized 
instrument, the monstrous comes to evoke one’s interior alienation from embodied 
existence and the erotic libido.  Real, embodied, relationships to others (whether 
sexual per se, or not) become monstrous and feared.  One, alone, is swept up in the 
mentality of Narcissistic self-consumption and self-surveillance, like desperate 
simulacra of the Ouroboros.  Snakes eating our own tails, we do not renew ourselves 
in the depths of psyche, but burn ourselves up in a pyre lost in an Arctic waste of our 
own imagining.  Frankenstein’s monster is thus the mechanized self-image that is the 
product of the scientific attitude itself, with its Cartesian splitting of subject and 
object.  As this attitude became hegemonic in the West during the twentieth century, 
Frankenstein was promoted from nervous chemistry student to the Dr. Frankenstein 
of the movies, and his monster from the inarticulate “living dead” of horror films to 
the sophisticated robots of science fiction, with skins of gleaming steel and 
superhuman “artificial intelligence.”24 
 The story of the technician-hero increasingly becomes a story of men and their 
relationships with other men through their technical prowess.  The novels of Jules 
Verne, which are taken up in the next two chapters, will exemplify this tendency.  As 
the genre of science fiction unfolds it is less and less concerned explicitly with the 
slippage between magic and science.  Modern empirical knowledge-manufacture and 
the mastery of the earth provided by engineering are increasingly embraced as a 
means to absolute truth and power.  The unconscious complexes of the scientist 
disappear behind his rigid mask.  His power over various embodiments of the 
(M)other and his own body is increasingly the object of male specularity. 
 John M. Hill considers Frankenstein’s aborted female monster, who is left in 
torn pieces on the floor of Frankenstein’s cabin in the Orkneys, to be a second attempt 
to embody Victor’s incestuous love for his mother an “attempt [to recreate] the 
mother who could never deny her creator-son.”  Because the female monster’s body 
287  
 
comes closer to this desire than the original male monster did, Victor cannot bring 
himself to finish it (355).  It is worth considering how different this second act of 
creation is from the first.  It is, first of all, a forced act.  The monster calls Victor 
“slave” and is at pains to point out how the master-slave dialectic has been reversed 
through his violence.  Yet, each of these masters is also slave.  The monster, in the 
position of son, wants only a mate, that is, he wants to have the father’s power, the 
Symbolic Phallus that signifies status in language, in society, in the Symbolic Order.  
The intention is not lost on Frankenstein, who, as an archetypally bad father, 
withholds the Phallus from his son, terrified of losing his power of reproduction.  
Victor reasons with himself that the female may breed a race of hideous humans that 
could, like the solder male’s flooding masses overwhelm humanity, the “master race.”  
He also reasons that the female might reject the male monster and so leave the world, 
and Frankenstein, with two outraged creatures.  A third possibility, which he does 
not bring to consciousness in this rationalizing, is that his new Eve might respond just 
as his Adam did, that is by turning to her maker for love. 
 To receive such a response would not only reproduce the incestuous desire 
Victor has for his mother, desiring his father’s place, but it would also place him in 
the position of father incestuously desired by his daughter or else would reproduce 
his mother’s gift to Victor of his “more than sister” Elizabeth.  The incest theme is, of 
course, a commonplace in the Romantic and Gothic tradition.  It is the symbol for 
forbidden desires, but usually, in the form of brother-sister incest, a Narcissistic love 
of the male subject for his own Anima image reflected in another.  Incestuous love of 
father for daughter is further implicated in the Pygmalion theme, all the more when 
dealing in the works of a writer like Mary Shelley whose own father was so like 
Pygmalion.  Frankenstein’s creation of the female monster is the ultimate inversion of 
the master-sculptor’s creation of Galatea, for he deliberately sets out to make this 
monster hideous.  The male creature wants a mate who is his equal in ugliness so that 
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she will have no choice but to love him.  In such a wish, one can see that the monster 
has fully adopted the mentality of technical mastery and male dominance his creator 
embraced when engaged in his initial project.  The female will be forced to love, rape 
built in to her very nature.  Frankenstein’s monster explicitly confronts his creator 
with his own monstrousness.  The uncontrolled “ardour” that motivated Victor’s 
initial creation of his male monster, repressed in horror as soon as it might have been 
realized, comes back in this form as enforced love and sexual slavery. 
 At the same time, the making of the female monster is also an act of 
homosocial exchange between men.  However horrific it may be, the two men 
involved consider the act to be one of love, a bond between them, and it is not 
insignificant that it takes the form of the classic exchange of a woman.  In Victor’s 
case, he does not wish to acknowledge the act as an act of love freely given, but rather 
something forced from him.  The nature of the homosocial exchange lies behind his 
reaction when he sees the monster leering at the window and his resolve snaps, 
resulting in his mutilating of the female body.  The mutilation is a reversal of the 
homosocial exchange of a beloved and so is the monster’s response, which is to 
immediately go out and wring Clerval’s neck.   
 Clerval is, in a sense, more the monster’s rival than Elizabeth because what the 
monster wants from Victor is brotherly love, of which the gift of a mate and sex with 
her is merely a sign.  Yet the homosocial exchange so integral to the daylight world of 
men in nineteenth-century European society cannot be so easily carried out in the 
midnight world of nightmare Frankenstein and his monster occupy.  For as the 
spectre of the body’s interior “mass,” its liquid ephemerality, the monster is both 
mother and father.  Self-contained and unnamable, he is himself the primal scene of 
sexuality and the cycle of love-death.  Victor cannot relinquish the father’s Phallus to 
his Titanic son precisely because, Imaginally, the son is the Phallus.  Driven into 
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autonomous enmity against the rational ego that bears the name of father, this 
monstrous Chthonic Phallos becomes a machine to murder Eros. 
 Victor Frankenstein is motivated in all that he does by the tension between his 
desire to be like the archetypal mother in her ability to create life, and his desire to be 
like the archetypal father in his role as King and creator God.  To steal the fire of this 
Sky-father, he must murder the Dionysian impulse inside him and elevate Logos over 
Eros.  To become the master of social power in its apotheosis—Science—Frankenstein 
must make himself the enemy of Nature, its conqueror and master.  In rejecting Eros, 
Frankenstein rejects the love of men as well as the love of women, and in the end, the 
Narcissism he embraces must also become negative and so be turned into an 
obsessive quest for self-annihilation.   
_______________________ 
 In the work of the two Shelleys one has a unique dialogue between a luminous 
and a dark view of the psyche of the Promethean technician.  In Frankenstein, the 
mode of representation is still fantastic.  As the Industrial Revolution and European 
culture’s engagement with the ideal of technical man unfolded, the wonders of 
technology and the sublimity of the sheer quantities of new knowledge produced by 
new scientific institutions turned the technician-hero into a much more positive 
figure.  The works of Jules Verne epitomize the Victorian age’s celebration of technical 
man and his world, and yet they still contain, under the surface, many of the same 
concerns I have observed in Prometheus Unbound and Frankenstein. 
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Notes 
1 So much criticism has been written on the novel and its author that it begins to seem presumptuous to offer 
another interpretation.  At the same time that consensus seems to have been reached on many interpretative 
points, the sheer volume of articles and books on this novel seems too large to synthesize in any complete 
way.  There are many excellent psychological studies employing the theories of Freud and Lacan and there 
are many feminist analyses that address issues of gender-representation.  Yet, few critics have focused 
directly on the novel’s representation of masculinity and masculine psychology.  Veeder’s Mary Shelley and 
Frankenstein: The Fate of Androgyny focuses on gender psychology and cannot be recommended too highly 
for its painstaking attention to biography.  Cantor’s study of Romantic myth-making, Creature and Creator, 
traces the creation myth of Milton from Blake through Percy Shelley to Mary Shelley, focusing on the 
divided nature of human being, existing as both creature and creator.  I am indebted to the work of these and 
many other scholars, only some of whom are quoted or cited in this chapter.  Veeder’s book gives quite an 
exhaustive bibliography and discussion of criticism, as does J. M. Smith in the St. Martin’s critical volume.  
Undoubtedly the current standard anthology of critical views is Levine and Knoepflmacher’s Endurance of 
Frankenstein. 
2 See Francis Barrett’s The Magus (1801). 
3 Baldick calls Victor a “Faust without a Mephisto” and a “Prometheus without a Jove” implying that the 
comparisons to Faust or Prometheus are erroneous (42) but this is largely because he wishes to stress 
Frankenstein’s “modernity,” his secularity and distance from the earlier traditions.  As Baldick suggests, 
temptation becomes psychological:  a part of the psyche becomes the ego’s “tempter.”  Similarly, in the 
Prometheus myth punishment becomes intrapsychic, Jupiter the ego’s own shame. 
4 See Bloom, “Frankenstein, or the New Prometheus” and Baldick, 45. 
5 Callahan traces the shift to a splitting of the concept of truth into “double truth” by Bacon, who justified 
empiricism and experimental science while preserving the truth value of Christian revelation.  Separating 
the truths of reason from those of revelation effectively disconnected the products of instrumental reason 
(Bacon’s “operant knowledge”) from the Christian mythos and its laws (42). 
6 The suggestion that galvanism had something to do with Victor’s secret of restoring life to dead tissue was 
dramatically combined in the film adaptations with the important incident of the lightning bolt that 
destroyed a tree outside the Frankensteins’ house when Victor was a boy.  In the larger myth of 
Frankenstein, the flashing lightning and sparking of Van de Graaff generators have become part of the 
iconography of the mad scientist who wields power too great for mortal hands to control. 
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7 References to Frankenstein are to the Oxford University Press edition of the 1832 version edited by M. K. 
Joseph, except where noted. 
8 On anger, see Stearns, “Men, Boys and Anger.” 
9 There is a Maxfield Parrish painting titled “Prometheus” painted in 1919 and used for the 
General Electric Mazda Lamp Calendar of 1920.  In this painting Prometheus is pictures 
as a lithe and softly modeled youth flying over the mountains with his torch in his hand.  
Though painted a hundred years after the publication of Frankenstein, it is interesting 
nevertheless for its association of electric light with Promethean fire, and for its 
representation of the Titan as an eternal youth. 
10 On the other hand, Faraday was driven by a conviction that all the forces of Nature were unified, a conviction 
that led to his work on the relationship between electricity and magnetism.  It was not until the work of 
Joseph Swan in the 1860s and Thomas Edison in the ‘70s that electrical technology began to be developed 
into practical systems of lighting.   
11 Gelpi discusses, at length, the significance of nursing for Percy Shelley, including the story 
of his attempt to nurse his first child at his own nipple when his wife Harriet refused to 
breast feed the infant.  The importance of nurturance and bodily care of the “nursing” 
received in sickness comes back psychologically to the mother’s breast.  Mary Shelley’s 
experience of mothering was fraught with negative emotions—her mother, Mary 
Wollstonecraft’s death a few days after her daughter’s birth, the subsequent bad relations 
between young Mary Godwin and her step-mother, and, finally, her own traumatic 
motherhood and the loss of Clara, combined with almost incessant nursing of Percy in his 
recurrent bouts of ill-health. 
12. Frankenstein does not describe to Walton the pursuits of fishing, hunting, sailing, or mountain climbing, but it 
is clear enough from his later reversion to these Wordsworthian pursuits of solitude in Nature, that he 
engaged in them at some earlier point.  Not to put too fine a point on it, there is, nonetheless, a “spirit of 
solitude” in his approach to these pursuits and they have not led to a feeling of connectedness with 
other men. 
13 I am, of course, speaking only of a subjective failure of fathering, not necessarily an objective failure by any 
external criteria.  By  the standards of his culture, Alphonse Frankenstein’s fathering was beyond reproach, 
exemplary in fact, in his apparent self-sacrifice in old age.   
14 Women are also, but in different ways, alienated from their bodies, but this is chiefly due to their adopting (in 
part, as least) the androcentric imperative of their culture which sees women as objects.  This androcentric 
view must be different in a woman’s psyche because she does not identify her Persona (that is, her 
subjectivity) with that point of view, but rather sees herself from it second-hand, as it were.  One must be 
cautious of such a wide generalization and the scope of the present study does not permit me to pursue 
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further consideration of differences between the sexes and individuals, or the effects of conscious 
homosexual orientation on this structure. 
15 It is worth stressing that it is not just Prometheus who wants the knowledge-fire from Jupiter, but also 
Jupiter who wants knowledge from Prometheus—the knowledge of how his son will dethrone him. 
16 One might further note that Holmes regards Prometheus Unbound as “a poem of hope achieved agonizingly 
through suffering” but “not broadly an optimistic poem” (507).  It looks forward (in appropriately 
Promethean style) to an ultimate Victory, but in the end fails to solve the problem of the combination of 
violence and love—that is, positive and negative Activity corresponding to Eros and Phobos—that seems 
to be required. 
17 The inspiration Mary gives for Frankenstein is the animated conversation between Shelley and Byron, that is, 
the observation  of the play of male friendship. 
18 Musselwhite further suggests that Alphonse Frankenstein’s prohibition of the alchemists as “trash” renders 
them “pornography” for the thirteen-year-old Victor. 
19 On the other hand, it is worth noting that the phrase “powerful engine” is common in the poetic diction of 
eighteenth-century erotica for the male organ in its sexual application.  See, for example, John Cleland’s 
Fanny Hill.  In this popular erotic novel, one of the ever-ready males is described as wielding his “fierce 
erect machine” like a “weapon,” implicitly a sword to be sheathed (48).  Another organ, the size of which, 
“had proportions been observed… must have belonged to a young giant,” (94) is a “furious engine” (95) in 
the sense of “siege engine” or “battering ram” (105).  One can only speculate whether Mary Shelley was 
familiar with Fanny Hill, but certainly many readers of the day would have been, and it is not too much to 
surmise that such metaphors were part of the common vocabulary of erotic humor and euphemism. 
20 On the Double see Rogers, Tymms, and Rank.  Tymms notes, interestingly, that the psychological idea of the 
double is at the root of the development of nineteenth-century theories of the unconscious.  G. H. Schubert, 
who developed Mesmer’s theory of “animal magnetism” (that is, a magnetism of the anima or soul), 
discovered that hypnotism revealed the “night-side” of a personality, sometimes its opposite in character 
(Tymms 26).  These theories clearly are the antecedents of Freud’s notion of the unconscious as the locus of 
socially forbidden desires and Jung’s idea of the Shadow (and perhaps also the anima), as well as his early 
researches into multiple-personality phenomena. 
21 Tymms suggests that the numinous fascination with the image of the double in myth and literature finds its 
beginnings in “primitive” experience of one’s shadow and reflection as well as in the phenomenon of family 
resemblance (28).  This justifies not only the propriety of Jung’s term “shadow” but also its connection, as 
Gilman’s work has suggested, to the mirror phase of development that marks the transition into subjectivity 
through the experience of Self as object. 
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22 The monument to Percy Bysshe Shelley and Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley by Henry Weekes, Christchurch 
Priory, Dorset, and the one to Percy alone by Onslow Ford, University College, Oxford.  Each of these 
depicts an idealized spectacle of the dead male body, Weekes’ pointedly modeled after 
Michaelangelo’s Pietà (see London, especially photos on 254 and 259).  These are “animated statues” 
like Pygmalion’s Galatea in the sense that they are vehicles for the male anima or animus—a kind of 
androgynous soul. 
23 Baldick discusses at length the metaphoric and metonymic connection between Mary 
Shelley’s “monster” and the use of “monster” as a figure for the mob during the French 
Revolution and Napoleonic Wars, especially by Edmund Burke in his criticism of the 
revolution. 
24 Works such as Fritjof Capra’s The Turning Point  or  Bill Moyers’ Healing and the Mind illustrate the turn 
away from mechanistic models in the avant garde of postmodern scientific thinking.  Studies like Segal’s, 
however, demonstrate how recalcitrant the subject/object split is in scientific and academic thinking.  In 
such fields as engineering, the split is, if anything, more recalcitrant because the engineer’s “object” is less 
likely than the anatomy students’ cadavers to remind the technician of him or her self.  It is exactly this fact 
that is explored in modern science fiction dealing with robots, such as, for example, Isaac Asimov’s I, Robot 
stories or Marge Piercy’s recent He, She, and It. 
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Chapter VI  
Between Jove and Demogorgon: 
Dreams of Air and Earth 
 
__________________________ 
 
 
Tao is a hollow vessel 
   And its use is inexhaustible! 
Fathomless! 
   Like the fountain head of all things. 
   Its sharp edges rounded off, 
   Its tangles untied, 
   Its light tempered, 
   Its turmoil submerged, 
Yet dark like deep water it seems to remain. 
   I do not know whose Son it is, 
   An image of what existed before God. 
 — Laotse 
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(1)  The Shadow of His Terrible Machine 
 Throughout the nineteenth century, writers in Britain, America, Germany, and 
France expressed ambivalence toward the Promethean savior bringing the fire of 
knowledge.  The revelation that the world was a mechanism that could be controlled, 
but could also fly out of control like Frankenstein’s monster, opened a frightening 
abyss of authority.  Some saw the wonders of the steam engine and Darwinian 
theories of evolution and imagined a world of infinite “progress” led by human 
reason and technological institutions.  Others looked at the laws of thermodynamics 
and imagined a world slowly burning itself out toward entropic suicide.  The classical 
and Christian admonitions against hubris seemed to have been forgotten as the ancien 
règime unravelled.   
 J. C. Smith calls this transition in history the shift from a patriarchal Oedipal 
society to a Post-Oedipal order based on symbolic brotherhood rather than 
fatherhood.  One should not underestimate the collective psychic shock of the 
overthrow of the ideal of kingship as symbolic fatherhood.  Groups of men that had 
been defined in relation to an ultimate representative of manhood now had to justify 
their superiority on other grounds, on the grounds of the brotherhood of the 
collective itself.  This seems to me to be one reason for the intensification, in the late 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, of discourses on sexual and racial difference.  As 
men in powerful elites struggled to maintain control over the economic and military 
power of their society, legitimating discourses proliferated.   
 One of these, and arguably the most successful, was the rhetoric of science and 
technical expertise which promised a paradise of affluence and “civilization” and 
performed the miracles that could provide convincing proof of their claims.  In such 
ideologies nature became disenchanted, deanimated, its fire stolen and reduced to 
mathematical formulae on blackboards, which in turn could be transformed into 
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miraculous machines.  The power of scientific knowledge and methods to change the 
physical environment were profound and provided far more demonstrable results 
than prayer could be said to do.  The nineteenth century is characterized, in large 
measure, by the struggle for supremacy of the brotherhood of technicians and the 
brotherhood of the clergy, each vying for the possession of the god-image.  That is, 
each represented a discursively constructed ego-complex claiming to be the Self, the 
whole.  Where religion maintained that beyond ego was Mystery, science could argue 
positivistically that there were no mysteries that could not be reduced to rational 
cause and effect.   
 But, as I have been suggesting, the result of these formulations is that Eros, 
feeling, and the unconscious are rejected as (ironically) “mere myths.”  Manliness, in 
order to justify its authority, had to equate itself with the disembodied, Apollonian 
Logos, and the grinding logic of this equation would erode Romantic pretensions to 
sensibility and affection.  Although the ideal of the man of superior feeling would 
persist throughout the century, he was an increasingly scarce inhabitant of 
boardrooms and factories.  The ideal of the gentleman, as Frankenstein demonstrates 
fairly well, was founded on a type of feeling that was mostly talk, mostly an 
ideological mythos that preserved men’s claims to “spiritual” virtues and so 
legitimated the exercise of economic and military control.  Poetry and manners were 
used as tools to legitimate masculine power on the grounds of the superior “soul” of 
the feminine domestic sphere that was supposed to be the source of virtue.  But, as 
has been often observed, the ideology of the angel in the house and the source of 
manliness in the good mother was not an empowerment of women.  On the contrary, 
it solidified the strength of the Heraclean brotherhoods which controlled economic 
and military force by more forcibly excluding women to their own sphere.  
 Liberalism did promote feeling in the form of philanthropy, socialist ideals, and 
compassion for the poor.  But liberal solutions to social problems also reinforced the 
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mechanistic ideology with its faith in management.  The lower classes and the 
subaltern races of the colonies, were conceived as somehow lower on the 
evolutionary scale than the bourgeois liberals who sought to lift them up or inspire 
them to raise themselves.  The ideology of liberal Christian “conversion” of the 
heathens or the destitute was intimately connected to that of colonialist conquest.  
Each wore the Promethean mask of the Savior.  Indeed, the conflation of Prometheus 
and Christ on a mythic level is an important way Western authority shifted its 
balance from the brotherhood of Christians to the brotherhood of technicians.  
Suffering and self-sacrifice for the “masses” of inferior “Mankind” (the “White Man’s 
Burden”), and a sense of cosmic duty to the industrial enterprise of one’s nation, 
became predominant features of nineteenth-century manliness. 
 The concept of “Mankind” that developed in modern evolutionary biology and 
anthropology was crucial to the reconception of masculinity.  The term itself claims 
kinship between European men and the subaltern races, but simultaneously implies 
difference.  Europeans are the model of human potential and the rest of the “mass” of 
men is classified scientifically as only just above the beasts in an evolutionary 
hierarchy.  Saving ignorant savages on the grounds that they too were human was a 
morally tenable rationalization for taking over other countries and transforming their 
cultures into extensions of European economic power.  The colonialist enterprise is 
justified by the myth of the inevitable progress upward of “the human spirit” the 
Logos of instrumental reason as the essence of human being.   To the privileged terms 
of the binary oppositions I have described so far (Mind/Body; Masculine/ Feminine; 
Logos/Eros) is added Ordered Activity versus Disordered Inertia.  The Savage, like 
the Feminine, the Body, and the Unconscious, became imagined as an inert mass, 
recalcitrant, dangerous—the inanimate matter of modern science that exists to be 
energized, animated, formed, and directed into productive Activity by the male 
Logos. 
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 The technician-hero takes on many subtle forms, almost always expressing 
ambivalence over the wonder of his techne and the terror of his apparent soullessness.  
Loss of soul and an obsessive desire to dominate are often expressed through the 
male technician’s control (or creation) of women, as, classically, in the Pygmalion 
myth.  The master over matter is haunted by his own Mater-Anima.  Such 
ambivalence is strong in tales of the uncanny such as E. T. A. Hoffmann’s “The 
Sandman”(1816) and “The Mines at Falun” (1819)1; Nathaniel Hawthorne’s 
“Rappaccini’s Daughter” (1844) and “The Artist of the Beautiful” (1844); Edgar Alan 
Poe’s “Case of M. Valdemar” (and other stories marginally involving modern science 
with the macabre aspects of the fantastic); and Fitz James O’Brien’s interesting 
Anima-fantasy, “The Diamond Lens.”  To these might be added a story like H. Rider 
Haggard’s She, in which the apparatus of philological and classical scholarship forms 
a kind of thin “scientific” veneer over a wildly fantastic story, which Jung thought to 
be a supreme example of the Anima figure in literature.  Less fantastically, the 
Sherlock Holmes Stories of Conan Doyle (alongside the Dupin tales of Poe) 
emphasized reason and the application of scientific methods to the solution of 
criminal mysteries.  The latter, though perhaps seeming far from science and 
engineering, were intimately related to medical science and the whole epistemology 
that found in the Unknown the dark and shameful secrets of immoral men and 
women.  In the adventures of Sherlock Holmes, the uncanny element (if there is one) 
is usually explained away rationally, thus reinforcing a sense of underlying 
predictability to the world. 
 In the stories of Hawthorne and Hoffmann the technician is often a pre-
industrial figure, a craftsman or artist closer to the figure of the magician than to the 
modern conception of scientist.  He is a bridge between the mundane world and the 
world of the marvelous, a Frankensteinian fantastic in which machines are the 
fetishes of men’s alienation from their bodies.  The automaton of Hoffmann replaces 
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the homunculus of Faust as the symbol of the mechanical man, the artifice of self-
fashioning.  The automaton captures the mysterious fascination of complex machines 
which seem to eat, breathe, live, and move.  First the clockwork mechanism, then the 
steam engine and electricity, captured the imaginations of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century.  Steam evoked the reverie of fire in a very direct form, expressing 
all the ambivalence Bachelard has noted adhering to that element.   
 In seeming to be alive, such creatures of disciplined fire and steel opened an 
abyss in human self-conception.  Men, who equated themselves with secret inner 
fires, confronted a much more powerful creature of fire:  the engine, the locomotive, 
whose “horsepower” could be domesticated and harnessed, but whose complexities 
and motion called into question the radical difference that had been asserted between 
men and machines, or between men and animals, or, indeed  between men and 
women.  The breach of these boundaries on a cultural scale was a threat not only to 
established social forms and hierarchies but also to the rigid ego-boundaries of men.  
The nostalgic hearkening back to romantic craftsmen and artists as masters of a 
technological transcendence, such as Hawthorne’s Artist of the Beautiful, is part of 
the longing for autonomy and freedom from institutionalization.  The compensating 
fantasy is that of Hoffmann’s demiurgic Coppelius, who manufactures a perfect 
mechanical woman and later tears her to pieces in a scene reminiscent of Frankenstein.  
Coppelius represents a Pygmalion Animus that ultimately must turn back on itself.  
With ego inflated out of all contact with the Self, the technician must become his own 
God, creating himself as well as those he dominates.  In Blakean terms, he becomes 
the demiurgic Urizen, closed into a Narcissistic fantasy of the circular Ouroboros 
feeding upon itself. 
 If the technician appears as a magician figure inhabiting the liminal world of 
the fantastic, he also figures in realistic fiction, most notably in the role of physician.  
Reitz suggests that a physician was the “man of science” most visible to rural 
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communities.  As such, he served as a moral example of self-sacrifice or, alternatively, 
of self-absorption.  Reitz considers Frankenstein in this lineage, as well as the pairing 
of Dr. Jekyll with Mr. Hyde, and Dr. Watson with Sherlock Holmes.  She suggests that 
doubling in these stories symbolizes the doctor’s fundamentally split role.  He is an 
intellectually superior outsider and, simultaneously, an intimate observer of people’s 
weaknesses, their private lives, their bodies, even (as surgery advanced) the interiors 
of their bodies.  This splitting is a tension between Logos and Eros.  It is the division 
Daniel Segal noted between the clinical attitude, which equates Doctor/Patient with 
Subject/Object, and an attitude of emotional intimacy in which neither doctor nor 
patient is reified.  Such a fissure is like the splitting in Victor Frankenstein, between 
an objective, controlling, mastery over Nature set against subjective, unconscious 
forces.  The physician, in other words, is split by his own objective stance, his attempt 
to apply the ideal of scientific management to his own body and soul.   
 Doctors have a long lineage in literature and culture as comic or satirical 
figures and, in the nineteenth century, as exemplars of class versus community and 
the virtues of self-sacrifice.  Reitz and Hill each discuss the role doctors played in the 
movement to address public sanitation in the middle of the century.  Epidemics of 
cholera particularly seemed to be fitting symbols for the evils of upper-class neglect of 
the working class and the poor.  Yet, however heroic such doctors were, their techne is 
often only incidentally a part of the story and their most prominent feature was their 
place in the gap between classes.  This gap is related to the psychological split because 
the division between classes in England was seen as an epistemic fissure, not merely 
an economic one.  The poor, like the savages of Africa or India, were seen as the 
products of superstition and ignorance—that is, of unconscious animality.   
 Undoubtedly the most remarkable story involving a physician as a truly 
Promethean scientist is Robert Louis Stevenson’s Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. 
Hyde (1886), in which Jekyll’s literal and embodied splitting of himself into ego and 
308 
 
shadow halves seems to be a revisioning of Mary Shelley’s myth.  Edward Hyde is 
another figuration of the monstrous male body, the repressed chthonic phallos 
consumed by uncontrollable brutality and the lust for violence.  The splitting is not 
simply one between good and evil, for Jekyll himself is not simply a good and pious 
physician.  He has a high reputation but that is not the same thing.  A renowned 
consultant, Jekyll is a stark contrast to the self-sacrificing family men of the social 
problem novels.  He is removed in his own sphere, shut off even from friends, ending 
his life locked in his laboratory, that private and (in this case) highly Narcissistic male 
domestic space.  That laboratory reminds one of the dark attic room in which 
Frankenstein assembled his double.  Frankenstein’s monster is both figurative son 
and imaginal father to the scientist.  Jekyll’s age and prestige (as opposed to 
Frankenstein’s youth and inexperience) put greater emphasis on the corruption 
within the social ideal of the spiritual father (the great doctor) who, in his vanity, 
manufactures his rebellious and violent son.  Notably, Jekyll’s “birth” of Hyde is 
another male parthenogenesis.  Mr. Hyde embodies the Victorian fear (and rejection) 
of instincts:  the fear, that is, of the mythic associative chain—
animal/instinct/body/madness/criminality—that Victorian medicine had itself 
formulated.   
 Several novels by H. G. Wells, particularly The Invisible Man (1897), The Island of 
Dr. Moreau (1896), and War of the Worlds (1898)2, create figures just as monstrous as 
Edward Hyde, if not more so.  Moreau and the Martian invaders are devoid of Eros, 
which is symbolized by their ruthless violence perpetrated against the bodies of 
others.  Dr. Moreau has created an entire grotesque society of “Beast-People” who are 
the products of his vivisection techniques.  He works, with a perverted Promethean 
fury, to eradicate the “beast” from the creature and so construct a superior human 
being.  His “House of Pain” is an even more horrific vision than Stevenson’s of the 
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mad scientist’s laboratory.  His cold, urbane rationality gives his cruelty an even 
sharper edge.   
 Wells’s Martians take this lack of feeling amid pain to its logical extreme.  They 
are all brain and stomach, ponderously dependent, in Earth’s gravity, on their 
machines.  They are a kind of human sublime because they are the Darwinian dream-
image of humans after they have pursued their ideal of rationality through millennia 
of further evolution.  The fact that they catch and eat humans for food alongside their 
vampirism (they eat only blood) is an image of both hatred of bodies and lust for 
them.   
 Griffin, the Invisible Man, is a solitary scientist like Frankenstein or Jekyll, who 
makes his body transparent, an even more vivid image of the technician’s hatred of 
bodies and his longing for mastery over them.  He is a man characterized by anger, 
violence, and revenge, who ends up pursued by the villagers he tries to terrorize.  
There is an ironic significance in the fact that to carry out his reign of terror, Griffin 
must be naked, and so tangibly vulnerable.  His nakedness is the sign of an imaginal 
regression to a state of infancy that is the antithesis of the paradisal unitary reality.  
Instead of a state of Eros, he creates for himself a state of abandonment filled by his 
own infantile rage against those who refuse to respond to his delusory omnipotence.  
The invisible man is perhaps the last gasp of the romantic genius in exile, reduced to a 
figure of spectral horror. 
   One might analyze these stories and many others in detail to draw out the 
particulars of their imagery, but I will confine myself to an exegesis of the works of 
another writer whose heroes are paradigms of the nineteenth-century technician—
that is, Jules Verne.   
(2) The Labors of Heracles 
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 During the forty-five years that separate the publication dates of Frankenstein 
(1818) and Jules Verne’s first novel, Five Weeks in a Balloon (1863), European and 
American culture underwent momentous material and psychological changes.  The 
period saw a rapid expansion of mechanisms and scientific ideas into every area of 
life, particularly in the urban centers but also in rural regions where mechanized 
factories and mining represented the spirit of the Industrial Revolution.  The 
fascination with science and its instruments of discovery, and the ambivalence 
towards modern industrial machinery, which one notes in Percy Shelley’s poetry and 
Mary Shelley’s novel, emerge more and more into the collective consciousness and 
occupy a greater symbolic connection to the collective unconscious.   
 The reciprocation between fiction and “non fiction” in the growing literature of 
technical propaganda can be seen if one compares the novels of Jules Verne (1828-
1905) to the popular works of moral and technical education written by his 
contemporary, the Scottish physician, journalist, and biographer Samuel Smiles (1812-
1904).  Both writers were widely translated around the world and enormously 
popular during their lives.  Both pursued the ideal of educating the working classes 
and the scions of the bourgeoisie to make them more technically literate.  Both 
embraced a kind of Saint-Simonian or Utilitarian faith in technical progress towards a 
perfected, scientific social order, a faith moreover that tended to equate scientific 
knowledge with moral wisdom.  Archetypally speaking, the vision of Verne and 
Smiles is optimistically solar.  Both envisioned a civilization moving progressively on 
a continually brighter, more enlightened, and rising trajectory toward a bourgeois 
utopia.  Smiles’s “gospel of work” (Briggs 116) was more immediately practical than 
Verne’s adventure stories, but both express the dream of ever-increasing productivity 
and consumption as the essential measure of a culture’s quality.  Verne’s heroes 
exhibit the Smilean virtues of industry, thrift, sobriety, and chastity and, like Smiles’s 
engineer-heroes, they perform miracles using common sense and determination. 
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 Jules Verne is still a familiar name in English-speaking countries, though all 
but a few of his novels are forgotten and hard to find in English today.  He has 
received considerable scholarly attention in France (especially since the 1960s), but 
British and American critical articles and books remain rare and the general reader is 
unlikely to have read even his most famous titles.3  Samuel Smiles is even more 
obscure, his once hugely popular works long forgotten.  But both Smiles and Verne 
were of central importance in the promulgation of the ideology of individualism in 
the nineteenth century.4  Smiles’ Self-Help (1859, significantly the same year as 
Darwin’s Origin of Species) and its several sequels5 developed the ideology of 
capitalism, particularly that “national progress is the sum of individual industry, 
energy, and uprightness, as national decay is of individual idleness, selfishness, and 
vice” (qtd. by Travers 132).   
 This atomistic conception of society, in which each man is a cog in the great 
wheel of industry, partakes of just the sort of mathematical Logos that Jules Verne 
would glorify in his novels of adventure.  Smiles delineates “character” as a set of 
manly virtues including a “control of details” and a methodical approach to 
organizing time and tasks:  “industry, application, method, moral discipline, 
forethought, prudence, practical ability, insight into character, and power of 
organization” (Character 111).  Such devotion to management and efficiency entails 
Promethean self-sacrifice, which is merged imaginally with Christain martyrdom as a 
virtue.  In Chapter V of Character, titled “Courage,” Smiles catalogues a series of 
discoverers and inventors who were persecuted for enlarging “the domain of 
knowledge” but their martyrdom at the hands of public and official condemnation is 
seen as an essential quality of greatness of spirit.  This kind of courage is explicitly set 
in opposition to the free flow of imagination, which produces fear.  “[U]nless the 
imagination be held under strict discipline, we are prone to meet evils more than half-
way—to suffer them by forestallment, and to assume the burdens which we ourselves 
312 
 
create” (156-57).  There is much truth in this, to be sure, but what is interesting is the 
way Smiles draws “discipline,” as a kind of armor against imagination, into his model 
of virility.6 
 Smiles is concerned, as a trained physician and later railroad bureaucrat, with 
the management (and self-management) of the working classes and the abstract 
system of capital circulation that kept the machine moving.  Yet this abstraction is 
embodied in books comprised in large measure of anecdotes about exemplary men of 
science and industry.  This is particularly the case with his Lives of the Engineers (1861-
62), a series of biographies of famous historical engineers down to the nineteenth 
century.  This is the point at which Smiles and Verne converge, the one celebrating a 
new model of heroism in the figure of the industrial or civil engineer, the other 
creating fictional engineers, scientists, and explorers to serve as heroes for his readers, 
young and old.  Both writers, however they may display the Victorian fascination 
with machinery and invention, root their concept of the hero in self-sacrificing labor 
and such qualities as endurance, energy, and a will to compete with Nature or with 
other men. 
 In terms of the Smith quaternity, labor is the realm of Heracles, what Smith 
calls the brotherhood of the collective.  Samuel Smiles appeals to the communal 
power of the working class as the thing that can be uplifted through individual self-
education.  He did not actually go so far as to approve of trade unions, but his 
philosophy points in that direction.  Smith has considered Heracles, the archetypal 
big brother, to be the manly ego ideal of a complex that seeks identification with a 
large group.  It is a brotherhood removed from the tyrannical power of the father.  
Instead of the divine father-figure of the Periclean complex, the brotherhood of the 
collective elects leaders who are considered peers.  The parliamentary president, the 
labor union leader:  these are leaders in a way that is different than the father’s 
arbitrary right to rule his sons. They are different even from the military officer who 
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is identified as distinct and above his men in a rigid hierarchy.  Nevertheless, like the 
military commander, the leader of any brotherhood, whether it be a religious order, a 
commercial corporation, or a political party, derives his power through identification 
with the whole group.  It is the office of president or pope, not the person holding the 
office, that carries the power as a symbolic “head” of the group body.   
 Men always exist within such social groups and if they are not members of the 
elite classes and corporate bodies, they frequently (especially if they are bourgeois) 
are ambitious to become a member.  The gentleman’s club of Phileas Fogg is echoed 
throughout the works of Jules Verne in military, commercial, and scientific 
fraternities in which a sense of duty and role are the manifestations of a non-sexual 
Eros.  Duty, according to Smiles, is “based on a sense of justice—justice inspired by 
love” (Character 195), or, in other words, Eros transformed into Law, for “justice” is a 
culturally relative, even class-relative concept.  For Smiles, duty is the balance 
between submission to one’s social place and a sense of fair play towards others, high 
or low.  Such an ideal of duty structures the largest Heraclean group of all, the 
brotherhood of the white European middle class, which set out, in the nineteenth 
century, to colonize and regulate the world.   
 What is particularly important to note is that the Heraclean brotherhood of 
work is always defined in opposition to the domestic world of women and is 
structured on their exclusion.  The two spheres, however, reciprocate in the moral 
philosophy of Samuel Smiles, for he sees the home (and the mother) as the place 
where men must learn discipline and temperate habits.  Character is thus not only 
discipline but a kind of domestication.  This should not mislead one into thinking that 
Smiles escapes the polarity of men’s and women’s spheres; on the contrary, the 
domestic space is set in opposition to Nature and brute instincts or passions, to which 
men are presumed to be naturally subject.  The Heraclean brotherhood is thus a kind 
of counter-domestic space (a ship’s crew, an army, an office, a corporation) in which 
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manliness may either escape or defend the ideal of discipline.  Smiles relegates the 
teaching of temperance and self-control to mothers because he acknowledges the 
increasing absence of fathers in the lives of their sons during the century, but the 
effect is to value women for their ability to reproduce a type of masculinity, not, it 
should be noted, for their inculcation of feminine traits.  Cleanliness and piety may be 
associated with the feminine “nature” but they ultimately are tools of class order and 
religion, which derive their authority from male-dominated medicine and churches.  
Female domestification serves to reinforce the idea of the control of wild Nature, 
instinct, and impulse—that is, the priviledging of law and order. 
 Indeed, in Smiles’s discussion of Richard Arkwright, one can see how industry 
is pitted in opposition to home and family relationships.  Arkwright is “the founder 
in England of the modern factory system, a branch of industry which has 
unquestionably proved a source of immense wealth to individuals and to the nation” 
(Self-Help 58), who out-maneuvers his competitors to establish a monopoly on the 
spinning machine.  To manage his business, the inventor-businessman works from 
four in the morning till nine at night and ruins his marriage as a result (58).  The grim 
logic of individualism seems to escape Smiles, who begins by praising the value of 
individual labor and ends with Arkwright as the hero, whose factories launched the 
movement away from the individual craftsman and toward a faceless “work force” 
manipulated in the equations of capitalists.  The Smilean domestic space is the 
crucible in which an individualistic Promethean energy is cooked.  It aims to create 
boys who worship “great men,” especially military heroes such as the Duke of 
Wellington, and will gladly leave home, join the Heraclean brotherhood, and carry on 
the work of re-shaping the world in their own image, all under the appeal to a desire 
to please women. 
(3) Colonial Adventurism and the Professionalization of Engineering 
315 
 
 In his study of the parallel rise of European science and ideologies of Western 
dominance, Michael Adas traces the history of travel writing in the eighteenth 
century.  Such writers as Galaisière le Gentil in his Voyage dans les mers d’Inde, 1761-
1769 (1779) and Michael Adamson in his Voyage to Senegal (1759) “prided themselves 
on their membership in or contacts with prominent members of the Académie des 
Sciences” (Adas 75).  Galaisière “traveled primarily to make astronomical 
observations” while “Adamson (more typically) filled the account of his trip to 
Senegal with detailed descriptions of geology, and flora and fauna, astronomical 
observations and temperature readings” (75).  These are the precursors to Jules 
Verne’s scientist-explorers, men who were able to reduce the world to words through 
the discourses of the sciences.   
 Adas notes that the purely cerebral quality of European’s supposed superiority 
over the “savage” races was, in part, a reflection of the fact that in the eighteenth 
century “the sciences” were considered more important than their application in “the 
arts” of technology.  Such was the contention of Voltaire, Sir William Jones, and 
David Hume, “whose writings strongly influenced European views on Asia and 
Africa” (Adas 78).  By the time Jules Verne was growing up in Nantes, however, 
Watt’s innovations in the use of steam power were permitting a much wider 
application of scientific “natural laws.”  A feeling of superiority at being able to 
explain natural phenomena in the terms of scientific Logos gave way to the belief that 
European men’s superior ability to control Nature demonstrated their right to rule and 
uplift savages.  Indeed the “savage” or wild man in a “state of nature” was 
considered part of the natural world that European explorers sought to explain and 
control.   
 The power of steamships, railways, telegraphs, and factories extended the 
power of nations and individuals, and accelerated the pace of material change, 
creating a feeling of sublimity in visitors to centers of industry such as London or Paris 
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(Adas 136).  The mechanical sublime infected the natural and racial self-image of 
Europeans and Americans, contributing to their own sense of superiority.  White men 
were “natural” technocrats and scientists, according to racialist arguments.  Logos 
was in their blood.  In a book evaluating the character and culture of Asia for British 
officials setting out for the colony, Charles Grant wrote that the Hindus suffered from 
a “lack of curiosity” and that “the Europeans’ understanding of the natural world 
could readily be demonstrated by the sight of their machines” (qtd. by Adas 168).  
Jules Verne captured this mechanical sublime in The Steam House, a novel of Indian 
adventure in which an Englishman, appropriately named Banks, builds a giant 
caravan drawn by a huge locomotive fashioned to look like an elephant.  In that 
image, the writer captures the propaganda value of the machine and plays upon the 
European amusement with “superstitious” awe in their colonial subjects.  James Mill 
(the father of John Stuart Mill), in his History of British India (1817), set European 
energy—quite literally their fire in the form of steam engines—in contrast with the 
“indolent nature” of the Indians (qtd. by Adas 169).  The “dark” races were all 
mythologized as something from the past, and travel into their cultures was described 
as a sort of time travel.  Verne takes up this image most vividly in Journey to the Center 
of the Earth, in which travel through successive geological layers is described as a 
passage into prehistory.   
 Both fiction and the official training manuals for colonial officers and 
bureaucrats develop and exchange the myths of fire, darkness, primordial ages, the 
underworld, the wild man.  They create a deep excitement in boys reading for 
entertainment, half-unconsciously searching for ego ideals.  Froidefond suggests that 
knowledge because it gives power also gives pleasure (23).  The young boy reading 
science fiction or science fact sublimates the desire for sex and the answers to the 
“mystery” of women, replacing them with a desire for learning and the pleasures of 
mastering elite disciplines.  Disciplined “self-government,” says Samuel Smiles, is 
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“the primary essence of character” and a type of courage (Character 165).  The images 
of engineers as potent ego-ideals continue to play out their inner dramas once those 
boys are men engaged in actual engineering, civil planning, capitalist enterprise, or 
warfare.  Reading, play, and unconscious complexes surrounding the role of engineer 
must have grown more common in the course of the nineteenth century as the 
building of railways, bridges, and waterworks transformed Europe and its colonial 
possessions.  Rosalind Williams, in her book Notes on the Underground, has amply 
shown the extent to which the increased amount of excavation in the period affected 
the imagination of Europe.  As the work of engineers took on mythic significance, 
especially within the mythos of colonialism, the status of engineering rose to vie with 
that of the traditional professions of law, divinity, and the military.  
 The movement of engineers from the sphere of the artisan or craftsman into a 
profession bestowing status in bourgeois society parallels a similar evolution in the 
practice of medicine by apothecaries and surgeons, who had been previously 
dominated by physicians, the upper-class, university-educated man of science.  The 
apothecary or surgeon (who got his hands dirty) and the elevated, gentleman-
physician (whose work occupied the clean realm of theories) merged more closely 
together in the course of the century.  In France this was partly due to the Revolution 
and the Napoleonic Wars, which had raised the military engineer, the surgeon, and 
the common citizen to new levels of importance.   
 Engineering had a similarly class-split pedigree, descending from the Egyptian 
master builder and the Greek archetekton, who built bridges and siege engines for 
ancient military operations.  During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as 
artillery was mechanized and became the dominant force in European armies, 
engineering became a military specialization of increasing importance.  In the career 
of Napoleon the expert artillery man, a mechanist, rose to the status of emperor in a 
vivid example of the overthrow of the old order’s aristocracy by the new technocrats.  
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By the end of the eighteenth century, engineering had become a defined field that 
could be separated from the military and pursued for more peaceful purposes.  “Civil 
engineer” became a new term for those specialists who assisted governments, such as 
Napoleon’s, in the new canal and highway projects that revolutionized late 
eighteenth-century commerce and communication (Wright 107).  By 1802, in the 
United States, Congress had separated the Corps of Engineers from the artillery and 
simultaneously established West Point as the center of an increasingly technical 
military education  (Reynolds “Engineer in 19th-Century” 11).  But this move to make 
technical education the heart of military discipline followed the lead of the French, 
whose engineers and curricula based in mathematics played a crucial role in the 
American Revolution.7   
 In the eighteenth century, France had set “the pattern of formal engineering 
education through the founding of the Ecole des ponts et chaussées (1747) and the Ecole 
polytechnique (1794)” (Rae 34).  Such schools had originated as an apparatus of 
monarchy and its centralization of authority, its proliferation of bureaucracy, and its 
large standing army.  Napoleon and subsequent republican governments would 
continue this trend.  Academic education for engineers was designed to standardize 
the government’s system of roads, bridges, and canals through scientific methods 
(Reynolds, “Engineer in 19th-Century America” 7-8).  In this way, engineering 
functions as an instrument of power, a means of control over borders and 
populations, a means of furthering the competition between powerful men and 
powerful institutions. 
 In the social imagination, the engineer becomes an icon of the disciplined 
masculine ego that receives the mantle of mastery from the tradition of mathematical 
science and carries it into the material sphere.  Technical discourses of power were a 
means to rise in the hierarchy of the collective brotherhoods even across class lines.  
Saint-Simon’s dream, as Angenot remarks,  
319 
 
expressed the social aspirations of the petty-bourgeois industrial vanguard, 
yearning for a “government of the producers” when “engineers would be 
kings.”  The division of labour is seen as functional:  a common and 
effective exploitation of Nature will eradicate exploitation of man by man. 
(30)   
 In a time when aristocracy was beginning to be viewed as mere idleness, a 
flaccid and negative masculinity, engineering was becoming more necessary to a 
growing industrialism than military heroics, and the engineer began to be seen as a 
new form of conqueror—not just a laborer but one of the “captains of industry” 
whose mental prowess produced machines that changed the face of power across the 
globe in ways that muscular heroism could not.  Muscularity became a metaphor, the 
mythic strength of Heracles manifest in the institutional and technological power 
commanded by unassuming gentlemen with high silk hats and walking sticks.   
 The fraternity of engineers and industrialists is a particularly good illustration 
of Smith’s Heracles complex and its social form, the elite brotherhood.  Individuals 
within these brotherhoods did not wield great power except by identification with the 
whole fraternity and cooperation with its larger body, the capitalist ruling class.  This 
body itself was a nested set of vying brotherhoods—clergy, lawyers, statesmen, 
university professors, bureaucrats, and the old aristocracy.  Yet each of these was 
sustained in its control of economic power through its particular grasp on an 
ideological authority, that is, on a particular legitimating myth.  The myth that was 
rising to power most rapidly, and at the expense of the more venerable myths of 
church and aristocracy, and even the relatively new democratic institutions, was the 
myth of the Heraclean engineer and the Apollonian scientist.  These two fraternities 
competed, then as they still do, for supremacy, engineering seemingly dependent on 
science yet more clearly leading to economic and military power than its exalted 
brother.  One recalls that Prometheus, for all his brilliance as a Luminary, was 
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chained to a mountain by an Olympian engineer (Hephaestus) and freed by the hero 
of physical strength and this whole idea of institutional brotherhoods, Heracles.  It is 
perhaps significant that Smith did not find a Promethean complex  prominent in his 
masculine quaternity, for, however admired, the fire-bringer remains an outsider, a 
rebel of patriarchal authority.  But it is also for this reason that he makes a good 
image for the struggling technical minds of the nineteenth century, struggling against 
established class boundaries and religious authorities but not yet fully 
professionalized.8 
 The class dynamic of the new profession and its myths is especially apparent 
in Britain and America, where the men who joined the engineering fraternity did not 
come only from the middle and upper classes, as they did in France, but rose from 
apprenticeship as often as through formal education.  Such men took on a Persona 
that was liminal, striving upwards in the class hierarchy from the world of the worker 
and artisan towards the elite world of the masters.  In the Symbolic register of myth, 
they would steal the fire of the Sky-Father to form a new Heraclean brotherhood. 
(4) The Conquest of the Sky Father 
Oh! thou clear spirit of clear fire…thy right worship is defiance… I own thy 
speechless, placeless power; but to the last gasp of my earthquake life will 
dispute its unconditional, unintegral mastery in me.  In the midst of the 
personified impersonal, a personality stands here… Oh, thou clear spirit, of 
thy fire thou madest me, and like a true child of fire, I breathe it back to 
thee… thou art but my fiery father; my sweet mother, I know not.   
— Melville, Moby Dick, Ch. 119 
 Jules Verne published some seventy books in his long life, mostly in the series 
he and his publisher, Jules Hetzel, founded:  the Voyages Extraordinaires.  Verne and 
H. G. Wells are often contrasted as rivals for the title of “father of science fiction,” but 
in fact few Verne novels contain much of the machinery of that genre.  They are more 
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about exploration and geography than rockets or submarines.  The impression that 
Verne was a writer of technological prediction has been formed during the twentieth 
century on the basis of novels such as 20,000 Leagues Under the Sea, Clipper of the Clouds 
(Robur le Conquèrant in French), Master of the World, and the two moon books, From the 
Earth to the Moon and Around the Moon.  Other well-known works such as Mysterious 
Island, Journey to the Center of the Earth, and Around the World in Eighty Days have 
virtually no technology in them that didn’t exist in the world of their readers. 
 Verne is still not widely studied by American or British academics even though 
his reputation underwent a remarkable rebirth in French critical circles during the 
1960’s and 70’s.  According to Evans, over 600 works on Verne have been published 
since 1960 (See Evans; E. Gallagher et al.; and Raymond).  Verne’s neglect in English, 
as critics frequently complain, has been due to his reception (in bad translations) as a 
writer of children’s fiction and, later, of science fiction, both genres traditionally 
ignored by scholars as subliterary (see introductions in Miller and Evans).   
 Verne’s style has also been problematic, seeming to consist of two-dimensional 
characters and loosely episodic plots in which exciting events are interrupted by long 
lectures and descriptions of geological, biological, or physical phenomena.  But, with 
the advent of mythopoetic and structural criticism in the last generation of scholars, 
intriguing patterns began to be discovered.  Once the label of “children’s literature” 
was removed from the texts, readers were freed to see the complexity and subtlety of 
the Vernean “cryptogram,” or the themes of initiation (Vierne Initiatique) or of the 
“straight line” (Machery) or “circulation” (Angenot9; Serres) or the myth of the 
Golden Age or the “supreme point” (Butor).  Each of these motifs or themes plays its 
part in the complex imaginal work of the Voyages.   
 Indeed my interest in this imaginal work returns me to the question of 
literature read primarily (thought not exclusively) by children around the world.  
Besides the obvious importance of the works within French culture, I am particularly 
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interested in the influence of the Voyages in their English translations upon the 
imaginations of boys in the United States and Britain.  For all their bowdlerization the 
translations still manage to carry the archetypal power of the originals.10  Yet, because 
the theory of unconscious association and the interplay between images, words, and 
archetypal patterns often depends on subtle associations between words, the reading 
I will perform on the English texts will not necessarily carry over in every detail into 
the French originals.11  The general archetypal patterns cross the language barrier 
because the myth of the technician-hero and the practice of engineering and science 
were themselves so international.  I will not attempt an exhaustive treatment of the 
whole Verne œuvre, and my consideration of the differences between the English and 
French texts will be limited to a few examples, merely to raise the question of nuances 
and shifts across the language barrier. 
 Among the most famous Vernean heroes, Professor Ferguson, Impey 
Barbicane, and Robur (“the Conqueror”) are all technicians of Air and Space, 
conquerors of the element of Air and beyond.  Yet the element that is really the object 
of their conquest is the Earth and its gravity, that force they transcend in their various 
flights.  The balloon, the space capsule fired from a giant cannon, and the heavier-
than-air flying machine, in the novels featuring these heroes,12 fulfill the dream of the 
puer aeternus for flight and escape from the “common clay” of mundane existence.  A 
bit like Robin Williams’ portrayal of the King of the Moon in Terry Gilliam’s film The 
Adventures of Baron Munchaüsen, these men desire to send their heads spinning off 
above their bodies, to use their heads as a way to transcend the limitations of 
embodied existence.  Flight, of course, is an ancient mytheme, the dream spawned 
probably long before history when early Homo sapiens first fell into reverie at the 
speed and freedom of birds.  But the heroism of these adventurers lies in a figurative 
flight of imaginative vision and its ability to let men escape the world of women, 
children, age, death, household finances, sex, and indigestion—or in other words the 
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zone of the body conceived as limitation.  As Yeats put it, the longing masculine 
Animus, “sick with desire/And fastened to a dying animal/…knows not what it is.”13  
 Robur “the Conqueror” may be taken as the epitome of the Air heroes, for he is 
one of Verne’s most obsessive figures.  The Clipper of the Clouds was published after 
the justly more famous 20,000 Leagues Under the Sea, and clearly Robur is a second 
attempt at a Nemo character.  He is big, strong, solid, the epitome of the heroized 
engineer, a man whose indomitable will and willingness to shoot off his pistols in a 
crowded room are more than a match for the belligerent and argumentative members 
of the Weldon Institute.  This club, devoted to ballooning, and vehemently opposed 
to any theory (let alone practice) of heavier-than-air flight, is a Vernean caricature of 
the wild Americans similar to the Baltimore Gun Club in the Moon books.  But, unlike 
Barbicaine, who is part of the club, Robur is a mysterious outsider who appears 
suddenly, mounts the podium and delivers a lecture that thoroughly insults the 
balloonists.  He then abducts the President and Secretary of the Weldon Institute—
Uncle Prudent and Phil Evans.  These two men have battled for the presidency of the 
organization by a test of their ability to locate the center of a line with mathematical 
and superhuman precision (without the aid of an instrument).14   
 Robur is an audacious Heracles.  Physically robust (as his name implies: Latin 
“oak, strength, hardness” but also “prison” and “elite”) and possessed of greater 
potency than men of such mathematical powers, he never does earn the friendship of 
his two captives, even though they are completely astonished by his flying machine, 
the Albatross.  Their behavior is quite a contrast to the respect and admiration 
Professor Aronnax gives Captain Nemo in 20,000 Leagues Under the Sea.  In the end, 
the ballonists sabotage the Albatross and blow her up with dynamite, escaping with 
their own lives.  Like the unstoppable Nemo, however, Robur comes back, having 
survived the crash and built another “aeronef.”  The relationships between the main 
characters are somewhat schematic precisely because they are so stubbornly 
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antagonistic, and because it is an antagonism based only in theoretical positions, 
opinions about the relative merits of balloons and Robur’s elaborate helicopter.   
 Verne, of course, uses this debate as an excuse to recite the whole history of 
research in flying machines.  In Chapter VII of Clipper, he begins with Camille 
Flammarion’s question:  “When will man cease to crawl in the depths to live in the 
azure and quiet of the sky?”  Soon, is the answer, and the means is electricity.  Like 
Frankenstein and like Captain Nemo, as I shall show in detail, Robur is a Prometheus 
of electrical fire.  He has created a mysterious process that permits electricity to 
generate vast motive force over long periods.  I find it interesting that Verne’s attempt 
to apply the same scenario he used in 20,000 Leagues to the element of Air is not at all 
as engaging as the earlier book.  Partly this is because Clipper and Master of the World 
are not written in the first person.  As a result, one learns so little about Robur’s past 
that one cannot sympathize with him.  He seems little more than masculine 
aggression and arrogance personified, a titanic showoff.  But his rivals are no better, 
so in the end, the reader is left with little point of interest other than the Albatross 
herself, which is a wonderfully fantastic design, however improbable.   
 Its “thirty-seven vertical axes” or masts bearing a total of seventy-four 
suspensory screws (Clipper Ch. VII, 189) give it the appearance of a sailing ship, so it 
captures all the romance of the tall ship.  It is, as a result of all this verticality, 
sufficiently phallic to serve as a symbol of Apollonian masculinity.  Like Captain 
Nemo’s submarine, the Albatross is powered by a miraculous electricity.  Electricity is 
“the soul of the industrial world,” says Robur, voicing a recurrent Vernean and 
Victorian fantasy (see Williams 99-109).  But, unlike the Nautilus, Robur’s clipper is 
not a self-sustaining environment.  It needs to touch down on land for food, if nothing 
else, and when it is aloft in its element, it is not invisible, though it is effectively 
untouchable.  This means that the Albatross is a flawed vehicle for complete escape 
from society.  It is, rather, a vehicle in which one can elevate oneself above other men 
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and at the same time be seen by everyone.  It is the masculine sublime as spectacle and 
performance.  In Master of the World Robur performs many stunts designed to be 
noticed and yet to baffle the minds of the land-locked.  In one night he flies around 
the world planting flags on the inaccessible tops of monuments and buildings, an 
almost childish use of his flying machine the Épouvante (the Terror).  Ultimately, 
however much they seem alike in their daring displays of mechanical speed and 
power, Robur has the opposite motive of Captain Nemo.  Far from wanting to escape 
into solitude, he actively seeks to dominate others, indeed, in the latter book, the 
whole world.   
 In Master of the World, Robur’s machine is a combination car, ship, submarine, 
and ornithopter with wings that fold out from its sides like a bird’s.  The plot of this 
novel is motivated by the device Verne had used for the first few chapters of 20,000 
Leagues, that is, an investigator’s attempt to identify a series of strange phenomena 
and sightings that turn out to all be Robur and his Terror.  What is interesting about 
the story is that technological superiority (especially speed) is equated categorically 
with conquest and rulership.  Robur proclaims himself Master of the World because no 
one can touch him or stop him but there seems to be little that he can do to the world 
he rules, for he cannot set foot aground, much less meet with other men to direct 
them.  It is easy to read Robur as simply a megalomaniac, but his aggression and 
taciturn refusal to communicate with his various captives (except in the occasional 
lecture) speak more specifically to the nineteenth-century model of manliness based 
in violent conquest and individualism.  The confrontation between this absurdly 
rugged individualism and the equally absurd brotherhood of the Weldon Institute is 
a parody of the two poles of the violent masculine ideal.  As a hero, Robur represents 
a masculine ego, so obsessed with the idea of speed, elevation, and technical 
superiority that it is inflated out of all connection with the Real.  His epithet “the 
conqueror” is given derisively by the members of the institute, ridiculing his claims to 
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have conquered the element of Air.  It is this ridicule that prompts him to prove his 
claims, but what is notable is what Robur doesn’t do.  He doesn’t join the club.  This is 
the man of genius set in opposition to the fraternity, insisting upon deriving his 
power from himself alone and not from any social elite.  As Angenot observes of all of 
Verne’s novels, science and its “progress” has no “institutional dimension:  there are 
isolated scientists, but there is no technostructure” (29). 
 Robur is an image of the individualistic fortress ego.  Whether on his secret 
Island X (in Clipper) or his inaccessible base in the extinct volcano, the Great Eyrie (in 
Master), he has placed all his energy in the idea of being enclosed, safe, removed from 
other men (save his few loyal followers, who are almost non entities just like Nemo’s 
crew).  The dream of speed and mechanical power is a dream not just of transcending 
the limitations of the body, but a dream of escaping all connection to other human 
beings.  Typically, women are almost completely absent from these novels and the 
men have no interest in them.  Moreover, the men form bonds to each other only 
through rivalry.  The detective in Master of the World, confronts Robur’s power with 
the only thing he possesses (once he has been captured):  his official capacity as an 
agent of the U. S. Federal government.  Addressing the silent madman flying his 
marvelous ship into the lightning storm, Inspector Strock invokes the “Law” and one 
feels the strangeness of the scene, as if the voice of authority has become the 
ineffectual play-acting of a boy.   
The air-ship soared upward into the heat of the sky, amid a thousand 
lightning flashes… I must throw myself upon this madman to prevent him 
from driving his machine into the very middle of this aerial furnace!…Then 
amid this wild excitement my own passions, all my instincts of duty, arose 
within me!  Yes, this was madness!  Yet must I not arrest this criminal 
whom my country had outlawed, who threatened the entire world with his 
terrible invention?…in a voice which rose above the tempest, I cried as I 
hurled myself upon Robur:  “In the name of the law, I—”  (Master Ch. 17; 
186-87) 
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 At that moment the Terror is struck by lightning and blasted to bits.  Strock 
inexplicably survives.  The episode is a strange mix of terror and comedy, the 
inspector’s obtuseness making one final gesture as death threatens him.  But his 
authority is meaningless in the face of the ego bent on defying not just the United 
States government but God and Nature, as well.  Robur is pursuing an ideal dream of 
patriarchal Law, the Periclean law of the fathers rather than that of the collective, an 
egocentric fantasy of omnipotence that Smith calls the ego-ideal behind the Pericles 
complex.  If he cannot enter the world of the fraternity and wield real economic or 
political power (or even, arguably, much brute force), he can wield his tyrannical rule 
on board his ship.   
 Despite his almost autistic withdrawal into himself, Robur needs to have his 
captives in order to make any use of the grandiose Persona he has erected and, at the 
same time, he desires to remain completely separated from ordinary men (save his 
crew) to preserve his delusion.  Both of his stories illustrate the contradiction between 
the old patriarchal forms of law and those of capitalist democracy in which legitimacy 
can only be fully achieved through membership in a brotherhood.  As Smith points 
out, the brotherhood becomes an ego-ideal and the individual assumes the power of 
the group by identifying himself with the collective, not merely through his own 
individual identity.   
 In a sense, one might see Robur as a Prometheus without a Jove.  The rule of 
the patriarch having been relegated to the sphere of the family in the nineteenth 
century, a dictatorial genius is ultimately identifying with an absence and so is left to 
burn himself out with his own stolen fire.  So the “Master of the World” perishes in 
the lightning of a hurricane (one of the many echoes from 20,000 Leagues).  Without a 
father-god, there can be no chaining of Prometheus to the rocks.  Instead, usurping 
Jove’s thunderbolt, he self-destructs.  Desiring to transcend the body, he defies death 
and death obliges him.  Strock describes his characteristic gesture.  When the 
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inspector demands to know what Robur is going to do with him, his captor remains 
in an autistic shell. 
Evidently my captor’s mind was obsessed by some other thought… He 
made again that gesture which I had already observed; he raised one 
defiant arm toward the zenith.  It seemed to me as if some irresistible force 
drew him toward those upper zones of the sky, that he belonged no more 
to the earth, that he was destined to live in space, a perpetual dweller in the 
clouds. (Master Ch. 17; 177) 
 Without giving the outward appearance of youth or charm, he is, nonetheless, 
mentally, the striving, aerial puer aeternus caught in adolescent rage, fleeing 
relatedness in pursuit of omnipotence and freedom.  Robur is almost a schematic of 
the polarization of Activity and Receptivity in the dynamic of libido:  as he 
frenetically strives after speed and transcendence, he accelerates a plunge into 
Thanatos.  Prometheus thus becomes Empedocles—or, in this case, perhaps, Icarus.15 
(5) Going Down in Mother Earth 
 The Empedoclean impulse is particularly evident in my second example of the 
Vernean daredevil.  A geologist rather than an engineer, his element Earth rather than 
Air, Herr Professor Otto Lidenbrock, in Journey to the Center of the Earth longs to 
penetrate the interior of the earth, not to fly above it.  Considered in terms of the 
metaphoric linkage between Earth and woman, however, the desire for conquest is 
the same.  Robur wishes to transcend the mother’s body to master it while Lidenbrock 
wishes to enter into it and thereby claim the father’s possession of the mother’s body.  
For both, the plenitude of the male gaze drinking in sublime vistas is an enactment of 
this mastery over feminized Nature.  The romantic sublime of the aerial vista or the 
subterranean sea inside its huge cavern each signifies the dream of mastery over 
environment.  Far from being dwarfed by the huge powers of Nature, these men 
assume that power by the act of seeing it “unveiled.”  Andrew Martin observes: 
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For the Vernean savant, the unmapped, the uncodified portions of reality 
pose an intolerable and provocative threat to his authority (founded on 
cartography and codification).  So long as there remain undiscovered 
countries, unexplored regions of the earth, so long as unseen objects and 
creatures persist unnamed, resisting colonization by the empire of science 
(in whose domain knowledge is synonymous with possession), the 
dominion of epistemic man is unstable, susceptible to usurpation.  (137) 
 The scientific gaze reduces worlds to words, to a desacralized and readable 
text:  “When science has spoken, one can only remain silent thereafter!” (Verne 
Journey 75).  As J. C. Smith notes, one of the functions of patriarchal religion is to 
“desacralize nature”, thus the gesture may be seen as the assumption of the Logos of 
the father-god, the scientific usurpation of this traditional religious function.  Smith’s 
point is to emphasize that this act is fundamental to the culture of Capitalism.  
Consequently the struggle in Verne’s novels between images of the Great Mother 
Goddess and scientific description of the natural world as so many classifiable objects 
is a struggle between a Logos that denies life to any manifestation of the Other, that 
is, to whatever is not within the elite fraternity of brothers.  This flight away from the 
Great Mother into Apollonian words can be seen in the scene from Clipper in which 
the Albatross flies over Niagara Falls: 
In an instant a majestic sound, a roar as of the tempest, mounted towards 
them; and, as if a humid fog had been projected into the air, the atmosphere 
sensibly freshened.  Below were the liquid masses.  They seemed like an 
enormous flowing sheet of crystal amid a thousand rainbows due to 
refraction as it decomposed the solar rays.  The sight was sublime.  (198) 
 The narrator attempts to master the scene by reducing its beauty to technical 
language, “unweaving the rainbow,” as Keats put it.16  Phil Evans and Uncle Prudent 
try not to react to the scenes Robur shows them, and he himself feigns indifference, 
knowing he has mastered them with his display.  All these men try to remain 
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unmoved by sublimity, feeling neither terror nor joy.  Frycollin, the stereotyped, 
cowardly black servant of Uncle Prudent, by contrast is terrified to a state of babbling, 
the implication being that it takes a highly “evolved” man to produce the Apollonian 
discourse and reason that masters fear and wonder.  The joy of the sublime is made 
possible, in part, by a confident feeling of safety produced by technical mastery over 
the laws of physics.  Such mastery works by the reduction of the numinous to an 
explanatory discourse which permits men to take over the position of God (the divine 
Logos) as creators and controllers of all they survey.   Here again the performative 
aspect of this masculine control is evident.  Godlike power needs to have an audience 
of “lesser” men, which is to say that technical power serves a fundamentally 
homosocial function, even in such a misanthropic guise as Robur’s 
 Similarly, the cranky Prof. Lidenbrock pitilessly instructs Axel in the “art of 
contemplation from high places” (Journey 44) by taking him to the top of the church 
tower in Copenhagen on their way to Iceland.  Axel must learn to overcome vertigo if 
he is to climb Snaeffels and descend its crater, even if it means terrifying him.  Terror 
leads to the experience of the sublime.  When they arrive at the mountain top, Axel 
says:   
I plunged into that high-blown ecstasy produced by lofty peaks, without 
feeling dizzy this time, as I was finally getting used to these sublime 
contemplations… I forgot who I was, where I was, and lived the life of 
elves and sylphs… I was intoxicated by the voluptuous pleasure of the 
heights, oblivious of the depths my fate was shortly going to plunge me 
into.  (81) 
 The “intoxicating…attraction of the abyss” (86) is sensual, even sexual, 
pleasurable and terrifying.  Axel has been initiated into a certain level of toughness 
through the repeated torture of being forced to stand on the church pinnacle in 
Copenhagen, but his mind is still far more romantic than his uncle’s.  Elves and 
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sylphs emerge in his imagination as signs of his crossing over the bar into the 
Imaginary.  He is constantly aware of the liminal implications of the mountain top or 
the abyss.  Vertigo, suggests Mauberret, is associated with the feminine.  To overcome 
it is to become a man.  This is because the feeling of vertigo is a feeling of losing 
control of one’s body.  Falling evokes a feeling of helplessness that can be associated 
with childhood memories of learning to walk and also with adult recognition that one 
is often the victim of events, at the mercy of circumstances that are, like gravity, 
entirely beyond the ego’s power to control.   
 Such moments are sublime in a sense because they evoke the infinity and 
omnipotence of Nature.  But they are especially frightening and bewildering because 
of the unconscious associations between Nature, Self, and the Great Mother.  Only the 
inward conquest of this autonomous complex and the assumption of its omnipotence 
permits the technician to avert fear.  Vertigo is the product of the “leap” or “plunge” 
(saut) which Carrouges marks as the violent event that marks the hero’s passage from 
the realm of the mundane into the marvelous (44).  One sees this leap or plunge in the 
theme of descent—into the volcano in Journey to the Center of the Earth, into the sea in 
20,000 Leagues (Carrouges 44).  That leap across the bar between conscious and 
unconscious demonstrates the hero’s virility precisely to the degree that he remains 
fearless in the face of the uncanny. 
 It is Lidenbrock’s Narcissistic determination to follow Arne Saknussemm’s 
trail to the center of the Earth that conquers this interior fear of the marvelous and the 
sublime.  The spectacles in Journey to the Center of the Earth are all, as one would 
expect, chthonic. The vaginal image of the volcano dominates the text.  Lidenbrock, 
his nephew, and their stoic guide Hans penetrate so deep into the subterranean 
passages that they enter a liquid uterine space that is profoundly sublime—far 
beyond what Robur’s aerial vistas and storms could evoke.   It is a world inside the 
world, a huge ocean that underlies part of the Atlantic and most of Europe.  This 
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feminine, maternal sublime of enclosure within an infinite extension of space evokes 
an echo in the mind of the explorer of the womb and the unitary reality.  
Retrospectively, the memory of this reality must be conceived as an existence floating 
in an infinite space, for the memory precedes all rational perception of space.  The 
vast cavern is uncanny, precisely because it ruptures the habits of perception and 
opens consciousness to the unconscious memories of the pre-Oedipal Imaginary.  On 
the shores of this “Central Sea” (a play on Mediterranean applied to a body of water 
that perhaps more appropriately deserves the name), Lidenbrock shows Axel a forest 
of giant phallic mushrooms as tall as trees.  While crossing this sea, they encounter 
prehistoric sea monsters battling each other, a tremendous geyser, a fearsome 
electrical storm, and, on the opposite shore, a plain covered with bones.  Axel 
describes the cavern in which they find themselves “imprisoned”: 
It was impossible to say how wide it stretched, since the shore broadened 
until it was out of sight, nor how long, for the eye was soon restricted by a 
slightly uncertain horizon.  Its height must have been several miles at the 
very least.  It was impossible to make out where the vault rested on its 
granite buttresses, as there was so much cloud floating in the atmosphere, 
which had to be over two miles up… The word “cavern” is clearly 
insufficient for my attempt to convey this immense place.  The words 
which make up human language are inadequate for those who venture into 
the depths of the Earth.  (Verne, Journey 139) 
 Axel struggles throughout his narration with the inadequacies of language and 
geological theory to explain what he sees.  The most profound moment of this gap 
between the signifier and the signified comes when he thinks he sees a living 
prehistoric man, a twelve-foot giant with a herd of mastodons to tend. 
There, less than a quarter of a mile away, leaning against the trunk of an 
enormous kauri tree, was a human being, a Proteus of these underground 
realms, a new son of Neptune, shepherding that uncountable drove of 
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mastodons!… He swung in his hand an enormous bough, an appropriately 
primeval crook for this shepherd from before the Flood.  (Ch. 39; 186-87) 
 Axel’s amazement gives way to fear and he flees the scene with his uncle.  In 
his narrator’s voice, reflecting in retrospect, he considers whether what he remembers 
really happened. 
And now, when I consider it calmly, now that peace has returned to my 
mind, now that months have gone by since this strange, this supernatural, 
encounter—what am I to think, what to believe?  No, it’s just not possible!  
Our senses must have been mistaken, our eyes can’t have seen what they 
saw!  No human creature lives in that underground world.  No race of men 
populates those deep caverns of the globe, unconcerned with the 
inhabitants of the surface, not communicating with them in any way!  It’s 
insane, deeply insane!  (Ch. 39; 187) 
 The abyss opens between Real and Imaginary, the two fields which the 
patriarchal Symbolic seeks to separate definitively.  Axel’s denial is the ego’s denial of 
the existence of the unconscious out of which it emerges like an island.  To face its 
origins is to face autonomous complexes that are stronger than the ego-complex.  The 
chthonic man with his huge phallic bough must be denied, repressed, relegated to 
dreams or madness.  The giants actually living in the earth are terrifying because they 
are like the autonomous complexes of the psyche.  They are chthonic “sons of 
Neptune,” deeper, older, closer to the roots, to the origins, to the center of human life.  
As we shall see, Axel’s experiences under the earth are fraught with fears and once he 
has escaped alive, the thought of anyone remaining below only serves to return him 
again and again to his own dark night of abandonment. 
 As in the myth of Prometheus, and as in Frankenstein, the world of giants is a 
world of electrical fire where light signifies both knowledge and repressed libido.  
The contemplation and mastery of the terrain requires vision and Verne’s underworld 
is surprisingly well lit.  At first the speleologists must bring their own lanterns to light 
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the way, but the deep oceanic cavern is illuminated by a phenomenon like an aurora 
borealis:  “the luminous power of this light, its flickering diffusion, its clear dry 
whiteness, the lowness of its temperature, its brilliance, superior indeed to the 
moon’s, all pointed to an electrical origin” (138).  The dark unconscious, like the 
dream world, is discovered to be illuminated and full of the fluid of life.  Butor 
suggests that Verne’s use of atmospheric fire as the supreme element is rooted in the 
experience of breathing and the combustion of oxygen as the source of life the “soul 
of the world” (13-14).  One can see the same archetypal reverie in the association of 
lightning and life in Frankenstein.  In Journey to the Center of the Earth, the sublime 
atmosphere becomes truly terrifying when the voyagers’ raft is engulfed by an 
electrical storm that lasts for days.  The contrast between the guide, Hans (who is 
always quiet and stoically courageous), the professor (whose more fiery and 
explosive courage seems like dangerous audacity) and Axel (who is repeatedly 
terrified) is perhaps at its strongest during this ordeal.   
Hans does not move a muscle.  His long hair, pushed down over his 
motionless face by the tempest, gives him a strange appearance, for the end 
of each hair is illuminated by a tiny, feather-like radiation.  His frightening 
mask is that of an antediluvian man…  [T]he rain forms a roaring cataract 
in front of this horizon towards which we race like madmen.  But before we 
reach it, the veil of cloud is torn apart; the sea begins to boil; and the 
electricity, produced by some great chemical action in the upper layers, is 
brought into play.  Dazzling streaks of lightning combine with fearful claps 
of thunder; flashes without number criss-cross amongst the crashes.  The 
mass of water-vapour becomes white-hot; the hailstones striking the metal 
of our tools and firearms become luminous; each of the waves surging up 
resembles a fire-breathing breast, in which seethes an internal radiance, 
with each peak surmounted by plumes of flames.  (Verne, Journey 166-67) 
 This description is typical of Axel’s narration.  The discourse of science—
naming things scientifically and objectively—dissolves repeatedly into a mythological 
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discourse.  Their guiding stream, the “Hans-bach,” becomes a water nymph leading 
them into the underworld and, in the passage just quoted, Hans himself becomes 
mythologized into an echo (or foreshadowing) of the primeval giant.  Axel’s world is 
always on the verge of metamorphosing into the monstrous.  It is a regressive world 
of the Imaginary, the interior of the mother’s womb, in which the threat of being 
forever absorbed, trapped inside the body of the Earth Mother is a constant source of 
anxiety and men are reduced to a naked and primitive state of wildness.   
 This fear of being overwhelmed and entombed is almost realized at one point 
when Axel becomes separated from his uncle and the guide.  Here, as during the 
storm, the narrative “I” is reduced to a state of wordlessness, a symbolic erasure of 
the Logos upon which the ego is constructed.  “I cannot depict my despair.  No word 
in any human language would be adequate to describe my feelings.  I was buried 
alive with the prospect of dying in agonies of hunger and thirst” (125).  Axel first 
shouts in despair to his uncle who  dragged him down into the earth unwillingly, 
then he turns to childhood memories of religion and prays.  Axel is an interesting 
scientist-hero for, though he loves classifying things and trying to explain the 
inexplicable, debating constantly with his uncle, he nevertheless he repeatedly reverts 
to romantic feelings and emotional responses.  He panics several times and almost 
perishes of thirst.  When he loses control during his abandonment in the dark, he runs 
through the tunnels until he falls down a cliff and ends up covered in his own blood.  
It is hardly surprising that Simone Vierne, among others, has considered Journey to the 
Center of the Earth a modern story of initiation.  The young man is torn away from his 
fiancée, Grauben, to prove his bravery, to follow the model of his mad uncle.   
 In the moment of his isolation, when his Promethean lamp is extinguished, 
Axel undergoes the soul’s dark night, expressing his loss of soul as the loss of all 
human connection—with Hans and his uncle, but also with Grauben and all his life 
back home.  In this moment he is the image of masculine alienation, encased in rock, 
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untouchable but nevertheless utterly vulnerable within.  Moreover, Axel points to the 
essence of the vulnerability inside the manly adventurer:  it is an infantile fear of 
abandonment pitted against the imperative to “be a man,” individual and self-
sufficient.  To be sure, one trapped underground has a right to be terrified, but there 
is, in myth and literature, a clearly uncanny horror surrounding being entombed 
alive.  Symbolically, Axel’s ordeal is a confrontation with that fear of abandonment by 
the protecting parents, which is experienced in some degree by all children.  In a boy, 
however, this fear may take a gendered resonance as he is forced to separate from his 
mother and attach himself to a father who is distant and often absent, heightening the 
son’s fear of abandonment.  The fact that Verne makes the father-son relationship 
even more tenuous by placing an uncle in role of father, only serves to emphasize the 
fear of father-lessness Axel experiences. 
 Professor Lidenbrock is the Promethean spirit of this novel, even if he seems 
more literally an echo of Orpheus.  Like Robur, he is concerned with the expenditure 
of masculine energy beating out any rivals for speed and achievement of the goal.  
While he is a more endearing character than Robur because of his family relationships 
and the personal intimacy between the scientist and his nephew, Lidenbrock is 
nonetheless another man whose virility is essentially violent.  His chief eccentricities 
are his impatience and his absolute determination to follow the trail of Arne 
Saknussemm.  Like Frankenstein, he is obsessed with the achievements of ancient 
alchemists and his journey into the earth’s core is like a search for spiritual renewal.  
Like Paracelsus to Frankenstein, Saknussemm is a sublime father, the “mythic 
ancestor” (Mauberret 51).  The professor turns from the world of collective 
brotherhoods and their laws (scientific theories in this case).  He leaves his colleagues 
and his work at the university to engage in his secret quest seemingly on a whim.  
But, in effect, his desire to triumph is aimed, like Robur’s feats, at impressing the elite 
fraternity he has left behind.  He is the phallic “man of perpendiculars” (115) who 
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fumes and broods when the path is horizontal.  Like Robur, his energy is directed 
along a vertical axis, the axis of spirit and sweeps others along with him.  As Samuel 
Smiles says, 
Energy of character has always a power to evoke energy in others… The 
zealous, energetic man unconsciously carries others along with him.  His 
example is contagious… He exercises a sort of electric power, which sends 
a thrill through every fibre, flows into the nature of those about him, and 
makes them give out sparks of fire.  (Character 105) 
 Lidenbrock and his companions experience this imagery literally during the 
electrical storm in the underground sea.  But such contagious passion flames in the 
place of love and affection.  Like so many of Verne’s cranky misanthropes 
Lidenbrock’s idée fixe leaves no libido for relationships and feelings.   
 When Axel seems to be dying of thirst and there is no way to return to the 
surface in time, the professor repents his hubris; but when Hans discovers a source of 
water, Lidenbrock is restored to his old, stubborn drive toward ego-gratification.  
Later when they are on the bosom of the Lidenbrock Sea and once again seem to have 
become lost, Axel remarks, “In any case, we can’t regret coming this far.  The 
spectacle is magnificent and…”  “Seeing is not the question” interrupts his uncle, “I 
set myself an objective and I mean to attain it.  So don’t talk to me about admiring!” 
(155).  The professor is not quite right, for seeing is crucial to his science.  But not 
Axel’s “admiring”—the willful gaze is a seeing which conquers and moves on to 
further achievement. 
 Lidenbrock is so goal-oriented that he cannot value beauty or another person’s 
feelings.  Beauty and romantic sensibility to the sublime cannot be admitted.  As in 
the case of Robur, the heroic role is to present wonders, but not to be moved by them.  
Achievement is everything; relationship or connection to community, nothing.  The 
Thanatic tendency of this, as well as its Narcissism, is suggested by the fact that 
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Lidenbrock is obsessed with his relationship to a dead symbolic father he has never 
met—a complete abstraction.  Ardor for the distant past of great dead men is a safe 
vent for repressed Eros.  When a malfunction of the compass leads them to believe 
that the storm as landed them on the same shore of the ocean they had left days 
before, Lidenbrock is furious: 
“The elements are conspiring against me.  Air, fire, and water are 
combining to stop me getting through.  Well, they are going to see what my 
willpower can do.  I shall not yield, I shall not retreat a tenth of an inch.  We 
shall see who wins:  man or nature!”  Standing on a rock, irritated, 
threatening, Otto Lidenbrock, like wild Ajax, seemed to be hurling defiance 
at the gods.  (175) 
 Axel also likens the journey to Dante’s descent into the Inferno, but it is a far 
more aggressive descent.  Like Dante, the heroes pass through the earth and 
transcend her body, but the violence of their exit parallels Lidenbrock’s aggression.  
Naked and presumably half-cooked, they are shot orgasmically out of a volcano on 
the top of an eruption.  It is, as Carrouges suggests, an image of miraculous (re)birth.  
The suggestion of being cooked by the initiatory experience might be an example of 
Lévi-Strauss’s mytheme of “the raw and the cooked” which he identifies with the 
transformation of Nature into culture.  
 Part of the fascination with Journey to the Center of the Earth is its rich dreamlike 
quality.  Written in the first person, in the voice of an adolescent young man whose 
only ambition is to marry his sweetheart, the novel’s imagery has a persistent sexual 
allure.  The desire to penetrate deeper and deeper into the interior seems almost 
comically sexual in its irrational intensity and the fear with which it is met by the boy.   
In the adult men it is combined with emotions of anger and selfishness, on the one 
hand, and blank indifference on the other.  More abstractly, however, the desire for 
the Center is, as Butor put it, to arrive at the “point suprême.”  The ultimate point or 
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center, whether in the Earth’s core or at one of her poles, is a zone of Thanatic stillness 
or negation (Butor 15; Angenot 19-20).  “The pole,” remarks Butor, “is not [itself] the 
absolute, but only the figure of the absolute” (15).  There one is motionless with the 
world revolving around one, a fixation.  At the Earth’s center, the same is true and 
motionlessness is combined with weightlessness, a complete escape from 
embodiment (all the more so because getting there would seem to require being 
incinerated or crushed to a pulp). The supreme point is a symbolic position of 
mastery but also of wholeness, the ego’s negation and exultation as it identifies itself 
with the whole universe.  The goal is a mathematical abstraction more than an actual 
place.  There is no “sense of place” as one says when thinking of a community or 
landscape imbued with emotions.  The point itself is Imaginary and its emotions 
wholly Narcissistic:  feelings of victory, conquest, invincibility, and so safety.  The 
desire to occupy the absolute point is combined with the scopophilic desire of the 
young boy to see what has never been seen—to see the forbidden zone of the 
mother’s body, the hidden places of the Self. 
 The Vernean hero strives for the “center” but as Jung’s model of the psyche 
indicates, there are two psychic centers:  the ego, as center of consciousness, and the 
Self, as center of the whole psyche.  So the technician hero may be longing for 
connectedness to the Self unconsciously while he compensates consciously with an 
illusory inflation of the ego.  The Narcissism that is an illusory and dangerous 
identification of ego with the God-image is characterized by its paradoxical lust for 
speed and motion, an inversion of the apparent goal which is rest in the center.  
Phileas Fogg is the prime example of the theme of circulation, an activity, which, as 
Angenot observes, “is an end in itself; the only thing to do is speed it up, and the 
highest moral quality is haste” (23).  There is something characteristically modern in 
this complex, the fetishization of endless circulation:  the circulation of money, of 
information, of commuter traffic, of sexual partners, of television reruns and the 
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“surfing” remote control.  The key trait of Angenot’s ideas of “circulation” and 
“acceleration” is that they never arrive at the longed-for center.  They don’t even 
know a center exists.  Instead, they fetishize energy, action, and the infinite.  The 
fetish is characteristic of the puer aeternus:  an ego-inflation that is really the flight 
from a fear of centerless fragmentation, from the loss of soul.  The intimate connection 
of the complex to Victorian capitalism and industrialization is captured vividly by 
Lewis Mumford in Technics and Civilization: 
Progress was motion toward infinity, motion without completion or end, 
motion for motion’s sake.  One could not have too much progress, it could 
not come too rapidly, it could not spread too widely and it could not 
destroy the “unprogressive” elements in society too swiftly and ruthlessly.  
(qtd. in Angenot 24) 
 In Jules Verne’s novels, libido is channeled wholly into Activity of any sort 
other than sexual activity.  As Martin observes:  
Certainly there is an absence of sex, and a scarcity of women… [b]ut there 
is no lack of desire in the Voyages.  Sexual energy has not been eliminated, 
only displaced, rerouted into geographical grappling with the earth mother.  
The voyageurs do not mate:  they sublimate.  (218, note 30) 
 Verne’s heroes are characterized by “epistemophilia.”  Martin observes that 
“Freud’s analysis locates the origin of this ‘instinct for knowledge or research’ in a 
pre-genital phase and links its subsequent obsessional manifestations with a 
repressed desire for sexual mastery” (218, note 30).  But sexual mastery is itself a 
displacement of the masculine ego’s fear of vulnerability, the return of repressed 
aggression against the omnipotent mother or the castrating father.  Progress, speed, 
acceleration and the desire for the deep truth are themes that Verne developed even 
more fully in the undersea world of Captain Nemo, to which I will now turn. 
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Notes 
 
1 It is interesting to note that R. J. Hollingdale uses the analogy of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde to describe 
Hoffmann’s double personality, the tendency to drink and satirize, which undermined his career at regular 
intervals (Hoffmann, Introduction).   
2 The novels of Wells deserve much more detailed treatment, obviously.  His novels, though more fantastic than 
Verne’s, are also more overtly concerned with thematizing social change and this makes his view of the 
technician an important counterpoint to Verne’s vision of scientific progress as merely a perfection of the extant 
class order. 
3 Arthur Evans’ Jules Verne Rediscovered is both an excellent study of Verne in the context of scientific 
didacticism and an excellent introduction to the state of Verne scholarship at present.  His bibliography is 
extensive.  See also Gallagher et al. 
4 Travers argues that Smiles has been misread by many critics and historians, and also by many of his 
contemporaries, who have maintained that he advocated the “cult of success” (Orwell’s term).  Instead, Travers 
argues, Smiles advocated morality and contentment or making the best of one’s place in the economy.  Be this as 
it may, it is clear that Smiles’s doctrines and the examples he provided of successful men (and a few women) 
could easily be misconstrued.  He may not have intended to advocate selfishness and survival of the fittest but his 
teachings could certainly inspire individuals with the belief that emulation of these models would automatically 
raise them up.  Moreover, such teachings can be used as rationalizations for blaming the conditions of the 
working class or the unemployed on their lack of character, an argument which is still much in use today. 
5 Among Smiles’s other books are Physical Education (1838), Character (1871), Thrift (1875), Duty (1880), and 
Life and Labour (1887).  Travers is an excellent and thorough study of Smiles’s thought and writing, including 
his many editorials and articles. 
6 To be fair to Smiles, I should observe that he does not confine courage to men alone but says that women are 
simply not taught to eschew fear as men are (or should be).  Smiles’s treatment of manliness or virtue tends to 
emphasize its learned and constructed nature. 
7 See Walker, Engineers of Independence; and Goldfrank, French Engineers in the War of Independence. 
8 One wonders if the state of being not-yet-fully-professionalized is something like the vulnerably, half-delusory 
state of Theweleit’s “not-yet-fully-born.” 
9 Angenot develops this theme of circulation as a kind of mythos inspired by the Marxian theory of the circuit of 
money and commodities.  His analysis, though interesting, is severely damaged by his cavalier and obviously 
uninformed rejection of “archetypal critics” as too “superficial.”  He rejects Simone Vierne’s reading of the 
theme of initiation as an “artificial critical device which has been artificially superimposed on Verne’s texts” (22) 
with the obvious implication that Marxian theory is not.  This betrays a serious lack of understanding of how 
342 
 
 
textuality works.  As I have said, I maintain that all interpretations are in some way “artificial” and should be 
judged on the merits of what greater understanding they produce of the text and its effect on readers.  Texts are 
not solid objects upon which images can be “superimposed”; they derive meaning only by relationship to other 
texts, whether that be a mythos of initiation or of capital circulation.  To my mind, the archetype of circularity and 
circulation has deeper significance symbolically than the Marxian meaning, which is only one expression of deep 
longings for wholeness, movement, eternal return, etc.  
10 Even in comic-book form a story like 20,000 Leagues under the Sea carries many of the images of the book.  
The Disney film version (among many films of Verne stories) alters the characters and plot considerably but 
retains some elaborations of details that one might see as almost an “improvement” on the original in terms of 
effective excitation of emotions and the heroism of the main characters. 
11 The question of translation is difficult in the case of Verne and his criticism because the “standard” nineteenth-
century translations are so unreliable.  I have made an effort to use recent translations of the novels where this 
was practicable and have quoted the texts in English from the editions noted.  On a few occasions I have referred 
to the French (Hetzel) edition in reprinted form in order to clarify a point.  In the case of the critical writing in 
French, I have done my own translations, only reproducing the French word where I felt a nuance was important. 
12 Respectively, Ferguson is the heroic inventor-explorer of Five Weeks in a Balloon, Barbicaine, the man 
with the huge cannon in From the Earth to the Moon and Around the Moon; and Robur, the bellicose aviator in 
The Clipper of the Clouds (Robur le Conquèrant) and Master of the World. 
13 “Sailing to Byzantium” stanza 3.  
14 This satire of democratic elections is Verne at his most droll, but at the same time is an example of the 
idealized clockwork man, the compteur, to borrow Picot’s phrase.  Both men take on the character of precise 
measuring instruments, but in the end the superiority of the instrument is reasserted when a micrometer has to be 
brought in to distinguish between the two pin-pricks made by Evans and Prudent. 
15 Angenot calls both Nemo and Robur “Icarian” arguing that “Icarus is a Prometheus without a 
beneficiary for his gift” (22).  This formulation highlights the Narcissism of the Promethean complex, something 
that seems present even where there is an imagined benefactor.  The benefactors (humans) in the Promethean 
myth are problematic because they are also the creatures of Prometheus.  Icarus, I would argue, is different from 
Prometheus because he is a human striving too high (literally), and  foolishly misusing the invention of his father, 
Daedalus (who is the more Promethean figure).  Icarus has become (like Prometheus) a stock figure of hubris, but 
that doesn’t do justice to the nuances of the myth.  Pierre Grimal’s summary of the variants suggests that the key 
feature of the Icarus myth is his drowning after being unable to control one of his father’s inventions properly 
(sails rather than wings in one case).  That pattern is, in a sense, the opposite of the Promethean myth, for 
Prometheus succeeds in stealing the father’s techne whereas Icarus can’t manage it even when it is handed to him.  
Icarus is punished by the natural consequences of his mistake while Prometheus is punished by the cultural 
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power of the Sky Father.  Angenot chooses Icarus because of the flying, which doesn’t explain why Nemo should 
be called Icarian.  The theme of flight is suggestive of the puer aeternus and the element of Air, and is, in this 
myth, set explicitly against Fire (as well as Earth, and Water).  The death of the son might be read as a tragic 
highlighting of the successful puer dream of Daedalus, whose drive for mastery as an engineer and architect also 
caused him to throw his pupil and nephew Talos from the Acropolis for being too smart. 
16 In the poem “Lamia,”  II.237. 
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Chapter VII 
Oceanic Dreams 
 
_______________________ 
 
 
…but lulled into such an opium-like listlessness of vacant, 
unconscious reverie is this absent-minded youth by the 
blending cadence of waves with thoughts, that at last he 
loses his identity; takes the mystic ocean at his feet for the 
visible image of that deep, blue, bottomless soul, pervading 
mankind and nature; and every strange, half-seen, gliding, 
beautiful thing that eludes him; every dimly-discovered, 
uprising fin of some undiscernible form, seems to him the 
embodiment of those elusive thoughts that only people the 
soul by continually flitting through it. 
— Melville, Moby Dick, Ch. 35 
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(1) La Mer—La Mère—L’Amour: 
 20,000 Leagues Under the Sea is also structured on the heroic descent into and 
return from the underworld field of treasures.  The initiation theme is particularly 
evident in the case of Aronnax, who is the consummate seeker of knowledge.  
Expecting, when he falls overboard, to be swallowed by a whale like Jonah, the 
naturalist instead finds a marvelous submersible boat and a mysterious dark twin of 
himself, a mentor of the marvelous to unfold the secrets of the waters.  Hoping to 
capture a new species and mount it beside his name in the Paris Museum, Aronnax 
instead finds himself captured and kept within the walls of Captain Nemo’s private 
collection.  Here is the reversal that characterizes the crossing of the bar between the 
mundane world and the marvelous, the Real and the Imaginary.  Carrouges calls the 
world on the opposite side of the boundary, the “field of treasures,” an apt name for 
Captain Nemo’s collection and the natural wonders he shows to Aronnax. 
 The absence of women from the story is almost total, yet the feminine complex 
is everywhere present in symbolic forms.  As Froidefond remarks, “the search for 
Woman is the destination of each of the Voyages” (28).  Captain Nemo is a Byronic 
hero wandering the earth, alienated from domestic happiness because of some deep, 
secret wound.  Like Frankenstein, Captain Nemo has exiled himself from humanity.  
Like Frankenstein’s monster or Prometheus he is a Titanic figure:  superhuman, 
tortured, strangely sensitive, artistic, poetic.  But his exile is forced by oppression, not 
merely by the scholastic hubris one sees in Frankenstein.  He is, as one only learns in 
the sequel, Mysterious Island, a victim of colonialism.  Born the Indian Prince Dakkar, 
Nemo had evidently, prior to his participation in the Sepoy revolt, received a 
European education in science and engineering.  Outdoing even the inventors and 
naval architects of Britain and the United States, his technical knowledge is a 
Promethean theft from the Jovian colonial fathers.  Like Lidenbrock, he is pitted in 
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battle against Nature as the object of his scientific conquest, but also against “culture” 
or “civilization” as that is represented by the “hated nation” that is never named in 
the course of 20,000 Leagues.  He has the anger Verne would emphasize in Robur, but 
his obsession is more complex than Robur’s desire to be master of the known world.  
Captain Nemo renounces the world of dry land and refuses ever to set foot ashore.  
Instead he creates in the oceans a kingdom of his own.  As in Robur’s case, rulership 
is signified by mobility, speed, unlimited energy, and the ability to stand where no 
other man has gone before.  He is, despite being underwater, a solar, Apollonian hero, 
the sun which has set below the horizon, a kinship symbolized in Nemo’s dramatic 
address to the sun setting over his self-proclaimed Antarctic domain. 
 But there is a darkness in the abyss below the solar hero’s luminous mask.  So 
much of his identity is made up of that “stolen” fire of industrial machinery that 
Nemo is split within himself, divided and battling his own shadow.  Indeed he is “the 
huge shadow of the Promethean scientist” (Froidefond 24) a fallen “luminous” hero 
like Milton’s Lucifer or Blake’s Satan.1  Captain Nemo illustrates all the tensions I 
have identified within the construction of the bourgeois myth of scientific manliness.  
His techne gives him material mastery over space and natural resources, a mastery 
expressed through charting, mapping,2 mathematical prediction and control of matter 
through abstract reason.  But the price he pays for such cool objectivity and logic is an 
alienation from Eros, from the feminine.  Repressed Eros returns as “absolute desire 
which is projected onto his machine,” the “instrument of transgression” (Froidefond 
27 my italics). 
 The plot of 20,000 Leagues seems episodic but is actually carefully structured.  
The narrator and protagonist, Professor Pierre Aronnax, a naturalist from the Paris 
Museum and a medical doctor, embarks on a voyage to investigate reports of a giant 
sea monster and is tantalized by the thought of capturing a new species of giant 
narwhal.  Instead, he and two companions are thrown overboard (Carrouges’s “leap” 
352 
across the boundary of the marvelous) when their frigate is attacked by the monster 
and they discover that it is in fact a marvelous electric powered submarine with a 
crew that speaks a completely unidentifiable language.  The ship’s captain is tempted 
to throw the castaways back into the sea, but his principles will not quite let him, so 
he permits them to live on the condition they should never leave his ship or the sea.  
He gives no name but calls himself  Captain Nemo, Latin for no one.  The gesture is 
reminiscent of Odysseus who tricks the Cyclops Polyphemus by telling him his name 
is “No one.”3  The voyage that ensues is also Odyssean, taking Aronnax halfway 
round the world and to the south pole.  Unlike the Odyssey, however, it is not 
ultimately a voyage home; instead it is the voyage as home.  At regular intervals 
Captain Nemo performs daring maneuvers with his submarine, the Nautilus, 
demonstrating that it is virtually indestructible.  He dramatizes the power of science 
and engineering to conquer nature, while the professor studies and classifies the flora, 
fauna, and undersea topography.   
 The reader moves back and forth, from Aronnax’s almost poetic litanies of 
Latin classifications to fantastic adventures, such as an underwater mountain climb to 
the volcano-illuminated ruins of Atlantis and a battle with a school of giant squid.  It 
is gradually revealed that Nemo has a secret vendetta against a nameless nation 
whose warships he sinks, whenever he encounters them, by ramming their hulls with 
the formidable spur of his submarine.  Aronnax finally discovers that Nemo is 
seeking revenge for the death of his parents, wife, and children.   
 Because of his personal loss, Nemo has become an aristocratic patron of 
rebellions against tyranny and imperialism in various parts of the world.  At one 
point he delivers gold, which he has salvaged from the wrecks of the Spanish 
imperial fleet in Vigo Bay, to Cretans rebelling against the Turks, an adventure 
reminiscent of Byron’s battles in Greece.  The novel ends with Aronnax and his 
friends escaping at last, just when the Nautilus is being sucked down into the 
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Maelstrom off the coast of Norway.  At the end we do not know if Captain Nemo 
survives, but Aronnax hopes so and is left with a deep feeling of brotherhood with 
this heroic “Man of the Waters.” 
 The mystery of Nemo’s identity is the very center of the story even though it is 
never revealed until the sequel.  Aronnax’s desire to know more about this “sphinx,” 
whom he at first calls simply “The Unknown,” is held in dramatic tension with Ned 
Land’s desire for escape.   The professor’s valet, Conseil, is so completely loyal that he 
is really only an extension of the naturalist, but Ned, the master harpooner, is a heroic 
rival, who pits strength and love of freedom against Nemo’s need to keep his 
existence secret.  Captain Nemo is deeply torn.  If his existence is made known, he 
would lose his sense of total freedom and disconnection; in all probability a wanted 
man with a price on his head for his role in the Sepoy Rebellion, he would become a 
fugitive rather than a free man exiled by choice.  But he also clearly wants to retain 
the companionship of Aronnax, a fellow oceano-grapher, and suffers grave 
misgivings from the conflict the situation has created between self-defense and the 
principles of freedom he so ardently defends.  Treating Aronnax as a guest is a matter 
of principle, but also of deeply repressed emotions—the longing for a companion 
which, in a similar form, underlies the creative impulse of Frankenstein and the 
desperate longings of his creature.  Put abstractly, these relationships are the 
shadow’s longing for the ego and vice versa, the mutual need for erotic connection 
between two twins or doubles. 
 Captain Nemo exhibits what Chesneaux has called Verne’s “tendency towards 
libertarian individualism” (149) supporting freedom, yet paradoxically occupying the 
role of captain, the absolute master of his crew.  He is one of Saint-Simon’s engineer-
kings whose technical skill has allowed him to escape society rather than be its savior.  
Nemo quests for an individualist utopia but has cut all ties with nations and states.  
He has created, like Frankenstein, a new race of men with their own artificial 
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language, brothers sworn to oppose the forces of war and conquest, personally loyal 
to him as a teacher and benefactor.  He occupies a midway point between the role of 
patriarch and that of corporate “leader,” as J. C. Smith distinguishes them.   
 The leader, who is a member of the brotherhood, replaces the symbolic father, 
whose authority did not depend on being identified with a collective based on an 
ideology of equality (J. C. Smith 322).  As the father is “chased away,” the superego is 
also lost and replaced with what Chasseguet-Smirgel calls the illusion of ideology.  
The leader takes power not arbitrarily or through superior might alone, but through 
his ability to personify an ideological complex.  Chasseguet-Smirgel asserts that the 
individual’s identification with the brotherhood requires a loss of ego-boundaries.  
The utopia promised by ideology “stimulates the wish for the fusion of ego and ideal 
by way of regression and induces the ego to melt into the omnipotent primary object, 
to encompass the entire universe… [T]he individual [is] identified with the totality of 
the group, thereby conferring on himself an omnipotent ego, a colossal body” (qtd. in 
J. C. Smith 323).  Incorporation replaces embodiment:  rather than finding meaning and 
identity in one’s physical, sensual body, the ego is incorporated into an institutional 
structure that usurps his individuality and demands his body, his labor, his duty in 
service to the collective.4 
 This is the kind of fusion Nemo’s crew seems to have achieved, for they are so 
identified with their leader that they are often completely invisible.  Nemo has, by 
creating this brotherhood, not only displaced the Oedipal father, as Smith suggests, 
but is also “a replacement for the omnipotent mother” (323), in the sense that he 
becomes the object on which is projected the mother-complex and its association with 
the pre-egoic merged state of love.  The anti-egalitarian quality of incorporation and 
Nemo’s vast personal fortune (itself an incorporative accumulation) sets up a 
dissonance with his libertarianism.  The slippage between “leader” and “father” or 
despot is visible in the organization of space aboard the Nautilus.  Although Captain 
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Nemo believes in equality, his ship is starkly divided into the luxurious forward 
chambers inhabited almost solely by him and his upper-class guest, the professor, 
and the aft chambers that house Ned, Conseil, the crew and the engines.  The ego-
centrism of this arrangement is accentuated by the fact that the crew is so seldom seen 
during the voyage.  Except when they are acting as laborers to gather food or are 
fighting giant squids, they are eerily spectral—so much so, that at one point, Ned and 
the professor try to figure out how many there may be by calculating the number of 
men that could possibly be sustained by the oxygen in the submarine’s air reservoirs.   
 Such a focus on the mysterious captain suggests that the story is ultimately a 
search for Self by an ego caught in the contradictions between the ostensible equality 
of the Heraclean brotherhood and the despotism of the Periclean father.   Nemo’s 
very namelessness suggests the archetypal ego, the center of consciousness, itself a 
kind of point suprême that has been disconnected from the name of his father.  The 
seas are here (as in Journey to the Center of the Earth) symbolic of the unconscious 
matrix out of which ego emerges.  A “Man of the Waters,” as Aronnax calls him, 
Captain Nemo has dissolved his ego, his name, his family ties, and returned 
symbolically to the unitary reality of the pre-Oedipal Imaginary.  His position as 
leader of his crew, and then as potential friend to the professor and rival of Ned Land, 
disrupts this tranquil intra-uterine withdrawal.  Even when alone with his crew and 
his first officer, the captain lives within a contradiction:  the captain of any ship 
experiences the “loneliness at the top” of hierarchical power, but must always be 
aware of his interdependence with his men, an interdependence that implicitly 
contains vulnerability.   
 This condition is that of Theweleit’s soldier-male.  Bent on achieving a state of 
invulnerability, he imagines his ego and his body as a fortress, a weapon, but 
paradoxically dissolves his ego-boundaries in the omnipotent fantasy of the collective 
being.  Yet, in the case of the leader of the collective, the Periclean complex also 
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operates, which means that he can base his fantasies of omnipotence not only on the 
faith his men bestow upon him and the principles of the brotherhood’s ideology, but 
also on the Periclean father’s fantasy of absorbing, incorporating, the mother.  
Everything Nemo can claim to control or conquer adds to his fantasy of omnipotence.  
The soldier-male’s fantasies with incorporation—inside and outside, containment and 
penetration—are played out on many levels in Verne’s text. 
 Philmus describes Verne’s myth as that of “self-containment, of taking 
possession of and filling a world whose limits [are] carefully circumscribe[d]” (35).  
Roland Barthes suggests in “The Nautilus and the Drunken Boat” that “[t]he image of 
the ship… is, at a deeper level, the emblem of closure.  An inclination for ships always 
means the joy of perfectly enclosing oneself… A ship is a habitat before being a means 
of transport” (Mythologies 66).5  It is, in a literal sense, a “space” ship, its significance 
lying in its interior spaces and its movement through “outer” space, across the map or 
under the sea.  Gary Wolfe argues that spaceships are symbolic wombs playing on the 
dichotomy of inside and outside.  Inside is commonly associated with light, sound, 
warmth, nourishment, knowledge, order, community, and civilization; outside, by 
contrast, is associated with darkness, silence, cold, deprivation, ignorance, chaos, 
isolation, and nature (Wolfe 60).   
 The icon of the womb or containing vessel is, as Erich Neumann observed, part 
of the symbolism of the Great Mother archetype.  The voyager occupies the mythic 
place of the archetypal hero, negotiating in various ways the limines of his culture and 
the lines between inside and outside, unconscious and consciousness, Imaginary and 
Real.  The inside/outside dichotomy is linked metaphorically backwards in time (from 
the point of view of the Oedipal stage) to the separation of the child’s ego from the 
omnipotent Mother-Self-Environment complex; and it is linked forwards to the 
Heraclean brotherhood which includes its male members by excluding the Other.  
Inclusion, in other words, carries the deeply conflicted connotations of a Dionysian 
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merging of ego with the omnipotent mother-goddess complex alongside a merging of 
ego with the corporate brotherhood.  The difference is that the Dionysian impulse in 
its positive form, is an affirmation of Eros, the joining of two lovers, while the 
Heraclean impulse is founded on an explicit rejection of women and sexuality, and 
the courting of death through heroic action.  The dyadic merging of two lovers is seen 
to undermine and betray the collective merging of brotherhood.  To shun (or fear) 
sexual Eros is to embrace death as the ultimate escape from all desire. 
 To plunge into the sea is an Empedoclean image of suicide combined with 
immersion.  The sea—“changeable, hazardous, unpredictable, stochastic, a-rhythmical, 
a-mathematical”—is the antithesis of what Jean-Pierre Picot calls the “clockwork 
men,”6 the “compteurs,” calculators or speedometers, epitomized by Phileas Fogg in 
Around the World in 80 Days (Picot 64).7  Captain Nemo too is a mathematical 
instrument:   
“Gentleman,” he said calmly, “there are two ways of dying in the 
circumstances in which we are placed.”  (This inexplicable person had the 
air of a professor of mathematics lecturing to his pupils.)  “The first is to be 
crushed; the second is to die of suffocation…” (Leagues Pt. II: Ch. XVI, 433) 
 The automaton and its maker, as in Hoffmann’s “Sandman,” substitute 
clockwork for the human soul and so are associated with death, Thanatos, argues 
Picot.  Mathematics in place of feeling produces “[d]elusion, mimesis, disjunction, 
dichotomy, reification — and almost schizophrenia” (Picot 64).  Andrew Martin 
argues that in Verne’s fiction mere mimesis is “supplemented or supplanted by 
‘mathesis,’ whose task it is to accommodate the plurality of the world within a 
unitary discourse.”  Verne “offers a mathematical dream or an oneric mathematics” 
(133).  He is “a modern Pythagoras, the disciple of a mathematical mysticism” (134).8  
Nemo’s drama is centrally that between the mathematical motion of the engineer and 
his machine and the dark, chaotic (e)motion of the sea. 
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   Captain Nemo’s description of his union with the sea in Chapter X, titled 
“The Man of the Waters,”9 displays the Dionysian aspect of his desire for the state of 
immersion in the mother’s body.  He has just described how he makes his clothes 
from “the filaments of certain shellfish” and colors the fabric with purple dyes taken 
from sea hares.  The very ink with which he (and Aronnax) writes is “the secretion of 
the cuttlefish.”  Nemo lovingly invokes the eternal return and the Ouroboros: 
“Everything comes to me from the sea just as everything will return to it one day” 
(162).  Aronnax responds:  “You love the sea, don’t you, Captain?”  Nemo’s reply is a 
study in the interweaving of Nature and Woman in the imagination of western 
culture: 
“Yes, I love her!  The sea is everything. . . Her breath is pure and healthy.  
She is an immense desert where a man is never alone, for he can feel life 
quivering all about him.  The sea is not only a receptacle for a prodigious, 
supernatural existence; she is not only movement and love; she is the living 
infinite. . . the vast reservoir of nature. . . There lies supreme tranquillity.  
The sea does not belong to tyrants.  On her surface, they can still exercise 
their iniquitous rights, fighting, devouring one another and transporting 
iall terrestrial horrors.  But thirty feet below her surface their power ceases, 
their influence dies out and their domination disappears!  Ah! monsieur, 
live—live within the bosom of the seas!  Only there can one be 
independent!  There I recognize no masters!  There I am free!”  (Pt. I, Ch. X, 
162-63; translation modified) 
 A moment after this effusion, however, Nemo regains his self-control and 
Aronnax tells us, he “regained his customary coldness of expression” (164).  Nemo 
expresses the longing for the pre-Oedipal paradise and the omnipotent nurturance of 
the archetypal mother.  His is the desire of a bounded, rigid, and disciplined 
masculine ego to break down its walls and open itself to Nature.  This is all the more 
evident in the passage quoted, when one restores the middle section I elided above.  
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Having invoked the feminine “living infinite,” Nemo seems to retreats to a more 
scientific discourse, explaining:  
Nature manifests herself in it by her three kingdoms, mineral, vegetable, 
and animal.  The animal kingdom is represented generously by four groups 
of zoophytes, three classes of articulates, five classes of mollusks, three 
classes of vertebrates, mammals, reptiles, innumerable legions of fish, an 
infinite order of animals, which includes more than 13,000 species, of which 
only a tenth belong to fresh water.  The sea is the vast reservoir of nature… 
(162)  
 But this tug of Logos against the choric Mythos is merely the characteristic 
adaptation of classification and quantification to poetry, as if infinity could be proven 
empirically and was not, as is so evident in this passage, a psychological ideal.  The 
moment illustrates a recurrent infinity complex, one might say, or, to use the 
terminology I have already employed, one might call it the vertigo of Empedocles 
plunging into that infinite body of Nature.  In Smith’s terms, it is the Narcissistic 
Dionysian complex that pulls Nemo away from human relationships and towards 
fusion with the omnipotent mother.  His attempt to capture Mother Nature in 
empirical discourse shows the fundamental tension between the Dionysian and the 
Apollonian, the captain’s scientific mentality striving towards the ego ideal, of 
disembodied Logos.  The two poles work in proportion across the threshold of 
consciousness.  As the ego strives after pure Logos, the unconscious desire for fusion 
with the mother grows more autonomous and insistent.  In a sense, the real erotic 
object of the Apollonian is the very Mother-Body-Self it consciously rejects.  The 
result of this contradiction is that the Dionysian Eros becomes a suicidal Empedocles 
complex. 
 The relationship Nemo seeks with the sea is not love between subjects, but a 
love without subjects, a perfect, “conflict-free state” of “total connectedness” (Jacoby 
26-27).  The appearance on his deck of Professor Aronnax, a man Nemo admires for 
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his oceanographic work, precipitates the central thematic conflict in 20,000 Leagues:  
the ego’s struggle to maintain the boundary between inside and outside.  It is 
interesting that Aronnax’s first description of Nemo likens the captain not to any male 
hero but to a sphinx.  The sphinx is a dispenser of enigmas but also a supernatural 
monster, half woman and half lion, symbolizing the association of Woman and 
Nature and the monstrous quality of both.  For Aronnax, as for Oedipus, the sphinx 
represents a confrontation with the enigma of a man’s repressed Anima and, 
particularly (if one considers the riddle Oedipus is asked to solve) the association of 
the feminine with the embodied aspect of men’s lives, that is, their origins in infancy 
and evolution towards old age and death.  The riddle of what walks on four legs in 
the morning, two legs at noon, and three in the evening is a riddle about time and 
aging that directly confronts the Apollonian dream of the puer aeternus. 
 To the professor, the captain seems more monstrous than human in his 
violation of the rules of civilized conduct.  When Nemo tells the three castaways that 
they must remain captive guests or be thrown back into the sea, Aronnax asks in 
astonishment,  “We have to give up forever the idea of seeing our country, our friends 
and our families?” (70).  He has at once articulated the paradox of Nemo’s existence:  
in his retreat to a mythic primary Narcissism, Nemo has not brought his Anima into 
relation with consciousness, but has merely submerged himself in his own longing.  
Relatedness, or what Hillman calls soul, is both what Captain Nemo desires and what 
he has lost, indeed what he actively denies himself.  His violation of the rules of 
civilization—a very classical host-guest rule, in fact—rejects the Heraclean structure 
of male relationship.  In a sense, he will not let the three castaways fully enter his 
interior nor can he let them leave it. 
  Yet when Aronnax accepts his terms, Nemo reaches out to this fellow scientist, 
a fellow hero of Logos, to share the uterine existence he has made.  It is a timeless 
realm in which contemporary artists and musicians merge with the heroes of myth.  
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“These musicians,” Nemo says as he shows Aronnax his sheet music in the salon, “are 
all contemporaries of Orpheus, for differences of time disappear in dead men’s 
memories—and I am dead, professor; as dead as whatever friends of yours lie six feet 
under!” (78).  The ego returned to the body of the Great Mother is dead.  The paradox 
describes the structural conflict in Nemo’s character, the contradiction between his 
longing for a timeless paradise, a return to unconsciousness, and his repression of 
Eros as a man of Logos and Activity.  The result of this repressed Eros is, as Jung 
suggested, a will to power and conquest, which results not only in the deaths of 
others, but in a compulsive defiance of death in the hero.  The reference to Orpheus is 
not merely fortuitous, for Orpheus—as the personification of the power of song, or 
the enchanting power of language to shape reality—descended to the depths of the 
world in search of his lost wife, Euridice.  The myth of Orpheus is poignantly 
apropos, for we learn that Nemo’s descent was motivated by the loss of his wife and 
family, a loss taken psychically as the loss of Eros and so, of life. 
 The state of ego-dissolution is death and it is paradise.  The combination of 
death and paradise, are, of course, commonplace to many mythologies, as is the 
feminization of paradise.10  Nemo presents his life to Professor Aronnax as a 
seductive existence:   
You are going to travel in the land of marvels.  Astonishment and 
amazement will probably become your normal state of mind.  You will not 
easily become blasé at the endless spectacle which will be offered to your 
view…  You will be my companion in these studies.  From this day forward 
you are entering a new element; you will see what no other man has seen—
my men and I no longer count—and our planet, thanks to me, is going to 
reveal to you her secrets.  (159) 
 The penetration of Mother Earth, the stripping of her veil, vividly illustrates 
the conflation of Woman and Nature.  In 20,000 Leagues there are no female 
characters.  Instead of family relationships or sexual love, one finds a world of 
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technicians symbolically immersed in the body of the Great Mother.  The object of 
male desire and competition in Nemo’s world is la mer (la mère) and the machinery 
that allows the masculine penetration of her.  They are the love objects Nemo and his 
crew have exchanged to form their fierce, self-destructive devotion to each other; they 
are the same objects Aronnax and Nemo exchange in an attempt to form an even 
more intimate congress of spirits.  Aronnax remarks, “The commander’s words had a 
great effect upon me.  My weak point was touched and I forgot, for a moment, that 
the contemplation of these sublime subjects was not worth the loss of freedom” (159).  
This sharing of “secrets” figured erotically forms a triangular homosocial relationship 
between these two scientists.  The complete elision of women in 20,000 Leagues is in 
some ways the perfection of this structure.   
 The attempt at love between men ultimately fails because Nemo’s erotic nature 
is encircled, contained within the hermetic seal of Logos.  He cannot embrace 
Aronnax’s friendship without relinquishing his Promethean martyrdom, and his 
desire to define himself wholly through revenge against the “hated nation” that 
murdered his family.  Such a narrow self-definition along antagonistic lines is itself an 
expression of the Heraclean spirit, for the inverse of the ego identified with the 
collective brotherhood is one who has been excluded from it.  Nemo and his men 
constitute a sort of anti-brotherhood whose entire raison d’être is adversarial—or, 
again, put differently, it is the ego’s assumption of the role of shadow; the captain is 
the Enemy, the Other, the Repressed. 
 Another crucial expression of Captain Nemo’s problematic relationship to the 
feminine and his liminal existence may be seen in the Nautilus itself.  The reader is 
afforded a minute description of the ship’s design and furnishings.  The most alluring 
thing about the Nautilus is its domestic-uterine quality.  Nemo has filled his ship with 
all the comforts of a luxury yacht, including a salon replete with picture windows 
onto the sea and paintings by the European masters.  He has a formal dining room 
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and a library in which he smokes seaweed cigars and plays Beethoven, Gounod, and 
Wagner on the organ.  Nemo has exiled himself from “the unendurable worldly yoke 
which men believe to be liberty” (70) into a fabulous aristocratic domicile or 
gentleman’s club.  The “worldly yoke” of liberty refers to the Law of the Heraclean 
brotherhood by which supposedly free and equal men must live to avoid being cast 
out.  Real gentleman’s clubs are left behind with the world of men and its commerce, 
its governments.  Nemo’s library is conspicuously devoid of books on political 
economy.   His chambers are feminized by the exclusion of the world of patriarchal 
Law he has renounced.  Yet despite their ethos of comfort and tranquillity, the salon, 
the dining room, the library are not a woman’s world either.  They replace the 
feminine domestic sphere and the sensuality customarily ascribed to women while 
dispensing with the actualities of home and family.  If one sees a little of Jules Verne’s 
domestic life in the Nautilus, it is the life of the father’s private study, or, as was the 
case with Verne, his removal of that study onto his private yacht.   
 The salon is built for bodily comfort and the satisfaction of aesthetic desires:  
the sensuality of the curved couches, the decorative beauty of the mosaic tables, 
antique bronze statues, the priceless paintings, and collections of pearls and rare 
specimens of sea life.  Aronnax goes on at length itemizing the precious treasures, 
concluding that their value was impossible to estimate, but was surely finer than any 
European museum’s collection.  Culture and Nature are thus united in a display of 
beauty and vast wealth.  But it is worth noting the silent presence of Woman in the 
paintings detailed by Aronnax:  “a Madonna of Raphael, a Virgin of Leonardo da 
Vinci, a nymph of Correggio, a woman of Titian, an Adoration of Veronese, and 
Assumption of Murillo” (168-69).  To be sure, there are many landscapes, seascapes, 
and genre paintings and the conscious purport of the long list of diverse painters and 
musicians given by Aronnax is to demonstrate Nemo’s diverse, even (as Mickel says) 
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“eclectic” taste (n. 170).11  Nevertheless, this is one place where the feminine is 
represented and it is an idealized, even deified feminine in each case. 
 The most astonishing display of the body of the Great Mother, however, is in 
the specimen cases full of shells and plants, dominated by the central fountain 
constructed of a clam shell six meters in circumference.  “A rather nervous 
conchologist certainly would have fainted” remarks Aronnax (174).  The professor 
consistently sees these treasures through the lens of Logos, fitting them into scientific 
classifications, locating their origins geograph-ically, and estimating their economic 
value in the economy of collectors.  Captain Nemo pointedly remarks that for him 
their charm lies in the fact that he collected them all himself (175).  Eros blends with 
Logos as Professor Aronnax experiences an inconceivable delight, breaking off his 
scrutiny of the glass cases in order not to “exhaust [his] admiration” before he has a 
chance to admire the ship itself.  The passion for possessing and labeling the 
objectified creatures of the natural world is the passion of Logos:  the joy of naming, 
combined with the drive for power, the joy of mastery.  Despite the delight of 
Aronnax and Conseil in these collections and their ritual naming of species, genus, 
family, and class, Nemo’s salon is a museum full of dead things—Eros under glass.  
For both these men desire can be approached only through mastery, measurement:  
an embrace with a calipers.   
 The salon’s sensuality is belied by Nemo’s cabin, his most private space, which 
Aronnax observes, “had a severe, almost monastic look about it.  There was an iron 
cot, a work table and several dressers, all somewhat dimly lit.  No comforts; just the 
strict necessities” (80).  The Captain’s cabin is the site of a disciplined ego controlling 
itself, closed off, rejecting Eros, denying the body.  Later in the novel, when we have 
seen the withdrawn Nemo poring over algebraic equations in this stark room, 
snapping at Aronnax and refusing to give him freedom, we can look upon even the 
salon with a different eye.  The surface of romanticism is held in conflict with the 
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discipline of the scientific mind that turns this lounge into a prison where the 
objective of every embrace is mastery.   
 The containment of Eros within the circumference of Logos is played out in the 
very shape of the Nautilus.  For if the inside is a timeless uterine paradise, its outside 
is an ever-mobile and penetrating phallus of steel.  Nemo acts like a man competing 
in the game of Heraclean brotherhood with its aggressive violations and phallus-
envy.  The Nautilus is problematic to the hegemonic brotherhood of the sea’s surface 
precisely because of its phallic aggression against other ships.  In that aspect, she is an 
instrument of the symbolic Phallus as instrumentality.   
 In Chapter XII, “All by Electricity,” Captain Nemo shows Aronnax the ship 
and explains the various uses of electricity on board, from instruments, telegraphs, 
and cooking, to propulsion and the operation of the Nautilus’s prodigious pumps.  
Repeatedly the “almost infinite” quality of this power source is stressed.  As Andrew 
Martin observes, the many volumes of the Voyages Extraordinaires continually 
“display a fascination with sheer quantity, with enormous, almost inconceivable 
numbers” (134).  Verne’s characters are afflicted with a “numerical intoxication” (135).  
The mathematical sublime is most apparent when the professor asks how the boat is 
steered and how it resists the pressure of the seas.   
 Chapter XIII, “Some Figures,” is one of the most famous chapters of the novel.  
It has been scrutinized by fans of “hard” science fiction for its accuracy in the 
explanation of the principles by which submarines operate and its predictions of 
future technological developments.  It has been skipped over by boys too eager to get 
to the action.  It has been wryly dismissed by critics as one of those blatant examples 
of the didactic and educational work the Voyages Extraordinaires were supposed to 
accomplish.  The passion shared by Nemo and Aronnax is similar to that described by 
Smiles as a trait of James Watt’s character:  “he could not look upon any instrument or 
machine without being seized with a desire to understand its meaning, to unravel its 
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mystery, and master the rationale of its uses” (Boulton and Watt 20).  There is 
something behind such mechanical-anatomical mania. 
 As the captain and his pupil return to the salon, the two scientists smoke and 
share the intimate dimensions of the Nautilus and her capacities as other men might 
smoke cigars and talk about a woman.  They look over the blueprints of the 
submarine—”an elongated cylinder with conical ends… very like a cigar in shape” 
(182).  Despite Freud’s remark that “sometimes a cigar is only a cigar,” both of these 
cigar shapes are metaphorical phalluses.12  The action played out in the salon is a 
display of the technological Phallus, the power of mathematical and scientific 
knowledge that is symbolized in the infinite durability and power of the submarine.  
Unlike surface ships, the Nautilus is truly at home in the water.  “If danger threatens 
one of your ships on the ocean, the first impression is the feeling of an abyss… On the 
Nautilus men’s hearts have nothing to fear” (186).   
 The manly strength of technical man is epitomized in the culmination of their 
discussion when Captain Nemo reveals that the components of his vessel were 
constructed by industrial firms all over the world:  “…the engine by Krupp in Prussia, 
its spur in Motala’s workshop in Sweden, its mathematical instruments by Hart 
Brothers of New York, etc.…” (187).  The Nautilus is, as it were, the accumulation of 
the entire “civilized” world’s prowess, which Nemo masters through his secrecy and 
planning, his expert logistical skill, and his command of his men’s absolute loyalty.   
 One of the sole glimpses we get of who his crewmen are comes in his 
description of them assembling the submarine in their secret desert island; they are 
“my workmen, that is to say, the brave men that I instructed and educated” (187).  
The ship, its owner, and its crew are intimately bonded together, creators and 
creation, not merely a hired collection of sailors on a purchased vessel.  When 
Professor Aronnax exclaims, “Ah, Commander, …your Nautilus is certainly a 
marvelous boat!” Nemo can well reply with true emotion, “Yes, Professor, …and I 
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love it as if it were my own flesh and blood” (186).  “Captain Nemo spoke with 
enthralling eloquence,” says the professor. “The fire in his expression, the passion of 
his gestures transfigured him.  Yes, he loved his ship as a father loves his child” (187). 
 The captain admits to having been educated as an engineer in Paris, London, 
and New York, representing the three principal nineteenth-century technological 
empires.  That places him within the new Saint-Simonian aristocracy, but Captain 
Nemo also admits, when asked, that he is immensely rich, “Riche à l’infini” in the 
original.  The infinite, the sublime is transposed from Nature onto man.  “I could, 
without troubling myself, pay the ten billion franc national debt of France” (187), he 
says.  Carrouges notes the frequency with which the engineering marvels in Verne’s 
stories are made possible by vast private fortunes and suggests that gold is the 
material form of the element Fire (40).  A chain of associations emerges—gold: 
Phallus: fire: electricity.  The professor calls Nemo “bizarre” after this confession of 
wealth but that is because he thinks he is getting his leg pulled.  In fact, as the story 
unfolds, Aronnax learns that he is telling the truth, that he is truly titanic, a 
Prometheus who has indeed stolen the phallological fire and wields with complete 
autonomy all the powers of the fathers, their Law, their technology, their knowledge, 
and their command of capital.  Is he capitalist or aristocrat?  Despite the later 
revelation of his princely origins, he is far more the ego-ideal of the bourgeois, 
attaining the wealth and power of an aristocrat by means of education, accumulation, 
and technical-managerial skill and exploitation of natural resources (and sunken 
treasure).  He is, in short, a “captain of industry.” 
(2) The Exchange of the Phallus 
 If Captain Nemo’s relationship to the bourgeois professor Aronnax is thta of a 
mirroring double, his relationship to Ned Land, the harpooner, is that of an 
oppositional shadow.  Despite being a sublime father, the captain is increasingly set 
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in rivalry with the muscular sailor.  Land (as his name attests) represents not only the 
opposing elemental force to Nemo’s alliance with the sea, but also the earthy, chthonic 
aspect of the Animus.  Nemo is an Apollonian and Periclean ego-ideal, representing 
both the archetypal father and his abstraction into the disembodied Logos.  But Ned 
Land is a Heraclean hero, one of the brotherhood of working men, skilled in body, not 
mind, and concerned mostly with his belly and the pursuit of prey.  He is an 
archetypal hunter who uses his extraordinary strength and skill to satisfy basic, 
animal desires.  Nemo too is a hunter, but his quest is of the mind.  Yet despite the 
captain’s superiority in terms of power, wealth, and education, Ned Land is a rival 
because of the one thing they share:  a passion for liberty.   
 They are both men of action, but Nemo’s Logos dominates this manly 
attribute, removing his investment of libido from his actual flesh into the extensions 
of that flesh in steel and electrical apparatus.  Ned’s earthiness is an aspect of 
masculinity Nemo has rejected in his search for transcendence.  His spiritual quest for 
power in the machine he has built has removed him from his own embodied nature.  
Put another way, Ned achieves freedom in embodiment without being incorporated 
by the Heraclean institutions, while Nemo has utterly erased his identity and so his 
embodiment.  In this way, Nemo’s rivalry with Ned is a rivalry with his own shadow, 
with a repressed positive relationship to his embodied manhood.   
 The shadow-doubling is evident in other ways too.  Both share a love of food, 
though Nemo’s is the gourmet’s artistry and Ned’s a sailor’s raw appetite.  Both are 
“men of the seas” and make their lives in the Heraclean brotherhood perhaps most 
characteristic of the mythical Heracles:  that is, the crew of a ship like that of the Argo.  
The ship’s compliment is, even more than an army, the epitome of the enclosed 
Heraclean brotherhood structured on the exclusion of women.  Such exclusion has the 
effect of intensifying the homosocial bonds between men.  Women are, as I have 
suggested, reduced to distant ideals, representations in pictures or stories that can be 
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used for exchange purposes between men.  But the very structure of these tightly 
controlled erotic bonds is also founded on competition and displays of anger, and the 
most important way Ned mirrors Nemo is in his violence.   Ned Land’s “tempers” as 
well as his blood-lust are a foil for the ferocious hatred that consumes Nemo, but 
which he channels into his machinery.  Samuel Smiles delineates the contrast and its 
connection to the man-machine ideal: 
Strong temper may only mean a strong and excitable will.  Uncontrolled, it 
displays itself in fitful outbreaks of passion; but controlled and held in 
subjection—like steam pent-up within the organized mechanism of a steam 
engine, the use of which is controlled by slide-valves and governors and 
levers—it may become a source of energetic power and usefulness.  
(Character 172) 
 Similarly Ned’s voracious appetite is a shadowing of the appetite for 
knowledge exhibited by Nemo, Aronnax, and even Conseil.  Martin observes that 
Verne himself was a gourmand and that his characters are often obsessed with 
“consumption” (128).  The search for knowledge is represented as a form of 
consumption, a “nutritive epistemology” in which “consciousness is conceived on the 
model of the digestive system as an apparatus dedicated to the automatic 
internalization of external objects” (A. Martin 128-29).  The metaphor of the “appetite 
for knowledge” and the boy who “devours books” is also used by Samuel Smiles 
when writing of James Watt (Boulton and Watt 20).  “Diet,” says Martin, “not less than 
travel… furnishes an organizing metaphor, in the Voyages, for the accumulation of 
knowledge” (129).  Nemo, as the familiar Vernean savant-gourmet, exemplifies the 
union of nutrition and cognition.  Looking is devouring; scenes are banquets for the 
eye; books are eaten; the sum of scientific knowledge is a corpus; men are reduced to 
brains and stomachs.  “Polyphagy and polymathy, bulimia and epistemophilia, obey 
a single corporate impulse” (A. Martin 129-130).  The implication that the scientists’s 
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digestion of the natural world into discourse is a sublimation of the harpooner’s less 
refined orality is made clear through Conseil, who bridges between the two.  The 
valet mimics Aronnax’s science through the mechanical act of classification, while he 
is also most closely associated with Ned Land because they are themselves placed in 
the same subordinate class.  The Latin system of classifications, so beloved by Conseil, 
is also applied to people. 
 The images of consumption that exemplify the mirroring between Ned Land 
and Captain Nemo are proliferated throughout their adventures, as various animals 
are killed or try to eat the men.  Ned rescues Nemo from a shark and the captain 
returns the favor by rescuing Ned from the tentacles of a giant squid.  The submarine 
is almost consumed by the relentless Antarctic ice when they are trapped inside an 
iceberg, and in the end of the novel the Maelstrom swallows the ship whole.  All of 
which suggests that orality is symbolizing a larger fear-desire complex, one that I 
would suggest is rooted in the masculine ego’s fear of dissolution in the unconscious, 
in the body, and in the omnipotent mother.  Polyphagy and polymathy express the 
same desire to consume the mother’s body and thereby possess her fearful 
omnipotence. 
 Finally, one must observe that Captain Nemo’s competition with Ned is also a 
competition for the affections and allegiance of Professor Aronnax.  The one wants 
him to stay in the womb or the marriage bower, wedded in scientific passion; the 
other wants his help to escape and return to the surface world.  It is interesting that 
each choice is a choice for escape from a form of tyranny. 
 The sharing of the sea and emotional intimacy between Aronnax and Nemo 
continues until the captain encounters one of the ships of his secret enemies.  In this 
turning point—Part I, Chapter XXIII, entitled “Aegri Somnia” (“Bitter Dreams”)—
Nemo drugs Aronnax and his companions to prevent them knowing the dark 
violence he will perform.  Nevertheless, the violence leaves its trace, for one of 
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Nemo’s crew is fatally wounded and the captain asks Aronnax to save the man’s life.  
Even though he is a surgeon, Aronnax can do nothing and the dead man is buried 
and mourned in an undersea cemetery amid the corals.  There is a sharp movement in 
these episodes from hatred directed to the outside world and empathy directed to the 
inner brotherhood, upon which Nemo depends for what emotional support he has. 
 The placement of these events shows the subtlety of Verne’s plotting.  In the 
previous chapter the Nautilus had run aground on a reef off Papua.  Captain Nemo 
had demonstrated his power over the sea and the feminine, not by using force, but by 
waiting for the Moon to lift the tide high enough to float the submarine:  “Tomorrow, 
on the day stipulated, at the hour cited, the tide will lift it peacefully and it will 
resume its navigation” (264).  The gesture is elegant in its passivity, for he shows that 
his power is mental and mathematical, based in the understanding of the predictable 
laws of Nature.  It is the power of the Zen master almost, on the side of Receptivity 
more than Action, yet explicitly not intuition but calculated thinking.  At the same 
time, however, the ship is attacked by cannibals from the islands and Nemo calmly 
repels them with his “thunderbolt,” and electric charge applied to the railing of the 
main companionway.  The episode is used to demonstrate the height of technical man 
above such races:  “The presence of these cannibals affected [the crew] no more than 
the soldiers of a masked battery care for the ants that crawl over its front” (264).  The 
Promethean fire actually becomes the wall around the fortress ego in this image.  
Captain Nemo, here more than almost anywhere else, demonstrates his civilized 
status, his godlike elevation above “savages.”  That the natives symbolize the base, 
fleshly man is clear when Ned Land succumbs to the same fate.  As they watch the 
Papuans scream and flee, Conseil is “in ecstasy”; “Ned Land, carried away by his 
violent instincts, rushed onto the staircase.  But the moment he seized the rail with 
both hands, he, in turn, was knocked back” (265).  Reflecting on the episode the next 
day, Aronnax calls the submarine “an ark of safety which no profane hand might 
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touch without being thunderstruck.”  “My admiration,” he says, “was unbounded, 
first for the structure and then for the engineer who had created it” (266).   
 Here indeed is Prometheus untroubled by Jupiter, wielding the lightning bolt 
in the cause of human technical advancement.  The fire imagery is repeated when the 
Nautilus submerges and passes through a bank of phosphorescent “infusoria.”  The 
similarity of this phenomenon to the electrical light under the Earth in Journey to the 
Center is evident in the description:  
I was surprised by lightning in the midst of these luminous sheets, as 
though rivulets of lead had been melted in a burning furnace, or metallic 
masses brought to a white heat, so that, by force of contrast, certain 
portions of light appeared to cast a shade in the midst of the general blaze, 
from which all shade seemed banished.  No.  This was not the calm 
irradiation of our ordinary lighting [the Nautilus’s electric floodlight].  
There was unusual life and vigor; this was truly living light!  (270) 
 Like the burning bush in which the Lord confronted Moses, this is a “fire that 
doesn’t burn” (270).  The existence is peaceful and “enchanting”, a magical plenitude 
in which each of the men disports himself to his own pleasures.  Conseil “arranged 
and classed his zoophytes, his articulata, his mollusks, his fish” and “Ned, according 
to habit, tried to vary the diet on board.  Like snails, we were fixed to our shells, and I 
declare it is easy to live a snail’s life” (Pt.II, Ch. XXIII, 270).  It is leisurely and aimless, 
tranquil, as opposed to the goal-oriented ambition of masculine Activity.  This intra-
uterine bliss is disrupted by Nemo’s own goal-directed side:  an encounter with his 
sworn enemies.  The immersion in this androgynous infusion of fire and water is 
violated by war and to conceal this aspect of himself and, as he had warned them, to 
exclude them from being accessories, Nemo puts his three passengers into a literally 
unconscious state of drugged insensibility. 
 When the professor must examine the dying crewman, Nemo explains that the 
man had received the horrible blow to his head when one of the levers of the engine 
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broke.  He had thrown himself in front of Nemo’s lieutenant, taking the blow himself.  
“A brother sacrifices himself for his brother, a friend for a friend.  What could be 
simpler!  It is the rule on board the Nautilus!” (276).  When he learns the man cannot 
be saved, “Captain Nemo’s hands contracted; tears glistened in his eyes, which I 
thought incapable of shedding any” (276).  The burial of the man in the coral 
graveyard is one of the most moving and tender episodes of the book.  Here the 
Heraclean brotherhood’s animosity toward outsiders is balanced by their love for 
each other as comrades.  Like Frankenstein in front of Walton, Captain Nemo betrays 
his deep feelings, despite himself, but the events do not open him up to Professor 
Aronnax.  Instead, he retreats inward again so that Aronnax does not have the 
slightest contact with him for more than a month (a rather astonishing feat on a 
submarine but one that is repeated at intervals, so that Aronnax himself begins to 
think Nemo has left the ship for periods).  But, as before, Nemo suddenly reappears 
to invite him on a third undersea excursion, this time to the Manaar pearl beds off the 
coast of India. 
 The scene in the pearl bed is erotic and symbolic in a way different from the 
episode in the coral graveyard, for here the captain and the professor are joined in an 
intimate sharing, a sign of Nemo’s desire to make Aronnax his friend and brother.  In 
Verne’s usual style and the objective voice of Aronnax, the scenery is described as if 
its scientific interest is everything.  But the giant and priceless pearl imbedded in the 
thick flesh of its huge oyster, surrounded by a protective cave, is a vivid image of the 
Great Mother, combining images of womb, vagina, and clitoris.  It is thus suggestive 
of a deified Nature, freed from the commodification the pearl beds represent.  The 
moment when Nemo restrains Aronnax from touching the pearl is important 
precisely because he is resisting the mentality of conquest.  In this shrine the oyster 
shell of Venus remains unravaged by human exploitation.  I am struck, too, when I 
read the mixture of reverence and empirical appraisal in Aronnax’s voice in this 
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scene, that there is, in this “pearl of ten millions,” a vivid symbol of the Self.  The 
pearl’s perfect roundness, size, numinous lustre, all suggest the circular imagery not 
only of the ouroboric unitary reality, but of the deeper psychic wholeness of the Self 
from which both Aronnax and Nemo are disconnected.   
 Where the cross dominated the scene of the undersea funeral, the circular or 
spherical dominates here.  The circle squared, which Jung called the mandala, 
symbolizes the wholeness that is the deeply hidden treasure the ego must seek 
through individuation.  It is through the mandala that one may disassociate Self from 
archetypal Mother and thereby see the “centering” complex that unifies all the 
unconscious personalities of the psyche not as something outside one’s body or being 
but within.  With this realization a man takes the first step also towards realizing that 
the feminine is within, a part of his wholeness, not something for which he must 
nostalgically and tragically long.  Finally, I would read this episode as a kind of 
symbolic marriage between Aronnax and Nemo, a symbol, that is, of the love both 
men wish they could establish and retain openly. 
 The vaginal symbolism of 20,000 Leagues is so often repeated that it can 
justifiably be considered the “return of the repressed.”  Without analyzing all the 
instances in detail, I will mention the major ones.  The passage of the Nautilus through 
the “Arabian Tunnel” under the Sinai Peninsula immediately follows the exchange of 
the beautiful mother’s body in the pearl bed.  Again, the feat is not only a heroic act of 
prowess and an exchange between captain and professor, but another instance of 
Nature’s (and Nemo’s) secrets dwarfing the feats of human engineering—the tunnel 
passes directly below the place where de Lesseps was excavating the Suez canal.  
Nemo himself takes the submarine’s wheel and he shares this display of his prowess 
in the dead of night only with Aronnax.  In the next chapter (Pt. II, Ch. 7) the Captain 
shows the naturalist an undersea volcanic eruption, and this symbol of smoldering 
chthonic power is repeated three chapters later when the two scientists make an 
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underwater mountain-climbing expedition in the mid-Atlantic.  There they look 
down upon a huge submarine volcano that illuminates the ruins of the lost 
civilization of Atlantis.   
 This moment is certainly a climax of wonder for Aronnax (the climaxes seem 
each greater than the last) and reminds me of Carl Jung’s own formative dream about 
the multilayered unconscious.  Jung’s dream took him down from the rooms of his 
own modern house into a series of subterranean cellars, each representing an older 
period of human history.  This archaeological metaphor for the exploration of the 
unconscious was widely applied to other branches of science.  Rosalind Williams has 
noted the prevalence of the metaphor of excavation for the pursuit of truth, and also 
the vast amount of digging that was going on in the nineteenth century.  The 
reconstruction of the Paris sewers and streets, the blasting of railway tunnels through 
the mountains of Europe and America, the ever deeper coal and mineral mines made 
possible by the application of Watt’s steam engine to pumping systems, were all 
examples of the engineer’s power to delve downward.  These echoed the even more 
astonishing discoveries emerging from archeological digs in Egypt and Mesopotamia 
and the paleontological speculations that emerged from the discovery of early human 
remains and dinosaur skeletons.   
 Professor Aronnax, who was detoured into the search for the sea monster, was 
returning home from a trip to the Nebraska badlands where fossil remains and 
geologic strata were prevalent.  In the 1860s, when Aronnax’s adventure was set, the 
world was being continually astounded by the discoveries of archeology.  In 1868, 
while Verne was writing 20,000 Leagues, four skeletons were found during the 
construction of a railway line near Les Eyzies in France.  These “Cro-Magnons,” as 
they were called, were clearly the successors to the earlier discovered Neanderthal 
men and scientists were suggesting that they were distant relatives of modern 
humans, an idea which shattered the established Biblical account of human history.  
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Archeology, the newest science of the time, dealt with the oldest things, what Sir John 
Lubbock called prehistory (Williams 38). 
 Verne was fully aware of these discoveries and the scene in Atlantis is again 
intended to demonstrate Nemo’s superhuman power as a scientist, capable of gaining 
access to the deepest layers of human civilization.  Archeology and the vast, even 
infinite, expanses of time opened by the new understanding of the geologic record 
created a temporal abyss, and the human sublime.  In Nemo’s discovery of Atlantis 
by the light of volcanic fire, there is a sense of Virgil showing the sublimity of Hell to 
Dante and a whisper of Shelley’s “Ozymandias.”  It is a confrontation with the cyclic 
nature of life and death, and the fact that humanity—even human techne—is bound 
up in it.  Aronnax views the volcanic fire as an emblem of the vital creative energy of 
Nature, the channel through which the world is born. 
 Another highly charged scene comes when the Nautilus puts into its secret, 
volcanic harbor for refueling.  The harbor is in a subterranean lake inside the hollow 
cone, almost cut off from sunlight.  That birds, plants, and other forms of life could 
thrive in a subterranean world may seem a strange nineteenth-century fantasy.  But 
psychologically, it seems to be an important dream of the age, as Williams has 
demonstrated.  The second industrial revolution and its ubiquitous excavating had 
combined with Edmund Burke’s theory of the sublime to produce a mythos of an 
underground paradise, usually made possible by technology.  The vast, electrically 
illuminated interior space in Journey to the Center of the Earth appears in many novels 
of the later nineteenth century.13  It is a sublime space that represents the transition 
from the ancient world’s view of the underworld as “ugly, repulsive, slimy, dark” to 
the perception of it as a “magical paradise” (Williams 95).    “By the middle of the 
nineteenth century” writes Williams, “the highly ambivalent emotions aroused by 
subterranean sublimity had begun to yield to unambiguous appreciation of 
subterranean beauty” (95).  This dream is linked to the increasing actual experience of 
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artificial light in underground excavations or artificially immense spaces, but the 
aesthetic fantasy of “an artificial environment where technological and artistic beauty 
coincide” is also linked to the complete resolution of social conflicts “thanks to the 
definitive conquest of nature” (Williams 101).   
 Williams also notes, however, that this dream of technology and plenty 
eliminating conflict tends to rely on a fantasized power source like electricity, 
“technologies that permit direct dominion over nature without the mediation of 
human labor” (100).  This elision of the obvious division of labor that must exist 
between Captain Nemo and his men is a further illustration of the fantasy of equality, 
upon which the Heraclean brotherhood depends.  The “leader” must remain one of 
the boys, so to speak, rather than be seen as a “father” and so categorically different 
from his subordinated sons.  But Nemo partakes of the archetypal quality of the 
sublime father more than he does the ethos of brotherhood.  He is a benign despot 
rendered good though his hatred of despotism.  He is a savior-god, not an elected 
leader and peace is preserved in his community through his men’s unquestioning 
belief in his intellectual superiority. 
 Thus, in the secret harbor under the volcanic island, Nemo stops to take on the 
sodium that runs his batteries.  Under the mountain, his men mine coal to fuel this 
process.  Since the coal supply is ostensibly under the sea, Nemo does not see this as a 
violation of his determination to live wholly without the products of the land.  Not 
only is the exploitation of human labor elided in this episode, but so is the 
increasingly obvious point that if the Nautilus’s machinery was built in the factories of 
Europe and America, considerable manufacturing capacity would be needed to keep 
it in repair.  Instead of this, the machinery is given the patina of magic and 
indestructibility.  Like its owner, the Nautilus is ageless because it exists beyond the 
bar of the Real in the underworld of the dead.   
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 This is one reason why the coal mines are not even described by Aronnax, who 
sticks to his usual enumerations of the flora and fauna of the volcano’s interior.  The 
persistence of Nature’s fecundity even in the most inhospitable parts of the globe is 
an archetypal invocation of the union of environment and the body of the mother in 
the pre-Oedipal state, an invocation of the chthonic Earth Mother.  In this instance, 
the volcanic lake, entered through a vaginal tunnel from the sea, links the Earth and 
Sea aspects of the Great Mother.  Significantly, while exploring this uterine cave 
Aronnax falls asleep and dreams.  Napping in “a magnificent grotto” inside the larger 
cavern of the volcano he dreams that his “existence was reduced to the vegetative life 
of a simple mollusk” (385).   
 The scene is almost an infinity of minute enclosures—in the “thousands of 
shellfish” spread upon the lake shore and in that quintessential image of matrifocal 
social harmony, a beehive full of honey.  The world is hollow, notes one critic, 
“[d]iscontinuous, porous, perforated, its surface… ruptured by innumerable 
orifices… indicating the presence of an enticing profondeur… Our honeycomb globe 
presents the dangerous and voluptuous feature of multiple orality: its crust is 
envisaged as a series of mouths” (A. Martin 137-38).  The Empedocles complex, so 
evident in this scene under the volcano, enacts a desire to be swallowed.  “The 
libidinous occupation of the voyageur consists in occupying any available apertures… 
Thus the volcano is, among other things, the gateway to the sphere of Eros” (A. 
Martin 138). 
 In all of these episodes Verne has woven images of primal unity in a triangular 
homosocial exchange between Nemo and Aronnax.  It problematizes the love these 
men feel for each other, and for Nature, and the conflict of these desires with the 
masculine repression of Eros.  Both men are scientists who revere the rational and the 
mathematical.  Both revere the power of technology, one as spectator, the other as 
creator.  But both men are also inscribed within an ideology of exploitation.  Captain 
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Nemo repudiates tyranny and war, yet operates a machine capable of destroying 
warships as easily as threading a needle through sailcloth.  He works to support the 
efforts of rebels and keeps pictures of famous historic freedom-fighters on his cabin 
wall, but during the course of the story fate places him in the situation where to retain 
his privacy, he must keep three entirely guiltless men prisoner.  What is more, one of 
these men, Aronnax is a companion who might lift a great weight of loneliness. 
 At the same time, however, Aronnax is a perpetual reminder of the society 
Nemo has renounced.  His title can only serve as an ironic signifier of the institutional 
structure of scientific power.  The essence of science and its power does not lie in 
isolated individuals, or DaVinciesque geniuses, but in the continuous accumulation of 
data and theory of ordinary scientists like Aronnax.  Chesneaux has noted that Verne 
would move away from this view of scientific individualism as his life and the course 
of world politics moved on.  I believe he is already problematizing such fantasies of 
freedom in this early work.  Nemo can build his ship and operate it in perfect 
independence because of his vast wealth and because he used the finest 
manufacturing firms of the world to fabricate the parts for his submarine.  He is thus 
historically dependent on the civilization he deplores, and in the second half of the 
novel it is revealed in a series of increasingly violent and stormy conflicts with 
Nature, that Nemo’s scientific libertarian ideology reproduces, rather than repudiates, 
the will to power of the European tyrants he has fled. 
 After his subvolcanic epiphany, Aronnax is left alone to pursue his own 
scientific observations with his companions.  The captain refused to accompany his 
passengers onto the dry land of the volcanic beach for the sake of his renunciation of 
that element.  But in some way, all the more because of his absence, I feel that 
Aronnax’s dream is a dream of union with his hero.  For Conseil earlier compared 
Nemo to a mollusk in his shell and in Aronnax’s dream the vegetative existence is an 
intuition of the root of psyche and being in that “lower” state of natural union and 
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unconsciousness.  Entering the inside of the shell, Aronnax gives himself up to stay 
with Nemo, twins eternally in the womb, shadow and ego reunited in narcissistic 
embrace.   
 I read this episode, like the ones in the chapter “Bitter Dreams” and in the coral 
graveyard, as an intense moment of trial for the love between these two men, not 
because it leads visibly to their increased intimacy in the action of the novel, but 
precisely because it does not.  Verne was expressing something here that was 
unspeakable in the medium in which he wrote.  The homoerotic basis of masculinity 
could only be troped in terms of distanced dignity, admiration for displays of 
masculine power, and aloof withdrawal.  But it is precisely in Nemo’s mysterious 
withdrawals—disappearances in fact—that I read the intensity of his struggle with his 
own desires.  When Eros emerges into consciousness, Nemo represses it in fear 
(Phobos), withdrawing to his desk and his algebraic equations.   
 The Professor sometimes comes across books left open by the Captain in the 
library, but Nemo seems absorbed in his “work,” whatever that is exactly.  In the 
night, Aronnax hears “the melancholy sounds from the organ” (270).  Then Nemo 
emerges again from seclusion and, on the pretense of verifying the depth of the 
soundings in the Sargasso Sea, performs another titanic demonstration of his Phallic 
prowess.  He uses all the Nautilus’s power to drive down to the very bottom of the 
abyss past the depth where animal or vegetable life exists.  This is a penetration to the 
depths of the Great Mother beyond her fecundity and into her terrible aspect as the 
devouring goddess of death.   
 For an awful moment it seems as if the submarine will implode.  But, of course, 
it doesn’t.  Far from it.  At the ocean bottom, under unimaginable pressures, Nemo 
calmly permits Aronnax to photograph the landscape through the panels of the salon.  
What more perfect image of the objectified exchange of Nature between two urbane 
men?  As always, on the narrative surface it seems like no more than a celebration of 
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human engineering, but the explosive, vertical return of the Nautilus to the surface is 
as vividly phallic as it is orgasmic.     
 The audacity of this exhibition of strength is redoubled in the next chapter.  
Having sought out the Terrible Mother in the dead reaches of the sea floor, Captain 
Nemo encounters a tableau of Nature at war with itself:  a school of black whales 
being attacked by sperm whales. Nemo’s hatred of the sperm whales seems 
motivated by some symbolic association out of all proportion to a naturalist’s 
temperament.  One moment he forbids Ned Land, the harpooner, to kill the black 
whales, delivering a diatribe against the barbarism of whalers:  “People like you, 
Master Land, are very wrong to destroy kind, inoffensive creatures like black whales 
and right whales” (281).  He argues ecologically that the extermination of species will 
only upset the balances of Nature.  But the next moment he sights a herd of sperm 
whales which he describes as “terrible animals.  I’ve sometimes seen them in herds of 
two or three hundred!  They’re cruel and destructive, and people are right to kill 
them” (281).  There is more than a little of Captain Ahab in this scene.  Just as Verne 
would out-Crusoe Defoe in Mysterious Island, so now he out-Ahabs Melville.  Nemo 
proceeds to use the Nautilus as a superhuman harpoon, slaughtering the huge 
creatures in defense of the black whales until, as Aronnax describes it, “The sea was 
covered with mutilated carcasses. . .The water had turned red for several miles in 
either direction and the Nautilus was floating in a sea of blood” (283). 
 This manifestation of phallic aggression vividly captures the contradiction in 
Nemo as hero.  Ostensibly siding with the “kind, inoffensive creatures” he is capable 
of violence that leaves even Ned Land aghast.  Evaluating the aftermath, Ned says 
“there’s no doubt about it, it was a terrible sight.  But I’m a hunter, not a butcher, and 
this was nothing but a massacre” (284).  The rivalry and jealousy between Land and 
Nemo is intense here and distracted from confrontation only by an even stranger 
incident.  Discovering a mother black whale floating dead with its calf, Nemo 
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dispatches his men to milk the creature.  “The captain offered me a glass of this still 
warm milk,” writes Aronnax but, “I could not refrain from showing my distaste for 
this sort of drink” (284).  After reassurances that it is as good as cow’s milk, Nemo 
wins the professor over in a striking exchange of the mother’s body and her power of 
feeding. 
 The whole episode of the whales expresses the Vernean ambivalence over 
consumption and swallowing.  The sperm whales are described as deformed, 
“nothing but mouth and teeth.”  They are the vagina dentata, the omnipotent mother’s 
fantasized desire to eat her baby, and the infant’s own aggressive mouth at its 
mother’s breast.  They are the devouring father too, the ruthless aggression of colonial 
powers and Nemo’s own despotic containment of his captive guests.  The Nautilus, is 
explicitly compared by Aronnax to the whale that swallowed Jonah, making Nemo 
not merely a kind of Yahweh but a Saturn who swallows his children.  The 
consumption of this Terrible Father by the Terrible Mother is played out dramatically 
in the adventure that immediately follows, the descent under the Antarctic ice.  
 
(3) The Great Mother and Violent Waters 
 In a novel full of descents, the voyage beneath the ice is undoubtedly the most 
intense, for the South Pole is the ultimate underworld from the point of view of 
European globes.  Nemo again pushes the Nautilus to its limits to penetrate the 
Antarctic ice barrier to the ice-locked sea which Verne hypothesized lay at the pole 
itself.  Captain Nemo succeeds in reaching the earthly nadir and claims it like a 
colonial conqueror with his black flag.  This is another momentous step, for Nemo, 
the anarchist whose flag bears a large N reminiscent of Napoleon, enacts the very 
imperial mentality of conquest which drove him to the sea in the first place.  
Moreover, for the scientific mind, the conquest of the pole, where all lines of 
longitude join in a single point, is a symbolic conquest of the entire world.  That we 
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are meant to see hubris in this action is clear when the explorers, venturing back 
under the ice, are trapped by an overturned iceberg and nearly suffocated.  They are 
entombed in a deadly womb of ice that vividly enacts the terror of engulfment one 
saw in Axel’s underground dark night of the soul in Center of the Earth.  The inside of 
this womb is the opposite of the uterine warmth and security of the good mother; its 
interior fluid is rapidly freezing solid, swallowing the Nautilus even more mercilessly 
than the submarine has swallowed up its captives. 
 The feat of engineering that Nemo and his men perform to escape their icy 
tomb is a triumph of Logos over the mindlessness of matter.  It is a significant 
imagining of death and rebirth, but the escape does not apparently appease the 
devouring forces of the unconscious for it is quickly followed by a return of the 
submerged instincts in more mobile form—a school of giant squid.  The “ten or 
twelve” squid are the perfect symbolic complement to the Nautilus as I have been 
reading it, for like the submarine the squid combine masculine and feminine icons.  
Their bodies and tentacles are phallic, but their horned beaks at the center of the 
tentacles are the very image of the vagina dentata.  As an image of phallus, the ten 
arms of a squid have the same kind of significance as serpents.  Aronnax relates them 
to the Greek Furies, and he might also have said the Gorgons.   
 This chain of associations draws out the significance of the squid clearly.  They 
are avatars of the Terrible Mother again, but an archaic feminine force which seems to 
have seized the power of the phallus for itself.  This is not the Phallus as image of the 
solar Logos, the rule of the sword and the law of the fathers; it is the chthonic phallus 
(small-p), the instinctual, embodied, masculine Eros which is repressed by too great 
an emphasis on Logos.  And so Captain Nemo’s battle with the squid is a battle 
consistent with the fight I have been tracing throughout the novel, a fight against his 
own embodied Eros, his sexual nature, and his affections.  But the giant tentacles are 
also the inflated priapic Phallos—the negative, megalomaniac form of Dionysian 
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generativity.  It is Eros repressed by the masculine ego into the depths of the 
unconscious, back to the Great Mother, from whence it suddenly erupts into Phobos.  
The attack of Nemo’s own obsessive desire for power and vengeance is reflected as 
the revenge of Nature on her would-be conqueror.  Again Nemo triumphs, but 
narrowly.  Covered in blood at the end of the battle, he has once more lost a crewman.  
Symbolically the loss is not only an assault on his affections, but the loss of himself.   
 The Captain has yet another phallic apotheosis when he lashes himself to the 
pitching deck in the midst of a hurricane.  The spiral meeting of elements seems again 
to be the signature of the Great Mother, and the hurricane for all its destruction is 
described by Aronnax as the very breath of life for the seas, drawing oxygen into the 
waves.  As Bachelard remarks:  “In its violence, water takes on a characteristic 
wrath… it is easily given all the psychological features of a form of anger” (Water and 
Dreams 15).  Amid this elemental violence, the submarine pitches vertically into the 
air and catches the lightening on its spur like a lightening rod.  Apart from the 
slaughter of the whales, this scene is the most vivid allusion to Captain Ahab and one 
cannot escape the growing sense of Nemo’s madness.  The Promethean imagery 
precedes the final attack on a warship of the hated, but still nameless, empire that 
destroyed his family.   
 Professor Aronnax, however impressed he has been by the conquest of Nature 
by Logos, draws the line at the slaughter of other men, but when he attempts to avert 
the attack, Nemo rages at him, saying, "I am the law and justice!  I am the oppressed, 
and there is the oppressor!  It is through him I lost everything I ever loved, cherished 
or worshipped—my country, wife, children, father, mother!  I saw them all perish!  
Everything I hate is there!" (360).  Nemo’s assumption of the mantle of judgment, like 
his unfurling of the conqueror's flag at the south pole, betrays his self-contradiction 
and the element of projection in his hatred.  When the professor stands beside Nemo 
in the salon watching the sailors drown on the masts of the sinking vessel, Aronnax's 
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hair stands on end and he describes the captain as a "terrible dispenser of justice, [a] 
veritable archangel of hatred"  (363).  Nemo is both Jehovah and Satan, Zeus and 
Prometheus, a demonic force of destruction and defiance against vast powers of 
oppression—governments or gods—but in his own imperial ambitions over the sea, 
he is no better than his enemies.  Yet, immediately after this transfiguration, Nemo 
removes to his cabin and Aronnax watches.  "On the opposite wall of his room, 
beneath the paintings of his heroes, I saw the portrait of a young woman and two 
small children.  After gazing at it for several moments, Captain Nemo stretched out 
his arms toward the picture, sank to his knees and burst into deep sobs"  (363). 
 Verne leaves us in ambiguity, not knowing whether Nemo is on the verge of 
giving in to Aronnax’s moral remonstrance or not.  Aronnax himself is too frightened 
by what he has witnessed to resist any longer Ned Land’s urging that they escape.  As 
he steals toward the escape rendezvous, the professor encounters his shadow once 
more but already it is as if the two exist in different planes.  Walking in his library, 
Nemo looks right through Aronnax and so the last chance for connection slips away 
into darkness.   
 The captain, withdrawn into his shell, has apparently allowed the Nautilus to 
blunder into the Maelstrom off the coast of Norway.  Aronnax calls that mythic 
whirlpool “the Navel of the Ocean” (369) and it is the novel’s final symbol of the 
devouring and regenerating Great Mother, drawing Nemo down into her body.  It 
signifies the pull into the cycle of generativity, not simply into death but into that 
ecological life where life and death are united systematically.  The metaphor of the 
navel suggests the rebirth of the solar hero, not to a triumph of a technological 
paradise, but to the state of being to which such dreams point:  a state of union 
between conscious and unconscious, between human Logos and the undifferentiated 
flux of natural life.  This spiraling force of nature is the fulfillment of the hurricane 
which Nemo earlier defied, an image of inescapable embodiment and connection to 
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Nature.  The Ouroboric spiral is the final sign that the masculine ego is fatally rooted 
in its chthonic opposite, the Mother-complex.  Consciousness is precariously written 
on the fluid surface of the unconscious. 
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(4) The Island Ego 
 Verne brought Captain Nemo back as the “genius of the island” in Mysterious 
Island (1874).  I will not analyze the novel in detail, yet the sequel to 20,000 Leagues 
Under the Sea is an important epilogue to the story of Nemo, for in this modernization 
of Robinson Crusoe, Verne was dealing with one of the most important imaginal 
symbols of modern Western history, that of the island.  Capable of symbolizing 
individualism, atomistic man, national isolationism, or the dream of the hortus 
conclusus and the whole Self, the island and its genre, the Robinsonade, captured the 
fascination of readers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as it continues to do 
today.  It is a prominent theme in children’s literature,14 and, as such, occupies an 
important place in childhood imagination.   
 The association of the archetypal scientist with the wilderness isolation of 
islands is manifestly appropriate as an expression of the fortress ego and its desire to 
exercise control over a whole world.  Verne’s Mysterious Island has frequently been 
discussed as a fantasy of the human project of building a civilization.  The emphasis 
has come from Marxian scholars such as Angenot and Machery, so that economics 
and the question of the type of society created by the castaways has been emphasized.  
Angenot argues contra Machery to suggest that far from a reproduction of capitalism, 
the social order of the islanders is a communal and democratic one in which everyone 
shares the means of production.  Nevertheless, Cyrus Smith and his ability to create 
modern technical wonders is at the very center of the society and the novel. 
 Cyrus Smith (as his name suggests) is a Saint-Simonian engineer-king.  His 
usual epithet is “the engineer” and his inventive brilliance exemplifies the conflation 
of Prometheus and Christ.  Nearly his first act, after he has mysteriously been brought 
back from the brink of death, is to bring fire to the other castaways by removing the 
two crystals of his pocket watch and filling them with water to create a lens that will 
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focus the rays of the sun.  But the Prometheanism is overshadowed by aid given by 
some unknown benefactor.  Until nearly the end of the novel the castaways are not 
sure whether the strange events definitely indicate the presence of someone else on 
the island or not.  In the end they are led (by a telegraph wire!) to Captain Nemo who 
has survived all his crew and retreated, now completely alone, into the subterranean 
womb of Lincoln Island’s central volcano.  The Nautilus, trapped by the shifting of 
water and earth as the volcano prepares to erupt, is finally entombed with its godlike 
captain. 
 Nemo, as Froidefond observes, seems more supernatural in this novel than in 
20,000 Leagues.  He is dying, old, with a flowing white beard, and so he becomes 
something other than he was when Professor Aronnax knew him.  He has become the 
lonely architect-God at the center of the universe, providing secret assistance for the 
worthy men of the new miniature society that has sprung up on his island.  The 
possessor of miraculous technology, Nemo, who is now revealed to be Prince Dakkar, 
admires Cyrus Smith and his comrades.  There are many things that one could say 
about Mysterious Island but what particularly strikes me as a kind of closure to the 
symbolism of 20,000 Leagues is the image of Nemo as “spiritual father.”  It has been 
speculated (by Moré and others) that Jules Verne’s life and work are unified by a 
quest for a spiritual father, one that can compensate for the disappointment he felt 
from his real father, Pierre, who was notably stern and businesslike with his son and 
thought a career in law or the stock exchange a more respectable path than the 
pursuit of writing.  One can see something of Jules Verne’s own reclusive and quiet 
personality in the withdrawal of Captain Nemo to his private refuge.  Fixed in space, 
the Nautilus has become, finally, an enclosed garden of scientific order, filled with the 
meticulously labeled collections of shells and sea creatures.   
 In the context of the comparisons I have drawn between 20,000 Leagues and 
Frankenstein, one cannot help but be struck by the similarity between the masterful 
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dying speech of Victor Frankenstein and that of Captain Nemo.  Both men speak from 
a position of multiplied immobility.  They are dying aboard ships locked in place by 
ice in one case and water enclosed by earth in the other.  Frankenstein’s genius burns 
out amid the frozen waste; Nemo’s in the conflagration of a volcanic eruption.  Yet, if 
Frankenstein’s end seems to underline the futility of his hubris and his inability to 
join another in love, Captain Nemo’s death partakes of the re-birth imagery 
associated in Verne with the volcano.  The castaways are saved and their brotherhood 
solidified as they return to America to found a community in Iowa that 
commemorates Lincoln Island.  Nemo, who has escaped an apparent death by water 
once, is absorbed not only by the matrix of the sea, but by the fires of the Earth’s 
renewal. 
 Mysterious Island is an almost uniformly positive celebration of the Heraclean 
brotherhood of scientific and technical men.  The castaways form a society completely 
without women or sexuality, a brotherhood that revolves around food and the 
cultivation of the island’s colonial possibilities.  Cyrus Smith is the leader who truly 
replaces the old, patriarchal father of the Periclean aristocracy.  Nemo, who seemed 
somehow too despotic, his followers too faceless, to represent the leader of a 
brotherhood of peers, is revealed to be the Periclean father-ideal.  So revealed, he dies 
and the engineer, Smith, asserts that the progress of science must go on and that 
Nemo was too devoted to stasis and the past.  Nevertheless, the sociability of the 
castaways—taking in even the criminal and half-savage Ayrton—is an illusion of the 
archetypal Heracles complex.  For it is only by excluding women and by reproducing 
a subservient servant class in Neb and even in Pencroft, the sailor, to a degree, that 
such an ideal, peaceable society can exist.  Even more pointedly, it is only because 
Lincoln Island is completely uninhabited that the colonial venture can go forward to 
tame and exploit nature without destroying a native population.  Not only is the 
assistance of Nemo required for their successes, but also the equally fortuitous 
390 
sustained insulation from any other colonists.  Ayrton is the only real exception and 
his reception into the community hardly raises the question of how Cyrus Smith and 
his followers might deal with a shipload of other settlers.  The triumph of rationality, 
is, in other words, too simple, too Narcissistic, even if it is a group-Narcissism.  
Verne’s celebration, even here, deconstructs itself through the inclusion of Captain 
Nemo.  The foundations of the ideal of Heraclean brotherhood will not stand scrutiny 
by the very rational analysis upon which this one is supposed to be based.  Ultimately 
it will only work with the divine authorial help of the deus ex machina. 
 In H. G. Wells’s novel The Island of Dr. Moreau one can see a revision of the 
scientist in the island theme.  A grim story indeed, Dr. Moreau, the vivisectionist is 
the shadow of Cyrus Smith.  Moreau is a physician whose callous disregard for the 
physical and psychological pain he inflicts on his experimental victims is the 
inversion of the Vernean paradise where bodies are scarcely described.  The sexual 
implications of The Island of Dr. Moreau created a scandal when the book was 
published.  In it, Wells suggested that the Beast women made out of various animals 
serve as sexual objects for the men and that the various species interact sexually.  The 
narrative is a nightmarish journey of a man who starts out as a wealthy gentleman, 
shipwrecked and almost dead.  He passes through this violence into a world where 
the bestial interior of men is brought out through the surgeon’s ability to penetrate 
every cavity and organ of the living body.  The spectacle is a fantasy of an age when 
antiseptic surgery and anesthesia were challenging the ancient association of doctors 
with horribly painful “cures.”  What is particularly horrific about Moreau is the 
aimlessness of his scientific experiments.  He is not motivated by any desire to cure 
disease or even, as in Frankenstein’s case, to discover the secret of life.  Instead his 
pursuit of an idealized creature with the “beast” removed from it, is a perverse 
fantasy of the split between the solar and chthonic phallus I have traced in this study.  
Moreau is more Jove than Prometheus, as is emphasized by the resemblance between 
391 
his tortured victims and the titan chained and forever vivisected by the eagle of 
Jupiter. 
 I end with these two works only to illustrate that the thesis I am pursuing—the 
patterns of splitting, the symbolism of fire, water, the island, the Edenic “field of 
treasures,” and the godlike Logos of a masculinity devoted to instrumental reason—
can be fruitfully pursued in many other works besides those I have chosen as my 
paradigmatic examples.  H. G. Wells, Arthur Conan Doyle, and many other writers 
into the twentieth century would continue the dialogue surrounding this construction 
of masculinity.  In the 1980’s and 90’s one finds the theme expressed in science fiction 
films and TV, where the machine-man consummates the merging of the technician 
and his machine.  Having elevated a technical Logos to the godhead, men are faced 
with joining their ego’s not simply to the brotherhood of scientists and engineers, but 
imaginally to their machines themselves to partake of that godlike power.  The Six 
Million Dollar Man, Robocop, Darth Vader, or the ubiquitous cyborgs of science 
fiction and cyberpunk, play out the themes of the technician-hero in a way that often 
glorifies the reduction of men to so many interchangeable parts and asserts the 
superiority of the machine over the hopelessly uncontrollable and weak flesh.   
 One of the most fascinating denouements of a machine-man in recent film was 
the discovery by Luke Skywalker that Darth Vader was his father (vater, after all).  
The sickly pale father who cannot even breathe unassisted, and in whose armor battle 
tank and iron lung are combined, is a startling confirmation of the thesis that modern 
masculinity is rooted in a lack of connection between fathers and sons and the 
inherited hatred and disregard for the body as the source of vulnerability.  In this 
famous Dark Father, one sees the dying Captain Nemo, the dying Frankenstein, the 
dying Martians of Wells, longing for powers beyond imagining, struggling against 
the despised mortal clay.   Inside their machinery or their theoretical dreams and 
conquests, they are oblivious to the possibilities of intimate relationship, nurturance, 
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harmony with a natural environment, harmony with one’s own body and the difficult 
work of sustained love. 
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Notes 
 
1 Froidefond sets up an opposition between Cyrus Smith, the hero of Mysterious Island and Captain Nemo, who 
occupies a hidden role in that novel as the secret benefactor and savior of the castaways.  Froidefond casts Nemo 
in the role of “sorcerer” as an opposite to Smith the engineer.  His table of oppositions is instructive and 
illustrates the solar/chthonic polarity (above/below) as well as the Heraclean/Periclean tension I find in Nemo’s 
character (brother/father).  Some of his pairs seem more dubious, however, such as Smith’s relatively unwealthy, 
bourgeois “capacité” versus Nemo’s aristocratic inherited wealth.  Nemo’s capacity as an engineer is amazing 
and far greater than any competence Smith displays.  Moreover, Smith’s survival and some of his projects are 
subordinated to Nemo’s by the simple fact that only Nemo’s intervention makes them possible.  Nemo’s apparent 
“sorcery” is only engineering taken to a marvelous extreme, an opposition which Froidefond perhaps implies in 
the formula mesuré/demesuré.  I cannot concur in the simple association of Smith with nature and Nemo with 
artifice, quite the reverse being true in some ways, but his assertion that Smith represents “progress” while Nemo 
represents “cataclysm” suggests very cogently the association of the eruption of unconscious contents with 
cataclysm.   
2 Charts and maps are obviously ubiquitous in Verne’s novels.  It is worth noting that even today, in an age when 
the world has been completely charted, the act of mapping is still a powerful metaphor for scientific mastery, as 
in genetic mapping.  An understanding of topography, after all, permits prediction, of an enemy’s maneuvers, or a 
flooding river’s course, or one’s own path.  In this way, a map is an engagement with time as well as space. 
3 Compère attributes to Marcel Moré the observation that Nemo echoes Odysseus (“Approche” 12).  Moré’s 
comment may be found on p. 23 of Le Très Curieux Jules Verne. 
4 I am indebted to Vara Neverow’s delineation of this distinction in a presentation titled “The Politics of 
Incorporation and Embodiment:  He, She, and It as a Feminist Epistemology of Resistance,” which was delivered 
at the 1993 conference of the Society for Utopian Studies, St. Louis, Missouri. 
5 Another reading is given by Andrew Martin:  “The closed, confined, well-ordered space (of vitrines, 
submarines, classifications, cerveaux, orbits) …is the physical counterpart to the closure of history that is the 
prerequisite of epistemic totalization” (155). 
6 It is interesting that Adas, in his study of colonialist anthropology and machinery, notes that timepieces were 
considered by the African explorers of the nineteenth century to be “tangible links to the more ‘advanced’ 
societies they had left behind” (245).  Explorers and their families felt “more civilized” once they had unpacked 
their mantle clocks (246).  One can connect this most obviously with Verne’s Phileas Fogg, but Captain Nemo’s 
chronometers and other instruments are the objects of great admiration and discussion as well.  They signify not 
only circulation, but the regulation of life and—especially—work.  Andrew Martin notes:  “Human 
distinctiveness and dignity are derived… from the ability to quantify time and space.  The heroes of L’Île 
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Mystérieuse, whose first task it is to measure the meridian and plot their position, know that Ayrton… has been 
reduced to… savagery because he no longer knows what year it is.  The visible signs of this obsession are 
omnipresent:  watches, clocks, barometers, speedometers, altimeters, etc.” (135). 
7 Andrew Martin attributes to Foucault the observation that “Vernean man… is a homo calculator [who] 
subordinates the task of description to the technique of computation” (A. Martin 134). 
8 Andrew Martin argues that while Machery sees the Voyages as “les aventures de la ligne droite” (the adventures 
of the straight line) and Serres sees them as variations of the circle, the Vernean traveler actually seeks “the 
infinite line postulated by Nicholas of Cusa which would be simultaneously a straight line, a triangle, a circle, and 
a sphere… the maximum absolutum and the maximum contractum” (135).  The Vernean scientist “dreams of 
being like the God of Nicholas’s mathematical theology, simultaneously at the centre and at the circumference of 
the all-embracing sphere that is the universe” (136).  This is the same metaphor used by Jung to describe the Self 
archetype and its God-image.  The Self is the whole and the central organizing principle that directs wholeness.  
The ego’s desire to be the Self/God takes the form of a fantasy of encompassing the universe in consciousness, 
that is, in language. 
9 In the English translations, this is almost always given as “The Man of the Seas” but l’homme des eaux suggests 
more directly the elemental connection between the Captain and the water into which he has dissolved himself. 
10 The feminization of paradise may be seen in various images of luxury and the pastoral bliss of a kind of 
extended domestic life where work and warfare (the main male preserves) are eliminated.  The houris of the 
Islamic heaven, the Valkyries of Valhalla, the Virgin Mary as Queen of Heaven in Roman Catholic Christianity, 
or, in parallel, Eve and the Garden of Eden, so closely associated and placed in opposition to Adam, the first man. 
11 The Eurocentrism of the list suggests that Verne originally had in mind a European origin for Nemo; he had 
wanted to make him a Polish prince, but the onset of the Franco-Prussian War made that idea politically 
indiscreet and was vetoed by Hetzel. 
12 The cigar, I would point out, is almost as ubiquitous a sign of patriarchal, Victorian manliness as a gentleman’s 
beard.  It derives its symbolic value not just because it looks like an erect penis and contains fire, but because it 
signifies class and imperialism.  Tobacco, in any form, is an indexical sign of European colonialism and it is on 
this imaginal level, which includes the visual phallic metaphor of the cigar’s shape, that the post-prandial brandy 
and cigars in a room apart from the ladies became such a significant bourgeois male ritual.  The scene under 
discussion has the added interest in the fact that Nemo’s cigars are not tobacco, but a seaweed rich in nicotine 
farmed by his crew.  They are not the products of colonial labor (though manufacturing is conspicuously hidden).  
Rather, they are made from the body of the Great Mother Sea. 
13 See Williams Ch. 4 passim for discussion of works by Bulwer-Lytton, William Delisle Hay, Gabriel Tarde, 
and Verne. 
14 On the island theme, see particularly D. Gunstra, D. Loxley, and V. Wolf. 
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Epilogue/Epi-Logos 
_____________________ 
 
She packed my bag last night, pre-flight 
Zero-hour: nine A. M. 
And I’m gonna be high as a kite by then. 
I miss the earth so much, I miss my wife. 
It’s lonely out in space, on such a timeless flight. 
And I think it’s gonna be a long, long time 
Till touch down brings me round again to find 
I’m not the man they think I am at home. 
Ah, no, no, no!  I’m a Rocket Man. 
Rocket Man!  Burning out his fuse, up here, alone. 
Mars ain’t the kind of place to raise the kids. 
In fact, it’s cold as Hell. 
And there’s no one there to raise them, if you did. 
And all this science I don’t understand. 
It’s just my job, five days a week: 
A Rocket Man!  A Rocket Man. 
And I think it’s gonna be a long, long time 
Till touch down brings me round again to find 
I’m not the man they think I am at home. 
Ah, no, no, no!  I’m a Rocket Man. 
Rocket Man!  Burning out his fuse, up here, alone. 
And I think it’s gonna be a long, long time 
And I think it’s gonna be a long, long time 
And I think it’s gonna be a long…  long time… 
— Rocket Man by Elton John 
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(1) Some themes and images 
 Having introduced this study as an act of play rather than mastery, I am 
reluctant to draw the customary conclusions that would culminate in the closure 
of Q.E.D.  I have attempted to follow the Jungian method of perambulation, 
looking at images from several sides, seeing how they emerge in slightly 
different shades and tones in different texts.  I believe, nevertheless, that it is 
useful to say that this limited study suggests a close linkage between the 
romantic myth of Prometheus, the archetypal symbolism of fire, and technical 
mastery as a masculine ideal of power.  Many motifs and patterns make up the 
Promethean complex and the small number of works studied here have probably 
not exhausted the possible list.  I am not sure that striving for exhaustive 
description is even a desirable goal.  Nevertheless, let me review some of the 
themes and motifs that I have traced. 
Phallus/Phallos  
 The Phallus is one of the most highly charged symbols in any masculinity 
complex.  I have suggested that in addition to the Lacanian Phallus, it is useful to 
distinguish the literal erect phallus, the flaccid penis and its association with the 
testicles as containers of the seed, and, finally, the Phallos that is the association 
of the male organ with the Self, as opposed to the ego.  It is in the realms of 
“sacred” Phallos that one moves beyond the mere signification of social power or 
ego assertion into the Priapic inflation of the ego (negative Phallos), or, 
contrarily, Phallos as a positive symbol of male generativity and creativity.   
Phallus (in the Roman spelling) is the solar ideal of Law and Order, control, 
predictability, balance, and kingly rule.  Phallos (in the Greek spelling) is the 
solar ideal of spirit, and godlike creativity. 
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 Because I have placed so much emphasis on the negative side of solar 
Phallus/Phallos, it is worth emphasizing that these complexes can have their 
positive forms as well, but that these are dependent on a realistic ego-Self 
relationship, that acknowledges the limitations of ego and its source in the 
creativity of unconscious imaginal processes.  Jules Verne and Percy Shelley both 
explore the possibility of casting off domination as the central feature of 
masculinity, and emphasizing instead the generativity and embodied pleasures 
of sensitivity and empathic connection with others and with Nature. 
Chthonic phallus/penis  
 I have indicated the utility of reserving the lower-case phallus and penis 
as terms for the actual physical organs of the male genitals in erect and flaccid 
states, respectively.  The terms do not refer to any universal or essential 
experience of the male body, its reproductive organs, and its other male sex 
characteristics.  The organs are obviously experienced in very different ways.  
They may be experienced as mediating symbols of dominance and aggressive 
power, but the embodied experience may be one of weakness, vulnerability, and 
a shameful feeling of failure to be virile enough.  The term chthonic phallus 
refers to the experiences of bodies, but also to a mythological complex, a cultural 
construct which men internalize and to which they establish a highly 
individualized relationship.  The idea of the body as chthonic links body to earth, 
fertility, and images of phallic gods.  In this respect the chthonic phallus is 
inscribed within the Dionysian complex, just as the solar sublimations of phallus 
into capitalized Phallus/Phallos are inscribed within the Apollonian complex. 
 I have not said much about the humble penis because in its non-
aggressive state, the penis is elided and hidden in modern Western culture.  This 
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is not to say that it plays no imaginal role, however.  For even in the nineteenth 
century, the penis was visible as a signifier in certain venues, such as anatomical 
drawings and classical statuary.  This dimension of the symbolism of masculinity 
should be explored further in future work. 
The Great Mother 
 The Great Mother complex has been ubiquitous in my analysis of the 
technician-hero, but mostly in the shape of Mother Nature.  One of the 
dimensions of the technical masculine is its tendency to define the male ego as 
isolated and self-sufficient, even cloistered away in scientific or scholarly study.  
In Smith’s terminology, this is the technician’s Apollonian aspect as disembodied 
and transcendent mind.  Conceived in this way, the masculine ego takes the 
feminine only as a deanimated object of analysis.  This is in distinction to the 
Heraclean configuration that substitutes a collective brotherhood or corporate 
institution for the archetypal Mother.  The substitution is predicated on female 
exclusion and usually the mastery of the feminine as a despised and threatening 
enemy, not just an object of scientific control.  Control is achieved in the 
Heraclean mode by annihilation.  The Promethean Complex, I have ventured to 
suggest, is not quite Apollonian and not quite Heraclean for it conceives itself as 
alone but not disembodied.  He is Logos, but significantly chained to a mountain 
top, or flying from Olympus with the stolen fire of knowledge.  Moreover, as one 
sees in Percy Shelley’s articulation of the myth, Prometheus is intimately 
dependent upon his Asia, the feminine idealized as a mother-goddess-lover.   
 Thus, the Promethean Complex is torn between the ego-ideal of 
disembodied Logos and the sensual embodiment that is signified by Dionysus.  
This is what one sees particularly well in Captain Nemo, who displays deep 
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longing for the uterine paradise and the nurturance of the Mother’s body, as well 
as erotic attachment with other men.  He exhibits aspects of Heraclean rejection 
of the maternal in his desire to conquer soft feelings and threatening aspects of 
Nature, but more often he exhibits a longing for dissolution in the environment 
and the waters of the unconscious.  In other words, Prometheus illustrates the 
Oedipal struggle to possess and identify ego with the paternal Logos, but the 
corollary of this activity is the desire to possess the Mother.  The maternal is 
mostly projected onto Nature, but she also exists in the unconscious of the hero 
of Logos, in his repression of his own embodied nature. 
The Monstrous.   
 Related to the Terrible Mother and the body, the monstrous frequently 
takes the form of Theweleit’s bloody mass.  It is the body as rejected and 
disgusting, a thing to be feared and controlled, the demonstration of evil or sin or 
a state of “filth.”  The monstrous, delineated in this association to blood taboos is, 
in the first instance an aspect of the Mother complex and the feminine.  
Menstrual and birth taboos form part of this complex of the monstrous and the 
outcast.  In medical literature, such taboos emerge when menstruation, 
menopause, or birth are described with metaphors of “breakdown” as if they 
were inherently defects in biology, deviations from an orderly male norm (see E. 
Martin).  Associated with the feminine, the monstrous nevertheless incorporates 
the male body as well, and the Apollonian scientists horror of disorder and 
“malfunction.”  The medical conception of male bodies as normally healthy (a 
norm from which disease is a deviation) is a fantasy of order that belies the 
reality of the body and the psyche, which are normally in some process of 
“disease” or “pathology.”  James Hillman and others have written extensively on 
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this fantasy of “natural” healthiness, which I would argue is a part of the 
Apollonian fantasy of disembodied order, the reduction of individuals to 
textbook diagrams and paradigms.  To understanding “pathology” as part of 
natural processes of growth and change, wholeness must be understood to include 
“disorder.” 
The Vessel 
 In the novels of Verne one particularly sees the symbolic work of the 
vessel.  From submarines and ships to the containing shells of mollusks, vessels 
symbolize the mother’s body, the uterus, and embodiment more generally.  By 
extension, they may symbolize the domestic space of comfort and safety and 
sensual freeplay.  By inversion, the vessel may become a male domestic space 
characterized by austerity and military discipline, but also frequently by erotic 
affections between men that belie the attempt to exclude eros through the 
exclusion of women from a Heraclean brotherhood.  In Captain Nemo’s Nautilus 
one sees the play of meaning within the interior/exterior polarity as it relates to 
the genital organs.  The submarine is both phallus and uterus, both the weapon 
used to penetrate Others and the impervious shell that encloses the male ego 
inscribed within the ideology of individualism. 
The Man-machine 
 The vessel as a symbol of bodily containment and disciplined space is 
complemented by the technological vision of vessel as machine, that archetype of 
order and predictable control.  There are two ways this connection has worked in 
the texts I have analyzed here.  One is the body as machine or Anatomical Man 
one finds in Frankenstein’s monster.  The other is the machine as body that one 
finds in Captain Nemo’s relationship to his Nautilus.  The merging of men and 
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machines is a theme that is developed widely in the literature of the nineteenth 
century and itself could be studied more thoroughly.  Instances of the metaphor 
might be collected and examined for differences between the representation of 
working men as machines and the representation of engineers and scientists as 
machines.  It is in the zone of class representation and the application of the 
metaphor to both masters and their employees that the image becomes 
particularly ambiguous.  As industrialism advances and writers such as H. G. 
Wells, Aldous Huxley, and others take up the theme, it becomes harder and 
harder to tell who is master, machine or man, or if, indeed, the distinction does 
not entirely collapse.  In later science fiction and films, robots and androids carry 
the metaphor to its logical conclusions, suggesting that human beings are not 
only no better than machines but are not even as good.  The mechanical android 
ultimately follows the lead of Frankenstein’s monster and becomes the Modern 
Prometheus itself. 
Vertigo and the Plunge into the Abyss 
 The motif of vertigo and the plunge, I suggested, represent the descent 
into the unconscious, but the logical inversion of man and machine I just 
described opens up another facet of the abyss.  The undermining of the concept 
of human being or “man” parallels the undermining of epistemology which 
logocentrism ultimately produces.  Having elevated Logos to the supreme source 
of reality and truth, the nineteenth century was to find that logic itself would 
dictate an end to truth.  The increasingly strong assertion that reality lay in 
linguistic figuration and discourse would ultimately deconstruct itself, leaving 
philosophers with no ground on which to base reality.  Postmodern philosophy 
is still painted into this corner, asserting that beyond discourse there is only an 
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abyss that cannot be known.  While the logic of these propositions is hard to 
deny, they are, nevertheless, an expression of a Logos-mentality that cannot, 
ultimately, accept the body and embodied experience but must subsume them to 
language.  Even the freeplay of myth that I have termed Mythos, is ultimately 
rejected as simply illusion.  For such serious, adult minds, constructed within the 
disciplines of rationalism, play cannot be accepted as the grounds of being, much 
less embodied play, or (as Colin Falck suggests) the gestural communication of 
dance.   
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The Chora 
 I have borrowed Julia Kristeva’s notion of the maternal chora that includes 
the voice of the mother prior to the infant’s entrance into symbolic 
understanding, and also includes the non-verbal sounds and sensations of loving 
bodies merged in a pre-egoic symbiosis.  One feels it is the chora that 
Wordsworth hears in his Ode: Intimations on Immortality.  I have suggested that 
Percy Shelley wove his own strong involvement in the maternal Imaginary with 
the myth of Prometheus to hint at the origins of symbolic knowledge, the fire of 
the fathers, in this pre-Oedipal state of body-music and gesture.  Gelpi develops 
a similar argument in great detail in her book, Shelley’s Goddess.  There she 
articulates the ways idealization of mothers and maternal nurturance created, in 
the nineteenth century, a powerfully compelling but also problematic mother-
complex.  For the mystique of choric envelopment is inevitably inscribed at a 
later stage of development with the incest taboo and the emotional struggle of 
the Oedipal triangle.  It is the return to the Imaginary that underlies the Symbolic 
register of consciousness like the bass-clef in an orchestral arrangement which is 
symbolized in the motif of the dark night voyage.  
The Dark Night Voyage.    
 Whether one considers Prof. Aronnax’s fall into the night sea and his 
subsequent voyage through the deeps with Captain Nemo, or Frankenstein’s 
nightmarish flight through rainstorms from the Orkneys to Ireland, or indeed his 
flight across the Arctic, the storm and darkness symbolize a drop out of the sunlit 
world of Apollonian social order.  The hero, representing the ego, plunges across 
the bar of the unconscious into the fantastic “field of treasures,” or a sea of 
monsters.  The essence of the heroic, it would seem, is in the encounter with the 
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unconscious, and I have identified this encounter as an especially masculine 
problem.  For the encounter with the unconscious is an encounter with the body 
the technician-hero believes he can control, and the discovery that it is less like a 
machine than like an argumentative mob of personified complexes. 
 I have suggested that it is because of his unresolved anxiety over 
disconnection from the mother, the primary love object, and by association, from 
the unconscious, the vulnerable, the irrational, the tender that the boy must 
particularly confront his unconscious.  The confrontation is often violent and 
darkly sexual.  In most of the literature I have examined the sexual aspect is 
imbedded in symbolism.  Only when one arrives at a work like H. G. Wells’s 
Island of Dr. Moreau is the sexual theme unmistakable.  In works that do not 
involve particularly technical heroes, the sexual component is easier to see on the 
surface.  I am thinking of the genre of the Gothic particularly.  But one reason the 
sexual content is masked even in the dream-exploration is that it is homosexual 
in nature.  For incestuous love for the mother is not the only love repressed by 
taboo.  Far more violently still, and perhaps far more traumatic for young boys, 
is the insistence that even when they transfer their ego-ideal to the father and the 
brotherhood, they are forbidden to express this bonding in embodied eros and 
tender opening to other men. 
 Sometimes the tumble into the sea or the night voyage comes upon a man 
because he has reached middle age and lost his soul.  Sometimes it is unsought, 
the eruption of autonomous complexes that have been so forcibly repressed that 
they can no longer be contained.  To fight against this dark night confrontation, 
to refuse reconciliation with one’s demons, dooms one to a life of projection—
forever repeating the same mistake, as D. H. Lawrence put it:  the mechanical 
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and compulsive reaching out of the ego for its projections in the external world, 
chasing mirages of its own making, projected seductresses and enemies that are 
the intrusions of Anima and Shadow from within. 
Promethean Fire.   
 The imagery of fire that has run through the texts I chose for this study is 
perhaps the strongest example of the continuity of reverie and the figurations of 
science.  Fire, associated with creation, sexual heat, the mother’s warmth, the 
hearth, and the lightning blast or blaze that transforms a world, runs through the 
imagination of technology and science.  Reveries of the elements, as Bachelard 
suggests, strike a deep chord in the archaic layers of psyche and culture.  Fire 
and water particularly carry a great deal of the symbolism of the fluid and 
transformative dynamics of the mind. The fire of Prometheus particularly 
symbolizes the erotic allure of knowledge and its Oedipal dimension. 
Eros and Logos 
 The opposition of Logos and Eros lies at the center of my analysis.  The 
works I have included illustrate how the opposition itself is a product of Logos, 
not a “natural” metaphysical opposition.  The dichotomy, parallel to that of 
Mind/Body is actually the Logos-identified ego repressing Eros.  My mapping of 
desire in Chapter III is intended to show not essences, but possible poles of 
pleasure.  These may blend and combine in almost any combination but one type 
of interaction that stands out in my analysis of the technician-hero and his 
symbols is the reversal Jung called enantiodromia.  By this reversal, the 
repression of Eros can produce an influx of Thanatic symbols and urges in the 
psyche, as Freud’s opposition of Eros and Thanatos suggested.  Similarly, a 
destructive excess of the pole I have called Limitation inhibits erotic connection 
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by erecting barriers and generating fear.  At the same time, one might also say 
that Phobos generates the Limiting Action, usually in a negative form.   
 What emerges in the representation of the Promethean technician is a loss 
of Eros similar to the loss described by Susan Griffin in Pornography and Silence.  
The technician mentality shares the same structure as the pornographic mentality 
because both are based in the denigration of the body and the objectification of 
the Other.  Pornography, as Smith’s delineation of his four complexes indicates, 
is the Shadow-fantasy underlying patriarchal science and engineering.  This is 
not to say that scientific practice must possess these characteristics, only that it 
has historically.  The emphasis in the works I have included on the loss of Eros, 
should be tested across a wider range of texts and the nuances of the problem 
articulated further.  Moreover, further research is needed to compare more non-
fictional texts with literature.  Scientific articles, popularizations, journalistic 
biographies and book-length biographies and autobiographies ought to be 
included in such analysis to trace the relationships between what one sees in 
fiction and what actual scientists, medical doctors, and engineers experienced.  
Finally, as a complement to the argument that scientific discourses share 
pornography’s objectifying gesture and aggression against bodies, one should 
examine visual representations of men of science to see how they appear 
iconographically. 
(2) Technical Fetishism 
 Rejection of eros by men is the rejection of themselves as embodied, 
sensual, vulnerable, and loving beings.  To reject tenderness is a defense of an 
ego that must be seen as invulnerable to survive.  The “survival instinct” is 
certainly a feature of the ego but its instinct is not for the survival of the whole 
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organism, much less the species.  Rather it is a psychic disposition to 
preservation of the complex as it has been constructed, a need to believe the 
myth at all costs to avoid psychic destruction and pain.  In a sense, the ego I have 
been describing in this study is a complex that has achieved too great a level of 
autonomy.  The problem, put otherwise, is not that unconscious complexes such 
as the mother or the father complex have grown too autonomous, but rather that 
their hyper-autonomous behavior is in direct proportion to that of the ego 
complex when it defines itself oppositionally against the unconscious, against the 
Other.   
 I wish to suggest that the masculine ego in its bourgeois Western 
delineation is constructed to deny its own construction.  It is constructed to 
believe it is utterly motivated by reason, that is by its own consciousness.  This 
tautological motivation ignores the unconscious, it ignores emotions, and it 
ignores the validity of needs that may arise from deeply repressed images and 
connections that have been produced by childhood traumas.  Clearly this is an 
important condition to face in an age when it is increasingly called to our 
attention that violent behavior is a result of being treated violently in childhood.   
 With ego inflated out of all contact with the Self, the technician must 
become his own God, creating himself as well as those he dominates.  This is 
wrong because the ego has, in a sense, usurped the god-image, creating a 
delusion of grandeur that destroys its ability to relate to others as equal subjects 
rather than inferior objects.  Cut off from its unconscious, the ego inevitably 
grows subject to delusions from the Imaginary.  Narcissism, paranoia, and 
schizophrenia come to characterize the Man of Reason along with the fetishizing 
of machines and abstract systems. 
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 The Gulf War is our most recent example of fetishized technology and the 
divorce of the instrumental, rational mentality from feeling.  Fetishes prevent one 
seeing that one is being lied to, diverted from meaningful engagement in 
political affairs.  Indeed, they prevent one seeing that one is killing other people 
or ignoring their suffering.  The mentality of violent intervention to assert one’s 
“interests” stems from the Heraclean brotherhood.  Safely merged in the uterine 
bliss of the collective, its instrumental disciplines and rationalizations, the soldier 
or the scientist, the middle manager or the banker can ignore his implication in 
the structures of institutional violence.  This war, alongside the many other 
military adventures of the past and present,  the development of weapons of 
mass destruction and economies that fail to truly value human life at its simplest 
level—all these are collective failures of Eros that ultimately depend on the 
pornographic mentality.  It is instructive that without seeming to notice the 
collective atrocities perpetrated in the name of free-market capital, substantial 
elements of the population can clamor against pornographic magazines and TV 
violence.  It is also interesting that such clamor recognizes the fact that 
individuals in Western culture have become inured to violence and killing.  It is 
far more important to the ego to identify with the strong, dominant “super 
power” that is our state, than to be connected to actual people either in our own 
cities or abroad who are being exploited and murdered for the profits of techno-
corporations. 
 To simply condemn technology and the professional scientist is not a 
realistic political solution to the problem I am talking about.  The answer to 
phallus-vehicle confusion is not to get rid of cars and rockets, but to stop 
fetishizing them, to disengage our ego-ideal and our self-conception from these 
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machines and to recognize that relationships to other human beings, to family 
and friends are more important than the much safer and easier engagement with 
a fetish.  The modern man who loves football or a car more than his wife or 
children and the kind of dysfunctional communities that are observable 
everywhere trace their lineage back to Victor Frankenstein and the eighteenth-
century fantasy of the man-machine.   
 Langdon Winner, in his book The Whale and the Reactor, writes of “Techne 
and Politeia” suggesting that modern technology from Verne’s time to today has 
replaced democratic political structures with authoritarian, hierarchical ones.  
Linked as it has been in Euro-American culture with capitalism, technology has 
shaped our social lives and the kinds of relationships that are possible.  
Relationship and the distribution of power in the workplace is far more 
important and certainly takes up far more individual energy from day to day, 
than democratic politics or participation in government.  But the workplace is 
usually characterized, now even more than it was in the nineteenth century, by 
“rule-guided patterns that involve taking orders and giving orders along an 
elaborate chain of command,”  that is, in short, a disguised authoritarianism and 
centralization of control (Winner 48).  Such was the shadow that haunted 
Captain Nemo’s desire for a free and egalitarian brotherhood.   
 In the end, I think it is paramount to shake our masculine ideals free from 
such grandiose models as Prometheus and Jupiter.  These are dreams of 
omnipotence that psychoanalysis has just within the last two generations really 
permitted us to lay out on the table and consider.  They are our cultural 
Frankenstein’s monsters, and we must do what Victor Frankenstein did not:  we 
must talk to each other about them before we apply the spark—indeed before we 
414 
even start robbing the charnel houses.  Too much of the erotic involvement of 
men with explosives, engines, noise, smoke, and speed comes back to 
Promethean fire and the longing for the power of an idealized father.  The only 
cure for this destructive and deluded grandiosity may be to become more tender, 
gentle, and attentive fathers.  The only way for sons to avoid becoming fortress 
mentalities consumed with the ego-ideals of the Periclean, Apollonian, and 
Heraclean complexes is for fathers to nurture them from birth along with their 
mothers and to offer them open, emotionally intimate empathy as they mature. 
 This is a tall order—enough perhaps to drive the literary critic back into 
the shelter of professional concerns.  What does this all say about the literature?  I 
maintain that the analysis of literature needs to do more than merely enrich our 
experience of novels and poems.  It needs to enrich our lives.   Reading novels 
and poems (and, of course, writing them) is a way to safely observe our inner 
demons and recognize them as part of oneself.  The very fictional quality of 
Captain Nemo or his giant squids, for example, can draw one’s attention to one’s 
inner mythos.  But it is for the initiated to lead, for the adult who has learned the 
play of complexes to awaken his or her children to their opportunities.  Parents 
and children together must fashion themselves and shape their own lifelong 
mythic quest toward individuation and the balanced understanding of Eros and 
Logos and the joy of inward and outward listening. 
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